Loan interests and penalties

 "Ruling

The Petition has no merit. By virtue of their contract of loan, MCC agreed to lend money to respondents, who, in turn, bound themselves to return the principal obligation plus pay monetary interest, which is the compensation for the use or forbearance of money.28 Under the principle of autonomy of contracts, parties to an agreement are allowed to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.29

Here, MCC and respondents agreed on 23.36% per annum as monetary interest for the PHP 467,600.00 loan under the first promissory note, PN No. 7155. The stipulated interests were computed for the five-year duration of the loan as they formed part of the PHP 16,895.77 monthly amortization to be paid by respondents. PN No. 7155 also provided for the payment of "an interest of 1/10th of 1% for every day" the loan obligation remains unpaid, plus "penalty of 1.5% per month" and "collection fee of P100.00 added, all of which, if left unpaid, shall be compounded monthly on due date to become part of the total outstanding obligation."30

In this case, however, the RTC found that MCC imposed an additional 3% monthly interest, referred to as the EIR. During trial, MCC admitted that it was their company policy to charge 3% per month EIR for every delay. The EIR is on top of the stipulated 23.36% per annum monetary interest and the penalties of 1/10 of 1% per day and 1.5% per month penalty, all of which were compounded monthly as part of the outstanding balance.

Clearly, the Court cannot sustain the imposition of the compounded 3% monthly EIR. The evidence shows that the EIR was not indicated in PN No. 7155. MCC unilaterally imposed the EIR by simply inserting it in the disclosure statement. This is not valid and does not bind the respondents as it violates the mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil Code, which states that the validity or compliance to the contract cannot be left to the will of one of the parties.31

The Court likewise rejects MCC's argument that the 3% monthly EIR may not be invalidated because the reduction of interest rates only apply to loans with open-ended terms, citing De la Paz v. L & J Development Company, Inc.32 Further, MCC cannot validly insist that respondents may not question the interest rates after agreeing to and benefiting from the proceeds of the loan.1aшphi1

In Megalopolis Properties, Inc. v. D 'Nhew Lending Corporation,33 the Court ruled that although there is no numerical limit on conscionability, the rate of 3% per month or 36% per annum is three times more than the 12% legal interest rate, and therefore, excessive and unconscionable. The rate of 36% per annum is also far greater than those previously upheld by the Court.34 Moreover, contrary to MCC's argument, we stressed in Megalopolis that the ruling in De la Paz did not in any way shield loan agreements with definite terms from scrutiny on conscionability. In De la Paz, the Court disallowed the creditor's claim for payment of monetary interests because of the absence of a written stipulation on interests as required under Article 195635 of the Civil Code. The fact that an interest of 6% per month was imposed on an open-ended loan wherein the period is unspecified only served to aggravate the outrageous amount being charged. At any rate, jurisprudence is settled that the willingness of the debtor in assuming an unconscionable rate of interest is inconsequential to its validity.36

When MCC and the respondents executed PN No. 7155 in September 2009, the legal interest rate was fixed at 12% per annum.37 This rate was considered the reasonable compensation for forbearance of money. As held in Spouses Abella v. Spouses Abella,38 while the contracting parties may depart from the legal interest rate, any deviation therefrom must be reasonable and fair. If the stipulated interest for a loan is more than twice the prevailing legal rate of interest, it is for the creditor to prove that this rate is justified under the prevailing market conditions.39 No justification was offered by MCC in this case.

In Chua v. Timan,40 the Court declared that stipulated interest rates ranging from 3% per month and higher are excessive, unconscionable, and void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law.41 Although Central Bank of the Philippines Circular No. 905-82 has effectively removed the interest ceilings prescribed under the Usury Law, still, lenders may not impose interest rates that would enslave the borrowers or hemorrhage their assets.42 Following these standards, the 3% per month or 36% per annum EIR cannot pass as reasonable. It is unacceptable particularly in this case where the EIR was charged on top of the stipulated 23.36% per annum monetary interest and the penalties of 1/10 of 1% per day and 1.5% per month, compounded monthly. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, MCC's scheme exponentially bloated the principal loan amount of PHP 467,600.00. It misled respondents into continuously paying on the belief that their balance was increasing because of several delayed payments.43

