Common-law spouse is co-owner; may file petition for letters of administration, be appointed as estate administrator

EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, FEBRUARY 6, 2007.

“x x x.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by aninterested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.[75]

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144[76] of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.[77]

X x x.”

Article 148 of the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry

EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, FEBrUARY 6, 2007.

“x x x.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79] we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.[80] The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

x x x x

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x[81]

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

X x x.”

Venue for intestate/estate administration and settlement; probate; Rule 73; residence vs. domicile.

EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, FEBrUARY 6, 2007.

“x x x.

Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.[41] (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with domicile. The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and residence for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.[43] Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[44] dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements[45] from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association[46]and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,[47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards[49] stating that his home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court[50] which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.[51] Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

X x x.”

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty.

JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015 

“x x x. 

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this court previously explained: 

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.45 (Citation omitted) 

X x x. 

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states: 

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: 

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete instrument or document; 

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and 

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied) 

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: 

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—. . . 

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document— 

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and 

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. 

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,47 we stated that "[i]t is obvious that the party acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary public[.]"48 Furthermore, this court pronounced that: 

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.49 (Citations omitted) 

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document. 

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee. 

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery became real. 

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50 Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51 Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,52 and Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the presence of the parties. In Linco, Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing those documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of another despite lack of authorization.54 In these cases, this court imposed the penalty of disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,55 the respondent lawyer notarized 22 public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.56 This court suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary public.57

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "[a] lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes. 

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts[.]" 

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, "wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this infraction. 

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this court’s directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation.61 The lawyer complied with the order to file a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.62 Likewise, she complied with the order to comment through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her delay.63 This court found that the lawyer’s "conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.’"64

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into account all his acts of misconduct. 

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to comply with an order from this court. Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

X x x .” 

JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015 

“x x x. 

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty. 

X x x. 

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this court previously explained: 

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.45 (Citation omitted) 

X x x. 

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states: 

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: 

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete instrument or document; 

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and 

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied) 

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: 

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—. . . 

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document— 

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and 

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. 

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,47 we stated that "[i]t is obvious that the party acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary public[.]"48 Furthermore, this court pronounced that: 

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.49 (Citations omitted) 

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document. 

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee. 

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery became real. 

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50 Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51 Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,52 and Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the presence of the parties. In Linco, Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing those documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of another despite lack of authorization.54 In these cases, this court imposed the penalty of disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,55 the respondent lawyer notarized 22 public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.56 This court suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary public.57

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "[a] lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes. 

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts[.]" 

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, "wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this infraction. 

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this court’s directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation.61 The lawyer complied with the order to file a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.62 Likewise, she complied with the order to comment through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her delay.63 This court found that the lawyer’s "conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.’"64

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into account all his acts of misconduct. 

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to comply with an order from this court. Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

X x x .” 

Disbarment; reinstatement to the Bar. - The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character

CONRADO N. QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., A.C. No.7054, November 11, 2014

“x x x.

On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed to the Members of the Court En Banc once again reiterating his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among others that for more than three years that he has been disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine, Commonwealth Avenue as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12

On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the Court’s consideration, and vowed that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance and implementation. He also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

X x x.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. He expressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he submitted a Medical Abstract18evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated parishioners.

X x x.

We deny the present appeal.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral character.21 The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of justice.22

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.23Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.24 The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.25

In the present case, we note that before his admission to the Bar, the respondent had demonstrated an active involvement and participation in community and church activities by joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had continued extending assistance to the indigent residents.

The respondent also actively engaged and participated in various community projects, through the Marinduque Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to 1987.

In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to have taken full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to him, he has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.

The respondent also claimed that the long period of his disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect on his professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to realize the gravity of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that significantly contributed to his character reformation.He professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment, he has been an active member of the Couples for Christ, Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.

Although the Court believes that the respondent is not inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral reformation.

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court, in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other transgressions since he was disbarred.

Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer’s sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion.

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in court) after considering the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and civic services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, and members of the judiciary.

In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the disbarred attorney before and after his disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’ sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second time that the respondent was accused and was found guilty of gross misconduct. The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly the same grounds on which the Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversityof the respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his guilt. While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.

