"x x x.
Constitutional Law
Bill of Rights; right to speedy trial versus right to speedy disposition of cases. The right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies. In this case, the appropriate right involved is the right to a speedy disposition of cases, the recovery of ill-gotten wealth being a civil suit. An examination of the petitioners’ arguments and the cited indicia of delay would reveal the absence of any allegation that petitioners moved before the Sandiganbayan for the dismissal of the case on account of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays that attended the proceedings. Petitioners are deemed to have waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case. Moreover, delays, if any, prejudiced the Republic as well. What is more, the alleged breach of the right in question was not raised below. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Constitutionality of PD 755, 961, 1468. This case cannot be resolved without going into the constitutionality of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in particular. For petitioners predicate their claim over the sequestered shares and necessarily their cause on laws and martial law issuances assailed by the respondent on constitutional grounds. This case is for the recovery of shares grounded on the invalidity of certain enactments, which in turn is rooted in the shares being public in character, purchased as they were by funds raised by the taxing and/or a mix of taxing and police powers of the state. As may be recalled, P.D. No. 755, under the policy-declaring provision, authorized the distribution of UCPB shares of stock free to coconut farmers. On the other hand, Section 2 of P.D. No. 755 authorized the PCA to utilize portions of the CCSF to pay the financial commitment of the farmers to acquire UCPB and to deposit portions of the CCSF levies with UCPB interest free. The CCSF, CIDF and like levies that Philippine Coconut Authority is authorized to collect shall be considered as non-special or fiduciary funds to be transferred to the general fund of the Government, meaning they shall be deemed private funds.
In other words, the relevant provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, as well as those of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468, could have been the only plausible means by which close to a purported million and a half coconut farmers could have acquired the said shares of stock. It has, therefore, become necessary to determine the validity of the authorizing law, which made the stock transfer and acquisitions possible.
It is of crucial importance to determine the validity of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 in light of the constitutional proscription against the use of special funds save for the purpose it was established. Otherwise, petitioners’ claim of legitimate private ownership over UCPB shares and indirectly over SMC shares held by UCPB’s subsidiaries will have no leg to stand on, P.D. No. 755 being the only law authorizing the distribution of the SMC and UCPB shares of stock to coconut farmers, and with the aforementioned provisions actually stating and holding that the coco levy fund shall not be considered as a special – not even general – fund, but shall be owned by the farmers in their private capacities.
A. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose. Consequently, they cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free to private individuals.
Taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. In this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. To hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
The Court rejected the idea of what appears to be an indirect – if not exactly direct – conversion of special funds into private funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase shares of stocks, which in turn would be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if these private individuals belong to, or are a part of the coconut industry, the free distribution of shares of stocks purchased with special public funds to them, nevertheless cannot be justified. The fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from persons or entities in the coconut industry, among others, does not and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject funds – or more bluntly, owners thereof in their private capacity. The said private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said special funds of the government.
B. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance thereof should revert to the general fund. Consequently, their subsequent reclassification as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the 1987 Constitution, restating a general principle on taxation, enjoins the disbursement of a special fund in accordance with the special purpose for which it was collected, the balance, if there be any, after the purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming, to be transferred to the general funds of the government,
As couched, P.D. No. 276 created and exacted the CCSF “to advance the government’s avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry.” The CCSF was originally set up as a special fund to support consumer purchases of coconut products. The protection of the entire coconut industry and the consuming public provides the rationale for the creation of the coconut levy fund. P.D. No. 276 intended the fund created and set up therein not especially for the coconut farmers but for the entire coconut industry, albeit the improvement of the industry would doubtless redound to the benefit of the farmers. Upon the foregoing perspective, the following provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 insofar as they declared, as the case may be, that: “[the coconut levy] fund and the disbursements thereof [shall be] authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers and shall be owned by them in their private capacities;” or the coconut levy fund shall not be construed by any law to be a special and/or fiduciary fund, and do not therefore form part of the general fund of the national government later on; or the UCPB shares acquired using the coconut levy fund shall be distributed to the coconut farmers for free, violated the special public purpose for which the CCSF was established.
Not only were the challenged presidential issuances unconstitutional for decreeing the distribution of the shares of stock for free to the coconut farmers and, therefore, negating the public purpose declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut industry. They likewise reclassified, nay treated, the coconut levy fund as private fund to be disbursed and/or invested for the benefit of private individuals in their private capacities, contrary to the original purpose for which the fund was created. To compound the situation, the offending provisions effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the cavil of public funds which normally can be paid out only pursuant to an appropriation made by law. The conversion of public funds into private assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these provisions. Clearly therefore, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund – a special fund of the government – to the coconut farmers, is therefore void.
C. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of legislative power.
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for the acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares a farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement of the national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to “accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development.” The said law gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted them exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose. Conversely, the private individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any other mode from the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any guideline, standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to distribute to coconut farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full disposition of such shares to private individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or restrictions that would advance the law’s national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of legislative power.
D. Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468 violate Article IX (D) (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 961 takes away the coconut levy funds from the coffer of the public funds. It privatized revenues derived from the coco levy. The same provision is carried over in Article III, Section 5 of P.D. No. 1468. These provisions violate Article IX (D), Section 2(1) of the Constitution, which states in pertinent part that the Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities.
The Constitution, by express provision, vests the COA with the responsibility for state audit. As an independent supreme state auditor, its audit jurisdiction cannot be undermined by any law. Indeed, under Article IX (D), Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, “[n]o law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.” Following the mandate of the COA and the parameters set forth by the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it has jurisdiction over the coconut levy funds, being special public funds. Conversely, the COA has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the coconut levy funds and, consequently, to the UCPB shares purchased using the said funds. However, declaring the said funds as partaking the nature of private funds, ergo subject to private appropriation, removes them from the coffer of the public funds of the government, and consequently renders them impervious to the COA audit jurisdiction. Clearly, the pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 divest the COA of its constitutionally-mandated function and undermine its constitutional independence.
The assailed purchase of UCPB shares of stocks using the coconut levy funds is an example of an investment of public funds. The conversion of these special public funds into private funds by allowing private individuals to own them in their private capacities is something else. It effectively deprives the COA of its constitutionally-invested power to audit and settle such accounts. The conversion of the said shares purchased using special public funds into pure and exclusive private ownership has taken, or will completely take away the said funds from the boundaries with which the COA has jurisdiction. Obviously, the COA is without audit jurisdiction over the receipt or disbursement of private property. Accordingly, Article III, Section 5 of both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 must be struck down for being unconstitutional.Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Decisions; statement of fact and law. Complainant alleges that respondent members of the CA’s Sixth Division violated Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically stating the facts and the law on which the denial of the petition for review was based. He insists that the decision promulgated by the CA’s Sixth Division had no legal foundation and did not even address the five issues presented in the petition for review. Section 14 provides that “[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without starting the legal basis therefor.” The Court held that the complaint was unfounded. The essential purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under the law as applied to the facts as proved; the provision nowhere demands that a point-by-point consideration and resolution of the issues raised by the parties are necessary. Re: Verified complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO etc. against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., et al., A.M. No. 11-184-CA-J, January 31, 2012.
Due process; right to be heard. Petitioner COCOFED’s right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of partial summary judgments before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et al. were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its “Class Action Omnibus Motion” dated February 23, 2001 where they appended around 400 documents including affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said documents comprise their evidence to prove the farmers’ ownership of the UCPB shares, which were distributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. COCOFED et al. even filed their own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there are no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section 26, Rule 130 which declares that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” Viewed in this light, the Court rejected petitioners’ allegations about being deprived the right to adduce evidence. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Eminent domain; just compensation. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of “just compensation” is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. In this case, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling that the commissioners properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties were expropriated by petitioner. The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry out the task of determining the value of the land and the improvements. The members of the new committee even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as distance from the highway and the nearby town center. Further, the committee members also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provides the value of the properties and the improvements for taxation purposes. The committee members based their recommendations on reliable data and considered various factors that affected the value of the land and the improvements.
The Court also upheld the CA ruling, which deleted the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the payment for just compensation. There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking. Republic of the Philippines, rep. by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) vs.Rural Bank of Kabacan, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 185124, January 25, 2012.
Ombudsman; due process. Petitioners were not denied due process of law when the investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based on the affidavits and other evidence on record. Section 5(b)(1), Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, provides that the hearing officer may issue an order directing the parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the order, their respective verified position papers on the basis of which, along with the attachments thereto, the hearing officer may consider the case submitted for decision. It is only when the hearing officer determines that, based on the evidence, there is a need to conduct clarificatory hearings or formal investigations under Section 5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that such further proceedings will be conducted. But the determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests on the sound discretion of the hearing officer. As the petitioners have failed to show any cogent reason why the hearing officer’s determination should be overturned, the determination will not be disturbed by this Court. The Court likewise find no merit in petitioners’ contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case was already undergoing trial before the hearing officer, should not have been applied. The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are not subject to its operation, or where to apply it would impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause injustice to them. Here, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity to defend themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and other evidence in their defense. Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and to defend themselves, they cannot rightfully complain that they were denied due process of law. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the parties submit to present their charges and defenses. But as long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due process. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
Ombudsman; power to impose penalties. In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His power is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. The provisions of R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. Thus, it is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions. Gemma P. Cabalit vs. COA-Region VII/Filadelfo S. Apit vs. COA, Legal and adjuciation, Region VII/Leonardo G. Olaivar, etc. vs. Hon. Primo C. Miro, etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 180326/180341/180342, January 17, 2012.