Likewise, the Court denies MCC's prayer to maintain the stipulated interest and charges in PN No. 7155 and hereby affirms the RTC and the CA's judgment equitably reducing the stipulated interest rate to the applicable 12% per annum legal interest. Even if we disregard the 3% per month or 36% per annum EIR, the Court sees that the stipulated interest rate of 23.36% per annum and the additional interest of 1/10 of 1% per day and 1.5% per month penalty, all compounded monthly, or roughly 42% per annum, is still excessive. Stipulations authorizing the imposition of iniquitous or unconscionable interest are contrary to morals, if not against the law. Under Article 140944 of the Civil Code, these contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning. They cannot be ratified nor the right to set up their illegality as a defense be waived. The unconscionable interest rate is therefore, nullified and is deemed not written in the contract of loan. For these reasons, and given the span of years counted from 2009 that are covered by the computation of interests, the reduction of the stipulated interest rates and penalties to the applicable 12% per annum legal interest is more equitable. This prevents the outstanding balance from increasing to an amount which disproportionately exceeds the PHP 467,600.00 principal debt.45 The Court is empowered to equitably reduce the penalties charged especially in respondents' case because of their substantial payments.46

Note however that only the EIR and stipulated interest rates and penalties are declared void for being unconscionable. The very nature of the parties' contract of loan entitles MCC to recover not only the principal amount, but also the payment of monetary interest from the respondents, as compensation for the use of the borrowed amount.47 Based on Article 142048 of the Civil Code, respondents' obligation to pay the principal and the interest subsists as this can be separated from the void interests rates and charges.

Now, in order to determine whether the RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that the entire principal obligation of PHP 467,600.00 under the first promissory note, PN 7155, has been fully paid by respondents, we apply the legal rate of 12% per annum, as monetary interest reckoned from the date of the contract, September 2009.49 We also deduct respondents' payments made until January 2014 amounting to a total of PHP 757,778.54,50 computed as follows:

X x x. 

As can be seen from the foregoing, the RTC and the CA correctly ruled that respondents had fully paid the entire obligation. The Court finds that the obligation was fully paid as early as August 2012 and there was even an overpayment of PHP 11,532.47 for that month. Since respondents continued the payments until January 2014, they have a total overpayment of PHP 203,532.47 for PN No. 7155.

Relative to this, the Court sustains the RTC and the CA's declaration that the second promissory note, PN No. 8351, is void for lack of consideration as it was only executed by respondents to cover the supposed "unpaid balance" in PN No. 7155. In this regard, we need to modify the RTC and the CA's judgment in order to reflect the correct amount of overpayment to be refunded to respondents. The total amount to be refunded to respondents must cover not only the payments made in PN No. 8351 in the amount of PHP 417,859.58,51 as awarded by the RTC and the CA, but also the overpayment in PN No. 7155 amounting to PHP 203,532.47, as shown in the computation above, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of respondents' Complaint until finality, following Nacar v. Gallery Frames.52 All monetary awards will earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Decision until full payment.53

Finally, the Court affirms the CA's ruling that the foreclosure proceedings are void. Generally, the nullity of the unconscionable interests and charges does not affect the terms of the real estate mortgage. The creditor's right to foreclose the mortgage remains, and such right can be exercised upon the failure of the debtors to pay the debt due.54 In this case however, the principal loan obligation was extinguished by the full payment of the respondents. This act automatically terminates the real estate mortgage. Being a mere accessory contract, the mortgage cannot exist independently of the principal obligation.55 Considering that the mortgage ceased to exist, the new title, TCT No. 010-201900129856 of the Registry of Deeds for Parañaque City, issued in the name of MCC as a result of the foreclosure, is void. The title registered in the name of respondent Ramon, TCT No. 72248,57 was properly reinstated by the RTC and the CA.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 6, 2021 and the Resolution dated December 22, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 115157 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Manila Credit Corporation is further ordered to refund to respondents Ramon S. Viroomal and Anita S. Viroomal the overpayment in the amount of PHP 203,532.47 for PN No. 7155, in addition to the amount of PHP 417,859.58 for PN No. 8351, with legal interest of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of respondents' Complaint until finality. Legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is likewise imposed on all the monetary awards, from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED."

