What is the reason for allowing the press to cover the impeachment trial?
Aside from the freedom of the press discussed below, press people have the right to attend trials by virtue of their being members of the general public.
Both the Constitution (Section 14(2), Article III) and the Rules of Court require that trials be open to the public. In the case of Craig v. Henry (331 US 367 [1947]), it was held that “A trial is a public event. What transpires in the courtroom is public property.” Also, the US Supreme Court ruled in In re Oliver (333 US 257 [1948]) that the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment militates against the holding of secret proceedings. In England, the requirement of a public trial was due to a “revulsion against the tyrannical secret proceedings of the Court of Star Chamber.” (John Lofton, Justice and the Press, p.55 [1966].
What is the role of the press in the administration of justice?
The press plays an important role in the administration of justice. Its involvement in the legal process ranges from being an observer, commentator and critic (Perfecto V. Fernandez, Law of Mass Media, 1984, p. 355).
Thus, the press serves as one of the instruments by which the right of the people to information on matters of public concern is actualized. In the case of Richmond Newspapers Inc., et al. v. Virginia, et al., (448 US 555 [1980]) it was held that: “xxx a trial courtroom is a public place where the people and the representatives of media, generally, have a right to be present, and where their presence has been historically thought to enhance the integrity and the quality of what takes place.”
What is the watchdog function of the press?
According to Fernandez (Law of Mass Media, p. 354), this “watchdog function of the press” becomes all the more important during the conduct of trials. In his article “The Media and the Courts, International Conference of Appellate Magistrates Reading Materials, Vo. II, p. 447 [1977],” former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro observed that “the judge while trying a case will be conscious that he is likewise under trial.”
This observation is affirmed by John Lofton in his book “Justice and the Press” (p. 137) who points out that, “(a) part from its overt activity, the press exerts a considerable influence merely by existing, since officials are conscious of the possibility that at some point a reporter may be asking for an explanation of their conduct.”
This perceived role of the press is the very source of its social responsibility to report the facts truthfully without bias or interest. In other words, freedom of the press carries with it the concomitant obligation of its members to report “the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth,” so to speak.
What are the constitutional rights involved in the impeachment trial?
The constitutional rights which must be considered and balanced are: the freedom of the press; the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and the right of the litigant or accused to an impartial and public trial. (Section 4, Section 7 and Section 14 (2), Article III, 1987 Constitution). These are the rights that are involved when the press reports on the trial of cases.
What is the right of the accused to an impartial and public trial?
It is a basic imperative of justice that the courts be free from influence or bias to ensure that the parties to a case, whether civil or criminal, are afforded their rights to a fair trial. In his book, Fernandez (p. 355) likened the courtroom to a “laboratory insulated from extraneous pressures and influences.”
What is the freedom of the press?
The freedom of the press is enshrined in our Bill of Rights (Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution) which provides that “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
How should the press treat these constitutional rights?
Faced with the unavoidable conflict between the right of the people to know and of the press to report on matters of public concern, on one hand, and the right of the litigants to a fair trial, on the other, there is a need to determine which of these interests should prevail or have priority over the other.
In their book “Crime and Publicity” (p. 237 [1967]), Alfred Friendly and Ronald Goldfarb illustrated this dilemma: “We do not want a press that is free, more or less, just as we should not tolerate trials that are almost fair. xxx The paradox is that neither value can be absolute, yet we cannot accept the diminution of either one.”
The New York Bar Association points out that “neither of these ‘rights’ is absolute for they conflict and must be reconciled in a manner calculated to cause the least injury to either value.” (Special committee on radio, television and the administration of justice of the Association of the Bar of the city of New York, Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial: Final Report with Recommendations, p. 11 [1967].)
The resolution may lie in viewing these constitutional rights not as diametrically opposed but rather as complementary goals to be achieved. These can be done by by stressing the attendant duties and responsibilities which attach to the exercise of such constitutional rights.
Thus, media practitioners, particularly those in television because of their instant impact on the public, should be scrupulous to a fault in verifying their facts and understanding the legal procedure when reporting on a court trial or any legal proceedings.
However, if the clash is unavoidable and irreconcilable, freedom of the press must yield to the right to a fair trial. The reason for this is that in that case, the right to know of the general public suffers only a temporary curtailment, whereas irreparable damage may be caused the accused.
What are “press abuses?”
