DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS

RULE 138, RULES OF COURT

(Attorneys and Admission to Bar):

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain ALLEGIANCE to the REPUBLIC OF RHE PHILIPPINES and to support the CONSTITUTION and obey the LAWS of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him TO BE JUST, and such defenses only as he believes TO BE HONESTLY DEBATABLE UNDER THE LAW.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, SUCH MEANS ONLY AS ARE CONSISTENT WITH TRUTH AND HONOR, and NEVER SEEK TO MISLEAD the judge or any judicial officer BY ANY ARTIFICE OR FALSE STATEMENTS OF FACT OR LAW;

(e) To maintain inviolate the CONFIDENCE, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the SECRETS OF HIS CLIENTS, and TO ACCEPT NO COMPENSATION in connection with his client's business EXCEPT FROM HIM or with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To ABSTAIN from all OFFENSIVE PERSONALITY and TO ADVANCE NO FACT PREJUDICIAL TO THE HONOR OR REPUTATION OF A PARTY OR WITNESS, UNLESS REQUIRED BY THE JUSTICE OF THE CAUSE WITH WHICH HE IS CHARGED;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an ACTION OR PROCEEDING, or DELAY any man's cause, from any CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the DEFENSELESS OR OPPRESSED;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, BY ALL FAIR AND HONORABLE MEANS, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

ON SEARCH WARRANTS

 ON SEARCH WARRANTS

By MANUEL LASERNA JR. 

Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights), of the 1987 Constitution refers to the RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

Let us discuss its legal concept.

1. The right of the people "to be secure" in their "PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, and EFFECTS" against unreasonable searches and seizures "OF WHATEVER NATURE" and "FOR ANY PURPOSE" shall be "INVIOLABLE."

To repeat, the right against unreasonable search and seizure is "INVIOLABLE".

2.  No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon "PROBABLE CAUSE" to be "DETERMINED PERSONALLY" by "THE JUDGE."

The powers (a) to determine the existence of "probable cause" and (b) to issue a search warrant are  EXCLUSIVELY VESTED by the Constitution on the JUDICIARY.

These powers DO NOT BELONG to the EXECUTIVE, the CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY, the AFP and the PNP.

The determination of the existence of "probable cause" must be "PERSONALLY" performed by "THE JUDGE".

It MAY NOT BE DELEGATED by him.

3. The judge shall PERSONALLY conduct an "EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION" of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

The examination to be conducted by the judge must be SEARCHING in character, NOT PERFUNCTORY  HAPHAZARD OR RECKLESS.

The searching examination partakes of the nature of an ADVERSARIAL CROSS EXAMINATION. 

The reason behind the MANDATORY SEARCHING EXAMINATION RULE is that the CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure and the sanctity of his LIFE, LIBERTY, PROPERTY  and SECURITY and those of his FAMILY are at stake.

The "COMPLAINANT" is the "APPLICANT" for a search warrant (policeman or soldier).

He is a POLICEMAN OR A SOLDIER in a military or a police  intelligence unit or in a field operations unit,  tasked with a mission order to SURVEIL A SUSPECT and to BUILD UP THE CRIMINAL CASE against him.

The allegations in the application may include the intelligence reports of his  CONFIDENTIAL ASSET.

The applicant is NOT DUTY BOUND TO REVEAL to the judge the IDENTITY and personal circumstance of his CONFIDENTIAL ASSET.

Judges respect the  CONFIDENTIALITY RULE of the AFP and the PNP as to the identities and personal circumstances of their  CONFIDENTIAL ASSETS.

The applicant must file with the judge an APPLICATION UNDER OATH,

(a) stating THE FACTS supporting such an application and
(b) attaching the DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

to  justify the approval of the aplication.

As earlier stated, the issuing judge is duty bound to CROSS EXAMINE the applicant THROUGH SEARCHING QUESTIONSS.

He must actively and tediously SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH through his PENETRATING ADVERSARIAL  QUESTIONS.

The proceeding may be held inside the chamber of the judge -- not inside the regular court sala where public trials are usually held -- to maintain the CONFIDENTIALITY of the application.

4.  The SEARCH WARRANT issued by the judge shall  "PARTICULARLY" describe:

(a) "THE PLACE to be searched" and (b) "THE PERSONS or THINGS to be seized."

A violation of the aforementioned PARTICULARITY RULE (or any of the constitutional principles discussed above, for that matter) shall INVALIDATE THE SEARCH WARRANT upon filing by an aggrieved party of a timely  MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT and a MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. 

FURTHER, it must be noted that Section 3, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution provides that "ANY EVIDENCE" obtained in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, as discussed above, shall be "INADMISSIBLE: for "ANY PURPOSE" in "ANY PROCEEDING."

Parenthetically, the aforementioned Section 3 also provides that the "PRIVACY" of "COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE" shall be "INVIOLABLE"

The exceptions thereto are:

(a) a "LAWFUL ORDER" of the court, or
(b) when "PUBLIC SAFETY OR ORDER" requires otherwise, "AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW."

Similarly, "ANY EVIDENCE" obtained in violation of foregoing RIGHT TO "PRIVACY" shall be "INADMISSIBLE" for "ANY PURPOSE" in "ANY PROCEEDING."

AS A FINAL WORD, any party who VIOLATES athe foregoing constitutional requirements -- be he a JUDGE, a POLICEMAN, a SOLDIER or a CIVILIAN --  may be exposed to CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES, as may be WARRANTED  by the facts of the case, pursuant to applicable laws, e.g.,

*Revised Penal Code (perjury, falsification, etc.),
*New Civil Code (abuse of right, torts and damages or quasi-delict/culpa acquillana),
*Anti-Torture Act of 2009 (RA 9745),
*Anti-Terrorism Act (R.A  11479, now being questioned in the SC),
*Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019),
*Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees (RA 6713),
*Revised Administrative Code (Book V, E.O. No. 292),
*and others.