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/jan2023/gr_258526_2023.html

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 258526, January 11, 2023 ]

MANILA CREDIT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON S. VIROOMAL AND ANITA S. VIROOMAL, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY ATTY. JERRY R. TOLEDO AND SHERIFF ALEJANDRO P. ABREMATEA, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

LOPEZ, M., J.:

Exorbitant and unconscionable interests

"A contract that is freely executed has the force of law between the parties. This time-honored principle of autonomy in contracts is, however, not absolute. It is balanced by the governing rule in Article 1306 of the Civil Code which declares that parties may not stipulate on matters which are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.1 Guided by this premise, the parties' principal loan of PHP 467,600.00, payable for five years at PHP 16,895.77 per month, inclusive of interests, which, later on condemned the debtors to pay the sum of PHP 1,175,638.12, yet still leaving more unpaid balance, cannot be upheld. The interests and penalties charged by the creditor are patently exorbitant and unconscionable; hence void.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 6, 2021 Decision3 and the December 22, 2021 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 115157, which affirmed the trial court's judgment declaring the interest rates imposed on respondents' loan void for being unconscionable and contrary to morals.5"

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 258526, January 11, 2023 ]

MANILA CREDIT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. RAMON S. VIROOMAL AND ANITA S. VIROOMAL, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY ATTY. JERRY R. TOLEDO AND SHERIFF ALEJANDRO P. ABREMATEA, AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, RESPONDENTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2023/jan2023/gr_258526_2023.html

Chain of custody of evidence; planting of evidence

 "Further, even if the seized items are deemed admissible, the prosecution's case would still fail for violating the chain of custody rule.

In all cases involving dangerous drugs, great importance is put in ensuring that the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, the drug itself, remains intact. This is due to the delicate nature of dangerous drugs and its susceptibility to being altered or tampered. This was elucidated in People v. Jaafar:77

Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and nature, they must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic substances are also highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence. . . . 78 (Citations omitted)

It is also the vulnerability of dangerous drugs and the confidential manner by which it is produced and distributed which makes it a target of abuse by authorities during anti-narcotics operations, as explained in People v. Saragena:79

There is great possibility of abuse in drug cases, especially those involving miniscule amounts. This Court has recognized that buy-bust operations could be initiated based on dubious claims of shady persons. or that small amounts of illicit drugs could be planted as evidence on innocent individuals, in view of the secrecy surrounding drug deals in general. Thus:

"[B]y the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the case with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses[.]80 (Citation omitted)

Thus, to prevent any mishandling of the prohibited drug once it is confiscated, the rules on chain of custody were enacted in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, which provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served, or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

This ensures that every link from the moment the dangerous drug is seized from the accused, until it is presented before the judge is accounted for. Any break or disruption in the chain would cast doubt on the identity and integrity of the seized item. Thus, it is essential for the prosecution to establish with moral certainty that the drug presented in court is the same drug confiscated from the accused.81 Failure to do so would render the evidence against the accused insufficient, resulting in an acquittal.82

Here, the prosecution miserably failed to establish that the police officers complied with the requirements laid down in Section 21.

First, the marking of evidence was not done immediately upon confiscation of the items from the accused-appellants. Records show that after SPO1 Bactad seized one clear plastic sachet from each of them, he did not mark any of it before putting them in his pants pockets.83 Similarly, PO2 Cruz did not mark the paraphernalia found on top of the table before putting them in a plastic. The marking was only done at the police station.

Due to these sequence of events, it cannot be said that the sachets were accurately marked. This is especially important for the criminal charges pertaining to the individual possession of dangerous drugs by each accused-appellant, as it cannot be determined from whom each sachet was confiscated. This immediately casts doubt on the identity of the seized objects from its seizure, the first link in the chain of custody.

Aside from this, marking and inventory were not done in the presence of the required witnesses, namely, representatives from the Department of Justice, a Barangay Kagawad, and a media representative. While Cabading and Alcantara signed the Confiscation Receipt, Cabading manifested that she was not present during the marking, inventorying, and photographing of the items.84 These are unacceptable lapses by the police authorities cause another break in the chain of custody.

