NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu ,
Br. 19, BANGPAI
SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 170491, April 4, 2007.
“x x x.
The focal point of this
entire controversy is petitioners obstinate contention that the photocopies it
offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent
of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists
that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court,
the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute
electronic evidence based on its own premise that an electronic document as
defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not
limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an electronic document can
also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced
electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: any print-out or output, readable
by sight or other means.
We do not agree.
X x x.
On the other hand, an electronic document
refers to information
or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of
written expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a
fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.[1] It
includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or
other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document.[2]
The rules use the word
information to define an electronic document received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic
document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein,
similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents.[3] However, what
differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner
by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an
electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the
information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically.
By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be
considered as information electronically received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these
paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the
law. Having thus declared that the offered
photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential
that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error
can be ascribed to the court a quo in
denying admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits
A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings, I, J and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its
sub-markings, N and its sub-markings, O, P and its sub-markings, Q and its
sub-markings, and R. The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies
as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value
being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of
discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule
was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the
introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals.[4]
But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of
fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law.[5]
The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal
relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the
terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns
addressed by the best evidence rule.[6]
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions.
There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of
inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of
the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other
document in the custody of a public
officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an
existing record a certified
copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of
the whole."
When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.[7]
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof:
(a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of
the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents;[8]
(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a
reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c)
it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been
made for the document in the proper place or places.[9]
However, in the case at bar, though
petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it
failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions
as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the
Order of the court a quo denying
admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes
this Court why petitioner continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities
given by the trial court for it to present the originals of the photocopies it
presented yet comes before us now praying that it be allowed to present the
originals of the exhibits that were denied admission or in case the same are
lost, to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence. Had
petitioner presented the originals of the documents to the court instead of the
photocopies it obstinately offered as evidence, or at the very least laid the
predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not
have unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court and finally to this
Court for adjudication. Had it not been for petitioners intransigence, the
merits of petitioners complaint for damages would have been decided upon by the
trial court long ago. As aptly articulated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
has only itself to blame for the respondent judges denial of admission of its
aforementioned documentary evidence and consequently, the denial of its prayer
to be given another opportunity to present the originals of the documents that were denied admission nor to lay the
predicate for the admission of secondary evidence in case the same has been
lost.
X x x.”
[1] Rules on Electronic Evidence, Rule 2,
Sec. 1, par. (h).
[2] Id.
[3] Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 130,
Sec. 2.
[4] Lee v. People of the Philippines , G.R.
No. 159288, 19 October 2004 ,
440 SCRA 662, 683.
[5] Id.
[6] Id. citing Seller v. Lucas Films Ltd., 808 F. 2d
1316 (1989).
[7] Id. citing RULES OF
COURT, Rule 130, Sec. 5.
[8] Id. citing United States v. Balzano, 687 Fed. 6; Wright v. Farmers Co-op, 681 F. 2d. 549.
[9] Id. citing 32 Corpus Juris Secundum, id. at 773.