"For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary.24 The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture.25 Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.26
Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. Cagas27 and in People v. Taraya,28 the Court added a fourth requisite before "voluntary surrender" may be appreciated in favor of the accused – that there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. Since the warrant of arrest had been issued, petitioner insists that arrest was imminent and the "surrender" could not be considered "voluntary."
In Cagas, after the stabbing incident, the accused ran to the upper portion of the cemetery where a police officer caught up with him. Thereupon, he voluntarily gave himself up. The Court held that if the accused did then and there surrender, it was because he was left with no choice. Thus, the "surrender" was not spontaneous.
In Taraya, when the accused learned that the police authorities were looking for him (because of a warrant for his arrest), he immediately went to the police station where he confessed that he killed the victim. Notwithstanding such surrender and confession to the police, the Court refused to appreciate the mitigating circumstance in his favor.
Lastly, in People v. Barcino, Jr.,29 the accused surrendered to the authorities after more than one year from the incident in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court refused to mitigate the accused’s liability because there was no acknowledgment of the commission of the crime or the intention to save the government the trouble and expense in his search and capture; and there was a pending warrant for his arrest.
Certainly, we cannot apply the same conclusion to the instant case. Cagas is not applicable because the accused therein did not surrender but was caught by the police. In Taraya, the warrant of arrest had, in fact, been issued and was forwarded to the proper authorities for implementation. In Barcino, it was a year after the commission of the crime when the accused went to the police station, not for purposes of acknowledging his culpability, nor to save the government the expense and trouble of looking for and catching him, but actually to deny his culpability.
In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005, the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed a motion for reduction of bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court to issue the warrant of arrest.30
The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the surrender. As distinguished from the earlier cases, upon learning that the court had finally determined the presence of probable cause and even before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest, Geren already gave himself up, acknowledging his culpability. This was bolstered by his eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment. Thus, the trial court was correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender."
We would like to point out that the mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco,31 the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the accused surrendered to the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up.:
G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009
ROSARIO T. DE VERA, Petitioner,
vs.
GEREN A. DE VERA, Respondent
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_172832_2009.html
