Influence peddling by lawyers

TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016.

“x x x.

Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in complainant's case.

Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their profession.⁷⁶Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where the case was pending.⁷⁷

Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02⁷⁸prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.⁷⁹ Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7⁸⁰ of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."

In relation, Canon 13⁸¹ mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."

A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.⁸² This act of influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in the legal profession:

The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge—or a judge evincing a willingness—to discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge's sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession.⁸³

In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,⁸⁴ we disciplined the respondent for preparing a release order for his clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice and the stationery of the Secretary:

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people's faith in the judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients' success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.

x x x.

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must always be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.⁸⁵

Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,⁸⁶ we disbarred a lawyer who solicited bribe money from his client in violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.

First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means—a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all—to all lawyers, their clients and the general public—that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.⁸⁷ (Emphasis supplied)

In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence peddling, and in the interest of maintaining the high ethical standards of employees in the judiciary, this Court did not hesitate in dismissing its own employee from government service when she peddled influence in the Court of Appeals:⁸⁸

What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.⁸⁹

X x x.”