Sunday, June 21, 2015

Valid warrantless arrest




"x x x.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his  arrest.  There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:[28]
"Sec. 5.  Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a)  When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)  When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c)  When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.[29] Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner.  It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene."[30] As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver.  After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.[31]
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run.[32] We beg to disagree.  That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life.  Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens.  It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action.[33] The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit,[34] a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident.[35] The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulablesuspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.[36] Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.[37]
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense.  There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension.  Moreover, after having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner,[38] its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof.[39] These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.[40]
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.[41] Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest.[42] Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.[43]
x x x."

[G.R. No. 121917.  March 12, 1997] - OBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.