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Libel in relation to freedoms of speech, press, assembly and petition

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. GREGORIO PERFECTO, defendant-appellant. EN BANC, G.R. No. 16924, March 23, 1922


"x x x.

In the case of United States vs. Bustos ([1918], 37 Phil., 731, 739), it was said, and it is now repeated:

Freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in Filipinas Despues de Cien Años ( The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus, non," which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "The minister . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipino delegates." The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of La Solidaridad and by other means invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino people demanded "liberty of the press, of cults, and of associations." (See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights zealously guarded freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition.

x x x x x x x x x

A reform so sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, should now be protected and carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.

Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The Constitution of the United States and the State constitutions guarantee the right of freedom of speech and press and the right of assembly and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find President Mckinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for the Philippines, continued this guaranty. The words quoted are not unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are the counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the American people demanded before giving their approval to the Constitution.

x x x x x x x x x

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Compete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be borne for the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.

The development of an informed public opinion in the Philippines can certainly not be brought about by the constant prosecution of those citizens who have the courage to denounce the maladministration of public affairs. The time of prosecuting officers could be better served, in bringing to stern account the many who profit by the vices of the country, than by prosecution which amounts to persecution of the few who are helping to make, what the country so much needs, an enlightened public opinion. Accordingly, it is again for the appellate court to vindicate a defendant editor.

x x x."

Libel; truth and good motive as defenses

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle, vs. GREGORIO PERFECTO, defendant-appellant. EN BANC, G.R. No. 16924, March 23, 1922


"x x x.

Both under the ancient civil law and the ancient common law, the truth was no defense in a criminal prosecution for libel. This position was defended by the old maxim, the greater the truth the greater the libel. Beginning, however, with Lord Campbell's Act (6 and 7 Vict., chap. 96) in England, truth in criminal actions for libel was allowed in many jurisdictions as a justification, provided the publication was also made with good motives and for justifiable ends. To this class belongs the Philippines, for in the Libel Law (Act No. 277, section 4), it is provided that "In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the court, and if it appears to the court that the matter charged as libelous is true and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; otherwise he shall be convicted; but to establish this defense, not only must the truth of the matter so charged be proven, but also that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends." A few more progressive states have made truth a complete defense in criminal prosecutions regardless of motive or intent.

x x x."

The dangers of red-tagging under the Anti-Terrorism Law - Vera Files

See - https://verafiles.org/articles/vera-files-fact-sheet-dangers-red-tagging-under-anti-terrori


"x x x.

The dangers of red-tagging under the Anti-Terrorism Law

VERA FILES

DECEMBER 08, 2020

x x x.

2. What is the legal status of the CPP-NPA in the country?

The CPP-NPA -- as one entity -- was declared in December 2017 as a “designated/identified terrorist group” by President Rodrigo Duterte through Proclamation No. 374 on the basis of Republic Act (RA) 10168, or the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012. However, it has not been outlawed pending its proscription by the Court of Appeals (CA).

Under RA 10168, a “designated/identified terrorist group” will fall under the jurisdiction of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) for the freezing and forfeiture of properties or funds because the law criminalizes financing of terrorism.

Membership in the CPP is not a crime and has not been since 1992 when then president Fidel Ramos repealed RA 1700, or the 1957 Anti-Subversion Law, through RA 7636. The Duterte administration, however, had wanted to revive it purportedly to counter the recruitment of communist rebels among the Filipino youth.

So far, the petition filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) to officially declare the CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization is still pending at the CA.

DOJ’s petition was previously filed with the Manila Regional Trial Court as required under RA 9372. Following the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020, hearings for the DOJ petition will be “transferred to a division of the [CA] to be authorized by the [SC], according to Sen. Panfilo “Ping” Lacson, principal sponsor and author of the measure.

Under the saving clause of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, released on Oct. 16, all judicial decisions and orders issued, as well as “pending actions relative to the implementation of the [HSA],” will remain valid and effective.

Several groups and individuals have questioned a number of provisions in the Anti-Terrorism Act signed by Duterte on July 3. At least 37 petitions are pending before the SC, contesting the constitutionality of the law. Oral arguments on the legal challenges were set for Jan. 19. 2021.

3. What happens if persons, organizations, or associations are designated or proscribed as ‘terrorists’ under the Anti-Terrorism Act?

RA 11479 provides two levels in which individuals, groups, organizations, or associations may be regarded as “terrorists:” designation, then proscription.

Under the new law, the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) -- composed of key Cabinet officials, including the executive secretary, national security adviser, and the secretaries of foreign affairs and defense -- is empowered to designate persons or entities as "terrorists."

A person suspected -- with probable cause -- to have committed, of actually committing, or of attempting to commit an act of terrorism, as defined by the ATA, in the presence of a law enforcement officer or military personnel may be arrested without a warrant and detained for up to 24 days, after which the suspect must be turned over to the proper judicial authority.

In such cases, the nearest court must be notified in writing by the law enforcement agent custodian within 48 hours from the time of arrest. The ATC and CHR must also then be given a copy of the notification given to the judge to “ensure” adherence to the 48-hour requirement.
4. What other dangers do red-tagged persons or groups face?

At worst, red-tagging can lead to warrantless arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, or extrajudicial killings, according to a 2012 study by the International Peace Observers Network (IPON) Philippines, a nonprofit human rights organization based in Hamburg, Germany.

In August 2019, Global Witness, an international nonprofit organization which focuses on protecting human rights and fights environmental abuses by exposing links of conflict and corruption, said continued “red-tagging” of human rights and environmental activists had earned for the Philippines the top spot as the “world’s deadliest country for [environment] defenders” for that year. (See Red tagging puts PH as ‘deadliest country’ for environment defenders: Global Witness)

In April this year, activist Jory Porquia, coordinator of party-list Bayan Muna in Iloilo, was gunned down by unidentified men. In August, peace consultant Randall Echanis, a peasant leader and former chairperson of Anakpawis party-list, was killed inside his home in Quezon City, and was found to have been “tortured” before his death, according to the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). In the same month, Zara Alvarez, a legal worker of Karapatan, a network of human rights defenders in the country, was shot dead in Bacolod City. Alvarez was the 13th human rights worker from Karapatan killed under the Duterte administration, according to the group's statement.

