"x x x.
It is a well-established rule that consummated acts can no longer be restrained by injunction8. When the acts sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition have already been performed or completed prior to the filing of the injunction suit, nothing more can be enjoined or restrained;9 a writ of injunction then becomes moot and academic,10 and the court, by mere issuance of the writ, can no longer stop or undo the act. To do so would violate the sole purpose of a prohibitive injunction, that is, to preserve the status quo.
Moreover, the issuance of a preliminary injunction is not intended to correct a wrong done in the past, or to redress an injury already sustained, or to punish wrongful acts already committed, but to preserve and protect the rights of the litigant during the pendency of the case.11
In Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals,12 the Court ruled that injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights and interests. When the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied.
The Court also ruled in Go v. Looyuko13 that when events sought to be prevented by injunction or prohibition have already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. It is a universal principle of law that an injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done. A writ of injunction becomes moot and academic after the act sought to be enjoined has already been consummated.
In the present case, the act sought to be restrained by the petitioners has already been partly accomplished. The actual suspension and expulsion of Co, Cruz, Alegado and Jester from PCCI rendered their prayer for injunctive relief moot. Evidently, it is no longer possible to grant the relief they were seeking – that is, to stop PCCI from implementing their suspension and expulsion – as the same has already been consummated. The status quo can no longer be restored.
Furthermore, Dayrit v. Delos Santos, the case cited by the petitioners is not squarely applicable to the present case. The factual circumstances in that case are clearly distinguishable from those in the present case.
In Dayrit, the party praying for an injunction alleged not only acts that were already committed or consummated, but also those acts that the defendant could still continue to execute unless restrained. Moreover, the acts sought to be restrained in that case (i.e., making excavations, opening a ditch, and construction of a dam) are capable of being continued or repeated. In other words, the defendant’s questioned acts, even if partly or initially executed, are capable of continuation, as these acts consist of several stages that are not consummated by a mere single act.
In the present case, the suspension and expulsion of petitioners Co, Cruz, Alegado and Jester are finished completed acts and which can only be restored depending on the final outcome of the case on the merits. This is different from the acts enjoined in Dayrit which consisted of the making of excavations, opening a ditch, and construction of a dam, which were all continuing.
Hence, we cannot apply the ruling that “not only the commission or execution of such acts, but also their continuation can be prevented or prohibited by an injunction.” Thus, we hold that the trial court’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, insofar as petitioners Co, Cruz, Alegado and Jester, is improper, as the same may no longer be availed of.
x x x."
See:
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 190112, April 22, 2015, PRIMO CO, SR., EDGARDO CRUZ, FE LANNY L. ALEGADO, JESTER B. ONGCHUAN, JOSEPH ONGCHUAN AND LUCIANNE CHAM, PETITIONERS, VS. THE PHILIPPINE CANINE CLUB, INC., RESPONDENT