Truth can sometimes be clouded by misperception, inaccuracy, speculation and bias. In many cases, the avowed commitment of the press to fair and accurate reporting of news has been known to give way to sensationalized reportage of events to gain wider readership. This is especially true of the so-called “scandal sheets,” more popularly known as “tabloids” (Ambrosio Padilla, Free Press and Independent Judiciary, Ateneo Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 3 [January], p. 363 [1956]).
Also, factual inaccuracies in newspaper reports are frequent if not unavoidable especially in the case of legal news. Former Chief Justice Castro noted that the problem could be attributed to: “xxx carelessness, often induced by the haste with which news is gathered, a smaller portion to bias and more blameworthy causes.” (Castro, Courts, p. 451.)
He added, however, that: “xxx a great deal of it must be attributed, in candor, to ignorance which frequently is not at all blameworthy. For newspapers are conducted by men who are laymen to the laws.” (Castro, Courts, p. 451.)
What is trial by publicity?
The existence of mass media has given rise to the danger of trial by publicity. This phenomenon may be said to be the biggest threat to the rights of litigants, particularly of an accused, to a fair trial.
It is in criminal cases that trial by publicity poses the greatest concern mainly because it is these cases that are most susceptible to massive publicity. According to an authority, this is due to the fact that it is because civil cases “are either too uninteresting for press coverage, too complicated, or too lengthy to sustain a reader’s interest” and thus, in civil cases “the likelihood of prejudice is small.” (Carter, Franklin and Wright, The First Amendment and the Fourth Estate: the Law Of Mass Media, Third Ed., p. 312 [1985])
Fernandez (Mass Media, p. 356) enumerated and described the types of publicity which may interfere with the right of an accused person to a fair trial:
First, we have sensationalized reporting. This usually involves the playing up of details calculated to arouse the interest of the public and thus boost the sale of the paper.
Second, we have vigilantism by the press. In such cases, the press convinced of the guilt of a particular person and determined to bring him to justice, undertakes a partisan crusade for his prosecution and conviction.
Third, we have excessive publicity.
Fourth, we have publication of prejudicial material which tends to establish the guilt of a particular person for a specific crime, or to poison the attitude of the public toward him.
Since the trier of facts in our court system is a judge and not a jury, you may agree, however, with Justice Malcolm’s observation that “Here, in contrast to other jurisdictions, we need not be overly sensitive because of the sting of newspaper articles, for there are no juries to be kept free from outside influence.” (In Re: Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 [1930]). It is conceded that members of the jury are more likely to be influenced by prejudicial publicity because they are laymen and thus untutored in the complex and arcane rules of evidence.
But judges, for all their years of training and experience in the law, are first and foremost human beings. Fernandez acknowledged the vulnerability of judges “to the inroads of publicity, especially where it is massive, sensationalized, partisan, clamorous and sustained.” (Fernandez, Mass Media, p. 358).
Thus, he observes that, “(u)nder the stimulus of massive publicity, the mind of the judge may become receptive to evidence that points to guilt and resistant to matters that establish innocence.”
Should TV cameras be allowed in the Senate?
As the Senate, acting as an impeachment court, has allowed live TV coverage of the trial, we take the position that it should either be a full coverage or nothing at all, and should prohibit the media from selectively covering portions of the proceedings.
This position is consistent with previous pronouncements of the Supreme Court relating to ordinary criminal trials which we hold to be persuasive to a certain extent and which we hope the media should duly take note of.
In an en banc resolution of our Supreme Court dated Oct. 22, 1991, on the matter of the “Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of (former) President Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel Case,” the high court categorically prohibited the live radio and television coverage of court proceedings “to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” The high court furthermore declared that the right of the people to information may be subserved by “less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means.”
In this regard, the Supreme Court set forth the following guidelines: “Video footage of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.”
(This article is based primarily on the Lecture at the First Continuing Legal Education Seminar on Feb. 25, 1994 at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, Manila by Ricardo J. Romulo [Lawyers’ Review, Vol. VIII, No. 4, April, 30 1994], as updated by the authors.)
Belaro is the dean of the St. Dominic Savio College of Law. He holds degrees in political science (cum laude) and in law from UP, where he served as class president at the College of Law. He also has a master of laws from Cornell University where he was chosen class representative. Francisco is a professor of constitutional law at St. Dominic Savio College and is a former editor of the MLQU Law Journal."
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