This Court has established that an "ostensibly approximate compliance"85 to Section 21 of Republic Act. No. 9165 will not suffice to reach a conviction. It bears reiterating that each link of the chain of custody of the seized drug must be accounted for to show there was no "tampering, alteration, or substitution, may it be by accident or otherwise."86 The chain of custody rule requires actual compliance to prove with moral certainty the corpus delicti of the crime charged. Seeing as the prosecution neither established the identity of the seized items in each link of the chain of custody, nor preserved its integrity, accused-appellants must be acquitted.

We reiterate our statements in People v. Holgado,87

It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of this drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels.88

This case was riddled by procedural infirmities from the moment the accused-appellants were apprehended to the moment the gavel was struck to convict them. While this court laments the proliferation of the use and distribution of illegal substances, it cannot support the haphazard and shoddy execution of government agents of their official tasks. We remind our police officers, as well as officers of the Court, that the constitutionally protected rights of the people must always prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the January 15, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08489 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-Appellants Jamal Rangaig y Ampuan, Saad Makairing y Lonto, and Michael Juguilon y Solis are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision, the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for their information.

The Regional Trial Court is also ordered to turn over the shabu subject of this case to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAMAL RANGAIG Y AMPUAN, SAAD MAKAIRING Y LONTO, AND MICHAEL JUGUILON Y SOLIS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, 

G.R. No. 240447, April 28, 2021. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/apr2021/gr_240447_2021.html

Warrantless search, seizure and arrest

 "Similarly, in this case, after receiving a tip from an informant, the police officers proceeded to the abandoned nipa hut without conducting any prior surveillance or verification of the facts given by the informant. There, PO2 Cruz peeked through the door of the hut which was slightly ajar and found the accused-appellants about ten meters away, sitting beside a table with what seemed to be a clear plastic sachet on it along with other paraphernalia, such as foil. This prompted PO2 Cruz to signal his teammates to enter the house and apprehend accused-appellants.

Lastly, this case cannot be considered a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(c) as accused-appellants were not fugitives fleeing the custody of a penal establishment at the time of their apprehension.

Corollary to warrantless arrests, this Court in Lapi v. People,63 reiterated the different kinds of valid warrantless search and seizure, thus:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence:

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view"

. . . .

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances."64

The first type of valid warrantless search and seizure will not apply as there was no valid warrantless arrest to begin with.

Similarly, the second type of valid warrantless search and seizure known as seizure in plain view, does not apply in this case. The Plain View Doctrine is "usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object[.]"65 To be valid, there must be a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest and, secondly, the evidence found must have been in plain view of the arresting officer and not inadvertently found.66

In United States case law, the plain view doctrine cannot be applied in one's curtilage, or the area immediately surrounding a person's home or dwelling where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy.67 This gives emphasis to the sanctity of the home which is accorded special protection in line with the '"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."68 The concept of curtilage was explained in United States v. Dunn,69 in this wise:

[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that when mechanically applied, yields a "correct" answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration — whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's “umbrella" of Fourth Amendment protection.

Thus, law enforcers may seize evidence and contraband that are in plain view, as long as the officer is in a place where he has a legal right to be, and the seizure does not involve entering one's home or curtilage.

Applied in this case, the fact that PO2 Cruz saw accused-appellants around a table through the slightly opened door of an abandoned nipa hut, in itself cannot be considered a violation of the sanctity of their home or curtilage as they could not have any expectation of privacy in their location. However, this does not change the fact that the buy-bust team were at the abandoned nipa hut on the strength of a single tip, without conducting prior surveillance. The plain view doctrine is only proper when the two requirements—a prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest and that the evidence found was in plain view of the arresting officer—is met.

Here, the prosecution failed on the first requirement. There was no valid intrusion by the police officers as they did not have probable cause to enter the premises without a valid warrant of arrest or search warrant. It is apparent that PO2 Cruz's suspicion was anchored on the informant's tip they received earlier informing them of an on-going pot session in the area. Consequently, the act of peeping through an open door to ascertain what the accused-appellants were doing inside the house cannot be justified.