Following the death of Alvarez, CHR spokesperson Jacqueline Ann de Guia said in a statement:
“CHR stresses, as reflected in its Report on the Situation of Human Right Defenders in the Philippines (2020), that the act of red-tagging of human rights defenders alone already constitutes a grave threat to their lives, liberty, and security. Further, tagging human rights workers and advocates as terrorists distorts the nature of their work and makes them open, legitimate targets to attacks and a number of violations.”

Source: Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines Official Facebook page, Statement of CHR spokesperson, Atty Jacqueline Ann de Guia, on the killing of Zara Alvarez, Aug. 20, 2020

5. What legal remedies are available when ‘tagged’ under the Anti-Terrorism Act?

An individual or group designated or identified as a terrorist may file a “verified request” for delisting before the ATC within 15 days after publication of the designation in a newspaper of general circulation, the online Official Gazette, and the website of the ATC, as required under the IRR.

It may be filed as often as the following grounds are present, but the filing must be done six months from the time of denial of an earlier request. The grounds are:

mistaken identity;
relevant and significant change of facts or circumstance;
newly discovered evidence;
death of designated person;
dissolution or liquidation of designated organizations, associations, or groups of persons; or
any other circumstance showing that the basis for designation no longer exists.

A group or organization may contest the proscription before the CA, Arabejo said. “If successful, the preliminary order of proscription will be lifted,” he added.

In Rule 7 of the IRR, the proscription is considered valid for three years after its publication. Six months before the “permanent order of proscription” is set to expire, the DOJ, as authorized by the ATC and NICA, may “cause [its] review” by filing the appropriate application before the CA.

The CA will then review the application for the reissuance of the proscription and decide whether the permanent order of proscription should be lifted or reissued.

Those who are unlawfully intercepted or arrested without legal grounds may file a writ of habeas data, a judicial remedy to any person whose right to privacy, liberty, or security is violated or threatened by “unlawful act” of a public official in the course of “gathering, collecting, or storing” information about the aggrieved person or party.

“Unfortunately, there are no formal legal procedures” to deal with red-tagging, Arabejo said.

On December 4, Karapatan filed criminal and administrative complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman against high ranking officials of NTF-ELCAC, including National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon, Parlade, Badoy, and former Communications undersecretary Margaux “Mocha” Uson, using RA 9851 or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity. The group said the red-tagging activities of these officials fall under crimes against humanity of persecution.

x x x."

Following the judiciary

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Police body cameras

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APPLICATION OF INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES

RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES. 

ARTICLE 63, REVISED PENAL CODE.

"Under ART. 248 of the REVISED PENAL CODE, as AMENDED by R.A. No. 7659, MURDER shall be punishable by the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA  TO DEATH. It is composed of TWO INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES, warranting the application of ARTICLE 63 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, viz:

ARTICLE 63. RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES. - In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of TWO INDIVISIBLE PENALTIES, the following RULES shall be observed in the APPLICATION thereof:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present ONLY ONE
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, the GREATER PENALTY shall be applied.

2. When there are NEITHER MITIGATING NOR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES in the commission of the deed, the LESSER PENALTY shall be applied.

3. When the commission of the act is attended by SOME MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES and there is NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, the LESSER PENALTY shall be applied.

4. When BOTH MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to OFFSET ONE ANOTHER in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation. (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the RTC PROPERLY IMPOSED the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

X x x."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JONAS PANTOJA Y ASTORGA, Accused-Appellants
G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017. 

DIMINISHED WILL POWER AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

"Even if the MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DIMINISHED
WILLPOWER were to be considered
in accused-appellant's favor, it
CANNOT be a basis for CHANGING
THE NATURE OF THE CRIMES NOR FOR IMPOSING A PENALTY LOWER THAN THAT PRESCRIBED BY LAW.

Accused-appellant contends that even assuming his insanity was not sufficiently proven, the Court should convict him of homicide only because the defense has proven that he has an illness which diminishes the exercise of his willpower without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.

This contention is WITHOUT MERIT. At the outset, the PRESENCE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES DOES NOT CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE CRIME. It CAN ONLY AFFECT THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY, depending on the kind of penalty and the number of attendant mitigating circumstances.

While the evidence of accused-appellant DOES NOT SHOW that he was COMPLETELY DEPRIVED OF INTELLIGENCE OR CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS when he committed the crime, there is SUFFICIENT INDICATION that he was suffering from SOME IMPAIRMENT OF HIS MENTAL FACULTIES; thus, he may be CREDITED WITH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DIMINISHED WILLPOWER.

X x x."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JONAS PANTOJA Y ASTORGA, Accused-Appellants
G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017. 

TREACHERY IS PRESENT WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD OF TENDER YEARS

 TREACHERY IS PRESENT WHEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD OF TENDER YEARS.

"Since the VICTIM WAS A CHILD OF
TENDER YEARS, TREACHERY WAS
PROPERLY APPRECIATED against
accused-appellant.

The RTC properly considered the killing as MURDER QUALIFIED BY TREACHERY, thereby warranting the imposition of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Well-settled is the rule that TREACHERY exists when the prosecution has sufficiently proven the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the accused employs means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.31

This Court has held that the KILLING OF A CHILD IS CHARACTERIZED BY TREACHERY even if the manner of the assault is not shown because the WEAKNESS OF THE VICTIM DUE TO HIS TENDER AGE results in the absence of any danger to the accused.32

Considering that the victim in this case was only six (6) years old, treachery attended his murder.

X X X."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JONAS PANTOJA Y ASTORGA, Accused-Appellants
G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017. 

