Extended power of judicial review

See - Between independence and subservience





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While intervening in the domain of the Executive and the Legislative branches with consequences akin to that of a bull charging into a china shop, the Court has been aggressively asserting its independence. It has criticized the DBM for limiting the increase in its budget for FY2015. It has refused to release details of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) to Congress, with one justice even asserting that Congress does not have the power to amend the law creating the fund. The Court has also refused to release the justices’ Statements of Assets Liabilities & Net Worth (SALNs) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

There are issues of democratic practice embedded in the SC’s power of judicial review which cannot remain within the necessarily secretive confines of court deliberation. The SC can rule that the Executive, together with the Legislative, or separately, are guilty of "grave abuse of discretion." What recourse is available to the Executive and Legislative branches when the SC is guilty of "grave abuse of discretion"? Under the Constitution, and Philippine jurisprudence, none.

Even only in the recent past, there have been SC decisions which have arguably breached the limits of "discretion." In 3 decisions involving the rights and power of former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the SC either directly violated the law or stretched the limits of its power. These included allowing the appointment of Renato Corona as Chief Justice at a time when Arroyo was already explicitly prohibited from doing so; preventing the new administration from creating a Truth Commission; and most egregiously, a TRO on a GMA hold departure order which would have allowed Arroyo to leave the country and escape prosecution.

One key principle of democractic practice is "check and balance" between the 3 branches of government. It may be perfectly valid for the Supreme Court to have the power to "check" the other branches, but if neither the legislature nor the Executive has the power to "check" the Supreme Court, there is no "balance." The only powers available to the Executive and Legislative branches against the SC are "disruptive." Cutting the budget of the Supreme Court or worse, impeaching the justices, cannot be organized into the "normal course of [political] events." How did this come to pass?

The 1987 Constitution was written in the immediate aftermath of the Marcos dictatorship. It is only natural that the main thrust of the anti-dictatorship movement – preventing a dictatorship – was the main determinant. One provision, limiting the power of the president to declare martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus has found general acceptance. It is the other provision, giving the SC power to review acts of the legislature and the Executive, which has been problematical.

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