"The petition lacks merit.
While we are called upon to resolve the sole issue of whether the CA correctly denied the issuance of the writ of certiorari, we cannot ignore the procedural issues which the trial and appellate courts failed to appreciate.
In filing her motion for reconsideration before the RTC and her petition for certiorari before the CA, petitioner sought the modification of the court’s judgment of conviction against Geren, because of the allegedly mistaken application of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender." The eventual relief prayed for is the increase in the penalty imposed on Geren. Is this action of petitioner procedurally tenable?
Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. – A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
Simply stated, in judgments of conviction, errors in the decision cannot be corrected unless the accused consents thereto; or he, himself, moves for reconsideration of, or appeals from, the decision.13
Records show that after the promulgation of the judgment convicting Geren of bigamy, it was petitioner (as private complainant) who moved for the reconsideration14 of the RTC decision. This was timely opposed by Geren, invoking his right against double jeopardy.15 Although the trial court correctly denied the motion for lack of merit, we would like to add that the same should have been likewise denied pursuant to the above-quoted provision of the Rules.
As explained in People v. Viernes,16 the rule on the modification of judgments of conviction had undergone significant changes before and after the 1964 and 1985 amendments to the Rules. Prior to the 1964 Rules of Court, we held in various cases17 that the prosecution (or private complainant) cannot move to increase the penalty imposed in a promulgated judgment, for to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. The 1964 amendment, however, allowed the prosecutor to move for the modification or the setting aside of the judgment before it became final or an appeal was perfected. In 1985, the Rules was amended to include the phrase "upon motion of the accused," effectively resurrecting our earlier ruling prohibiting the prosecution from seeking a modification of a judgment of conviction. Significantly, the present Rules retained the phrase "upon motion of the accused." Obviously, the requisite consent of the accused is intended to protect him from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked.18
Equally important is this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Court of Appeals19 on the propriety of a special civil action for certiorari assailing a judgment of conviction. In that case, the trial court convicted the accused of homicide. The accused thereafter appealed his conviction to the CA which affirmed the judgment of the trial court but increased the award of civil indemnity. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the prosecution, then filed before this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion. The OSG prayed that the appellate court’s judgment be modified by convicting the accused of homicide without appreciating in his favor any mitigating circumstance. In effect, the OSG wanted a higher penalty to be imposed. The Court declared that the petition constituted a violation of the accused’s right against double jeopardy; hence, dismissible. Certainly, we are not inclined to rule differently.
Indeed, a petition for certiorari may be resorted to on jurisdictional grounds. In People v. Veneracion,20 we entertained the petition for certiorari initiated by the prosecution to resolve the issue of whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in imposing a lower penalty. In that case, the trial judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refused to impose the penalty of death because of his strong personal aversion to the death penalty law, and imposed instead reclusion perpetua. In resolving the case in favor of the prosecution, the Court concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion, and remanded the case to the trial court for the imposition of the proper penalty. By so doing, we allowed a modification of the judgment not on motion of the accused but through a petition initiated by the prosecution. But it was an exceptional case. Here and now, we reiterate the rule that review is allowed only in apparently void judgments where there is a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The aggrieved parties, in such cases, must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.21
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and cause of its alleged misappreciation of the mitigating circumstance of voluntarrrender. Consequently, the trial court’s action cannot come within the ambit of the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the trial court’s action becomes an improper object of, and therefore non-reviewable by, certiorari.23:
G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009
ROSARIO T. DE VERA, Petitioner,
vs.
GEREN A. DE VERA, Respondent
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_172832_2009.html