INSANITY AS AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE

"ISSUE

This Court is tasked to determine whether accused-appellant has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of INSANITY TO EXEMPT HIM FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY and, in the negative, whether his mental issues constitute DIMINISHED WILLPOWER SO AS TO MITIGATE HIS LIABILITY AND TO LOWER THE PENALTY.

THE COURT'S RULING

After a careful evaluation of the records, this Court sees no reason to overturn the decision of the CA, except to modify the amount of damages awarded.

The defense of INSANITY is in the
nature of a CONFESSION AND
AVOIDANCE, requiring DEFENDANT TO PROVE IT WITH CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

The RTC and the CA both found that all the elements constituting murder exist in the case at bar, with accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The accused-appellant did not present evidence controverting such findings. However, accused-appellant raises the defense of insanity in claiming that he should not be found criminally liable.

INSANITY IS ONE OF THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, viz:

ART. 12. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY. - The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An INSECURE or an INSANE person, UNLESS the latter has acted during a LUCID INTERVAL.

x x x x

Strictly speaking, a person acting under any of the EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES COMMITS A CRIME BUT CANNOT BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE therefor. The EXEMPTION FROM PUNISHMENT stems from the COMPLETE ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE OR FREE WILL in performing the act.18

The defense of insanity is thus in the nature of a confession or avoidance. The defendant who asserts it is, in effect, ADMITTING TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. Consequently, the BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTS TO DEFENDANT, who must PROVE HIS DEFENSE WITH CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.19

In People v. Madarang,20 the Court ruled that a MORE STRINGENT STANDARD IN APPRECIATING INSANITY AS AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE has been established, viz:

In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN COMMITTING THE ACT, i.e., the accused is DEPRIVED OF REASON; he ACTED WITHOUT THE LEAST DISCERNMENT because there is a COMPLETE ABSENCE OF THE POWER TO DISCERN, or that there is a TOTAL DEPRIVATION OF THE WILL. MERE ABNORMALITY OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES WILL NOT EXCLUDE IMMUTABILITY. (emphasis supplied)

Moreover, the evidence of the defense must establish that such INSANITY constituting COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE EXISTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING OR SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.21

Thus, for the defense of insanity to prosper, TWO (2) ELEMENTS must concur: (1) that defendant's insanity constitutes a COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE, REASON, OR DISCERNMENT; and (2) that such insanity EXISTED AT THE TIME OF, OR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING, THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

Since no man can know what goes on in the mind of another, one's behavior and outward acts can only be determined and judged by proof. Such PROOF may take the form of OPINION TESTIMONY by a WITNESS who is INTIMATELY ACQUAINTED WITH THE ACCUSED; by a WITNESS who has RATIONAL BASIS to conclude that the accused was INSANE based on the witness' own PERCEPTION of the accused; or by a witness who is qualified as an EXPERT, such as a PSYCHIATRIST.22

The proof proffered by accused-
appellant is insufficient to
sustain his defense of insanity.

To prove its assertion, the defense presented the testimonies of accused-appellant and Cederina. It also offered in evidence a (1) LETTER from the NCMH addressed to Cederina; (2) accused-appellant's PATIENT IDENTIFICATION CARDS FROM THE NCMH AND THE PGH; (3) accused-appellant's CLINICAL RECORDS; and (4) DOCTOR'S PRESCRIPTIONS.

A scrutiny of the evidence presented by accused-appellant unfortunately FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY BEREFT OF REASON FOR DISCERNMENT AND FREEDOM OF WILL when he fatally stabbed the victim. The paucity in accused-appellant's proof is shown by the following circumstances:

First, the testimony of Cederina tends to show that accused-appellant exhibited signs of mental illness only after being injured in an altercation in 2003; that she observed changes in his personality and knew he had difficulty sleeping since then; that accused-appellant was confined in the hospital a few times over the years for his mental issues; and that he was confined at the NCMH on 8 July 2010 from where he subsequently escaped. Nothing in her testimony pointed to any behavior of the accused-appellant AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION, OR IN THE DAYS AND HOURS BEFORE THE INCIDENT, which could establish that he was insane WHEN HE COMMITTED THE OFFENSES, as seen from the following exchange during trial: x x x.

X x x.

The foregoing narration does not attribute to accused-appellant any behavior indicative of insanity at the time of, or immediately preceding, the incident. His SEEMINGLY ODD BEHAVIOUR of repeatedly GOING IN AND OUT OF THE HOUSE in the days PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT DOES NOT, IN ANY WAY, DEMONSTRATE HIS INSANITY.

In People v. Florendo,24 the Court held that "the prevalent meaning of the word 'CRAZY" is NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH THE LEGAL TERMS 'INSANE,' 'NON COMPOSITION MALENTIS,' 'UNSOUND MIND,' 'IDIOT,' or 'LUNATIC.' The POPULAR CONCEPTION of the word 'CRAZY' is being used to describe a person or an act UNNATURAL OR OUT OF THE ORDINARY. A man may behave in a CRAZY MANNER but it DOES NOT NECESSARILY AND CONCLUSIVELY PROVE THAT HE IS LEGALLY SO." Not every ABERRATION OF THE MIND OR MENTAL DEFICIENCY constitutes INSANITY.25

For purposes of EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY, MERE BEHAVIORAL ODDITIES CANNOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF INSANITY unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a TOTAL ABSENCE OF REASONABLE, DISCERNMENT, OR FREE WILL AT THE TIME THE CRIMES WAS COMMITTED.

As admitted by Cederina, prior to the incident, THERE WERE MOMENTS when she observed that accused-appellant  APPEARED WELL. On the DAY IN QUESTION and IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE INCIDENT, NO IMPROPER, VIOLENT OR ABERRANT BEHAVIOR WAS OBSERVED of accused-appellant, as he was merely sitting on the balcony before he suddenly disappeared to go to the victim's house. During the commission of the crime itself, there were NO EYEWITNESSES who could relay the behavior of accused-appellant, as even Cederina happened upon the accused-appellant and the victim only AFTER the stabbing incident.

