“X x x.
A. APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE
78. Cited hereunder are the decided cases applicable
to support the defenses of
the respondents.
E.1. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND
THE PURPOSE OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
79.INNOCENCE is presumed in our Constitution and the Rules of Evidence,
unless the contrary is clearly, positively and convincingly proved by the
complainant. In case of doubt, INNOCENCE being presumed by our Constitution,
the Rules of Evidence, and existing criminal laws, the scale of justice thus
tilts in favor of the ACCUSED. This is the EQUIPOISE RULE in the Rules of
Evidence.
80.The respondents respectfully INVOKE
the presumption of their INNOCENCE.
Complainant
ought
to traverse the said presumption with
convincing
contrary evidence.
81. The instant case ought to be DISMISSED
in order to shield the respondents from precipitate, spiteful and burdensome
prosecution and to spare them from unnecessary and undeserved trouble, expense,
and torment of a public trial.
E.1.1. SUPPORTING JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
PURPOSE AND SPIRIT OF
PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION
82.In the case of JOSE BERNARDO vs.
RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, G.R. No. L-37876, May
25, 1979, it was held that although “prosecutors are endowed with
ample powers in order that they may properly fulfill their assigned role in the
administration of justice x x x, (it) should be realized, however, that when a
man is haled to court on a criminal charge, it brings in its wake problems not
only for the accused but for his family as well” and that “therefore, it
behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence carefully and to deliberate thereon
to determine the existence of a prima facie case before filing the information
in court”, otherwise, it, held that, it “would be a dereliction of duty”.
83.In the case of “SUSANA B. CABAHUG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, SANDIGANBAYAN, 3rd Division, and OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents”, G.R. No. 132816. February 5, 2002, the Supreme Court ”(admonished) agencies
tasked with the preliminary investigation and prosecution of crimes that the
very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from
precipitate, spiteful and burdensome prosecution”. It added that such
investigating agencies were “duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely necessary,
open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent the trouble,
expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary expense
on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials”. It held that “when
at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima
facie case or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution
must desist from inflicting on any person the trauma of going through a trial”.
Thus:
“x x x.
We cannot
overemphasize the admonition to agencies tasked with the preliminary
investigation and prosecution of crimes that the very purpose of a preliminary
investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and
burdensome prosecution. They are duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely
necessary, open and public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent
the trouble, expense and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent
unnecessary expense on the part of the State for useless and expensive trials.
Thus, when at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or that
the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of
the accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting
on any person the trauma of going through a trial.
X x x”.
84.In the case of BERNARDO vs. MENDOZA, G.R. No. L-37876,
May 25, 1979, it was held that
“(although) prosecutors are endowed with ample powers in order that they may
properly fulfill their assigned role in the administration of justice, it
should be realized, however, that when a man is haled to court on a criminal
charge, it brings in its wake problems not only for the accused but for his
family as well”; and that “it behooves a prosecutor to weigh the evidence
carefully and to deliberate thereon to determine the existence of a prima facie
case before filing the information in court”; and that “anything less would be
a dereliction of duty”.
E.2. PRESUMPTION
OF GOOD FAITH
91. In the
absence of convincing contrary
evidence, the
respondents are presumed to have acted in GOOD FAITH. The respondents hereby state that they performed
community service, with the authority of Xxx Homeowners, according to the
authority given, in all HONESTY and GOOD
FAITH.
E.2.1. APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE
ON THE PRESUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH
92. In the
case of Cabahug v. People, GR No. 132816,
February 5, 2002, it was
held that “good faith is always
presumed”; that “the very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to
shield the innocent from precipitate, spiteful and burdensome prosecution”;
that “they are duty-bound to avoid, unless absolutely necessary, open and
public accusation of crime not only to spare the innocent the trouble, expense
and torment of a public trial, but also to prevent unnecessary expense on the
part of the State for useless and expensive trials”; that “when, at the outset
the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie case or that the existence of
probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused
cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any
person the trauma of going through a trial”. Thus:
“X x x.
