Confessions to the media: "We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. (People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, 67 [1991]). It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997.

“x x x.

The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.

Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.

These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . .

Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. [This provision was taken from Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which adopted the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 [1966] and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. ed. 2d 977 [1964]. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. (People v. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 [1993]; Sampaga v. People, 215 SCRA 839 [1992]; People v. Penero, 213 SCRA 536 [1992]). The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 410 [1996]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 457.). The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 445; Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294, 298 [1975]).

It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. (People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 [1994]; People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566, 575 [1994]; People v. de Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; People v Olvis, 154 SCRA 513 [1987]). As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." (Bernas, supra, at 411).

When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz: xxxx.

Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified: x x x.

X x x.

The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. (People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 17-19 [1986]).

The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz: x x x.

X x x.

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police [R.A. 6975, Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, Chapter III (D), sec. 51 (b)]. and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. [Leuschner v. State, 397 A. 2d 622 [1979]; Vines v. State, 394 A. 2d 809 [1978]; Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294 [1975]; Howell v. State, 247 A. 2d 291 [1968]; Statements made by defendant while in custody of police officers but not pursuant to any questioning by officers were properly admitted as spontaneously volunteered statements — State v. Matlock, 289 N.W. 2d 625 [1980]; State v. Red Feather, 289 N.W. 2d 768 (1980)].

In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. (Baysinger v. State, 550 S.W. 2d 445, 447 [1977], where a defendant, not in custody, in talking with the sheriff wanted the sheriff for a confidant instead of a law enforcement officer, his admissions on an incriminating taped conversation did not violate the 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and are thus admissible).

Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. (Aballe v. People, 183 SCRA 196, 205 [1990]; People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111, 123-124 [1988]; People v. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373, 378-379 [1981]; see also People v. Rogers, 422 N.Y.S. 18, 48 N.Y. 2d 167, 397 N.E. 2d 709, 714 [1979]).

What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 199, pp. 975-976; see also People v. Marti, supra, at 67-68 where we ruled that the constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures cannot be extended to searches and seizures done by private individuals without the intervention of police authorities; People v. Maqueda, supra, at 59 where we held that extrajudicial admissions of an accused to a private person and to a prosecutor in connection with the accused's plea to be utilized as a state witness were deemed outside the scope of the provision on custodial investigation).

Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence.

The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that: x x x.

X x x.

Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as follows: x x x.

X x x.

Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994. 42 He also testified that: x x x.

X x x.

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. (Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175, 183-184 [1994] — We ruled that an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer nor did he, in this case, act as one). They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. (People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 525-526 [1987] where several accused were forced by the police to reenact the commission of the crime.).
In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. (People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, 67 [1991]). It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. (People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, 590 [1995]; Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W. 2d 413, 417 [1957], citing Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 93, 358).


Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. (16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 199, pp. 975-976; see also People v. Marti, supra, at 67-68 where we ruled that the constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures cannot be extended to searches and seizures done by private individuals without the intervention of police authorities; People v. Maqueda, supra, at 59 where we held that extrajudicial admissions of an accused to a private person and to a prosecutor in connection with the accused's plea to be utilized as a state witness were deemed outside the scope of the provision on custodial investigation).

X x x.”