For A Comment To Be Considered As Contempt Of Court “It Must Really Appear” That Such Does Impede, Interfere With And Embarrass The Administration Of Justice... - The Lawyer's Post

See - For A Comment To Be Considered As Contempt Of Court “It Must Really Appear” That Such Does Impede, Interfere With And Embarrass The Administration Of Justice... - The Lawyer's Post





"x x x.

The Court’s ruling:

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court[1], which reads:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

x x x

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]

The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature[2]. This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it[3]

For a comment to be considered as contempt of court “it must really appear” that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice[4]. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case[5]. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies[6].

The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The “clear and present danger” rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional boundary between these two rights[7].

The “clear and present danger” rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat[8].

The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.

As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered byMarantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court.

As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents’ comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.

“A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice[9].” By no stretch of the imagination could the respondents’ comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. No criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments of the respondents.

Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases[10]. The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice[11]. In the present case, such necessity is wanting.

x x x."

See - G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014, P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO AND MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA’O, RESPONDENTS.