Friday, July 10, 2015

"Stop and Frisk" Searches; Right Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure.



See - Constitutional Law: Right Against Unreasonable Searches (Stop And Frisk)…
THE LAWYER'S POST.


"x x x.
“The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.

“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches[ are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses.

However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in.  This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.”


x x x

“The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was “suspicious.”

x x x

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause:

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.(Emphasis supplied)


For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as “a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.”


x x x

“Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the “genuine reason” requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:


[A] “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the  general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating  possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.[99] (Emphasis supplied)


The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. As in Manalili, jurisprudence also allows “stop and frisk” for cases involving dangerous drugs.”


x x x


“The Constitution provides:

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.



Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.”[137] It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.


Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.


Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better.

However, we cannot, in any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.”


x x x."


G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE, VS.
VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
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Cf. THE LAWYER’S POST.