"x x x .
The present petition is ripe for
judicial review.
At the outset, the respondent is questioning the propriety of the exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review over the instant case. He argues that the petition is premature since there is yet any actual controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. He points out the lack of allegation in the petition that the assailed issuances had been fully implemented and that the petitioners had already exhausted administrative remedies under Section 25 of the Revised Administrative Code before filing the same in court.22
It is well-settled that the Court’s exercise of the power of judicial review requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.23
The respondent claims that there is yet any actual case or controversy that calls for the exercise of judicial review. He contends that the mere expectation of an administrative sanction does not give rise to a justiciable controversy especially, in this case, that the petitioners have yet to exhaust administrative remedies available.24
The Court disagrees.
In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,25 the Court characterized an actual case or controversy, viz:
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.26 (Citations omitted)
The existence of an actual controversy in the instant case cannot be overemphasized. At the time of filing of the instant petition, the respondent had already implemented the assailed memorandum circulars. In fact, on May 26, 2011, Villafuerte received Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2011-009 dated May 10, 201127 from the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur, requiring him to comment on the observation of the audit team, which states:
The Province failed to post the transactions and documents required under Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83, thereby violating the mandate of full disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offering.
x x x x
The local officials concerned are reminded of the sanctions mentioned in the circular which is quoted hereunder, thus:
“Noncompliance with the foregoing shall be dealt with in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. In particular, attention is invited to the provision of Local Government Code of 1991, quoted as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrarySection 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions – An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office on: (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence or dereliction of duty.”28
The issuance of AOM No. 2011-009 to Villafuerte is a clear indication that the assailed issuances of the respondent are already in the full course of implementation. The audit memorandum specifically mentioned of Villafuerte’s alleged non-compliance with MC No. 2010-83 regarding the posting requirements stated in the circular and reiterated the sanctions that may be imposed for the omission. The fact that Villafuerte is being required to comment on the contents of AOM No. 2011-009 signifies that the process of investigation for his alleged violation has already begun. Ultimately, the investigation is expected to end in a resolution on whether a violation has indeed been committed, together with the appropriate sanctions that come with it. Clearly, Villafuerte’s apprehension is real and well-founded as he stands to be sanctioned for non-compliance with the issuances.
There is likewise no merit in the respondent’s claim that the petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies warrants the dismissal of the petition. It bears emphasizing that the assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the rule-making or quasi-legislative power of the DILG. This pertains to “the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute.”29 Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.30 In challenging the validity of an administrative issuance carried out pursuant to the agency’s rule-making power, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not stand as a bar in promptly resorting to the filing of a case in court. This was made clear by the Court in Smart Communications, Inc. (SMART) v. National Telecommunications Commission (NTC),31 where it was ruled, thus:
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. x x x.32
Considering the foregoing clarification, there is thus no bar for the Court to resolve the substantive issues raised in the petition.
x x x."