Public funds/assets. The coconut levy funds are special public funds. Consequently, any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. In this case, the 6 CIIF Oil Mills were acquired by UCPB using coconut levy funds. On the other hand, the 14 CIIF holding companies are wholly owned subsidiaries of the CIIF Oil Mills. These companies were acquired using or whose capitalization comes from the coconut levy funds. However, as in the case of UCPB, UCPB itself distributed a part of its investments in the CIIF Oil Mills to coconut farmers, and retained a part thereof as administrator. The portions distributed to the supposed coconut farmers followed the procedure outlined in PCA Resolution No. 033-78. And as the administrator of the CIIF holding companies, UCPB authorized the acquisition of the SMC shares. In fact, these companies were formed or organized solely for the purpose of holding the SMC shares. As found by the Sandiganbayan, the 14 CIIF holding companies used borrowed funds from UCPB to acquire the SMC shares in the aggregate amount of P1.656 Billion. Since the CIIF companies and the CIIF block of SMC shares were acquired using coconut levy funds – funds that have been established to be public in character – it goes without saying that these acquired corporations and assets ought to be regarded and treated as government assets. Being government properties, they are accordingly owned by the Government, for the coconut industry pursuant to currently existing laws. Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines; Wigberto E. Tanada, et al., intervenors; Danilo S. Ursua vs. Republic of the Philippines,G.R. Nos. 177857-58 & G.R. No. 178193, January 24, 2012.
Election Law
Supreme Court; review of decision of a COMELEC division. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Thus, the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
One exception to the above rule is that the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.Douglas R. Cagas vs. the Commission on Elections & Claude P. Bautista, G.R. No. 194139. January 24, 2012.
Public Officers
Public employee; grave misconduct. Grave misconduct consists in a government official’s deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. It is regarded as grave when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are present. In particular, corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or reputation to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Rigging by a public official of bidding in the organization where he belongs is a form of corruption. As a public officer, private respondent had the duty to protect the process of public bidding in his organization. A ruling that would absolve private respondent of any liability for rigging the bids in the government office where he works on the pretext that he was not a member of the bids and awards committee would encourage public officers who are not members of bids committees to make an industry of rigging bids, using their offices and official reputations.National Power Corporation vs. Civil Service Commission & Rodrigo A. Tanfelix, G.R. No. 152093. January 24, 2012.
Public officers; reassignment; detail versus reassignment. The issue here is whether or not respondent’s reassignment constitutes constructive dismissal entitling her to reinstatement and back wages. The Court ruled in the affirmative. While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the employee’s prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward his removal, or a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or when it is designed to indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil Service. Section 6, Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of 1998, defines constructive dismissal as a situation when an employee quits his work because of the agency head’s unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from one position of dignity to a more servile or menial job. Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.
The Court distinguished between a detail and reassignment. A detail, as defined and governed by Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Civil Service Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. On the other hand, a reassignment, as defined and governed by E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7), means that an employee is reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency, provided that such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salaries. The principal distinctions between a detail and reassignment lie in the place where the employee is to be moved and in its effectiveness pending appeal with the CSC. A detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a movement within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately effective.
Having ruled that respondent was constructively dismissed, the next question is whether she is entitled to reinstatement and back wages. The Court held that she is entitled to reinstatement but not to full back wages and benefits. An illegally dismissed civil service employee is entitled to back salaries but limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Civil Service Commission vs. Minerva M.P. Pacheco, G.R. No. 178021, January 31, 2012.
Public officers; reorganization; termination of employment. The issue here is whether the NEA Board had the power to terminate all of NEA’s employees in connection with a reorganization of the agency. Under Rule 33, Section 3(b)(ii) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the EPIRA Law, all NEA employees shall be considered legally terminated with the implementation of a reorganization program pursuant to a law enacted by Congress or pursuant to Sec. 5(a)(5) of PD 269 through which the reorganization was carried out. Petitioners argue that the power granted unto the NEA Board to organize or reorganize does not include the power to terminate employees but only to reduce NEA’s manpower complement. The Court disagreed and affirmed the termination of the employees. Reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It could result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid, it must pass the test of good faith; otherwise, it is void ab initio. Evidently, the termination of all the employees of NEA was within the NEA Board’s powers and may not successfully be impugned absent proof of bad faith. United Claimant Association of NEA (Unican) etc., et al. vs. National Electrification Administration (NEA), et al., G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012.
Public officers; temporary and coterminous employees. No officer or employee in the Civil Service can be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions, as it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are temporary and coterminous in nature. Here, petitioner’s appointment was temporary as he did not have the required career executive service eligibility. An appointee without such eligibility cannot hold the position in a permanent capacity. A temporary appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moment’s notice. As to those with eligibilities, their right to security of tenure pertain to their rank but not to the position to which they were appointed. Petitioner never alleged that, at any time during which he held the position in question, he had acquired the requisite eligibility. Petitioner’s temporary appointment was also coterminous, or one that is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at the latter’s pleasure. As such, his replacement was not a removal but rather an expiration of term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were necessary to effect the same. The acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without cause. One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause. Samuel B. Ong vs. Office of the President, et al., G.R. No. 184219. January 30, 2012.
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