Illustrative is the case of People v. Bolasa,70 wherein the authorities proceeded to a certain house after being tipped off that Bolasa, among others, was packing drugs therein. After peeking through the window of the house and seeing and a man and a woman packing marijuana, the police entered the house, arrested the two, and seized the drugs and paraphernalia. There, this Court held that the arrests and resulting searches and seizures were invalid as the arresting officers did not have personal knowledge of the criminal activities in the house. It was further held that "[n]either can it be said that objects were seized in plain view [as the] the police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room."71

Nevertheless, this Court has held that peeping into a window may be deemed "plain view" if the law enforcement officer had prior justification for being at the position. In Miclat v. People,72 it was explained:

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent: (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent[.]

It is clear, therefore, that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Since petitioners arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner's guilt of the offense charged."73 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Unlike this case, in Miclat, the police authorities knew the identity of the person connected to drug activities and conducted surveillance before making a valid warrantless arrest. Thus, they had a prior justification for being in a position within view of the criminal activity. Had PO2 Cruz and the buy bust team first conducted proper surveillance before proceeding with the warrantless arrest, the subsequent search and seizure may have fallen under the "plain view" doctrine.

As such, the prosecution here failed to establish by sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that there was probable cause to execute a warrantless arrest, and concomitantly seize the confiscated items. It is apparent from their narration that their arrest of the accused-appellants and search thereafter was fueled solely by the informant's tip. Apart from this, there is no evidence to show that the police officers had personal knowledge that would allow them to infer anything suspicious.

There being no valid warrantless arrest on accused-appellants, their arrest is illegal, and the ensuing search as a result thereof, is likewise illegal.74 It must be noted that a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures is constitutionally protected and must prevail over the campaign against illegal drugs. Warrantless arrests and seizures remain to be exceptions to the general rule and must be construed strictly against government agents.75 Since there is no justification for the absence of an arrest warrant or search warrant upon the premises, the subsequent items obtained from the unreasonable search and seizure must be excluded in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.

The corpus delicti for the crimes charged presented into evidence by the prosecution is deemed inadmissible. Such inadmissibility then prevents conviction and calls for the imm ediate acquittal of the accused-appellants.76"

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAMAL RANGAIG Y AMPUAN, SAAD MAKAIRING Y LONTO, AND MICHAEL JUGUILON Y SOLIS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, 

G.R. No. 240447, April 28, 2021. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/apr2021/gr_240447_2021.html

Double Jeopardy

 'Accused-appellants were charged and found guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in a social gathering, which are penalized under Republic Act No. 9165 Article II, Sections 11 and 13, respectively.

Accused-appellants assert that the charge of the possession of illegal drugs is absorbed in the charge of possession of illegal drugs in social gatherings. Thus, charging and eventually convicting them of both offenses, separately, placed them in double jeopardy. We agree.

The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is provided in Article II, Section 21 of the Constitution:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

This constitutional right is implemented in Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SECTION 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the rule on double jeopardy protects the accused by prohibiting the state from charging or convicting a person of either the same offense or the same act. These two categories of double jeopardy is differentiated in People v. Quijada:43

Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article II I of the Constitution, ordains that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (italics in the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. . . .

Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The Constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved.44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The test of identity of offenses in ascertaining whether double jeopardy exists has been used by this Court as early as 1954 in People v. F. Diaz45 as cited in Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro,46 thus:

In the case of People v. F Diaz, G.R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a 'fast and reckless manner . . . thereby causing an accident.' After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court 'for failure of the Government to prosecute'. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other[.]47

Applying this, We now examine the elements of the two crimes charged against accused-appellants.

The elements for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 require: (1) the possession by the accused of an item or object identified to be a prohibited or dangerous drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. On the other hand, Section 13 of the same law, requires the presence of the exact same elements with an addition of a fourth element: that the accused possessed the prohibited or dangerous drug during a social gathering or meeting, or in the company of at least two persons.48

Evidently, a charge for illegal possession in a social gathering absorbs one for illegal possession, as the former includes all the necessary elements in the latter. Petitioners correctly cited People v. Posada,49 which held that the sale of dangerous drugs absorbs the possession of it since all the elements of possession are inevitably integrated in its sale.

Since sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes possession of the same, the accused-appellants should be convicted or possession. We have consistently ruled that possession of prohibited or dangerous drugs is absorbed in the sale thereof. Then Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban logically and clearly explained the rationale behind this ruling, to wit:

The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.

Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs. It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject or the sale be identified and presented in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could not be established without a showing that the accused possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly indicates that possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them away to another[.]50 (Citation omitted)

Here, just like in Posada, the violation of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is necessarily included in illegal possession of dangerous drugs in a social gathering. Thus, the prosecution erred when it filed separate informations for both charges, arguing that each charge pertain to separate and distinct sachets—a charge for illegal drugs in a social gathering for the clear plastic sachet found on the table, and another charge for possession of illegal drugs for the clear plastic sachets found in the pockets accused-appellants. The justification that the sachets found in the persons of accused-appellants were probably intended for some future dealing is purely conjecture and cannot stand.

Accordingly, charging and convicting the accused-appellants under Section 11, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and Section 13, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs in a social gathering, put them in double jeopardy.

As it stands, the acquittal of accused-appellants is in order. However, it is necessary to discuss the remaining issues regarding the conduct of the warrantless arrests, search and seizure, and observance of the chain of custody rule by the authorities for the guidance of bar and bench."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAMAL RANGAIG Y AMPUAN, SAAD MAKAIRING Y LONTO, AND MICHAEL JUGUILON Y SOLIS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, 

G.R. No. 240447, April 28, 2021. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/apr2021/gr_240447_2021.html

Warrantless arrests

 "No less than the Constitution mandates that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. While jurisprudence and statute have created exceptions allowing warrantless arrests founded on probable cause, if a warrantless arrest is conducted outside of these exceptions, any evidence resulting therefrom will be deemed inadmissible in court. "

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAMAL RANGAIG Y AMPUAN, SAAD MAKAIRING Y LONTO, AND MICHAEL JUGUILON Y SOLIS, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS, 

G.R. No. 240447, April 28, 2021. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/apr2021/gr_240447_2021.html

Effect of appeal

 "It is well-settled that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.42

Guided by the foregoing considerations, and as will be explained hereunder, the Court: (a) affirms accused-appellants' and their co-accused's conviction for Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide of Dr. Andres, Sr.; and (b) acquits accused-appellants and their co-accused, except for Antonio, for the Murder of Major Arcega."

G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORES Y CORPUZ, JESUS TIME Y CABESA, GILBERT PACPACO Y DIRECTO, GILBERT RAMIREZ Y DUNEGO, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, ROGELIO ANTONIO Y ABUJUELA, TOMMY CABESA Y VILLEGAS, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED,

ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORESYCORPUZ, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_242696_2020.html

Death of accused pending appeal

 "At the outset, it is well to note that during the pendency of this appeal, the Court received a letter38 dated May 8, 2019 from the Bureau of Corrections stating that one of the accused-appellants, Cortez, had already died on May 17, 2016, as evidenced by copies of his Death Report39 and Certificate of Death.40 In light of Cortez' supervening death, the Court is constrained to dismiss the instant criminal actions against him inasmuch as he can no longer stand as an accused herein. In the same vein, the civil action impliedly instituted for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is likewise ipso facto dismissed, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Cortez' civil liability, if any, in connection with his acts against the victims, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, the victims' heirs may file separate civil actions against Cortez' estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.41 As such, the instant criminal cases must be declared closed and terminated as to Cortez in view of his supervening death. "

G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020 

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORES Y CORPUZ, JESUS TIME Y CABESA, GILBERT PACPACO Y DIRECTO, GILBERT RAMIREZ Y DUNEGO, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, ROGELIO ANTONIO Y ABUJUELA, TOMMY CABESA Y VILLEGAS, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED,

ZALDY BERNARDO Y ESPIRITU, MONROY FLORESYCORPUZ, DANNY CORTEZ Y DONIETO, AND MILA ANDRES GALAMAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/nov2020/gr_242696_2020.html

This Court further elucidated that except for the most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances, there must be a five-year minimum period before "dismissal or disbarment [can] be the subject of any kind of clemency."

"Issue

The core issue is whether Atty. Rojas should be disbarred for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR.

