This Court is tasked to determine whether accused-appellant has clearly and convincingly proven his defense of INSANITY TO EXEMPT HIM FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY and, in the negative, whether his mental issues constitute DIMINISHED WILLPOWER SO AS TO MITIGATE HIS LIABILITY AND TO LOWER THE PENALTY.
THE COURT'S RULING
After a careful evaluation of the records, this Court sees no reason to overturn the decision of the CA, except to modify the amount of damages awarded.
The defense of INSANITY is in the
nature of a CONFESSION AND
AVOIDANCE, requiring DEFENDANT TO PROVE IT WITH CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
The RTC and the CA both found that all the elements constituting murder exist in the case at bar, with accused-appellant as the perpetrator. The accused-appellant did not present evidence controverting such findings. However, accused-appellant raises the defense of insanity in claiming that he should not be found criminally liable.
INSANITY IS ONE OF THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, viz:
ART. 12. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY. - The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An INSECURE or an INSANE person, UNLESS the latter has acted during a LUCID INTERVAL.
x x x x
Strictly speaking, a person acting under any of the EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES COMMITS A CRIME BUT CANNOT BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE therefor. The EXEMPTION FROM PUNISHMENT stems from the COMPLETE ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE OR FREE WILL in performing the act.18
The defense of insanity is thus in the nature of a confession or avoidance. The defendant who asserts it is, in effect, ADMITTING TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. Consequently, the BURDEN OF PROOF SHIFTS TO DEFENDANT, who must PROVE HIS DEFENSE WITH CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.19
In People v. Madarang,20 the Court ruled that a MORE STRINGENT STANDARD IN APPRECIATING INSANITY AS AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE has been established, viz:
In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE IN COMMITTING THE ACT, i.e., the accused is DEPRIVED OF REASON; he ACTED WITHOUT THE LEAST DISCERNMENT because there is a COMPLETE ABSENCE OF THE POWER TO DISCERN, or that there is a TOTAL DEPRIVATION OF THE WILL. MERE ABNORMALITY OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES WILL NOT EXCLUDE IMMUTABILITY. (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the evidence of the defense must establish that such INSANITY constituting COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE EXISTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING OR SIMULTANEOUSLY TO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.21
Thus, for the defense of insanity to prosper, TWO (2) ELEMENTS must concur: (1) that defendant's insanity constitutes a COMPLETE DEPRIVATION OF INTELLIGENCE, REASON, OR DISCERNMENT; and (2) that such insanity EXISTED AT THE TIME OF, OR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING, THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
Since no man can know what goes on in the mind of another, one's behavior and outward acts can only be determined and judged by proof. Such PROOF may take the form of OPINION TESTIMONY by a WITNESS who is INTIMATELY ACQUAINTED WITH THE ACCUSED; by a WITNESS who has RATIONAL BASIS to conclude that the accused was INSANE based on the witness' own PERCEPTION of the accused; or by a witness who is qualified as an EXPERT, such as a PSYCHIATRIST.22
The proof proffered by accused-
appellant is insufficient to
sustain his defense of insanity.
To prove its assertion, the defense presented the testimonies of accused-appellant and Cederina. It also offered in evidence a (1) LETTER from the NCMH addressed to Cederina; (2) accused-appellant's PATIENT IDENTIFICATION CARDS FROM THE NCMH AND THE PGH; (3) accused-appellant's CLINICAL RECORDS; and (4) DOCTOR'S PRESCRIPTIONS.
A scrutiny of the evidence presented by accused-appellant unfortunately FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY BEREFT OF REASON FOR DISCERNMENT AND FREEDOM OF WILL when he fatally stabbed the victim. The paucity in accused-appellant's proof is shown by the following circumstances:
First, the testimony of Cederina tends to show that accused-appellant exhibited signs of mental illness only after being injured in an altercation in 2003; that she observed changes in his personality and knew he had difficulty sleeping since then; that accused-appellant was confined in the hospital a few times over the years for his mental issues; and that he was confined at the NCMH on 8 July 2010 from where he subsequently escaped. Nothing in her testimony pointed to any behavior of the accused-appellant AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT IN QUESTION, OR IN THE DAYS AND HOURS BEFORE THE INCIDENT, which could establish that he was insane WHEN HE COMMITTED THE OFFENSES, as seen from the following exchange during trial: x x x.
X x x.
