"x x x.
We find the petition meritorious.
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant. – A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
SECTION 3. Motion and proceedings thereon.– The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions or admissions at least three (3) days before the hearing. After the hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to anymaterial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless delays where the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried.[24]A “genuine issue” is such issue of fact which require the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.[25]There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in dispute.[26] A party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.[27]
Contrary to the findings of the trial court and CA, the Answer filed by petitioners contained a specific denial of absolute liability for the amount being claimed as actual expenses for repairs/renovations works done on repondent’s building after the execution of the Contract of Lease.
5. SPECIFICALLY DENY the allegation in paragraph 4 of the complaint that MARINA requested for alterations/renovations in accordance with the plans prepared by MARINA on the MARC building for the account of and at the expense of MARINA, the truth being those stated in the Special and Affirmative Defenses hereof. They likewise SPECIFICALLY DENY the rest of the allegations therein that said request alterations/renovations started on December 5, 2001 and was done by the lowest bidders, JTV Construction Group, Inc., for civil works/renovations and NCC Communication Networks, for wiring and cable installation, for whcih plaintiff allegedly advanced/paid the sum of P1,555,170.40 for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
x x x x
13. As an act of good faith, Atty. Sevilla, in behalf of MARINA, has offered to shoulder and pay the actual expenses incurred for the works done on the premises based on MARINA’s request. Moreover, defendants cannot allow plaintiff to collect from them the additional sum of P2,527,215.48 which is equivalent to two (2) months rental as penalty simply because there is no justification therefor.
Furthermore, petitioners averred in their Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff:
With regard to the claim for reimbursement, plaintiff has yet to conclusively prove that the alterations/renovations it claims to have been made in its building were actually made and that the same were actuallyin accordance with the alleged request made by MARINA.
The reply-letter dated January 23, 2002 of defendant Sevilla in response to the letters of Ericson Marquez dated December 17, 2001 and January 18, 2002, demanding reimbursements of the alterations/renovation allegedly made upon its building, shows that it merely required Marquez to show proof or receipt of the expenses plaintiff alleges it had incurred.
Likewise, the letter of defendant Sevilla dated July 1, 2002, this time in response to a similar demand letter made by plaintiff’s counsel, Atty. Antonio Atienza, simply stated that defendants have committed themselves to pay the actual expenses incurred by plaintiff as based on MARINA’s request. The same offer was reiterated by defendants in paragraph 13 of their answer to plaintiff’s complaint. It must be noted, however, that said offer specifically pertains only to alterations/renovations which were actually made on plaintiff’s properties in accordance with MARINA’s request.
Verily, defendants have yet to actually acquiesce to the veracity of the accomplishment reports, receipt, etc. submitted by plaintiff since the same are still subject to verification which can only be achieved through a full-blown trial.[29] (Emphasis and underscoring in the original.)
As can be gleaned, the fact that Administrator Sevilla sent respondent letters wherein MARINA offered to shoulder actual expenses for works done on the premises based on MARINA’s request does not necessarily mean that petitioners had waived their right to question the amountbeing claimed by the respondent.[30]Since the factual basis of the claim for reimbursement was not admitted by the petitioners, it is clear that the resolution of the question of actual works done based on MARINA’s request, as well as the correctness of the amount actually spent by respondent for the purpose, required a trial for the presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence to support such claim. The trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment for the respondent. The averments in the answer and opposition clearly pose factual issues and hence rendition of summary judgment would be improper.
It must be stressed that trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.[31]As already stated, the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact rests upon the movant, in this case the respondent, and not upon petitioners who opposed the motion for summary judgment. Any doubt as to the propriety of the rendition of a summary judgment must thus be resolved against the respondent. But here, the partial summary judgment was premised merely on the trial court’s hasty conclusion that respondent is entitled to the reimbursement sought simply because petitioners failed to point out what particular works were not done or implemented not in accordance with MARINA’s specifications after demands were made by respondent and the filing of the complaint in court. Precisely, a trial is conducted after the issues have been joined to enable herein respondent to prove, first, that repair/renovation works were actually done and such were in accordance with MARINA’s request, and second, that it actually advanced the cost thereof by paying the contractors; and more importantly, to provide opportunity for the petitioners to scrutinize respondent’s evidence, cross-examine its witnesses and present rebuttal evidence. Moreover, the trial court should have been more circumspect in ruling on the motion for summary judgment, taking into account petitioners’ concern for judicious expenditure of public funds in settling its liabilities to respondent.
The partial summary judgment rendered under the trial court’s Order dated March 5, 2003 being a nullity, the case should be remanded to saidcourt for the conduct of trial on the issue of the reimbursement of expenses for repair/renovation works being claimed by the respondent. For this purpose, petitioners shall be afforded fair opportunity to scrutinize the respondent’s evidence, cross-examine its witnesses and present controverting evidence. It is to be noted that the partial summary judgment was rendered before petitioners were declared non-suited. Petitioners had promptly challenged the validity of the default order and even sought an injunction against the ex-partepresentation of evidence by the respondent; however, the CA did not act on the matter until the rendition of the trial court’s December 1, 2003 Decision. Substantial justice in this instance can best be served if a full opportunity is given to both parties to litigate their dispute and submit the merits of their respective positions.[32]
x x x."