Second, accused-appellant testified that he was admitted to the hospital for his mental illness several times prior to the incident, which is corroborated by the testimony of his mother and in a report26 on his mental condition issued by the NCMH on 21 February 2011. This fact, however, DOES NOT ALSO PROVE THAT HE WAS INSANE AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED THE CRIME. PRIOR CONFINEMENT at a mental institution DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, CONSTITUTE PROOF OF INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.27 Even accused-appellant admitted during trial that he was released from confinement from time to time, which resulted after doctors deemed him well after a series of examinations and interviews, to wit: X x x.

X x x.

Thus, even assuming accused-appellant was insane, SUCH INSANITY WAS CLEARLY NOT CONTINUOUS, AS HE HAD LUCID INTERVALS. Consequently, it is PRESUMED THAT HE WAS SANE, OR WAS IN A LUCID INTERVAL, AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED THE CRIME.

Third, the documents offered in evidence by the defense DO NOT CATEGORICALLY STATE that accused-appellant was insane; nor do they show WHEN he became insane; whether such insanity constituted ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION OF REASON, INTELLIGENCE, AND DISCERNMENT; and whether such insanity EXISTED AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED THE CRIME. NO EXPERT TESTIMONY was also presented to testify on such.

As correctly held by the R TC, the letter from the NCMH merely informed Cederina of the accused-appellant's escape on 14 July 2010; but the fact that he was ABLE TO ESCAPE UNNOTICED FROM THE INSTITUTIONS AND TO RETURN HOME BY HIMSELF is indicative of REASONABLEDOUBT INTELLIGENCE AND FREE WILL merely a week BEFORE the commission of the crime. The patient's identification cards29 issued by the NCMH and the PGH are only indicative of accused-appellant's admission therein, which is not disputed, and nothing else. The clinical abstract30 issued by PGH, while diagnosing accused-appellant with PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIA, appears to have been issued on 18 February 2007, YEARS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES and could not serve as basis to rule that he was insane WHEN HE COMMITTED IT. Finally, the DOCTOR'S PRESCRIPTION SLIPS only contain the MEDICATIONS prescribed, but do not show the SPECIFIC ILLNESS targeted by the medicine.

A consideration of all the foregoing pieces of evidence clearly does not point to accused-appellant's insanity AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED THE CRIME.

X X X."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JONAS PANTOJA Y ASTORGA, Accused-Appellants
G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017. 

When the mental health system takes over the criminal justice system

 Go to link -

https://youtu.be/dNTdBxb4x_A

Covid-19 pandemic: the world demands justice from the Chinese Communist Party

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https://youtu.be/OF9to1iBia0

Should you trust unanimous decisions - TED Ed.

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https://youtu.be/heCSbA8w57A

ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS

ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS, DEFINED. 

SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, RA 9165, AS AMENDED. 

"Under SECTION 5, ARTICLE II of R.A. No. 9165 or ILLEGAL SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS, in order to be convicted of the said violation, the following must concur:

(1) the IDENTITY of the buyer and the seller, the OBJECT OF THE SALE and its CONSIDERATION; and (2) the DELIVERY of the thing sold and the PAYMENT therefor.16 (Citation omitted )

In the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the ILLICIT DRUGS CONFISCATED from the accused comprise the CORPUS DELICTI of the charge.17 In People v. Gatlabayan,18 "the Court held that it is of paramount importance that the IDENTITY OF THE DANGEROUS DRUG BE ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; and that it must be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is EXACTLY THE SAME SUBSTANCE OFFERED IN EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. In fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the court as EXHIBIT and that which was exhibited must be THE VERY SAME SUBSTANCE RECOVERED FROM THE SUSPECT."19 Thus, the CHAIN OF CUSTODY carries out this purpose "as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed." 20

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MUSTAFA SALI Y ALAVVADDIN A.K.A. "TAPANG/PANG," ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 236596, January 29, 2020. 

CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF EVIDENCE IN DRUG CASES

CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF EVIDENCE IN DRUG CASES EXPLAINED.  SECTION 21, RA 9165, AS AMENDED.

"The prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized sachets of shabu from the time they were recovered from Sali up to the time they were presented in court. Section 1 (b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,21 which implements the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines chain of custody as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]

To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21 (a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non­ compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall, be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

In the present case, the physical inventory and photograph, as evidenced by the Certificate of inventory,22 were done at the PDEA, Regional Office 9, Upper Calarian, Zamboanga City, and not where the buy-bust operation was conducted. Although these processes may be excused in cases where the safety and security of the apprehending officers, witnesses required by law and item seized are threatened by immediate danger, the present case is not one of those. The allegation that the physical inventory and photograph were not done in the crime scene because of security reason will not suffice. The prosecution failed to expound what security threats the law enforcement agents were facing at the time of the buy-bust operation.

In the Joint-Affidavit of Arrest of IO1 Lanza and IO2 Natividad, it was mentioned that it was only after Sali was brought to their office, which is at the PDEA, Regional Office 9, when the proper documentation happened and not immediately upon seizure and arrest. There is also no justification contained in the Joint-Affidavit of Arrest of why the physical inventory and photograph were done away from the crime scene. It is hard to imagine that the apprehending officers were able to mark the items seized at the crime scene but were not able to photograph the same.

Moreover, it is apparent from the Certificate of Inventory that it was signed by the representatives from the media and the Department of Justice, and by an elected public official, but there is no signature of Sali or his representative. No evidence was proffered to indicate that the inventory was conducted in the presence of Sali or his duly authorized representative. The photographs submitted as evidence could not conclusively determine whether Sali was present during the inventory.

Hence, the prosecution failed to prove valid causes for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. Worse, there is no showing that earnest efforts were done to secure the attendance of Sali 's representative. The witnesses' testimonies in open court and in the Joint-Affidavit miserably failed to mention the causes for non­ compliance with Section 21.

The Court stressed in People of the Philippines v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:23

The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for non­ compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.

