SPOUSES ROY PO LAM and JOSEFA ONG PO LAM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIX LIM now JOSE LEE, respondents.
x x x.
However, it must be pointed out that even if a notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 2581 (Lot No. 1558) was still subsisting at the time petitioners bought the property from LAHCO, there also was a court order ordering that the annotation be cancelled, as in fact, it was cancelled on May 20, 1974.
A possessor in good faith has been defined as “one who is unaware that there exists a flaw which invalidates his acquisition of the thing (See Article 526, Civil Code). Good faith consists in the possessor’s belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title (Piño v. CA, 198 SCRA 434 [1991]). In this case, while petitioners bought Lot No. 2581 from LAHCO while a notice of lis pendens was still annotated thereon, there was also existing a court order canceling the same. Hence, petitioners cannot be considered as being “aware of a flaw which invalidates their acquisition of the thing” since the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was already being ordered cancelled at the time of the purchase. On this ground alone, petitioners can already be considered buyers in good faith.
More importantly, however, the notice of lis pendens inscribed on TCT No. 2581 was cancelled on May 20, 1974, pursuant to the order of the trial court in Civil Case No. 2953. Felix Lim did not move for the reinstatement of the cancelled notices of lis pendens. What is the effect of this cancellation? To follow the prior ruling of the Court in the instant case, the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens would have no effect. Regardless of the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, the Po Lam spouses are still considered as having notice of a possible defect in the title of LAHCO, making them purchasers in bad faith.
As we shall elucidate, hewing to such an interpretation misunderstands the nature and effect of a notice of lis pendens. The meaning, nature, recording, and effects of a notice of lis pendens are clearly stated in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus:
SEC. 14. Notice of lis pendens.— In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the right of the party who caused it to be recorded.
Lis pendens literally means a pending suit or a pending litigation; and the doctrine of lis pendens has been defined as the jurisdiction, power, or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment therein (54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 1). A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over the said property (AFPMBAI v. CA, G.R. No. 104769, March 3, 2000). The filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with a notice of the particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they may thereafter acquire on the property is subject to the eventuality of the suit (Laroza v. Guia, 134 SCRA 341 [1985]). Notice of lis pendens has been conceived and, more often than not, availed of, to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution or decision. With the notice of lis pendens duly recorded, and while it remains uncancelled, the registrant could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation (People v. Regional Trial Court of Manila, 178 SCRA 299 [1989]).
The filing of a notice of lis pendens in effect (1) keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment so as to prevent the defeat of the latter by successive alienations; and (2) binds a purchaser of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that will be promulgated thereon whether such a purchaser is a bona fide purchaser or not; but (3) does not create a non-existent right or lien (Somes v. Government, 62 Phil. 432 [1935]).
The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reason of public policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the judgment or decree shall have been entered; otherwise by successive alienations pending the litigation, its judgment or decree shall be rendered abortive and impossible of execution (Laroza v. Guia, supra; People v. Regional Trial Court of Manila, supra). The doctrine of lis pendens is based on considerations of public policy and convenience, which forbid a litigant to give rights to others, pending the litigation, so as to affect the proceedings of the court then progressing to enforce those rights, the rule being necessary to the administration of justice in order that decisions in pending suits may be binding and may be given full effect, by keeping the subject matter in controversy within the power of the court until final adjudication, that there may be an end to litigation, and to preserve the property that the purpose of the pending suit may not be defeated by successive alienations and transfers of title (54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens, supra).
From the above, it can be seen that the basis of the doctrine of lis pendens is public policy and convenience, under the view that once a court has taken cognizance of a controversy, it should be impossible to interfere with consummation of the judgment by any ad interim transfer, encumbrance, or change of possession (51 Am Jur 2d, Lis Pendens, § 3).
However, to hold that the Po Lam spouses are still bound by the results of the litigation over the property, despite and notwithstanding the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens prior to the termination of litigation, would consider the doctrine of lis pendens as one of implied or constructive notice. This view is erroneous.
While the doctrine of lis pendens is frequently spoken of as one of implied or constructive notice, according to many authorities, the doctrine is not founded on any idea of constructive notice, since its true foundation rests, as has already been stated, on principles of public policy and necessity. The lis pendens annotation, although considered a “general notice to all the world, . . . it is not correct to speak of it as part of the doctrine of notice; the purchaser pendente lite is affected, not by notice, but because the law does not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute as to prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice” (Tirado v. Sevilla, 188 SCRA 321 [1990]). “The doctrine of lis pendens, as generally understood and applied by the courts of this country, is not based upon presumption of notice, but upon a public policy, imperatively demanded by a necessity which can be met and overcome in no other way. It is careless ‘use of language which has led judges to speak of it as notice, because it happens to have in some instance similar effect with notice’ (Smith v. Kimball, 13 P. 801, 36 Kan. 474).”
And since the doctrine rests on public policy, not notice, upon the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, the Po Lam spouses cannot then be considered as having constructive notice of any defect in the title of LAHCO as to make them transferees pendente lite and purchasers in bad faith of Lots No. 1557 and 1558. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens inscribed on TCT Nos. 2580 and 2581. Differently stated, to hold the Po Lam spouses still bound by the notice of lis pendens inscribed on TCT No. 2581 despite its subsequent cancellation on May 20, 1974, would render said cancellation an empty, unavailing, and purposeless act, which could not have been the intent of the law. Lex neminem cogit ad van seu inutilia peragenda. The law will not compel one to do useless things.
As adverted to earlier, while the notice of lis pendens is duly recorded and as long as it remains uncancelled, the litigant can rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during litigation. Conversely, cancellation of the notice of pendency terminates the effects of such notice. Therefore, with the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. 2580 and 2581, the effects of such notice were terminated, resulting in the Po Lam spouses not being bound thereby. In fine, they cannot be considered transferees pendente lite and purchasers in bad faith of the property.
Moreover, since its operation is arbitrary and it may be harsh in particular instances, the doctrine of lis pendens is to be strictly construed and applied. It should not be extended without strict necessity (54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 1). To consider the Po Lam spouses still bound by the notice of lis pendens even after the same had been cancelled would be extending the doctrine when there is no reason therefor.
Lastly, Felix Lim’s claim is barred by the equitable principle of laches. At the time the notices of lis pendens were cancelled in 1969 and 1974, Felix Lim did not move to reinstate the same. Nor did he act when TCT No. 2580 and 2581 were replaced by TCT No. 8102 and 13711. Instead, he waited seven years, or until 1981, to have his claim on the disputed pieces of property recognized. Felix Lim’s long inaction and passivity in asserting his rights over the disputed property precludes him from recovering them from petitioners-spouses.
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