Author:
Ana Marie Pamintuan Publication:
The Philippine Star, November 9, 2026
Article:
BBM’s Supreme Court
https://www.philstar.com/
I. Central thesis
The article raises a serious institutional concern: President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s choice of Rodil Zalameda as the new Chief Justice could undermine the independence of the Supreme Court and create the public perception that the judiciary is becoming politically beholden to Malacañang.
Pamintuan's central argument is that judicial independence is threatened not necessarily by direct presidential interference in individual cases, but by the political influence presidents exercise through appointments, promotions, retirement benefits, and other institutional arrangements.
The author asks whether the country is getting an independent Supreme Court or one perceived as the Marcos administration's Supreme Court.
II. The controversial appointment of Rodil Zalameda
The article identifies three significant Supreme Court decisions authored by Zalameda that have attracted criticism.
1. The acquittal of Imelda Marcos in the Swiss deposits graft cases
* Zalameda authored the Supreme Court First Division ruling that overturned the 2018 conviction of former First Lady Imelda Marcos on seven counts of graft.
* The cases involved the Marcos family's Swiss bank deposits.
* The ruling became public only after the period for filing a motion for reconsideration had already expired.
* Former presidential commission official and hidden-wealth investigator Ruben Carranza was among those who questioned Zalameda's possible elevation to Chief Justice.
The author places this development against the historical background of the recovery of the Marcos family's ill-gotten wealth after the 1986 People Power Revolution.
She contrasts the original objective of transitional justice—recovering stolen public wealth and restoring accountability—with what she describes as the possibility of transactional justice, in which political relationships and interests influence the administration of justice.
2. The decision allowing BBM to run for president in 2022
* Zalameda also authored the Supreme Court en banc decision dismissing petitions seeking to disqualify Marcos from the 2022 presidential election.
* The petitions relied on Marcos' tax-related convictions covering 1982–1985.
* The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the offense involved did not constitute moral turpitude.
The article recalls this decision because it demonstrates Zalameda's involvement in a major legal controversy directly affecting Marcos' political eligibility.
Importantly, the author does not establish that the ruling was legally incorrect or that Zalameda acted improperly. Rather, she argues that the ruling contributes to questions about the political implications of his appointment.
3. The postponement of barangay and SK elections
Zalameda also authored the Supreme Court ruling allowing another postponement of the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections (BSKE).
The consequences, according to the article:
* Incumbent barangay and SK officials received another extension of their terms.
* Their tenure had already been extended through previous postponements.
* The author warns that Congress might again postpone the 2028 elections and possibly extend barangay officials' terms further.
She predicts that legislators with relatives or political supporters serving as barangay officials could have an incentive to support another postponement.
She also expresses concern that the Marcos administration and a Supreme Court under Zalameda might accommodate such legislation.
This is the author's political prediction, not an established future development.
III. The danger of a politically accommodating Supreme Court
Pamintuan argues that Zalameda has not yet established a reputation comparable to former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, whom critics associated with the interests of the Marcos family during Ferdinand Marcos Sr.'s presidency.
Nevertheless, she worries that the new Chief Justice could become politically accommodating toward BBM.
Her concern is that the President may receive favorable judicial treatment during the remainder of his administration, particularly in controversies involving the Marcos family's political and legal interests.
The article's warning is captured by its closing distinction:
Will this be the Zalameda Supreme Court or the Marcos Supreme Court?
The distinction is institutional rather than merely personal. The issue is whether the Court will independently apply the Constitution and laws or become perceived as an extension of presidential political power.
IV. The broader problem: A malleable Philippine justice system
The author then expands the discussion beyond the Zalameda appointment.
She recalls that foreign diplomats have described the Philippine legal system as malleable.
This refers to a system in which laws, rules and regulations can allegedly be bent to accommodate whichever political group happens to hold power.
Two major weaknesses are identified:
* Justice is notoriously slow.
* The implementation of laws and regulations can be influenced by political connections and interests.
The author recalls former President Joseph Estrada's denunciations of corrupt judges, whom he called "hoodlums in robes," and his criticism of fixers or "fix-cals."
However, she notes the irony that Estrada eventually lost the moral authority to lead such a campaign.
The broader message is that judicial corruption is not confined to one administration or political personality.
It is a systemic problem.
V. Ombudsman Remulla challenges the judiciary
The article discusses recent statements by Ombudsman Jesus Crispin Remulla, who called for the judiciary to undergo soul-searching because of alleged institutional problems.
Remulla specifically questioned the Sandiganbayan Third Division's decision granting bail to former senator Bong Revilla.
He used the expression mukhang natrabaho, suggesting that the decision might have involved case fixing.
The Supreme Court responded by demanding that Remulla provide specifics and encouraging him to file a formal complaint.
Pamintuan considers this an opportunity for the Ombudsman to pursue allegations of judicial corruption rather than merely making public accusations.
The legal and institutional point:
* The Supreme Court has constitutional authority to investigate and discipline members of the judiciary.
* The Ombudsman can file complaints against erring judicial officials.
* Allegations must be supported by evidence and submitted through proper procedures.
The author suggests that disciplinary cases involving members of the judiciary may be resolved more directly through the Supreme Court's administrative disciplinary jurisdiction rather than through ordinary criminal proceedings.
However, disciplinary proceedings and criminal prosecution are distinct. A finding of administrative liability does not automatically establish criminal guilt.
VI. Judicial corruption and the problem of accountability
Pamintuan emphasizes that the Supreme Court has previously dismissed judges and justices for corruption and misconduct.
She cites the case of former Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory Ong.
In 2014, Ong was dismissed by the Supreme Court for dishonesty, gross misconduct and impropriety connected with the pork barrel scam.
