Right to fair trial v. freedom of the press. - On
the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court
judges, the Court found that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the
right to a fair trial must pass the “totality of circumstances” test, applied
inPeople v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press,
that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the
right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and
proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice
resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. Re: Petition
for radio and television coverage of the multiple murder cases against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan, et al., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC/A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC/A.M. No.
10-11-7-SC. June 14, 2011.
TEXT OF
DECISION
RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE
MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET
AL., A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC, June 14, 2011.
RE: PETITION FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESENT COURT
HANDLING THE TRIAL OF THE MASSACRE OF 57 PERSONS, INCLUDING 32 JOURNALISTS, IN
AMPATUAN, MAGUINDANAO INTO A SPECIAL COURT HANDLING THIS CASE ALONE FOR THE
PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING GENUINE SPEEDY TRIAL and FOR THE SETTING UP OF VIDEOCAM
AND MONITOR JUST OUTSIDE THE COURT FOR JOURNALISTS TO COVER AND FOR THE PEOPLE
TO WITNESS THE TRIAL OF THE DECADE TO MAKE IT TRULY PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL AS
COMMANDED BY THE CONSTITUTION, A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC, June 14, 211.
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO III FOR THE
LIVE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE TRIAL., A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC, June 14, 2011.
EXCERPTS
“X x x.
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners
prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to
the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.
Putts Law[16] states
that technology is dominated by two types of people: those who understand what
they do not manage, and those who manage what they do not understand. Indeed,
members of this Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the experts
gown, so to speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices
or risks from the use of technology inside the courtroom.
A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino,
the Court is once again faced with the same task of striking that delicate
balance between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights.
The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage
to the accuseds right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the
era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left
a blow to the exercise of press freedom and the right to public information.
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was
shrouded, as it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation
which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and which fear,
if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety nets under existing rules
and exacting regulations.
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win
situation that shall not compromise rights in the
criminal administration of justice, sacrifice press freedom and allied rights,
and interfere with the integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance
with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to
the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same time,
maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm
─ [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to
all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o
so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs
from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings
are formulated. The observation that [m]assive intrusion of
representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and
destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.
The Court concluded in Aquino:
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right
to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice,
and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the
people to information may be served and satisfied by less distracting,
degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the
judicial officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the
commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be
permitted during the trial proper.
Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due
process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and
in the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to
PROHlBIT live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. Video footage
of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above
indicated.[17]
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to
revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
in a criminal case. It held that [t]he propriety of granting or denying
the instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the
one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along
with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring
a fair and impartial trial. The Court disposed:
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological
and scientific advances but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any
person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are
provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price
too high to pay.
x x x.
In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada,
by Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered
the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes, under the
following conditions:
x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety,
excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not
be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b)
cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the
movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for
documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d)
the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have
rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be
prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations
of the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the
audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision
and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made
pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of
the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office
for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.[19]
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v.
Texas[20] which Aquino and Estrada heavily
cited, was borne out of the dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations
for the possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members are
not necessarily schooled in the law, are different from that of a judge who is
versed with the rules of evidence. To petitioners, Estes also
does not represent the most contemporary position of the United States in
the wake of latest jurisprudence[21] and
statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all 50 states, except the District
of Columbia, allow television coverage with varying degrees of openness.
Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost
all the proceedings of United Kingdoms Supreme Court are filmed, and
sometimes broadcast.[22] The
International Criminal Court broadcasts its proceedings via video streaming in
the internet.[23]
On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and
witnesses, petitioners point out thatAquino and Estrada,
like Estes, lack empirical evidence to support the sustained
conclusion. They point out errors of generalization where the conclusion
has been mostly supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been
no authoritative study on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the
impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must
pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People
v. Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada
v. Desierto,[25] that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press,
that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the
right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and
proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere
fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice
resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He
may challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a proceeding
that transgressed a constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners,
an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of venue, for continuance
until the prejudice from publicity is abated, for disqualification of the
judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when necessary. The trial
court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue gag orders.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre
cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even
the parties to the cases the private complainants/families of the victims and
other witnesses inside the courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically
discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right
that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be
held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are
not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be
open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves
with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a
courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public
to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible
and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed
during the proceedings.[26](underscoring
supplied)
Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the
public who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal
cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of
hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57
victims and of the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to
attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the impleaded parties or trial
participants. It bears noting at this juncture that the prosecution and
the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a
courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether private
complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if the right
itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to
witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology
tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the
courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and public
trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live
broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the
Court lays down the following guidelines toward addressing the
concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre
cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live
radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of
application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings and that they have the necessary technological
equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking
that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations and cover
the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No
media entity shall be allowed to broadcast the proceedings without an
application duly approved by the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed
inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view
of the sala of the trial court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to
avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The
camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a
duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court.The camera equipment
should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays.Signal lights or
signs showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited
number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless
technology, must be unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial
court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court
Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical
set-up of the camera and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from
inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such a way
that the least physical disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to
the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link
with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account
of the media entities, which should employ technology that can (i) avoid the
cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary
ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude undue commotion in case of
technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the
set-up of the media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the
audio-visual recording either via wireless technology accessible even from
outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from
which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the
real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day
must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where
Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[27] applies,
and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the
courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved
identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the
witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of
corroborative testimonies is material, minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order
only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or
both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the
proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the
days proceedings are adjourned, except during the period of recess called by
the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is
ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output
from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any
voice-overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any
commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to
the contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be
allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still
images derived from or cartographic sketches of scenes based on the recording,
only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule
and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and
the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in
accordance with law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall
be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which may issue
supplementary directives, as the exigency requires, including the suspension or
revocation of the grant of application by the media entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall
forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing
regulations, and administrative matters referred to it by the Court concerning
the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance
with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall also
report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the
latest technology that would meet the herein requirements. It may conduct
consultations with resource persons and experts in the field of information and
communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the
proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices
such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable number of media
practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these
guidelines.
Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology
has to offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional
precepts into the workable context. Technology per se has
always been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need
fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance
of the various rights herein involved, within the contours of defined
guidelines.
X x x.”
* On
official leave.
[1] Ma.
Reynafe Momay-Castillo, Editha Mirandilla-Tiamzon, and Glenna Legarta.
[2] Horacio
Severino, Glenda Gloria, Mariquit Almario Gonzales, Arlene Burgos, Abraham
Balabad, Jr., Joy Gruta, Ma. Salvacion Varona, Isagani De Castro, Danilo Lucas,
Cecilia Victoria Orena Drilon, Cecilia Lardizabal, Vergel Santos, Romula Marinas,
Noel Angel Alamar, Joseph Alwyn Alburo, Rowena Paraan, Ma. Cristina Rodriguez,
Luisita Cruz Valdes, David Jude Sta. Ana, and Joan Bondoc.
[3] Roland
Tolentino, Danilo Arao, Elena Pernia, Elizabeth Enriquez, Daphne Tatiana
Canlas, Rosalina Yokomori, Marinela Aseron, Melba Estonilo, Lourdes Portus,
Josefina Santos, and Yumina Francisco,
[4] Vide rollo (A.M.
No. 10-11-5-SC), p. 95.
[5] Represented
by its president, Jerry Yap.
[6] Represented
by its president, Benny Antiporda.
[7] Vide rollo (A.M.
No. 10-11-6-SC), p. 19.
[8] Rollo (A.M.
No. 10-11-7-SC), pp. 1-2.
[9] Id. at
2.
[10] Rollo (A.M.
No. 10-11-7-SC), p. 3; rollo (A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC), p. 186.
[11] The Sangguniang
Panlungsod of General Santos City endorsed
Resolution No. 484 of November 22, 2010 which resolved to strongly
urge the Supreme Court of the Philippines to allow a live media
coverage for public viewing and information on the court proceedings/trial of
the multiple murder case filed against the suspects of the Maguindanao
massacre. The Court noted it by Resolution of December 14, 2010. Rollo,
(A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC), pp. 429-431, 434.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Cebu City
Chapter passed Resolution No. 24 (December 7, 2010) which resolved, inter
alia, respectfully ask the Supreme Court to issue a circular or order to
allow Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes to concentrate on the case of the Maguindanao
massacre, unencumbered by other cases until final decision in this case is
rendered. The Court noted it by Resolution of January 18, 2011. Rollo,
(A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC), pp. 90-91, 97.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de
Oro City also carried Resolution Nos. 10342-2010 and 10343-2010, both dated
November 23, 2010, which resolved to support the clamor for speedy trial and
that the hearing of the Maguindanao massacre be made public with a request to
consider the appeal to air live the hearings thereof. The Court noted it
by Resolution of December February 1, 2011.Rollo, (A.M. No.
10-11-5-SC), pp. 671-674, 676.
[12] En
Banc Resolution of October 22, 1991.
[13] A.M.
No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 248; Perez v. Estrada,
412 Phil. 686 (2001).
[14] Rollo,
(A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC), p. 121.
[15] Id. at
122.
[16] Based
on the 1981 book entitled Putts Law and the Successful Technocrat which is
attributed to the pseudonym Archibald Putt.
[17] Supra
note 20 at 6-7.
[18] Perez
v. Estrada, 412 Phil. 686, 711.
[19] A.M.
No. 01-4-03-SC, September 13, 2001, 365 SCRA 62, 70.
[20] 381 U.S. 532
(1965).
[21] Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560
(1981).
[22]
(Last accessed: May 25, 2011).
[23] Vide <http://livestream.xs4all.nl/icc1.asx>
(Last accessed: June 7, 2011).
[24] G.R.
Nos. 111206-08, October 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 54.
[25] G.R.
Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452.
[26] Perez
v. Estrada, supra note 26 at 706-707.
[27] Exclusion of the public. ─ The judge may, motu
proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be
produced during the trial is offensive to decency or public morals. He may
also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from the trial except court
personnel and the counsel of the parties.
