MUTILATION, Article 262, Revised Penal Code

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As to the charge of mutilation, Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime as –

Art. 262. Mutilation. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.

Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.

A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows that the elements55 of mutilation under the first paragraph of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive the offended party of some essential organ for reproduction. According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and penalized above, i.e., "[t]he vasectomy operation did not in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive organ, which is still very much part of his physical self." Petitioner Gloria Aguirre, however, would want this Court to make a ruling that bilateral vasectomy constitutes the crime of mutilation.

This we cannot do, for such an interpretation would be contrary to the intentions of the framers of our penal code.

A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v. Esparcia,56 in which this Court had the occasion to shed light on the implication of the term mutilation. Therein we said that:

The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not the crime committed is that defined and penalized by article 414 of the Penal Code. The English translation of this article reads: "Any person who shall intentionally castrate another shall suffer a penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The Spanish text, which should govern, uses the word "castrare," inadequately translated into English as "castrate." The word "capar," which is synonymous of "castrar," is defined in the Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the organs of generation or conception. Clearly it is the intention of the law to punish any person who shall intentionally deprived another of any organ necessary for reproduction. An applicable construction is that of Viada in the following language:

"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is the mutilation known by the name of 'castration' which consists of the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for generation. The law could not fail to punish with the utmost severity such a crime, which, although not destroying life, deprives a person of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind that according to this article in order for 'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that the 'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look only to the result but also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a person is deprived of the organs of generation, the act, although voluntary, not being intentional to that end, it would not come under the provisions of this article, but under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada, Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)

Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of some essential organ of reproduction? We answer in the negative.

In the male sterilization procedure of vasectomy, the tubular passage, called the vas deferens, through which the sperm (cells) are transported from the testicle to the urethra where they combine with the seminal fluid to form the ejaculant, is divided and the cut ends merely tied.57 That part, which is cut, that is, the vas deferens, is merely a passageway that is part of the duct system of the male reproductive organs. The vas deferens is not an organ, i.e., a highly organized unit of structure, having a defined function in a multicellular organism and consisting of a range of tissues.58 Be that as it may, even assuming arguendo that the tubular passage can be considered an organ, the cutting of the vas deferens does not divest or deny a man of any essential organ of reproduction for the simple reason that it does not entail the taking away of a part or portion of the male reproductive system. The cut ends, after they have been tied, are then dropped back into the incision.59

Though undeniably, vasectomy denies a man his power of reproduction, such procedure does not deprive him, "either totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction." Notably, the ordinary usage of the term "mutilation" is the deprivation of a limb or essential part (of the body),60 with the operative expression being "deprivation." In the same manner, the word "castration" is defined as the removal of the testies or ovaries.61 Such being the case in this present petition, the bilateral vasectomy done on Larry could not have amounted to the crime of mutilation as defined and punished under Article 262, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code. And no criminal culpability could be foisted on to respondent Dr. Agatep, the urologist who performed the procedure, much less the other respondents. Thus, we find sufficient evidence to explain why the Assistant City Prosecutor and the DOJ ruled the way they did. Verily, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the writ of certiorari is unavailing; hence, should not be issued.

It is once more apropos to pointedly apply the Court's general policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations. As it has been oft said, the Supreme Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case.62 The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but, as a rule, have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.63 The possible exception to this rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But that is not the case herein.

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G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008

GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B. PASCUAL, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/mar2008/gr_170723_2008.html