X x x.”

Disbarment; falsehood; misuse of court procedures; dilatory tactics; collaborating with non-lawyers

CONRADO N. QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., A.C. No.7054, November 11, 2014

“x x x.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice.

X x x.”

Professional misconduct

CONRADO N. QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., A.C. No.7054, November 11, 2014

“x x x.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. 

Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

X x x.”

Compromise agreement

METRO MANILA SHOPPING MECCA CORP., SHOEMART, INC., SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., STAR APPLIANCES CENTER, SUPER VALUE, INC., ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC., HEAL TH AND BEAUTY, INC., JOLLIMART PHILS. CORP., and SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION vs. MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, and THE CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 190818, November 10, 2014

 .

“x x x.

A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.8 It contemplates mutual concessions and mutual gains to avoid the expenses of litigation; or when litigation has already begun, to end it because of the uncertainty of the result.9 Its validity is dependent upon the fulfillment of the requisites and principles of contracts dictated by law; and its terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, and public order.10 When given judicial approval, a compromise agreement becomes more than a contract binding upon the parties. Having been sanctioned by the court, it is entered as a determination of a controversy and has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately executory and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The nonfulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ of execution; in such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.11

A review of the whereas clauses12 of the UCA reveals the various court cases filed by petitioners, including this case, for the refund and/or issuance of tax credit covering the local business taxes payments they paid to respondent City of Manila pursuant to Section 21 of the latter’s Revenue Code.13 Thus, contrary to the submission of respondents, the local business taxes subject of the instant case is clearly covered by the UCA since they were also paid in accordance with the same provision of the Revenue Code of Manila.

In this relation, it is observed that the present case would have been rendered moot and academic had the parties informed the Court of the UCA’s supervening execution.14 Be that as it may, and considering that: (a) the UCA appears to have been executed in accordance with the requirements of a valid compromise agreement; (b) the UCA was executed more than a year prior to the promulgation of the subject Decision; and (c) the result of both the UCA and the subject Decision are practically identical, i.e., that petitioners are not entitled to any tax refund/credit, the Court herein resolves to approve and adopt the pertinent terms and conditions of the UCA insofar as they govern the settlement of the present dispute.

X x x.”

Land registration; notice of initial hearing; publication of notice

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. APOSTOLITA SAN MATEO, BRIGIDA TAPANG, ROSITA ACCION, and CELSO MERCADO, G.R. No. 203560, November 10, 2014

“x x x.

The trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.

We find without error the CA’s characterization of the petition for registration as an action in rem, as well as its ruling on the petition’s compliance with the rules on notice and publication. The CA correctly held that the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the subject property. As the CA found, the names of the owners of the adjoining lots were indicated in respondents’ Amended Petition on April 28, 1999, and these persons have been properly notified of the proceedings. Moreover, there was proper publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, along with the technical description of the property. Given that this is an action in rem, the publication of the notice is sufficient notice to all claimants to the property.

The amendment of the technical description of the property, or the reduction of the area from 12,896 to 12,776 square meters, does not require a republication of the technical description, because the amended area was already included during the first publication. 

As this Court held in Republic v. CA and Heirs of Luis Ribaya:17

x x x only where the original survey plan is amended during the registration proceedings, by the addition of land not previously included in the original plan, should publication be made in order to confer jurisdiction on the court to order the registration of the area added after the publication of the original plan. Conversely, if the amendment does not involve an addition, but on the contrary, a reduction of the original area that was published, no new publication is required.

The amendment of the area was not a result of any substantial amendment in the property to be covered by the petition for registration, but was done merely to conform to the cadastral mapping of Taguig.18 Suffice it to say, therefore, that the amendment did not result in an addition of land not previously included in the original plan. Thus, no republication is necessary.

X x x.”

Alienable and disposable land; proofs of.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. APOSTOLITA SAN MATEO, BRIGIDA TAPANG, ROSITA ACCION, and CELSO MERCADO, G.R. No. 203560, November 10, 2014

“x x x.

