Civil liability in criminal cases, when inapplicable

"xxx.

Petitioner files the instant petition onthe civil aspect of the case alleging that:

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONVICTING THE RESPONDENT SO THAT EVEN IF THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED TO ACQUIT HIM IT SHOULD HAVE AT LEAST RETAINED THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONER.73

We find no merit in the petition.

To begin with, in Manantan v. CA,74 we discussed the consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of the accused as follows:

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act oromission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission." x x x.75

A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:

The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance inthis case indicate the weakness of her submissions.76

Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc.,77 we explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows:

x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.78

The issue of whether petitioner gave respondent the amount of US$100,000.00 is factual. While we are not a trier of facts, there are instances, however, when we are called upon to re-examine the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals and weigh, after considering the records of the case, which of the conflicting findings is more in accord with law and justice.79 Such is the case before us.

In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried toHong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation ofsomeone who had been swindled.

We find no reversible error committed by the CA in its findings.

Petitioner failed to prove on how she raised the money allegedly given to respondent. She testified that from December 2001 to May 2002, she was raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as the capital for the actual operation of the Phillip Salvador Freight and Remittance International Limited in Hong Kong,80 and that she was ableto raise the same in May 2002.81 She did so by selling82 or pawning83 her pieces of diamond jewelry. However, there was no documentary evidence showing those transactions within the period mentioned. Upon further questioning on cross-examination on where she got the money, she then said that she had plenty of dollars as she is a frequent traveler to Hong Kong and Bangkok to shop for her boutique in Glorietta and Star Mall.84 Such testimony contradicts her claim that she was still raising the money for 5 months and that she was only able to formally raise the money in May 2002.

There was also no receipt that indeed US$100,000.00 was given by petitioner to respondent.1âwphi1 Petitioner in her testimony, both in the direct and cross examinations, said that the US$100,000.00 given to respondent was for the actual expenses for setting up the office and the operation of the business in Hong Kong.85 She claimed that she treated the freight and remittance business like any of her businesses;86 that she, respondent, and the latter’s brother even agreed to divide whatever profits they would have from the business;87 and that giving US$100,000.00 to respondent was purely business to her.88 She also said that she kept records of all her business, such that, if there are no records, there are no funds entrusted89 . Since petitioner admitted that giving the money to respondent was for business, there must be some records ofsuch transaction as what she did in her other businesses.

In fact, it was not unusual for petitioner to ask respondent for some documents evidencing the latter's receipt of money for the purpose of business as this was done in her previous business dealings with respondent. She had asked respondent to execute a real estate mortgage on his condominium unit90 for the ₱5 million she loaned him in August 2001. Also, when petitioner gave respondent an additional loan of ₱10 million in December 2001, for the latter to redeem the title to his condominium unit from the bank, she had asked him to sign an acknowledgment receipt for the total amount of ₱15 million he got from her.91 She had done all these despite her testimony that she trusted respondent from the day they met in December 2000 until the day he ran away from her in August 2003.92

Petitioner insists that she did not ask for any acknowledgment receipt from respondent, because the latter told her not to have traces that she was giving money to him as it might jeopardize her then ongoing annulment proceedings. However, petitioner's testimony would belie such claim of respondent being cautious of the annulment proceedings. She declared that when she and her husband separated, respondent stood as a father to her children.93 Respondent attended school programs of her children,94 and fetched them from school whenever the driver was not around.95 In fact, at the time the annulment case was already pending, petitioner registered the freight and remittance business under respondent’s name and the local branch office of the business would be in petitioner's condominium unit in Makati.96 Also, when petitioner went with her mother and Ramon to Hong Kong to register the business, it was respondent who tookcare of her children. She intimated that it was respondent who was insistent in going to their house.

Worthy to mention is that petitioner deposited the amount of ₱500,000.00 to respondent's account with United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in July 2003.97 Also, when respondent was in New York in August 2003, petitioner sent him the amount of US$2,000.00 by telegraphic transfer.98 Petitioner's act ofdepositing money to respondent's account contradicted her claim that there should be no traces that she was giving money to respondent during the pendency of the annulment case.

Petitioner conceded that she could have either bought a manager's check in US dollars from the bank orsend the money by bank transfer, but she did not do so on the claim that there might be traces of the transaction.99 However, the alleged US$100,000.00was supposed to be given to respondent because of the freight and remittance business; thus, there is nothing wrong to have a record of the same, specially since respondent had to account for the valid expenseshe incurred with the money.100

The testimony of Enrico, petitioner's brother, declaring that he was present when petitioner gave respondent the US$100,000.00 did not help. Enrico testified that when petitioner filed the instant case in September 2004, another case was also filed by petitioner against respondent and his brother Ramon in the same City Prosecutor's office in Las Piñas where Enrico had submitted his affidavit. Enrico did not submit an affidavit in this case even when he allegedly witnessed the giving of the money to respondent as petitioner told him that he could just testify for the other case. However, when the other case was dismissed, it was then that petitioner told him to be a witness in this case. Enrico should have been considered at the first opportunity if he indeed had personal knowledge of the alleged giving of money to respondent. Thus, presenting Enrico as a witness only after the other case was dismissed would create doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated February 11, 2010, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."

G.R. No. 191240 July 30, 2014

CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/jul2014/gr_191240_2014.html