Our Ruling

It is settled in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Its primary objective is public interest, "and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon members of the Bar to account for [their] actuations as [officers] of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney."41

Timely for resolution is the present complaint involving a lawyer allegedly perpetuating an illegal act of promoting instant annulment of marriage through fabricated judicial decisions.

The power of the Court to remove or suspend an attorney finds support in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 27 – Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfull appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

Stripped of non-essentials, Atty. Rojas admitted his involvement in the reprehensible practice of perpetuating "annulment packages," albeit disavowing authorship and with the caveat that he only did so to help the complainant, and in the process, was also scammed by Santo.42 All these, regardless of his intention of presenting supposedly mitigating circumstances, besmirched the legal profession to the highest degree, by making a mockery of the judicial system. He simply violated his sworn oath to be honest, and to obey the law and the Constitution. It also created an impression to the public that the judicial process can be trifled with, and undermined the judicial processes of the courts.

The very wordings and the spirit of the Lawyer's Oath is a continuing undertaking every lawyer in the legal profession ought to live out, viz.:

Lawyer's Oath

I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 20 of Rule 138 reinforces the Lawyer's Oath and is crystal clear in its enumeration of the duties of every lawyer:

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Rojas failed his Oath, especially considering his qualifications as a former officer of the IBP South Cotabato and General Santos Chapter, former law professor, and officer of various civic organizations.43 Atty. Rojas deliberately defiled the legal profession and was utterly remiss in his duties to the profession, to the society, and to the courts.

The Code, particularly Canon 1, requires the lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 sets the path in doing so, viz.:

A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Concomitantly, Atty. Rojas' actions likewise defied Canon 10 of the CPR which mandates that a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court. This is magnified by Rule 10.01 stating:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

The rules need not be further elaborated especially for a seasoned lawyer. What is unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, doing any falsehood or consenting to its commission - are terms capable of estimation by a layperson but even more by a law practitioner.

Jurisprudence is replete with instances elaborating the rule. For emphasis, any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element. To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the other hand, a conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows: Having the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice, or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon. In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his or her injury.44

Fabricating a judicial decision or perpetuation of acts leading to such, undeniably comes within the prohibitive acts set by the CPR. Atty. Rojas, in actively and knowingly participating in the procurement of a fake decision in an annulment case undoubtedly violated the provisions of the CPR. He committed an unlawful act and disrespected the law and the legal processes. He deprived the judiciary to a rightful resolution of the case for annulment and have done so in defiance of truth, honor, and of the law.

In Manalang v. Atty. Buendia45 (Manalang), this Court disbarred a lawyer for fabricating a judicial decision granting annulment to the client. In the said case, the lawyer denied any participation and claimed to have only acted as an intermediary between the client and the lawyer who handled the annulment case. Such defenses were rejected by this Court and found the respondent lawyer to have violated the sworn duties under the Lawyer's Oath and the CPR by deliberately misleading and deceiving the client by fabricating a court decision. For such failure to uphold the standards required in the legal profession, and failure to perform the duties of competence and diligence required of lawyers, the Court held that the lawyer no longer deserves to be a member of the bar.46

Also in Manalang, this Court discussed analogous cases touching on the fabrication of judicial issuances, to wit:

Madria v. Rivera has analogous circumstances to this case. In Madria, petitioner obtained the legal services of respondent to help her with the annulment of her marriage. Respondent guaranteed he can obtain the decree of annulment without petitioner appearing in court. Months later, respondent informed petitioner that her petition had been granted and provided her a copy of the decision and a certificate of finality.

Petitioner's husband in that case, however, filed a complaint against her for allegedly fabricating the decision for the annulment of her marriage. It was then that petitioner learned that the decision and the certificate of finality were fabricated. Upon inquiring with the court, she found that her petition for annulment was actually dismissed and the signature in the alleged decision presented by respondent was forged.

In Madria, this Court disbarred respondent and explained that his act "not only violates the court and its processes, but also betrays the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client[.]" Therefore, disbarment was meted out for his failure to maintain and uphold the integrity of the Law Profession. In that case this Court held:

The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[.]

