PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EDISON C. MAGBITANG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT. EN BANC, G.R. No. 175592, June 14, 2016. - The Lawyer's Post.
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Under the Rules of Court, a child may be a competent witness, unless the trial court determines upon proper showing that the child’s mental maturity is such as to render him incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which he is to be examined and of relating the facts truthfully.3 The testimony of the child of sound mind with the capacity to perceive and make known the perception can be believed in the absence of any showing of an improper motive to testify.4 Once it is established that the child fully understands the character and nature of an oath, the testimony is given full credence.5 In the case of CCC, the Defense did not persuasively discredit his worthiness and competence as a witness. As such, the Court considers the reliance by the trial court on his recollection fully justified.
And, thirdly, we dismiss the argument of Magbitang that the trial court erroneously relied on circumstantial evidence to establish his criminal responsibility for the rape with homicide. The evidence of guilt against him consisted in both direct and circumstantial evidence. The direct evidence was supplied by CCC’s testimony, while the circumstantial evidence corroborated CCC’s testimony. Such evidence, combined, unerringly pointed to Magbitang, and to no other, as the culprit.
In this connection, it is worth reminding that circumstantial evidence is not necessarily weaker in persuasive quality than direct evidence. As the Court said inPeople v. Villaflores:6
We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape when only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide, because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed. Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as the identity of the culprit. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast, circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.7 To be clear, then, circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting a felon free.8
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred; hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.9 Nor has the quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed as to be reduced into some definite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus, the Court said in People v. Modesto;10
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial evidence is well set out in the following passage from People vs. Ludday:11 “No general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”
Notwithstanding our concurrence with the findings of the RTC and the CA, we reduce the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua in view of the intervening enactment of Republic Act No. 9346,12 but without eligibility for parole of Magbitang.13
Conformably with the ruling in People v. Jugueta,14 which the Court recently promulgated in order to lay to rest the inconsistencies in the fixing of damages as part of the civil liabilities in crimes, we modify the awards by imposing civil indemnity of P100,000.00; moral damages of P100,000.00; and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 because the penalty of death, although proper, had to be reduced toreclusion perpetua in deference to the application of Republic Act No. 9346.15 In addition, although we delete the actual damages for failure to prove them, the heirs of AAA were entitled to temperate damages of P50,000.00.
Lastly, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the damages herein awarded reckoned from the finality of this decision.16
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