In a legal easement case (re: subjacent and lateral support) that our office won in the Supreme Court, the adverse party filed a motion for partial reconsideration seeking an award of damages, notwithstanding the fact that her petition was denied by the Court, our client’s right to the easement affirmed by the Court, and the Decision of the Court did not contain any finding of bad faith, malice, or negligence on the part of our client. In our comment to the motion, which we wish to share for legal research purposes, we moved to deny the same on the following grounds:
1. X x x.
2. The petitioner’s PARTIAL motion for reconsideration does not question the RATION DECIDENDI of the Decision, dated February 2, 2011, of this Honorable Court.
2.1. The Decision AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION the appealed Decision, dated May 25, 2007, of the Court of the Court of Appeals.
2.2. The modification made by this Honorable Court to the decision of the Court of Appeals was the removal of “x x x the annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T- x x x , recognizing the existence of the legal easement of subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters, more or less, of the property of petitioner x x x”. (Dispositive Portion, Decision, February 2, 2011).
2.3. The “annotation” referred to the AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM which the respondent had caused to be annotated on the title of the property of the petitioner to assert his statutory right to the legal easement of adjacent and lateral support.
2.4. Such an annotation was deemed unnecessary by the Honorable Court because “a judicial declaration” of the easement claimed by the respondent “already binds” the property of the petitioner and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest. (Id., Page 9, Par. 2).
3. Although the Honorable Court declared that the respondent had no “adverse claim” against the property of the petitioner, as technically defined under Section 70 of P.D. No. 1529, it clarified and so held that “in reality what respondent was claiming was a judicial recognition of the existence of the easement of subjacent and lateral support over the 65 sq. m. portion of the petitioner’s property covering the land support/embankment area”. (Id., Pages 7-8).
3.1. The Honorable Court recognized that the reason/purpose of the respondent for such annotation was “only to prevent petitioner from removing the embankment or from digging on the property for fear of soil erosion that might weaken the foundation of the rear portion of his property which is adjacent to the property of the petitioner”. (Id.. Page 8).
4. The Honorable Court expressly declared that “in the instant case an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of respondent”. (Id., Page 9, Par. 1).
5. The Honorable Court expressly affirmed the following uncontroverted findings of facts:
5.1. The residential house and lot of respondent was “located on an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioner’s property”. (Id.).
5.2. The “embankment and the riprapped stones have been in existence even before the petitioner became the owner of the property”. (Id.).
5.3. The “petitioner had been making excavation and diggings on the subject embankment”. (Id.).
5.4. Unless restrained, “the continued excavation of the embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of the house of respondent to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the family dwelling”. (Id.).
6. The Honorable Court SUSTAINED the Court of Appeals in declaring that a PERMANENT INJUNCTION on the part of the petition from making INJURIOUS EXCAVATIONS was necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent. (Id., Page 9, Par. 2).
7. As stated earlier, the Honorable Court emphasized that “an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer necessary” because “it exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property”. (Id.).
7.1. The Honorable Court further held that “a judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest”. (Id.).
8. The foregoing dissertation would show that the Honorable Court had rejected the theory of the petitioner that the respondent should be held liable for damages for causing the annotation of an affidavit of adverse claim, which the respondent, in good faith, had perceived at that time to be the proper and valid manner of asserting his recognized statutory right to the legal e3asement of subjacent and lateral support.
8.1. The ratio decidendi of the Decision, dated February 2, 2011, of the Honorable Court does not make any declaration showing any legal or factual basis to punish the respondent in the form of an award of damages in favor of the petitioner.
8.2. Rightly so.
8.3. To award the petitioner with damages would not only be most unfair to the respondent. It would UNJUSTLY ENRICH the petitioner without any legal and factual basis or justification in relation to the ratio decidendi of the body of the Decision of the Honorable Court.
9. It must be noted that GOOD FAITH is a defense against any allegation of entitlement to damages based on a theory of malum en se or mala prohibita or abuse of rights (the latter being the theory upon which the petitioner bases her claims for damages).
9.1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CORA ABELLA OJEDA, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 2004:
X x x.
It must be noted that our Revised Penal Code was enacted to penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. The principal consideration is the existence of malicious intent. There is a concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which together make up the “criminal mind” behind the “criminal act.” Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As we held in Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332 [1997]:
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting.
X x x.
9.2. FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999, re: PRSUMPTION OF GOOD FAITH.
X x x.
The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. In Cabungcal v. Cordova, No. L-16934, 31 July, 1964, 11 SCRA 584, we affirmed the doctrine that an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the provisions of an ordinance by a city mayor does not amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to damages against that official. We reiterated this principle in Mabutol v. Pascual which held that public officials may not be liable for damages in the discharge of their official functions absent any bad faith. Sanders v. Veridiano II expanded the concept by declaring that under the law on public officers, acts done in the performance of official duty are protected by the presumption of good faith.
X x x.
10. Rejecting petitioner’s claim for damages, the respondent hereby cites the following jurisprudence:
10.1. LUCIANO BRIONES and NELLY BRIONES vs. JOSE MACABAGDAL, et. al., GR No. 150666, August 3, 2010:
One (1) last note on the award of damages. Considering that petitioners acted in good faith in building their house on the subject property of the respondent-spouses, there is no basis for the award of moral
damages to respondent-spouses. Likewise, the Court deletes the award to Vergon of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees for the litigation expenses Vergon had incurred as such amounts were not specifically prayed for in its Answer to petitioners’ third-party complaint. Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation are recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages nor judicial costs. Hence, such must be specifically prayed for—as was not done in this case—and may not be deemed incorporated within a general prayer for “such other relief and remedy as this court may deem just and equitable.” It must also be noted that aside from the following, the body of the trial court’s decision was devoid of any statement regarding attorney’s fees. In Scott Consultants & Resource Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated that attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorney’s fees.
10.2. Rodolfo N. Regala v. Federico P. Carin, G.R. No. 188715, April 6, 2011:
Moral damages; pre-requisites for an award. In prayers for moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of petitioner’s act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to instead look into the manner by which petitioner carried out his renovations to determine whether this was directly responsible for any distress respondent may have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful or illegal act or omission must have preceded the damages sustained by the claimant.
It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondent’s consent, the lack of the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.
X x x.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. While the Court harbors no doubt that the
incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondent’s property was malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
11. IN FINE, the respondent believes that there is no legal and factual basis to unjustly enrich the petitioner by granting her prayer for damages, which does not have any legal ad factual basis in the ratio decidendi of the body of the Decision of the Honorable Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the partial motion for reconsideration of the petitioner be DENIED for lack of merit.
Further, the respondent prays for such and other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.
Las Pinas City, May 20, 2011.
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