The non-observance of the procedure mandated by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, casts serious doubt if the illegal drugs presented in court are the same illegal drugs seized from Sali. It is worthy to note the quantities of the illegal drugs seized which are only 0.0241 gram and 0.0155 gram. They are extremely small amounts which are highly susceptible to planting and tampering. This is the very reason why strict adherence to Section 21 is a must.

There being no justifiable reason in this case for non-compliance by the law enforcement agents with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, this Court finds it necessary to acquit Sali for the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MUSTAFA SALI Y ALAVVADDIN A.K.A. "TAPANG/PANG," ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 236596, January 29, 2020. 

Special complex crime of robbery with rape

 "Finally, for the crime of robbery with rape, THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH WHETHER THE RAPE WAS COMMITTED BEFORE, DURING, OR AFTER THE ROBBERY, but only that it punishes robbery that was accompanied by rape. THE FACTS DO NOT BEAR OUT THAT THE ROBBERY WAS A MERE AFTERTHOUGHT, considering that AAA testified that accused-appellant "took time to disable her and then got away with her personal belongings."47

In sum, the prosecution established accused-appellant's GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. He was correctly convicted of the SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES OF ROBBERY WITH RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 294 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PIO SALEN, JR. Y SENA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020. 

APPEAL, EFFECT OF.

"Nevertheless, this Court deems it proper to MODIFY THE PENALTY. In criminal cases, an APPEAL "THROWS THE WHOLE CASE OPEN FOR REVIEW[.] The underlying principle is that ERRORS in an appealed judgment, EVEN IF NOT SPECIFICALLY ASSIGNED, MAY BE CORRECTED MOTU PROPRIO by the court if the consideration of these errors is necessary to arrive at a JUST RESOLUTION of the case."48

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PIO SALEN, JR. Y SENA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020. 

UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF RAPE VICTIM ALONE, WHEN SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT

VICTIM'S TESTIMONY ALONE, IF CREDIBLE, SUFFICES TO CONVICT. 

"AAA testified clearly and unequivocally to how accused-appellant raped then robbed her. While her TESTIMONY was UNCORROBORATED, this Court has ruled in a plethora of cases that "[t]he VICTIM'S TESTIMONY ALONE, IF CREDIBLE, SUFFICES TO CONVICT."44 The testimony of AAA, whom the trial court found to be a CREDIBLE WITNESS, was CLEAR AND STRAIGHTFORWARD.

Accused-appellant  ADMITTED THAT HE HAD SEX WITH AAA-insisting that it was consensual- and DENIED ROBBING HER. However, these SELF-SERVING, UNSUBSTANTIATED DEFENSES OF DENIAL fail against the victim's POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION.

What further bolsters the prosecution's case is the MEDICO-LEGAL OFFICER'S CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONY. The medico-legal report showed that AAA had sustained "HEMATOMA, ABRASIONS, [and] LACERATED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS ALL OVER HER BODY."45 These findings CORROBORATE AAA's TESTIMONY that "accused-appellant STABBED HER with a pointed weapon and inflicted FORCE AND VIOLENCE against her in order for her to submit to him."46


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PIO SALEN, JR. Y SENA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020. 

ROBBERY WITH RAPE

"The crime of ROBBERY WITH RAPE is punished under ARTICLE 294(1) of the REVISED PENAL CODE, as amended by REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659:

ARTICLE 294. ROBBERY with VIOLENCE against or INTIMIDATION of persons - PENALTIES. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

The penalty of SECLUSION PERPETUAL TO DEATH, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of HOMICIDE shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by RAPE or INTENTIONAL MUTILATION or ARSON.

The elements of ROBBERY WITH RAPE are the following:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.43"

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PIO SALEN, JR. Y SENA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

"Great respect is given to the TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS, particularly WHEN AFFIRMED by the COURT OF APPEALS. This is the GENERAL RULE, UNLESS the lower courts have "OVERLOOKED OR MISCONSTRUED SUBSTANTIAL FACTS which could have AFFECTED THE OUTCOME of the case."42

This case is no exception. A scrutiny of the records shows no cogent reason for this Court to reverse the Regional Trial Court's findings and assessment of the WITNESSES' CREDIBILITY, as AFFIRMED by the Court of Appeals."


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. PIO SALEN, JR. Y SENA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020

EVIDENT PREMEDITATION explained

 "Meanwhile, to substantiate the claim of evident premeditation, this Court instructed in People v. Borbon70 that it is indispensable that the facts on "how and when the plan to kill was hatched"71 are presented into evidence. In People v. Ordona,72 we added that "[t]he requirement of deliberate planning should not be based merely on inferences and presumptions but on clear evidence."73

Here, the prosecution failed to establish in its version of the events that accused-appellant and his family members had schemed to kill Villalobos. Fresado's testimony merely showed that Villalobos followed Lorna to Delpan Bridge, and that he was later attacked by accused-appellant, Lorna, and Lorna's husband. The Regional Trial Court merely inferred that there was a plan in place because accused-appellant's act of stabbing Villalobos five (5) times implied that "[s]ufficient time elapsed from the time [accused-appellant] determined to kill the victim up to the time he actually committed the act[.]"74 In fact, no evidence was presented to show the how and when of the plan to kill Villalobos.

Thus, the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the Regional Trial Court's finding of evident premeditation:

The prosecution failed to establish by clear and positive evidence the time when the accused-appellant resolved to kill the accused (sic) with respect to the time when it was actually accomplished; mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient. Also, mere determination to commit the crime does not of itself establish evident premeditation for it must appear, not only that the accused made a decision to commit the crime prior to the moment of execution, but also that his decision was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection or persistent attempt. Apropos, there is much to be desired from David 's testimony on this respect.75 (Citations omitted)

Nonetheless, because treachery is present in the killing, accused­ appellant's conviction for murder is affirmed. Moreover, this Court modifies the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each, in accordance with People v. Jugueta.76"

G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GREG ANTONIO Y PABLEO @ TOKMOL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

TREACHERY in MURDER case

 "Accused-appellant was charged with murder, which is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.

