Friday, August 30, 2019

Tax audit - "The Supreme Court recently ruled that an LoA is a part of the taxpayer’s right to due process. Hence, the issuance of a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) and Final Assessment Notice (FAN) without a prior LoA served on the taxpayer renders the assessment void on the ground, as it is a due process violation (Medicard Philippines Inc. vs. CIR)."

See - https://www.bworldonline.com/are-they-authorized-to-audit-you/


"x x x.

Are they authorized to audit you?August 26, 2019 | 10:19 pm




Let’s Talk Tax
By Peter Irish R. De Leon

Authorized or not? This question is very relevant to taxpayers who are subject to a tax audit. One should at least know if the Revenue Officer (RO) conducting the audit investigation is duly armed with a valid Letter of Authority (LoA). The Tax Code, as amended, requires the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) or their duly authorized representative to issue an LoA if it will delegate the examination of a taxpayer.

Section 13 of the code mandates the issuance of an LoA before an assigned RO may examine a taxpayer and recommend the assessment of any deficiency tax due.

The Supreme Court recently ruled that an LoA is a part of the taxpayer’s right to due process. Hence, the issuance of a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) and Final Assessment Notice (FAN) without a prior LoA served on the taxpayer renders the assessment void on the ground, as it is a due process violation (Medicard Philippines Inc. vs. CIR).

Is an RO required to complete an audit investigation within a specified period? And will this affect the validity of the assessment? This has been the subject of seemingly conflicting decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Relevant to these rulings is the BIR’s General Audit Procedures and Documentation (BIR GAPD), which provides that an RO is allowed only 120 days from the date of receipt of the LoA by the taxpayer to conduct the audit and submit the required report of the investigation. If the RO is unable to submit the final report within the 120-day period, the RO must then submit a progress report to the Head Office and surrender the Letter of Authority for revalidation.

The CTA Division viewed this rule as merely imposing an administrative liability on the part of the RO without affecting the validity of the LoA and the audit report. Citing Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 23-2009, the Division categorically declared the LoA valid, even though the investigation and audit lasted more than 120 days without the LoA being revalidated (CTA Case No. 9199 dated Feb. 8, 2019).

Interestingly, this is not the view of the CTA en banc. In an earlier case, when the RO submitted an audit report only after the lapse of the 120-day period without revalidating the LoA, the CTA en banc ruled the RO should have just submitted a Progress Report and surrendered the LoA for revalidation. Since the LoA was not revalidated on or before the expiration of the given period, the LoA ceased to be valid (CTA EB Case No. 1535 dated Jan. 4, 2018). The Court considered the 120-day period mandatory, such that, if no LoA revalidation was made within the said period, the LoA becomes ineffective.

What is the difference between the two cases to merit conflicting CTA rulings? Comparing the two, with regards to the Division ruling, the RO who conducted the audit was duly authorized by an LoA; however, he only completed the audit after the 120-day period and without revalidating the LoA. Thus, the sole issue is whether the LoA, which was not revalidated, has lost its validity. Since RMC No. 23-2009 only imposes administrative liability on the erring RO without affecting the audit and the LoA’s validity, the CTA Division merely harmonized the said rules and declared that the failure to comply with the 120 days does not affect the validity of the LoA.

However, the issue in the en banc case revolves not only on the failure of the RO to complete the audit and revalidate the LoA within the 120-day period, but also on the authority of the RO who conducted the audit. Since the RO named in the LoA was reassigned to another district, the case was transferred to another RO through a mere referral memorandum without revalidating or issuing a new LOA.

In declaring the assessment void, the Court ruled that the RO who conducted the audit has no authority to do so, since the officer was not authorized by an LoA. The Court did not give credence to the CIR’s view that the referral memorandum derives its validity from the original LoA. The Court further explained that RMO No. 43-90 explicitly requires an LoA revalidation in case of reassignment or transfer of cases to another RO. Citing the BIR GAPD, the Court declared that, since the LoA was not revalidated, the RO who conducted the audit has no authority to conduct the investigation, thus, rendering the assessment void.

The CTA en banc has been consistent in ruling that the RO designated in the referral memorandum does not have any authority to examine a taxpayer in the absence of an LoA revalidation. In another case, it debunked BIR’s invocation of RMO No. 44-2010, which has withdrawn the need for LoA revalidations for the failure of ROs to complete the audit within the prescribed period. RMO No. 44-2010 has the same effect as RMC No. 23-2009.

