G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014, CECILIA PAGADUAN, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION* AND REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, RESPONDENTS.
“X x x.
As early as 1961, in the case of De
Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces,18 the
Court disbarred a lawyer on the ground of conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, after having found that the said lawyer was convicted of the crime
of falsification of public documents. Similarly, in In Re – Attorney
Jose Avanceña,19 the
said lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law due to a conviction by final
judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude after being convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents. Lastly, in RE: SC Decision
dated May 20, 2008 in GR. No. 161455 under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court v.
Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin,20 the
Court reiterated that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary
to justice, honesty and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.21
Following the Court’s disposition in the aforecited
cases, the CSC and the CA therefore erred in reaching a conclusion to the
contrary, especially that Salvador’s conviction for such crime already attained
finality. Both tribunals were of the view that Salvador merely committed a mere
error of judgment and, thus, no moral turpitude was involved. Their position
was based on the finding previously made by the CSC-RO II in the first
administrative complaint. That could not a valid basis because, as earlier
pointed out, the second case was separate and distinct from the first one.
Although the CSC itself recognized that it was for the
Court to determine what crime involved moral turpitude, it ruled that
Salvador’s commission of the crime of falsification of public document did not
involve moral turpitude. Both the CSC and the CA strayed away from the settled
jurisprudence on the matter. It will be absurd to insist that Salvador
committed a mere error of judgment when the very basis of the second
administrative charge against her was a final judgment of conviction where the
trial court found otherwise.
Considering that the principal act punished in the
crime of falsification of public document is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, the
elements of the administrative offense of conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude clearly exist in this case. The Court does not have to look beyond
what is simply apparent from the surrounding circumstances.
X x x.”
