"The remedy in assailing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (la)
It is settled that this Court has jurisdiction to resolve petitions for certiorari assailing an Ombudsman order or resolution in criminal cases:
In Tirol, Jr. v. del Rosario, we held that although as a consequence of the decision in Fabian v. Desierto appeals from the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are now cognizable by the Court of Appeals, nevertheless in cases in which it is alleged that the Ombudsman has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed in this Court to set aside the Ombudsman's order or resolution. In Kuizon v. Desierto, we again held that this Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.82 (Citations omitted)
Respondents Casanova et al. argue that petitioner should have filed this case before the Court of Appeals. Citing Morales v. Court of Appeals,83 they conclude that the invalidation of Section 14(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 resulted in the Court of Appeals obtaining subject matter jurisdiction under Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.84 They insist that Morales should not only apply in administrative cases but also in criminal cases investigated by the Ombudsman.85
Respondents fail to convince.
In Gatchalian v. Ombudsman,86 this Court clarified that the ruling in Morales is applicable only in assailing the Ombudsman's ruling in administrative cases. The Court did not overturn the string of cases expounding on the procedure in assailing orders and decisions of the Ombudsman for criminal cases:
Gatchalian argues that the consequence of the foregoing is that all orders, directives, and decisions of the Ombudsman - whether it be an incident of an administrative or criminal case - are now reviewable by the CA.
The contention is untenable.
The Court agrees with the CA that the Morales decision should be read and viewed in its proper context. The Court in Morales held that the CA had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed therein because what was assailed in the said petition was a preventive suspension order, which was an interlocutory order and thus unappealable, issued by the Ombudsman. Consistent with the rationale of Estrada, the Court held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was proper as R.A. 6770 did not provide for an appeal procedure for interlocutory orders issued by the Ombudsman. The Court also held that it was correctly filed with the CA because the preventive suspension order was an incident of an administrative case. The Court in Morales was thus applying only what was already well established in jurisprudence.
It must likewise be pointed out that the Court, in arriving at the decision in Morales, cited and was guided by the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong. In Capulong, a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman was questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the CA. The Court in Capulong held that:
[t]he preventive suspension order is interlocutory in character and not a final order on the merits of the case. The aggrieved party may then seek redress from the courts through a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. x x x There being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65.
Also, as aptly pointed out by the CA in its assailed Resolution, "the Supreme Court never mentioned the proper remedy to be taken from the Ombudsman's orders in non-administrative cases or criminal cases, such as the finding of probable cause. In fact, this matter was not even alluded to in the Morales decision."
A thorough reading of the Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was limited in its application - that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. The Court never intimated, much less categorically stated, that it was abandoning its rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the distinction made therein between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot thus be read to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in non-administrative or criminal cases.
As a final point, it must be pointed out that subsequent to the Morales decision, the Court - likewise sitting En Banc - decided the case of Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines, et al. v. Commission on Elections, where it again upheld the difference of appellate procedure between orders or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative and non[-]administrative cases. Thus:
As a preliminary procedural matter, we observe that while the petition asks this Court to set aside the Supplemental Resolution, which dismissed both administrative and criminal complaints, it is clear from the allegations therein that what petitioners are questioning is the criminal aspect of the assailed resolution, i.e., the Ombudsman's finding that there is no probable cause to indict the respondents in the Ombudsman cases. Movants in G.R. No. 159139 similarly question this conclusion by the Ombudsman and accordingly pray that the Ombudsman be directed to file an information with the Sandiganbayan against the responsible COMELEC officials and conspiring private individuals.
In Kuizon v. Desierto and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, we held that this Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases. For administrative cases, however, we declared in the case of Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) that the petition should be filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Dagan ruling homogenized the procedural rule with respect to administrative cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman - first enunciated in Fabian v. Desierto - that is, all remedies involving the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, whether by an appeal under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, must be filed with the Court of Appeals.
x x x x x x x x x
The Ombudsman's determination of probable cause may only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Not every error in the proceedings or every erroneous conclusion of law or fact, however, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. It has been stated that the Ombudsman may err or even abuse the discretion lodged in her by law, but such error or abuse alone does not render her act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of another constitutional body, the petitioner must clearly show that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making her determination and in arriving at the conclusion she reached. For there to be a finding of grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that the discretionary power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law....
It is thus clear that the Morales decision never intended to disturb the well-established distinction between the appellate remedies for orders, directives, and decisions arising from administrative cases and those arising from non-administrative or criminal cases.
Gatchalian's contention that the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 declared in Morales equally applies to both administrative and criminal cases - and thus the CA from then on had jurisdiction to entertain petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 to question orders and decisions arising from criminal cases - is simply misplaced. Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was declared unconstitutional because it trampled on the rule-making powers of the Court by 1) prescribing the mode of appeal, which was by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for all cases whether final or not; and 2) rendering nugatory the certiorari jurisdiction of the CA over incidents arising from administrative cases.
The unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770, therefore, did not necessarily have an effect over the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because the said procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned section. To recall, the rule that decisions or orders of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause (or the lack thereof) should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court was laid down by the Court itself in the cases of Kuizon, Tirol Jr., Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudsman, Estrada, and subsequent cases affirming the said rule. The rule was, therefore, not anchored on Section I 4 of R.A. 6770, but was instead a rule prescribed by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers. The declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 was therefore immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the Ombudsman in criminal cases is concerned.87 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In this case, the assailed Ombudsman orders refer to its finding of lack of probable cause in a Complaint-Affidavit for violations of Section 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713. Thus, the proper remedy to correct grave abuse of discretion of the Ombudsman, if any, is a petition for certiorari filed before this Court.
Xxx."
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 225565, January 13, 2021 ]
CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY MANUEL T. UBARRA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA, FELICITO C. PAYUMO, ZORAYDA AMELIA C. ALONZO, TERESITA A. DESIERTO, MA. AURORA GEOTINA-GARCIA, FERDINAND S. GOLEZ, ELMAR M. GOMEZ AND MAXIMO L. SANGIL, RESPONDENTS.
