[G.R. No. 140777. April 8, 2005]
ANTONIO ABACAN, JR., RUFO C. VENUS, JR., ENRIQUETO I.
MAGPANTAY and MARIETA Y. PALANCA, petitioners, vs. NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY, INC., respondent.
“x x x.
Third issue. Whether the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 11296-14 must be held in abeyance pending resolution of SEC Case No.
12-96-5469. We rule in the affirmative.
Petitioners argue that SEC Case No. 12-96-5469, which is an
action to nullify the election of the directors of NUI belonging to the “Castro
faction,” is a necessary and logical antecedent of the issue of whether the
withdrawal of P1.4 M orP1.6 M, as the case may be, as well as the
institution of this suit for the recovery thereof was authorized by the NUI.
Technically, there would be no prejudicial question to speak
of in this case, if we are to consider the general rule that a prejudicial
question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever
the issue in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris
et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.[34] However,
considering the rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question, being
to avoid two conflicting decisions,[35] prudence
dictates that we apply the principle underlying the doctrine to the case at
bar.
A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.[36] The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve it must be lodged in another court or tribunal.[37]
In the present case, the question of which between the
Castro and the Nicolas factions are the de jure board of
directors of NUI is lodged before the SEC. The complaint before the RTC
of Laoag meanwhile alleges that petitioners, together with their co-defendants,
comprised of the “Castro faction,” wrongfully withdrew the amount of P1.4
M from the account of NUI with Metrobank. Moreover, whether or not Roy
Nicolas of the “Nicolas faction” is a duly elected member of the Board of NUI
and thus with capacity to institute the herein complaint in behalf of the NUI depends
on the findings of the SEC in the case pending before it. It would
finally determine whether Castro, et al. legally withdrew the subject amount
from the bank and whether Nicolas lawfully initiated the complaint in behalf of
herein respondent NUI. It is petitioners’ claim, and we agree, that the
presence or absence of their liability for allowing the withdrawal of P1.4
M from the account of NUI with Metrobank in favor of the “Castro faction” is
reliant on the findings of the SEC as to which of the two factions is the de
jure board. Since the determination of the SEC as to which of
the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is
crucial to the resolution of the case before the RTC, we find that the trial
court should suspend its proceedings until the SEC comes out with its findings.
We apply by analogy our pronouncement in Quiambao
vs. Osorio,[38] to
wit:
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent
course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings
in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case.
Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To
allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of
petitioner’s right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative
case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to
expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in
futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise
of a sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold
the action in abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another
court, especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its
dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for
litigants. Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled
the second action should be stayed.
While this rule is properly applicable to instances
involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the instant case of the same
considerations of identities of parties and issues, economy of time and effort
for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the
parties’ right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly
determined, justifies the rule’s analogous application to the case at bar.[39]
X x x.”
