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Rules on electronic evidence apply to criminal cases: "A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014
“x x x.
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.
X x x.
X x x.
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the police station because of the questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station where he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide. He certainly did not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his taxicab.
X x x.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 [A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002. Rule 1, Sec. 2. Cases covered. – These Rules shall apply to the criminal and civil actions and proceeding, as well as quasi-judicial and administrative cases.].
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.16 [Rule 11, Section 2: Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. – Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted].
Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed it.17 [RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Section 5(b)]. The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this knowledge.
X x x.”
Electronic evidence: "What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically."
NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu ,
Br.
“x x x.
The focal point of this
entire controversy is petitioners obstinate contention that the photocopies it
offered as formal evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent
of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists
that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate court,
the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute
electronic evidence based on its own premise that an electronic document as
defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not
limited to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced
electronically. Rather, petitioner maintains that an electronic document can
also refer to other modes of written expression that is produced
electronically, such as photocopies, as included in the sections catch-all proviso: any print-out or output, readable
by sight or other means.
We do not agree.
X x x.
On the other hand, an electronic document
refers to information
or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of
written expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a
fact may be proved and affirmed, which
is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.[1] It
includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or
other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document.[2]
The rules use the word
information to define an electronic document received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic
document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein,
similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents.[3] However, what
differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner
by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an
electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the
information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically.
By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be
considered as information electronically received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these
paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the
law. Having thus declared that the offered
photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential
that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their
original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error
can be ascribed to the court a quo in
denying admission and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits
A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings, I, J and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its
sub-markings, N and its sub-markings, O, P and its sub-markings, Q and its
sub-markings, and R. The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies
as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value
being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of
discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule
was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the
introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals.[4]
But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of
fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law.[5]
The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal
relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the
terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns
addressed by the best evidence rule.[6]
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions.
There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of
inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of
the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other
document in the custody of a public
officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an
existing record a certified
copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them
is only the general result of
the whole."
When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.[7]
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof:
(a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of
the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents;[8]
(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a
reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c)
it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been
made for the document in the proper place or places.[9]
However, in the case at bar, though
petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it
failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions
as enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the
Order of the court a quo denying
admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes
this Court why petitioner continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities
given by the trial court for it to present the originals of the photocopies it
presented yet comes before us now praying that it be allowed to present the
originals of the exhibits that were denied admission or in case the same are
lost, to lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence. Had
petitioner presented the originals of the documents to the court instead of the
photocopies it obstinately offered as evidence, or at the very least laid the
predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not
have unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court and finally to this
Court for adjudication. Had it not been for petitioners intransigence, the
merits of petitioners complaint for damages would have been decided upon by the
trial court long ago. As aptly articulated by the Court of Appeals, petitioner
has only itself to blame for the respondent judges denial of admission of its
aforementioned documentary evidence and consequently, the denial of its prayer
to be given another opportunity to present the originals of the documents that were denied admission nor to lay the
predicate for the admission of secondary evidence in case the same has been
lost.
X x x.”
[1] Rules on Electronic Evidence, Rule 2,
Sec. 1, par. (h).
[2] Id.
[3] Revised Rules on Evidence, Rule 130,
Sec. 2.
[4] Lee v. People of the Philippines 19 October 2004 ,
440 SCRA 662, 683.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
Confessions to the media: "We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. (People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, 67 [1991]). It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997.
“x x x.
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen, the mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) . . .
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. [This provision was taken from Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which adopted the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 [1966] and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. ed. 2d 977 [1964]. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. (People v. Enrile, 222 SCRA 586 [1993]; Sampaga v. People, 215 SCRA 839 [1992]; People v. Penero, 213 SCRA 536 [1992]). The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 410 [1996]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 457.). The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at 445; Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294, 298 [1975]).
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. (People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 [1994]; People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566, 575 [1994]; People v. de Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993]; People v Olvis, 154 SCRA 513 [1987]). As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." (Bernas, supra, at 411).
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the crime, viz: xxxx.
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified: x x x.
X x x.
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. (People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]; People Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 17-19 [1986]).
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day, Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad testified, viz: x x x.
X x x.
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police [R.A. 6975, Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, Chapter III (D), sec. 51 (b)]. and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by the latter. [Leuschner v. State, 397 A. 2d 622 [1979]; Vines v. State, 394 A. 2d 809 [1978]; Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294 [1975]; Howell v. State, 247 A. 2d 291 [1968]; Statements made by defendant while in custody of police officers but not pursuant to any questioning by officers were properly admitted as spontaneously volunteered statements — State v. Matlock, 289 N.W. 2d 625 [1980]; State v. Red Feather, 289 N.W. 2d 768 (1980)].
In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. (Baysinger v. State, 550 S.W. 2d 445, 447 [1977], where a defendant, not in custody, in talking with the sheriff wanted the sheriff for a confidant instead of a law enforcement officer, his admissions on an incriminating taped conversation did not violate the 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and are thus admissible).
Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. (Aballe v. People, 183 SCRA 196, 205 [1990]; People v. Dy, 158 SCRA 111, 123-124 [1988]; People v. Taylaran, 108 SCRA 373, 378-379 [1981]; see also People v. Rogers, 422 N.Y.S. 18, 48 N.Y. 2d 167, 397 N.E. 2d 709, 714 [1979]).
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. (16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 199, pp. 975-976; see also People v. Marti, supra, at 67-68 where we ruled that the constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures cannot be extended to searches and seizures done by private individuals without the intervention of police authorities; People v. Maqueda, supra, at 59 where we held that extrajudicial admissions of an accused to a private person and to a prosecutor in connection with the accused's plea to be utilized as a state witness were deemed outside the scope of the provision on custodial investigation).
Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence.
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that: x x x.
X x x.
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered the proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as follows: x x x.
X x x.
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on February 26, 1994. 42 He also testified that: x x x.
X x x.
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant. (Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175, 183-184 [1994] — We ruled that an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer nor did he, in this case, act as one). They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. (People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 525-526 [1987] where several accused were forced by the police to reenact the commission of the crime.).
In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. (People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57, 67 [1991]). It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that government has the duty to protect. (People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, 590 [1995]; Quinn v. Buchanan, 298 S.W. 2d 413, 417 [1957], citing Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 93, 358).
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies. (16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 199, pp. 975-976; see also People v. Marti, supra, at 67-68 where we ruled that the constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures cannot be extended to searches and seizures done by private individuals without the intervention of police authorities; People v. Maqueda, supra, at 59 where we held that extrajudicial admissions of an accused to a private person and to a prosecutor in connection with the accused's plea to be utilized as a state witness were deemed outside the scope of the provision on custodial investigation).
X x x.”
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