OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. FORMER JUDGE LEONARDO L. LEONIDA, OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27, STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA, En Banc, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2198, January 18, 2011
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In sum, Judge Leonida failed to decide 102 criminal cases and 43 civil cases both in Branch 27 and Branch 74, and failed to resolve motions in ten (10) civil cases in Branch 27.
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Precedents have shown that the failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period warrants administrative sanction. The Court treats such cases with utmost rigor for any delay in the administration of justice; no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.[14] Not only does it magnify the cost of seeking justice; it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.[15]No less than Section 15 (1), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower courts shall be decided or resolved within three (3) months from the date of submission. The prescribed period is a firm mandatory rule for the efficient administration of justice and not merely one for indulgent tweaking.
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[16] In the same vein, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct is emphatic in enjoining judges to administer justice without delay by disposing of the court’s business promptly and deciding cases within the period prescribed by law.
Corollary to this, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
Judge Leonida was clearly remiss in his duties as a judge for he did not take the above constitutional command to heart. Neither did he observe the above rules which have encapsulated the Court’s strict message: “the need and the imperative” for judges to promptly and expeditiously decide cases including all incidents therein.[19] In this case, the findings of the OCA showed that Judge Leonida failed to decide a considerable number of cases: (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases. Judge Leonida openly admitted his culpability in the delay of disposition of cases.
His proffered explanation is unacceptable given the ample period that he had. He cannot take refuge behind the common excuse of heavy caseload to justify his failure to decide and resolve cases promptly. He could have asked the Court for a reasonable period of extension to dipose of the cases but did not.
Due to his inefficiency, the constitutional right of parties to a speedy trial was violated out of neglect. Instead of justice wrought by efficient and competent handling of judicial business, the lower courts handled and assisted by Judge Leonida produced unnecessary financial strain, not to mention physical and emotional anxiety, to litigants. Delay derails the administration of justice. It postpones the rectification of wrong and the vindication of the unjustly prosecuted. It crowds the dockets of the courts, increasing the costs for all litigants, pressuring judges to take short cuts, interfering with the prompt and deliberate disposition of those cases in which all parties are diligent and prepared for trial, and overhanging the entire process with the pall of disorganization and insolubility. More than these, possibilities for error in fact-finding multiply rapidly between the original fact and its judicial determination as time elapses. If the facts are not fully and accurately determined, even the wisest judge cannot distinguish between merit and demerit. If courts do not get the facts right, there is little chance for their judgment to be right.[20]
The Court has always considered a judge’s delay in deciding cases within the prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency.[21] Undue delay cannot be countenanced at a time when the clogging of the court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary. The raison d' etre of courts lies not only in properly dispensing justice but also in being able to do so seasonably.[22]
Aside from the delay in deciding the reported cases, the audit findings likewise show that the case records/rollo in Branch 27 were not chronologically arranged. Certificates of arraignment, minutes of hearings and notices of hearing were unsigned by the accused and his/her counsel, or worse, missing from the files. Judge Leonida was asked to explain the whereabouts of the case records of Criminal Case No. 12178. His bare denial however, does not overcome the fair conclusion that Section 14 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court[23] was not observed. The expectation directed at judges to exercise utmost diligence and care in handling the records of cases was certainly not met, or at least approximated.
The administration of justice demands that those who don judicial robes be able to comply fully and faithfully with the task set before them.[24] As frontline officials of the judiciary, judges should, at all times, act with efficiency and with probity. They are duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but likewise to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the public reposed on them and the institution they represent. [25]
Therefore, as recommended by the OCA after a thorough judicial audit and considering the unrebutted audit reports on record, proper sanctions must be imposed. The penalty imposed for undue delay in deciding cases varies in each case: from fine, suspension, suspension and fine, and even dismissal, depending mainly on the number of cases left undecided within the reglementary period, and other factors, such as the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and the age of the judge.[26]
The Court agrees with the OCA that the total number of cases which Judge Leonida failed to timely decide or act on warrants a fine higher than that prescribed by the rules. In Lugares v. Judge Gutierrez-Torres,[27] the defaulting judge who was found guilty of gross inefficiency for her undue delay in resolving cases submitted for decision for a number of years was dismissed from the service.
In view of Judge Leonida’s retirement on
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Leonardo Leonida, former Presiding Judge of Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Assisting Judge in Branch 74, Regional Trial Court, Malabon City, GUILTY of gross incompetence and gross inefficiency for failure to decide one hundred two (102) criminal cases and forty-three (43) civil cases for which he is FINED P50,000.00 to be deducted from his retirement/gratuity benefits.
Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor, Acting Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and Atty. Bernadette Platon, Branch Clerk of Court, are hereby ordered to report on their respective compliance with the orders of the Court contained in its July 29, 2009 Order, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. The Court notes that, in its
Judge Blancaflor is hereby ordered to cause the reconstitution of Criminal Case No. 12178 within three (3) months from receipt hereof and to report his compliance thereon within ten (10) days from completion.
Atty. Bernadette Platon is hereby ordered to include the status of said case in her Monthly Report of Cases.
SO ORDERED.
