Ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

HUBERT NUÑEZ vs. SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC., through its representative, CESAR SYLIANTENG,  G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010

“x x x.

Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved,¹⁹ there can be no gainsaying the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts²⁰ by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.²¹ In addition to being conferred by law,²² however, a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint²³ and the character of the relief sought,²⁴irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims asserted therein.²⁵ In much the same way that it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the case by one of the parties,²⁶ jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.²⁷

The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential for the MeTC’s acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.: (a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property; (b) they must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.²⁸ As it is not essential that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, it is considered a sufficient compliance of the requirement where the facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions.²⁹ The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.³⁰

X x x.”

Footnotes/Citations:

¹⁹ Tubiano v. Razo, 390 Phil. 863, 868 (2000).

²⁰ Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117005, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 275, 279.

²¹ Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person may at anytime within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

²² Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato, 384 Phil. 252, 259-260 (2000).

²³ Gochan v. Young, 406 Phil. 663, 673-674 (2001).

²⁴ Sunny Motor Sales, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 517, 520 (2001).

²⁵ Ty v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 793, 798 (2001).

²⁶ Pilipinas Bank v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 18, 28 (2000).

²⁷ Tamano v. Ortiz, 353 Phil. 775, 780 (1998).

²⁸ De La Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 103, 115.

²⁹ Cajayon v. Sps. Batuyong, G.R. No. 149118, 16 February 2006, 482 SCRA 461, 471-472.

³⁰ Ong v. Parel, 407 Phil. 1045, 1053 (2001).

³³ Heirs of Demetrio Melchor v. Melchor, 461 Phil. 437, 443-444 (2003).

³⁴ Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 619 (2005).

³⁵ Quizon v. Juan, G.R. No. 171442, 17 June 2008, 554 SCRA 601, 612.

⁴¹ Almocera v. Ong, G.R. No. 170479, 18 February 2008, 546 SCRA 164, 178.

⁴² Magaling v. Ong, G.R. No. 173333, 13 August 2008, 562 SCRA 152, 170-171.

⁴³ Gateway Electronics Corporation v. Asianbank Corporation, G.R. No. 172041, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 698, 718-719.

⁴⁴ Republic v. Vda. De Neri, 468 Phil. 842, 862 (2004).

⁴⁵ Art. 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded in the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the contrary in the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.

⁴⁶ Cayabyab v. Gomez de Aquino, G.R. No.159974, 5 September 2007, 532 SCRA 353, 361.

⁴⁷ Tecson v. Gutierrez, 493 Phil. 132, 138 (2005).