The foregoing narration does not attribute to accused-appellant any behavior indicative of insanity at the time of, or immediately preceding, the incident. His SEEMINGLY ODD BEHAVIOUR of repeatedly GOING IN AND OUT OF THE HOUSE in the days PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT DOES NOT, IN ANY WAY, DEMONSTRATE HIS INSANITY.
In People v. Florendo,24 the Court held that "the prevalent meaning of the word 'CRAZY" is NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH THE LEGAL TERMS 'INSANE,' 'NON COMPOSITION MALENTIS,' 'UNSOUND MIND,' 'IDIOT,' or 'LUNATIC.' The POPULAR CONCEPTION of the word 'CRAZY' is being used to describe a person or an act UNNATURAL OR OUT OF THE ORDINARY. A man may behave in a CRAZY MANNER but it DOES NOT NECESSARILY AND CONCLUSIVELY PROVE THAT HE IS LEGALLY SO." Not every ABERRATION OF THE MIND OR MENTAL DEFICIENCY constitutes INSANITY.25
For purposes of EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY, MERE BEHAVIORAL ODDITIES CANNOT SUPPORT A FINDING OF INSANITY unless the totality of such behavior indubitably shows a TOTAL ABSENCE OF REASONABLE, DISCERNMENT, OR FREE WILL AT THE TIME THE CRIMES WAS COMMITTED.
As admitted by Cederina, prior to the incident, THERE WERE MOMENTS when she observed that accused-appellant APPEARED WELL. On the DAY IN QUESTION and IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE INCIDENT, NO IMPROPER, VIOLENT OR ABERRANT BEHAVIOR WAS OBSERVED of accused-appellant, as he was merely sitting on the balcony before he suddenly disappeared to go to the victim's house. During the commission of the crime itself, there were NO EYEWITNESSES who could relay the behavior of accused-appellant, as even Cederina happened upon the accused-appellant and the victim only AFTER the stabbing incident.
Second, accused-appellant testified that he was admitted to the hospital for his mental illness several times prior to the incident, which is corroborated by the testimony of his mother and in a report26 on his mental condition issued by the NCMH on 21 February 2011. This fact, however, DOES NOT ALSO PROVE THAT HE WAS INSANE AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED THE CRIME. PRIOR CONFINEMENT at a mental institution DOES NOT, BY ITSELF, CONSTITUTE PROOF OF INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.27 Even accused-appellant admitted during trial that he was released from confinement from time to time, which resulted after doctors deemed him well after a series of examinations and interviews, to wit: X x x.
X x x.
Thus, even assuming accused-appellant was insane, SUCH INSANITY WAS CLEARLY NOT CONTINUOUS, AS HE HAD LUCID INTERVALS. Consequently, it is PRESUMED THAT HE WAS SANE, OR WAS IN A LUCID INTERVAL, AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED THE CRIME.
Third, the documents offered in evidence by the defense DO NOT CATEGORICALLY STATE that accused-appellant was insane; nor do they show WHEN he became insane; whether such insanity constituted ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION OF REASON, INTELLIGENCE, AND DISCERNMENT; and whether such insanity EXISTED AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED THE CRIME. NO EXPERT TESTIMONY was also presented to testify on such.
As correctly held by the R TC, the letter from the NCMH merely informed Cederina of the accused-appellant's escape on 14 July 2010; but the fact that he was ABLE TO ESCAPE UNNOTICED FROM THE INSTITUTIONS AND TO RETURN HOME BY HIMSELF is indicative of REASONABLEDOUBT INTELLIGENCE AND FREE WILL merely a week BEFORE the commission of the crime. The patient's identification cards29 issued by the NCMH and the PGH are only indicative of accused-appellant's admission therein, which is not disputed, and nothing else. The clinical abstract30 issued by PGH, while diagnosing accused-appellant with PARANOID SCHIZOPHRENIA, appears to have been issued on 18 February 2007, YEARS BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIMES and could not serve as basis to rule that he was insane WHEN HE COMMITTED IT. Finally, the DOCTOR'S PRESCRIPTION SLIPS only contain the MEDICATIONS prescribed, but do not show the SPECIFIC ILLNESS targeted by the medicine.
A consideration of all the foregoing pieces of evidence clearly does not point to accused-appellant's insanity AT THE TIME HE COMMITTED THE CRIME.
X X X."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JONAS PANTOJA Y ASTORGA, Accused-Appellants
G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017.