On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity.

With evident premeditation.

With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

The Regional Trial Court found that Villalobos' killing was attended by treachery and evident premeditation, thereby qualifying it to murder.64 For its part, the Court of Appeals only appreciated treachery, ruling that there was a want of evidence for evident premeditation.65

The Court of Appeals is correct. Only treachery is present here.

Treachery is defined as "the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his [or her] part."66 To substantiate its allegation of treachery, the prosecution must prove: "(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him."67

Here, both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found that treachery attended accused-appellant's attack on Villalobos. The Court of Appeals held:

Clearly, treachery in this case is evident from the fact that: accused-appellant grabbed the victim's arm by surprise and simultaneously stabbing him with a foot-long knife despite being unarmed. To the Court, these are methods employed which rendered Arthuro helpless as it left him with no opportunity to defend himself or even to retaliate; ultimately causing his death.68 (Citation omitted)

The lower courts' finding of treachery finds substantial basis in Fresado's testimony, which both courts found to be convincing and believable.69"

G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GREG ANTONIO Y PABLEO @ TOKMOL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Self-defense explained

 

G.R. No. 229349, January 29, 2020

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. GREG ANTONIO Y PABLEO @ TOKMOL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

"Accused-appellant's defense centers on his claim of self-defense and defense of his sister, invoking the first and second justifying circumstances under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 11. Justifying Circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

An admission of self-defense or defense of a relative frees the prosecution from the burden of proving that the accused committed the act charged against him or her. The burden is shifted to the accused to prove that his or her act was justified:

It is settled that when an accused admits [harming] the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he [harmed] the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.42

For the justifying circumstance of self-defense to be appreciated in the accused's favor, the accused must prove the following: "(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense."43 The justifying circumstance of defense of a relative likewise requires the first two (2) requisites, but in lieu of the third requirement, it requires that "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein."44

The first requisite of unlawful aggression is defined as the actual or imminent threat to the person invoking self-defense.45 This requirement is an indispensable condition of both self-defense and defense of a relative; after all, if there is no unlawful aggression, the assailant would have nothing to prevent or repel.46 In People v. Caratao,47 this Court emphasized that if unlawful aggression is not proven, "self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present."48

As for the second requisite, "reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel such aggression" envisions a rational equivalence between the perceived danger and the means employed to repel the attack.49 This Court in People v. Encomienda50 recognized that in circumstances that lead to self-defense or defense of a relative, the instinct for self-preservation will outweigh-rational thinking.51 Thus, "when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the act irresponsible in law for the consequences."52

Finally, the third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation requires the person invoking self-defense to not have antagonized the attacker.53 This Court explained in People v. Nabora54 that a provocation is deemed sufficient if it is "adequate to excite the person to commit the wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity."55"

Invalid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure; inadmissibility of evidence illegally seized.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAFAEL OLIVARES, JR. and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants. G.R. No. 77865, December 4, 1998

Invalid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure; inadmissibility of evidence illegally seized.

“x x x.

In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery and; thus, no direct evidence points to appellants criminal liability. The prosecution's principal evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who arrested, investigated and subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when juxtaposed with appellants' constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of confessions leads to a conclusion that they cannot he held liable for the offense charged despite the inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are not guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.

First, appellants were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest and their arrest cannot even be justified under any of the recognized exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest mentioned in Section 6, (now section 5) Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which prior to its amendment in 1998 provides:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

b) when the offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or/place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

None of the foregoing exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest concurs herein. At the time appellants were apprehended, two days had already lapsed after the discovery of the crime — they were not doing nor had just done any criminal act. Neither were they caught in flagrante delicto or had escaped from confinement. Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they made the arresting officers testified that appellants were merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, however when construed in the light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an interrogation.16 Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation. Thus, pursuant to Section 4(2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which was in effect at that time, "any evidence" obtained in violation of their right under Section 3, Article IV (pertaining to invalid warrantless arrests)17 "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."18 By virtue of said constitutional protection any evidence obtained, including all the things and properties alleged to be stolen by appellants which were taken by the police from the place of the illegal arrest cannot be used as evidence for their conviction. In the same manner, all the products of those illegal arrest cannot be utilized to sustain any civil liability that they may have incurred by reason of their acts. This is the clear mandate of the Constitution when it provides that those illegally obtained evidence being "the fruits of the poisonous tree" are "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding". The foregoing constitutional protection on the inadmissibility of evidence (which are the product of an illegal search and arrest) known as the eclusionary rule, applies not only to criminal cases but even extends to civil, administrative and any other form of proceedings. No distinction is made by the Constitution; this Court ought not to distinguish.

X x x.”

Robbery with homicide - Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAFAEL OLIVARES, JR. and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants. G.R. No. 77865, December 4, 1998

Robbery with homicide - Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

“x x x.

Initially, the categorization by the prosecution of the crime of robbery with double homicide is erroneous because the word "homicide" in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) should be taken in its generic sense,11 absorbing not only acts which results in death (such as murder) but also all other acts producing anything short of death (such as physical injuries) committed during the robbery.12 and regardless of the multiplicity of the victim which is only considered as an aggravating circumstances.13 The indictable offense is still the complex crime of robbery with homicide (which is its proper nomenclature), the essential elements of which are:

a.) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person;

b.) the property thus taken belongs to another;

c.) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;

d.) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide which is therein used in a generic sense, was committed. 14

x x x.”

Inadmissible extrajudicial confession

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAFAEL OLIVARES, JR. and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants. G.R. No. 77865, December 4, 1998

Inadmissible extrajudicial confession

“x x x.

