ESTHER P.
MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, A.M.
No. RTJ-12-2336 (Formerly A.M. OCA-IPl No. 11-3695-RTJ), November 12, 2014
“x x x.
Complainant asserts that respondent judge committed
gross ignorance of the law and evident partiality when she overturned the order
granting the demurrer to evidence because it would constitute as a violation to
her constitutional right against double jeopardy. Complainant argues that a
dismissal due to such order is considered as acquittal which bars a subsequent
opening of the criminal case.
This Court is convinced that respondent judge acted in
accordance with the law and jurisprudence. It was the February 2, 2011 Omnibus
Order which elucidated the clear legal
basis why respondent judge continued the criminal case despite the earlier
order granting the demurrer to evidence.
Generally, if the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not
sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an
adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and
may no longer be appealed.
The current scenario, however, is an exception to the general rule. The
demurrer to evidence was premature
because it was filed before the prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not
yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal
offer of evidence of the prosecution when complainant filed her demurrer to evidence. Hence, respondent
judge had legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence
as there was no proper acquittal. The
complainant elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari but it
sustained her ruling. The CA decision reads:
Indubitably, an order
granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of
the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. To this general rule, however, the Court has previously made
some exceptions.
People v. Tan eruditely
instructs that double jeopardy will not attach when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as
where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where
the trial was a sham. In addition, in People v. Bocar,32 this Court rule that
there is no double jeopardy when the prosecution was not allowed to complete
its presentation of evidence by the trial court.
The circumstances obtaining
in this controversy placed it within the realm of the exception.
The records demonstrate that
the prosecution, with respondent Oilink International Corporation as private
complainant, had not yet rested its case when the Demurrer to Evidence was
filed and eventually granted by the RTC Branch 161.
x x x x
The RTC Branch 161 should have ruled on the
prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence before acting on petitioner’s Demurrer
to Evidence. Having failed to do so, there is nary a doubt that no double
jeopardy attached. Petitioner’s blind insistence that she is made to face trial
after having been acquitted carries no conviction.
Though the CA decision has not reached finality, it
only goes to show that the respondent judge acted in good faith as she merely
followed precedents.
X x x.”
