G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014, CECILIA PAGADUAN, PETITIONER, VS. CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION* AND REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, RESPONDENTS.
SERVICE COMMISSION* AND REMA MARTIN SALVADOR, RESPONDENTS.
“X x x.
Now on the substantial issue, Pagaduan avers that Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude – a sufficient ground for dismissal from government service. On the other hand, Salvador
argues that the falsification she committed did not involve moral turpitude. In resolving the issue of whether Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the existence of only two elements is necessary: (1) the conviction of a crime, which conviction has attained finality; and (2) the crime for which the accused was convicted involves moral turpitude. There is no dispute as to the first element, leaving Us to determine the presence of the other.
argues that the falsification she committed did not involve moral turpitude. In resolving the issue of whether Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, the existence of only two elements is necessary: (1) the conviction of a crime, which conviction has attained finality; and (2) the crime for which the accused was convicted involves moral turpitude. There is no dispute as to the first element, leaving Us to determine the presence of the other.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general,7 contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.8 Not
every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.”9
fellowmen, or to society in general,7 contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.8 Not
every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that the Court has to determine as to what crime involves moral turpitude.”9
Salvador was convicted of falsification of public document. The MTCC found that she made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts and perverted the truth with a wrongful intent.10 While
Salvador invoked good faith as a defense, the MTCC was not convinced, stating that good faith could not be made to depend solely on the self-serving statement of the accused. It must be supported by other independent evidence.11 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show the presence of good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated:
Salvador invoked good faith as a defense, the MTCC was not convinced, stating that good faith could not be made to depend solely on the self-serving statement of the accused. It must be supported by other independent evidence.11 To the MTCC, Salvador miserably failed to clearly show the presence of good faith. More specifically, the trial court stated:
She alleged that she honestly believed she was employed with VWI because Alfonso Tuzon is the operations manager of VWT.
Second, she was responsible in the preparation of the payroll sheets of VWI.
Second, she was responsible in the preparation of the payroll sheets of VWI.
However, the following circumstances negate the existence of good faith:
Accused was not included in the list of employees of VWI as shown in Exhibits “G”, “G-i”, “G-2″, “G-3″, and “G-4,” “J” and its sub-markings and “K” and its sub-markings;
Accused was not in the payroll of VWI as shown in Exhibit “L”;
Accused received her salary from Rodolfo Quiambao and not from VWI;
Rodolfo Quiambao, who is not a VWI employee, issued directives to the accused;
Accused never went to the VWI office at Magapit, Lallo, Cagayan;
Accused never had any VWI identification card;
Accused had no contract of employment with VWI; and finally,
Rodolfo Quiambao worked personally with Alfonso Tuzon and not with VWI.
These circumstances were known to the accused. Despite knowledge of these facts, accused stated in her PDS that she was employed with VWI, thus, she perverted the truth. Said act constitutes malice on her part negating her claim of good faith.‘12 [Emphasis supplied]
Granting arguendo that Salvador had no criminal intent to injure a third person, the same is immaterial as such intent is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.13
X x x.”
