Alienable and disposable land; proofs of.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. APOSTOLITA SAN MATEO, BRIGIDA TAPANG, ROSITA ACCION, and CELSO MERCADO, G.R. No. 203560, November 10, 2014

“x x x.

However, on the issue of whether the respondents were able to prove that the subject property is alienable and disposable, We find that the respondents failed to prove that the property sought to be registered is indeed alienable and thus subject to registration. Respondents merely relied on the certification of DENR-South CENRO to the effect that the subject property is alienable. But as discussed below, this is insufficient, as respondents failed to present any proof that the DENR Secretary approved such certification. We rule that the CA’s reliance solely on the DENR-South CENRO certification constitutes reversible error on its part.

Material to the resolution of this issue is this Court’s ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,19 which, similar to the one at bar, is one for registration of property. There, the Court said:

x x x The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and

4. Issues renewal of certificates ofregistration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.

Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMSDENR:

1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;

2. Issues renewal of certificate ofregistration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;

3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;

4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure projects; and

5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.

Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.20 (emphasis supplied).

Clearly, therefore, a CENRO certification that a certain property is alienable, without the corresponding proof that the DENR Secretary had approved such certification, is insufficient to support a petition for registration of land. Both certification and approval are required to be presented as proofs that the land is alienable. Otherwise, the petition must be denied.

It is true, as cited by the respondent, that in Republic v. Vega,21 the Court granted a petition for registration even without the requisite DENR approval of the CENRO certification. There, as in this case, the registrant merely presented a CENRO certification that the land is alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record. The Court instead applied the rule on substantial compliance, and said:

Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENR’s original classification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground of substantial compliance.

Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record.22

The Court immediately made clear, however, that the ruling in Vega is pro hac vice, and is not to be considered an exception nor a departure from its ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which applied the rule on strict compliance with the rules. The Court clarified:

It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings. To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both(1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and(2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.

As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.23 (emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In Vega, the Court was mindful of the fact that the trial court rendered its decision on November 13, 2003, way before the rule on strict compliance was laid down in T.A.N. Properties on June 26, 2008. Thus, the trial court was merely applying the rule prevailing at the time, which was substantial compliance. Thus, even if the case reached the Supreme Court after the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, the Court allowed the application of substantial compliance, because there was no opportunity for the registrant to comply with the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, the trial court and the CA already having decided the case prior to the promulgation of T.A.N. Properties.

In the case here, however, the RTC Decision was only handed down on November 23, 2010, when the rule on strict compliance was already in effect. Thus, there was ample opportunity for the respondents to comply with the new rule, and present before the RTC evidence of the DENR Secretary's approval of the DENR-South CENRO Certification. This, they failed to do.

Respondents' invocation of the pro hac vice rule in Vega is severely misplaced. They would have this Court rule in their favor simply because the Republic failed to present countervailing evidence other than mere denials.24 Such is not the import of the Vega ruling. In Vega, aside from the certification from the CENRO, the registrants also presented other evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable. Here, it is the DENR-South CENRO's certification that is the sole evidence presented by the respondents to prove the land's alienability. That, by itself, is not sufficient. Respondents cannot now claim that there is no sufficient evidence that the land is inalienable, when their own evidence on alienability is wanting.

X x x.”