The Court categorically declared RMO No. 44-2010 as invalid, as it runs counter to the provisions of Section 6(A) of the National Internal Revenue Code and the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Medicard Philippines Inc. vs. CIR, reasoning that a mere administrative issuance cannot amend the law (CTA EB Case No. 1832 dated July 29, 2019). Will this recent development have an adverse effect on the above-cited CTA division ruling?

It is now up to the Supreme Court to settle the seeming conflict. Until then, the aggrieved taxpayer may rely on the CTA en banc’s pronouncement to challenge a deficiency tax assessment and, hopefully, tilt the scale of justice in its favor.

x x x.


Let’s Talk Tax is a weekly newspaper column of P&A Grant Thornton that aims to keep the public informed of various developments in taxation. This article is not intended to be a substitute for competent professional advice.
Peter Irish R. De Leon is a tax associate of Tax Advisory & Compliance Division of P&A Grant Thornton, the Philippine member firm of Grant Thornton International Ltd.

pagrantthornton@ph.gt.com

x x x."

Unauthorized law practice, influence peddling by government lawyer - 1 year suspension.



TERESITA P. FAJARDOComplainantv. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZRespondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016.

“x x x.

The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was "forced to give . . . Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that he ha[d] friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who c[ould] help with a fee."90 It is because of respondent's assurances to complainant that she sent him money over the course of several months.91 These assurances are seen from the text messages that respondent sent complainant: X x x.

X x x.

In response to his alleged text messages, respondent claims that complainant must have confused him with her other contacts.93 Respondent found it "mesmerizing" that complainant was able to save all those alleged text messages from two (2) years ago.94 Moreover, assuming these messages were "true, still they [were] not legally admissible as they [were] covered by the lawyer-client privileged communication as those supposed texts '[had been] made for the purpose and in the course of employment, [were] regarded as privileged and the rule of exclusion [was] strictly enforced.'"95

In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he transaction is always done in secret and often only between the two parties concerned."96 Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold respondent guilty of influence peddling.

We agree with the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. We find respondent's acts of influence peddling, coupled with unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law. To be so bold as to peddle influence before the very institution that is tasked to prosecute corruption speaks much about respondent's character and his attitude towards the courts and the bar.

Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with regulators, investigators, judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and debase themselves even as they claim to be members of a noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to one's ability to have illicit access. Rather, it should be about making an honest appraisal of the client's situation as seen through the evidence fairly and fully gathered. It should be about making a discerning and diligent reading of the applicable law. It is foremost about attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own power, illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly influencing people or public officials.
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply to a client that a lawyer knows who will make a decision is an act worthy of the utmost condemnation. If we are to preserve the nobility of this profession, its members must live within its ethical parameters. There is never an excuse for influence peddling.

While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering debtors,97 this Court has ordered restitution of amounts to complainants due to the erroneous actions of lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore, required to return to complainant the amount of P500,000.00—the amount that respondent allegedly gave his friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.

x x x.”

Influence peddling by lawyers


TERESITA P. FAJARDOComplainantv. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZRespondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016.

“x x x.

Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in complainant's case.

Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their profession.76Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where the case was pending.77

Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.0278prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.79 Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his personal relationships with officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 780 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."

In relation, Canon 1381 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."

A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.82 This act of influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in the legal profession:

The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judge—or a judge evincing a willingness—to discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judge's sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession.83

In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,84 we disciplined the respondent for preparing a release order for his clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice and the stationery of the Secretary:

The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people's faith in the judicial process is diluted.

The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients' success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.

x x x.

Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must always be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense.85

Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Rañeses,86 we disbarred a lawyer who solicited bribe money from his client in violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer's relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.

First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful means—a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all—to all lawyers, their clients and the general public—that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the Bar.87 (Emphasis supplied)

In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence peddling, and in the interest of maintaining the high ethical standards of employees in the judiciary, this Court did not hesitate in dismissing its own employee from government service when she peddled influence in the Court of Appeals:88

What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its vigilance in eradicating the so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel.89

X x x.”


Disbarment cases - "In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must prove his or her allegations through substantial evidence."


TERESITA P. FAJARDOComplainantv. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZRespondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016.


“x x x.