His penalties included:
* Dismissal from judicial service.
* Disqualification from holding public office.
* Forfeiture of retirement benefits.
However, he was not imprisoned as a consequence of that administrative ruling.
The author identifies a serious weakness in the existing accountability system: dismissal from judicial service may not be enough to punish corruption.
She argues that corrupt judges and justices should also face criminal prosecution and imprisonment where warranted, with the recovery and seizure of their illegally acquired assets.
She further highlights a potential investigative difficulty: the Supreme Court itself holds the official Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) of judges and justices.
Consequently, investigating unexplained wealth involving members of the judiciary may be particularly complicated.
Her position is that judicial officials should not enjoy immunity from accountability merely because they belong to the institution responsible for administering justice.
VII. Presidential appointments and judicial independence
This is arguably the article's most important constitutional argument.
Pamintuan acknowledges that the President has the constitutional prerogative to appoint the Chief Justice.
She also recognizes that presidents naturally prefer appointing people whom they trust.
However, she identifies a structural problem: the President's appointment power can influence the independence of a co-equal branch of government.
She cites the experience of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
The Renato Corona appointment
* Arroyo appointed Renato Corona as Chief Justice shortly before the end of her presidential term.
* Corona was subsequently removed following conviction in an impeachment trial.
The judicial retirement benefits
Pamintuan also recalls Republic Act No. 9946, signed by Arroyo in January 2010.
The law provided substantial retirement benefits for members of the judiciary, with pensions computed using current salary rates, similar to the retirement arrangements for uniformed personnel.
The author interprets these developments as examples of how presidential decisions concerning judicial appointments and benefits can have implications extending beyond the President's own term.
Her broader concern is that presidents facing possible legal proceedings after leaving office may have an incentive to appoint judicial officials they trust.
This is an institutional risk she identifies, rather than proof that a particular appointment was made to secure protection against future prosecution.
VIII. Proposed reforms
The article does not merely criticize the appointment. It proposes structural reforms to protect judicial independence and accountability.
1. Reduce presidential political influence over judicial appointments.
Although the President's constitutional appointment authority cannot simply be withdrawn, the selection and promotion system should be improved to minimize excessive presidential discretion and political influence.
Pamintuan suggests that mechanisms similar to those used in military appointments and promotions might provide useful models.
2. Prohibit retired Supreme Court justices from accepting presidential appointments.
The author proposes prohibiting retired Supreme Court members from accepting appointments from the incumbent President to other government positions.
This would include appointments to government corporations and potentially lucrative government positions.
The objective is to prevent the possibility that sitting justices might consider future presidential appointments when performing their judicial duties.
3. Strengthen disciplinary and criminal accountability.
The dismissal of corrupt judges should not be the end of the matter.
Where evidence warrants:
* Criminal prosecution should follow.
* Imprisonment should be imposed upon conviction.
* Illegally acquired assets should be recovered.
* Administrative accountability should be enforced consistently.
These measures would reinforce public confidence in the judiciary.
IX. Political and constitutional implications
The article raises five major implications for Philippine democracy.
A. Separation of powers must be real, not merely constitutional language.
The Constitution establishes three co-equal branches of government. But if presidential appointment powers create political dependence within the judiciary, the practical separation of powers can be weakened.
B. Judicial appointments have long-term political consequences.
A Chief Justice exercises institutional influence over judicial administration, court assignments, internal policies and the functioning of the Supreme Court.
The consequences of an appointment therefore extend beyond the immediate political interests of the appointing President.
C. Accountability must apply equally to the powerful.
Former presidents, incumbent officials, legislators, judges and justices must all be subject to the law.
Judicial officials should not become a privileged class protected from criminal investigation and prosecution.
D. The Supreme Court must preserve public confidence.
Even when judicial decisions are legally defensible, the appearance of political favoritism can damage institutional credibility.
Judicial independence requires both actual impartiality and public confidence in that impartiality.
E. Political dynasties and institutional entrenchment reinforce one another.
The article connects the postponement of barangay elections, the interests of incumbent political families and presidential influence over the judiciary.
This suggests a larger problem: political power can perpetuate itself when legislative decisions, executive appointments and judicial rulings reinforce the interests of entrenched political groups.
X. Overall assessment and takeaway
The strongest contribution of Pamintuan's article is its examination of the relationship between presidential appointment powers and judicial independence.
The issue is not simply whether Rodil Zalameda is qualified to become Chief Justice or whether he is senior enough to occupy the position. The President has constitutional discretion in selecting the Chief Justice from the constitutionally qualified nominees.
The more fundamental question is whether the Supreme Court can demonstrate that its loyalty belongs exclusively to the Constitution and the Filipino people—not to the President who appointed its leadership.
There is an important distinction, however: previous judicial decisions favorable to Marcos or his family do not, by themselves, establish bias, corruption or improper presidential influence. Each decision must be evaluated according to its legal reasoning, evidence and procedural history.
Nevertheless, the public is entitled to scrutinize judicial appointments and demand transparency, independence and accountability.
Conclusion
A Supreme Court that is perceived as politically indebted to the President is already suffering an institutional credibility problem, even before any particular case of judicial misconduct is proven. The Chief Justice must therefore demonstrate independence through actual decisions, transparent administration and an uncompromising commitment to accountability.
The ultimate test is whether the Supreme Court can rule against the President, his family, his allies or the administration whenever the Constitution and the law require it.
A Supreme Court must never become the President's court. It must remain the people's constitutional guardian.
Source:
Ana Marie Pamintuan, BBM's Supreme Court, The Philippine Star, November 9, 2026.
https://www.philstar.com/opinion/2026/11/09/2568810/bbms-supreme-court