Contrary to
the Ombudsman’s ruling that bad faith on the part of petitioner was deducible, good faith is always presumed.
Therefore, he who charges another with bad faith must prove it. In other words,
the Office of the Ombudsman should determine with certainty the facts
indicative of bad faith. However, the records show that the Office of the
Ombudsman was clearly uncertain of its position on the matter of existence of
bad faith on the part of petitioner Cabahug. X x x.
X x x.
Clearly,
any further prosecution of petitioner is pure and simple harassment. It is
imperative that she be spared from the trauma of having to go to trial on such
a baseless complaint. The evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie
case and it is evident that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient
belief as to the petitioner’s guilt.
X x x.
Judicial power of review includes the determination of whether there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government. Under this definition, the
Sandiganbayan should have, considering the divergent positions in the Office of
the Ombudsman, granted the motion for redetermination of probable cause after
reviewing the evidence thus far submitted, and dismissed the case against
petitioner. Thus, respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the case to proceed.
X x x.
93.
In the case of FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ, et. al.
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al., G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999, it was held “the rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good
faith. (Mendiola v. People, G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6
March 1992, 207 SCRA 85, 96)”. It added that in Cabungcal v. Cordova, No.
L-16934, 31 July, 1964, 11 SCRA 584, the Supreme Court “affirmed the doctrine that an erroneous
interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of an ordinance by a city mayor
does not amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to damages
against that official”. It “reiterated
the principle in Mabutol v. Pascual, G.R.
No. 60898, 29 September 1983, 124 SCRA 867, which held that public
officials may not be liable for damages in the discharge of their official functions
absent any bad faith”. It stressed that “Sanders v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 60898, 29 September 1983, 124 SCRA
867, expanded the concept by declaring that under the law on public
officers, acts done in the performance of official duty are protected by the presumption of good faith”.
94.
In the landmark
case of LUIS A. TABUENA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, EN BANC, G.R. No.
103501-03, February 17, 1997; and accompanying case: ADOLFO M. PERALTA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 103507, February 17, 1997, the Supreme Court held that
“good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer
from the crime of malversation”; “not every unauthorized payment of public
funds is malversation”; It held: “x x x. Where
the payment of public funds has been made in good faith, and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to whom the fund had been
paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to have acted in good faith, there is
no criminal intent, and the payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized,
renders him only civilly but not criminally liable.”
E.4.1. APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON
REQUIREMENT OF DECEIPT AND DAMAGE
IN THE CRIME OF ESTAFA
95.
The felony of Estafa was clarified by the Supreme
Court in the case of PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CORA ABELLA OJEDA, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 2004, where it held that DECEIT AND
DAMAGE were indispensable elements of the said crime. It held that “the
prosecution failed to prove deceit in this case. The prima facie presumption of deceit
was successfully rebutted by appellant’s evidence of GOOD FAITH, a defense in estafa
x x x.” It added that “our
Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil
intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is
the existence of malicious intent”. There
is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the
“criminal mind” behind the “criminal act,”
it. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most
cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent, it stressed. The rule is: Actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. That
is, “no crime is committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of is innocent”. (citing Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]). “Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with
an unlawful act for there to be a crime.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind
is wanting,” the Supreme Court said in the previously mentioned case. Citing
American jurisprudence, the Court held that “criminal intent in embezzlement is
not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect of a transaction
honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the
person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose”. In fine,
the Court said, the accused may thus prove “that he acted in good faith and
that he had no intention to convert the money or goods for his personal
benefit”.
X x x.”
LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER
& ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES
Counsel
for the Respondents
Unit
15, Star Arcade, C. V. Starr Avenue
Philamlife
Village, Las Pinas City
Tel.
Nos. 872-5443; 846-2539
Fax
No. 846-2539
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