In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must prove his or her allegations through substantial evidence.72 In Advincula v. Macabata,73 this Court dismissed a complaint for disbarment due to the lack of evidence in proving the complainant's allegations:

As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.74 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized unless it is shown that they committed a transgression of their oath or their duties, which reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued status as a member of the bar:

The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfltness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.75

X x x.”



Objective in disciplinary cases



TERESITA P. FAJARDOComplainantv. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZRespondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016.

“x x x.

The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer or employee but to continue to uplift the People's trust in government and to ensure excellent public service:

[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of that officer or employee, but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the government. . . . These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service.71

Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law, we find that there is now no need to determine whether the fees he charged were reasonable.
x x x.”


A conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee [lawyer] represents another government employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.



TERESITA P. FAJARDOComplainantv. ATTY. NICANOR C. 
ALVAREZRespondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016.


“x x x.

In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government,60 the petitioner was an incumbent City Councilor or member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bago City. He was a lawyer by profession and had continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority from the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government.61 In 1989, the petitioner acted as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang and filed a case for Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages against Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia, City Engineer of Bago City.62

Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case before the Department of Local Government for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713 and relevant Department of Local Government memorandum circulars on unauthorized practice of profession, as well as for oppression, misconduct, and abuse of authority.63 While the case was pending before Department of Local Government, the petitioner was able to secure a written authority to practice his profession from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, "provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions."64

This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner practiced his profession in conflict with his functions as City Councilor and against the interests of government:

In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct] [No.] 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.65

There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of government. By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.

In addition, the government has a serious interest in the prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt acts. Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic office is a public trust."66 The Office of the Ombudsman, as "protectors of the [P]eople,"67 is mandated to "investigate and prosecute . . . any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."68

Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee represents another government employee or public officer in a case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer ultimately goes against government's mandate under the Constitution to prosecute public officers or employees who have committed acts or omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.69 Furthermore, this is consistent with the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the [P]eople, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."70

X x x.”


Government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession [e.g., private law practice] unless authorized by their department heads.


TERESITA P. FAJARDOComplainantv. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZRespondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016.

“x x x.

Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986,53government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions of the government official or employee:

Republic Act No. 6713:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

X x x.

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions[.]

X x x.


Memorandum Circular No. 17:

The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides:

"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of directors", subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission.

In Abella v. Cruzabra,54 the respondent was a Deputy Register of Deeds of General Santos City. While serving as an incumbent government employee, the respondent "filed a petition for commission as a notary public and was commissioned . . . without obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of the Department of Justice."55 According to the complainant, the respondent had notarized around 3,000 documents.56 This Court found the respondent guilty of engaging in notarial practice without written authority from the Secretary of Justice. Thus:

It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the Secretary of the D[epartment] [of] J[ustice]. Respondent's superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.57ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for Mental Health, whose authority was designated under Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999.58ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.

Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole."59

X x x.”

Thursday, August 29, 2019

Practice of law defined



TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016.

“x x x.

This administrative case involves the determination of whether a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health is authorized to privately practice law, and consequently, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.

Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.

x x x.

We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.

x x x.

Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did he do unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,49 the modern concept of the term "practice of law" includes the more traditional concept of litigation or appearance before courts:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law."

X x x.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law," particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Arty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor—verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement—that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.50 (Emphasis supplied)

Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib:51

Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or legal talent" is practice of law.52 (Citations omitted)

X x x.”

Courts have 30% compliance with continuous trial



See - https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/238776-charts-philippine-courts-compliance-continuous-trial



"x x x.

IN CHARTS: 2 years on, PH courts have 30% compliance with continuous trial

Before continuous trial, only 2% of criminal cases on average finish trial in 180 days. The 30% compliance is an impressive improvement.


Lian Buan
@lianbuan
Published 9:57 PM, August 28, 2019
Updated 9:57 PM, August 28, 2019
www.rappler.com/


MANILA, Philippines – Two years after the rule became effective, Philippine courts are 30.53% compliant with the continuous trial rule that mandates trial proper to last for only 6 months or 180 days.

This latest data as of June 30, 2019, was provided by the Supreme Court to the House committee on appropriations when it defended its P38.71-billion budget for 2020 on Wednesday, August 28.

According to the same data, before the rules on continuous trial, only 2.13% of criminal cases on average completed trial in 180 days. The 30% compliance is an impressive improvement.