Even assuming arguendo that by entering a plea without first questioning the legality of their arrest, appellants are deemed to have waived any ojection concerning their arrest19 yet the extrajudicial confession of appellant Olivares, Jr. on which the prosecution relies, is likewise inadmissible in evidence. Under the Constitution, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right, among other to have a counsel,20 which right can be validly waived. In this case, the said confession was obtained during custodial investigation but the confessant was not assisted by counsel. His manifestation to the investigating officer that he did not need the assistance of counsel does not constitute a valid waiver of his right within the contemplation of our criminal justice system. This notwithstanding the fact that the 1973 Constitution does not state that a waiver of the right to counsel to be valid must be made with the assistance or in the presence of counsel. Although this requisite concerning the presence of counsel before a waiver of the right to counsel can be validly made is enshrined only in the 1987 Constitution, which further requires that the waiver must also be in writing,21 yet jurisprudence is replete even during the time of appellants arrest where it has been categorically ruled that a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel shall not be valid when the same is made without the presence or assistance of counsel.22 Consequently, the valid waiver of the right to counsel during custodial investigation makes the uncounselled confession, whether verbal or non-verbal,23 obtained in violation thereof as also "inadmissible in evidence"24 under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution25 which provides:

. . . . Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used aginst him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. (emphasis supplied).

Under the present laws, a confession to be admissible must be:26

1.) express and categorical;27

2.) given voluntarily,28 and intelligently where the accused realizes the legal significance of his act;29

3.) with assistance of competent and independent counsel;30

4.) in writing; and in the language known to and understood by the confessant;31 and

5 signed, or if the confessant does not know how to read and write thumbmarked by him.32

In this case, the absence of the third requisite above makes the confession inadmissible. The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession even by the slightest coercion33 as would lead the accused to admit something false.34 What is sought to be avoided is the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him.35 These constitutional guarantees have been made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical atmosphere of such investigation.36 In any case, said extrajudicial confession of one accused may not be utilized against a co-accused unless they are repeated in open court or when there is an opportunity to cross-examine the other on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay as against said accused under the rule on res enter alios acta, which ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.37

Aware of the abuses committed by some investigating and police agencies on a criminal suspect to get leadings confessions, information and evidence just so they can claim to have speedily resolved a crime and fulfilled their duty, all at the expense of the basic human rights guaranteed by the Constitution the Court cannot turn a blind eye by disregarding the constitutional rights accorded to every accused and tolerate official abuse. The presumption that a public officer had regularly performed his official duty,38 which is only a matter of procedure, cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence stated in the highest law of the land — the Constitution. As a contract between and among the people, the provisions of the Constitution cannot just be taken lightly.

X x x.”

Circumstantial evidence; when sufficient to convict accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAFAEL OLIVARES, JR. and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants. G.R. No. 77865, December 4, 1998

Circumstantial evidence; when sufficient to convict accused.

“x x x.

With the inadmissibility of the material circumstancial evidence which were premised on the likewise extrajudicial confession upon which both the prosecution and the lower court relied to sustain appellants' conviction the remaining circumstances cannot produce a logical conclusion to establish their guilt. In order to sustain a conviction based on circumstancial evidence, it is necessary that the same satisfies the following elements:

1. there is more than one circumstances;

2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.39

Simply put for circumstancial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time incosistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.40

X x x.

X x x (S)ome of the circumstancial evidence relied upon by the trial court were, at the risk of being repetitive, based on the inadmissible extrajudicial confession. The facts which became known only by virtue of the extrajudicial confession pertains to how the victims were killed, how appellants gained entrance into the premises, and how the alleged stolen properties were found in the house where one of them was arrested. Without the foregoing facts a combination of the remainder of the circumstancial evidence cannot sustain a conviction beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt: hence, the absence of the third requisite. Forthwith the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof and consequently to rebut with the required quantum of evidence42 the presumption of innocence43 fundamentally enjoyed by both appellants. For it is a basic evidentiary rule in criminal law that the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused. El incumbit probatio non qui negat. He who asserts — not he who denies — must prove. Likewise, it is settled that conviction must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the prosecution.44 Accordingly, circumstancial evidence with has not been adequately established cannot, by itself, be the basis of conviction.45

x x x.”

PAO; negligence as counsel – “The PAO, as the duly designated government agency to represent and render legal services to pauper litigants who cannot hire their own counsel, should have exerted more effort on this case.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAFAEL OLIVARES, JR. and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants. G.R. No. 77865, December 4, 1998

PAO; negligence as counsel – “The PAO, as the duly designated government agency to represent and render legal services to pauper litigants who cannot hire their own counsel, should have exerted more effort on this case.”

“x x x.

Upon a thorough review of the records of the case, appellants' conviction cannot stand for reasons which were not discussed or even mentioned by appellants' appointed counsel. The PAO, as the duly designated government agency to represent and render legal services to pauper litigants who cannot hire their own counsel, should have exerted more effort on this case. Its pleadings filed before this court could hardly be considered as the product of an advocate who has the responsibility to serve his client with competence and diligence. 10 The preparation of his case is a duty the lawyer owes not only to his client whose property, money and above all life and liberty he is bound to protect. It is also a duty he owes to himself, to his own integrity and self-respect at the bar. Nonetheless, the Court is not powerless to address and consider unassigned issues and relevant facts and law that may affect the merits and justifiable disposition of the case.

X x x.”

Kidnapping; proper penalty; damages awarded.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, Accused-Appellants. EN BANC, G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016.

Kidnapping; proper penalty; damages awarded.

“x x x.

The Proper Penalty:

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of the death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed in the Jaw, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases one from captivity.53

In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for Edward's release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC's imposition of the death penalty on Pepino and Gomez.

With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled ''An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" (signed into law on June 24, 2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.54

The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino, since it is more favorable to him.

The Awarded Indemnities:

In the case of People v. Gambao55 (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.

We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to Pl00,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping cases. This reduced penalty shall apply to Pepino for being more favorable to him. However, the additional monetary award (i.e., P100,000.00 civil indemnity) imposed on Gomez shall not be applied to Pepino.56

We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the amount of ransom demanded and received by the kidnappers. We also affirm the CA's award of Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages based on Gambao.

X x x.”