Invalid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure; inadmissibility of evidence illegally seized.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAFAEL OLIVARES, JR. and DANILO ARELLANO, appellants. G.R. No. 77865, December 4, 1998

Invalid warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure; inadmissibility of evidence illegally seized.

“x x x.

In this case, there were no eyewitnesses to the killing and robbery and; thus, no direct evidence points to appellants criminal liability. The prosecution's principal evidence against them is based solely on the testimony of the police officers who arrested, investigated and subsequently took their confession. Such evidence when juxtaposed with appellants' constitutional rights concerning arrests and the taking of confessions leads to a conclusion that they cannot he held liable for the offense charged despite the inherent weakness of their defenses of denial and alibi, not because they are not guilty but because the evidence adduced against them are inadmissible to sustain a criminal conviction.

First, appellants were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest and their arrest cannot even be justified under any of the recognized exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest mentioned in Section 6, (now section 5) Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which prior to its amendment in 1998 provides:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;

b) when the offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;

c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or/place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

None of the foregoing exceptions for a valid warrantless arrest concurs herein. At the time appellants were apprehended, two days had already lapsed after the discovery of the crime — they were not doing nor had just done any criminal act. Neither were they caught in flagrante delicto or had escaped from confinement. Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest they made the arresting officers testified that appellants were merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, however when construed in the light of the circumstances is actually in the nature of an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an interrogation.16 Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation. Thus, pursuant to Section 4(2), Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which was in effect at that time, "any evidence" obtained in violation of their right under Section 3, Article IV (pertaining to invalid warrantless arrests)17 "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."18 By virtue of said constitutional protection any evidence obtained, including all the things and properties alleged to be stolen by appellants which were taken by the police from the place of the illegal arrest cannot be used as evidence for their conviction. In the same manner, all the products of those illegal arrest cannot be utilized to sustain any civil liability that they may have incurred by reason of their acts. This is the clear mandate of the Constitution when it provides that those illegally obtained evidence being "the fruits of the poisonous tree" are "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding". The foregoing constitutional protection on the inadmissibility of evidence (which are the product of an illegal search and arrest) known as the eclusionary rule, applies not only to criminal cases but even extends to civil, administrative and any other form of proceedings. No distinction is made by the Constitution; this Court ought not to distinguish.

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