The revised rules on continuous trial became effective in 2017. It requires that arraignment and pre-trial be done within 10 days for detainees, and within 30 days for non-detainees. Trial proper should last only for 180 days, while the judgment should be promulgated within 90 days of terminating the trial.

The compliance rate is the average for all lower courts. Family courts were the best performing, with 63.70% compliance with the 180-day trial period. Metropolitan trial courts were the worst performers, with a compliance rate of only 22.19%.

The same data showed that for cases filed after continuous trial became effective, 64.3% were resolved within 100 days or below. But for cases which were filed before the continuous trial rules, only 2.7% were resolved within 100 days.

This spells more adjustments for the judiciary as a whole, as it endeavors to provide faster and more efficient administration of justice to Filipinos.

However, unfilled vacancies remain a problem. As of August 27, there were still 742 vacancies for judge positions across courts nationwide. There were 11,833 unfilled positions for lower court personnel as of June 30.

Drug cases

The deluge of drug cases under the Duterte administration has forced the judiciary to make adjustments. The Supreme Court has had to assign more drug courts to cater to drug cases which have overtaken the country's courts since 2017.

Because of continuous trial, 40% of the drug cases which were filed after the continuous trial rules took effect were resolved within 75 days. But for the drug cases filed before continuous trial, none or 0% were resolved within 75 days.

At least 23% of drug cases filed after the effectivity of continuous trial still lagged in the docket, or for 100 to 200 days.

For drug cases which were filed before continuous trial but which proceeded during its effectivity, most were still resolved beyond 500 days, indicating difficulty in catching up with procedures.

As seen in the chart, there's not much difference in the length of time it takes to resolve drug cases decided before continuous trial, and drug cases filed before continuous trial but which proceeded during its effectivity.

As of December 31, 2018, first-level courts (municipal and metropolitan courts) had 160,153 pending cases, while second-level courts (regional trial courts) had 546,182 pending cases.

Budget

The judiciary wanted P55.66 billion for 2020, but the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) approved only P38.71 billion.

Instead of interpellating judiciary officials on their budget, lawmakers during Wednesday's budget hearing asked the DBM why it slashed almost P17 billion from the original request. They were told that recurring expenses were removed.

The budget hearing lasted for less than 30 minutes only, with Misamis Occidental 2nd District Representative Henry Oaminal saying the swift approval is a "courtesy" to the justices.

Associate Justice Diosdado Peralta, a chief justice applicant, attended the budget hearing with Associate Justice Alexander Gesmundo and Court Administrator Midas Marquez.

Cagayan de Oro City 2nd District Representative Rufus Rodriguez backed possible increases in the budget when it reaches plenary debates.

For now, the House committee has approved the judiciary's P38.71-billion budget.

Talking to reporters after the hearing, Supreme Court Spokesperson Brian Keith Hosaka said the budget also aims to augment security assistance to judges and justices. – Rappler.com

x x x."

Government lawyers who engage in private practice need written permissions

FELIPE E. ABELLA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA,
Respondent, A.C. No. 5688, June 4, 2009:

“x x x.

Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
or

x x x

Memorandum Circular No. 17[18] of the Executive Department allows
government employees to engage directly in the private practice of
their profession provided there is a written permission from the
Department head. It provides:

“The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall
be granted by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which
provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if
an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief
of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally,
That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an
officer or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any
way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not
take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer or
member of the board of directors,

Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office
deems necessary in each particular case in the interest of the
service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service
Commission”. (Boldfacing supplied)

It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as
a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the
Secretary of the DOJ. Respondent’s superior, the Register of Deeds,
cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the
Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized
her, respondent failed to present any proof of that written
permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because
respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public after
Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.

X x x.”

OTHER CASES:

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003]
NELIA A. ZIGA, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAMON A. AREJOLA, respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003]
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA, 12th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo,
respondent.

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003]
NELIA A. ZIGA, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAMON A. AREJOLA, respondent.

[A.C. No. 6585. April 21, 2005]
TOMAS B. YUMOL, JR., FELIX S. VENTIC, ELMER L. MANIEGO and JAKE M.
MAGCALAS, complainants, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO R. FERRER, SR., respondent.

DIANA RAMOS vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG, A. C. No. 6788 (Formerly, CBD
382), August 23, 2007.

WILFREDO M. CATU, ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008.

QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court BRANCH
81, ROMBLON, ROMBLON ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE
PRACTICE OF LAW. A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19, 2009.