However, on the issue of whether the respondents were able to prove that the subject property is alienable and disposable, We find that the respondents failed to prove that the property sought to be registered is indeed alienable and thus subject to registration. Respondents merely relied on the certification of DENR-South CENRO to the effect that the subject property is alienable. But as discussed below, this is insufficient, as respondents failed to present any proof that the DENR Secretary approved such certification. We rule that the CA’s reliance solely on the DENR-South CENRO certification constitutes reversible error on its part.

Material to the resolution of this issue is this Court’s ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,19 which, similar to the one at bar, is one for registration of property. There, the Court said:

x x x The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and

4. Issues renewal of certificates ofregistration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.

Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMSDENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Issues renewal of certificate ofregistration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;

3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and

5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.20 (emphasis supplied).

Clearly, therefore, a CENRO certification that a certain property is alienable, without the corresponding proof that the DENR Secretary had approved such certification, is insufficient to support a petition for registration of land. Both certification and approval are required to be presented as proofs that the land is alienable. Otherwise, the petition must be denied.

It is true, as cited by the respondent, that in Republic v. Vega,21 the Court granted a petition for registration even without the requisite DENR approval of the CENRO certification. There, as in this case, the registrant merely presented a CENRO certification that the land is alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record. The Court instead applied the rule on substantial compliance, and said:

Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENR’s original classification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground of substantial compliance.

Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record.22

The Court immediately made clear, however, that the ruling in Vega is pro hac vice, and is not to be considered an exception nor a departure from its ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which applied the rule on strict compliance with the rules. The Court clarified:

It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings. To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both(1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and(2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.

As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.23 (emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered its decision on November 13, 2003, way before the rule on strict compliance was laid down in T.A.N. Properties on June 26, 2008. Thus, the trial court was merely applying the rule prevailing at the time, which was substantial compliance. Thus, even if the case reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, the Court allowed the application of substantial compliance, because there was no opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the trial court and the CA already having decided the case prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.

In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down on November 23, 2010, when the rule on strict compliance was already in effect. Thus, there was ample opportunity for the respondents to comply with the new rule, and present before the RTC evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of the DENR-South CENRO Certification. This, they failed to do.

Respondents' invocation of the pro hac vice rule in Vega is severely misplaced. They would have this Court rule in their favor simply because the Republic failed to present countervailing evidence other than mere denials.24 Such is not the import of the Vega ruling. In Vega, aside from the certification from the CENRO, the registrants also presented other evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable. Here, it is the DENR-South CENRO's certification that is the sole evidence presented by the respondents to prove the land's alienability. That, by itself, is not sufficient. Respondents cannot now claim that there is no sufficient evidence that the land is inalienable, when their own evidence on alienability is wanting.

X x x.”

Possession

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. APOSTOLITA SAN MATEO, BRIGIDA TAPANG, ROSITA ACCION, and CELSO MERCADO, G.R. No. 203560, November 10, 2014

“x x x.

Respondents have proved their possession of the subject property.

Finally, on the issue of possession, suffice it to say that We find that to be a question of fact, and thus, it is the trial court that is in the best position to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the respondents is sufficient to prove their claim of possession since 1948. We find no reversible error in the CA's affirmance of the RTC's reliance on the tax declarations presented by the respondents.

X x x.”

Best evidence rule; secondary evidence

MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP.  vs. MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP., G.R. No. 201001, November 10, 2014

“x x x.

MCMP challenges the ruling of the CA arguing that the appellate court should have disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule. MCMP specifically argues that based on the testimony of Peregrino, Monark did not diligently search for the original copy of the Contract as evidenced by the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of the document was not presented; 2) the alleged loss was not even reported to management or the police; and 3) Monark only searched for the original copy of the document for the purposes of the instant case.

Petitioner’s contention is erroneous.

The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court which provides:

"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis supplied)"

Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:

"Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss."

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman,11 the Court set down the requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original document whenever the original copy has been lost:

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.

In the instant case, the CA correctly ruled that the above requisites are present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, "findings offacts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court."12 Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.

MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that they entered into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the request of the trial court for it to produce its copy of the Contract.13 Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, butit also gives rise to the disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."

X x x.”