[x x x x]

The respondent would shift the blame to his client. That a lay person like the complainant could have swayed a lawyer like the respondent into committing the simulations was patently improbable. Yet, even if he had committed the simulations upon the client's prodding, he would be no less responsible. Being a lawyer, he was aware of and was bound by the ethical canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly those quoted earlier, which would have been enough to deter him from committing the falsification, as well as to make him unhesitatingly frustrate her prodding in deference to his sworn obligation as a lawyer to always act with honesty and to obey the laws of the land. Surely, too, he could not have soon forgotten his express undertaking under his Lawyer's Oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to its commission." Indeed, the ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. As we have observed in one case:

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.1âшphi1

[x x x x]

Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected the respondent to act with the highest degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility in the course of their practice of law. That he turned his back on such standards exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and general unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court. (Citations omitted)

Similarly, in Billanes v. Latido, this Court disbarred a lawyer for similar misrepresentation and deceitful acts.

In Billanes, petitioner engaged the services of respondent for the annulment of his marriage with his estranged Filipino wife. About a month later, respondent informed petitioner that the annulment case had been filed and that the judge had rendered a decision in his favor. Respondent even showed a copy of the decision to the petitioner.

Believing his marriage was annulled, petitioner married an Australian national and applied for an Australian visa, attaching the purported decision supporting the annulment of his first marriage. The Australian Embassy, however, informed petitioner that the decision was fraudulent and its submission will result in the denial of his visa application. Petitioner then inquired with the court which supposedly rendered the decision. However, that court issued a certification stating that his annulment case was never filed and the documents furnished to him were fake. With these circumstances, respondent was disbarred. This Court explained:

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing." Indubitably, respondent fell short of such standard when he committed the afore-described acts of misrepresentation and deception against complainant. Such acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they further reveal basic moral flaws that make respondent unfit to practice law.

In Tan v. Diamante, the Court found the lawyer therein administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR as it was established that he, among others, falsified a court order. In that case, the Court deemed the lawyer's acts to be "so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar." Thus, the Court disbarred the lawyer.

Similarly, in Taday v. Apoya, Jr., promulgated just last July 3, 2018, the Court disbarred the erring lawyer for authoring a fake court decision regarding his client's annulment case, which was considered as a violation also of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR. In justifying the imposition of the penalty of disbarment, the Court held that the lawyer "committed unlawful, dishonest, immoral[,] and deceitful conduct, and lessened the confidence of the public in the legal system. Instead of being an advocate of justice, he became a perpetrator of injustice. His reprehensible acts do not merit him to remain in the rolls of the legal profession. Thus, the ultimate penalty of disbarment must be imposed upon him."47 (Citations omitted)

Guided by the above discussion, the conclusion is thus all too clear. Atty. Rojas should be held administratively liable and must be considered unfit for the practice of law. To highlight, "the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also exercise a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of public trust."48

Atty. Rojas, while admitting his infractions, invokes leniency and supplicates that he be unqualifiedly absolved of his liability out of humanitarian reasons. He admits that his acceptance of the case transgressed the ethical yardstick but pleas to not be judged on that aspect alone and cited his accolades.49

Unfortunately for Atty. Rojas, We deny his supplication.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions and is reserved only for those who meet the twin standards of legal proficiency and morality. It is so delicately imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of this Court to control and regulate in order to protect and promote public welfare.50

We cannot give Atty. Rojas a free pass. To give in to his plea is to make a travesty of the judicial system and the legal profession and to go against this Court's bounden duty to safeguard the public against erring lawyers. Lawyers who have been found to have violated their oath must be accountable for their actions and must face the consequences of their ill choices that affect the legal profession.

Moreover, this Court has already set the parameters for judicial clemency for both disrobed judges and disbarred lawyers in Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint Against Judge Ofelia T. Pinto (In Re: Pinto).51 The following guidelines are laid, thus:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges['] associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation;

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation;

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he (or she) still has productive years ahead of him [or her] that can be put to good use by giving him [or her] a chance to redeem himself [or herself];

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service;

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.52

This Court further elucidated that except for the most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances, there must be a five-year minimum period before "dismissal or disbarment [can] be the subject of any kind of clemency." Further, "[t]o be sure, the underlying impetus of establishing a default uniform period is to curtail the broadly subjective process of determining the appropriate period within which genuine remorse and reformation are perceived to have been attained. Conceptually, the [five-year] requirement is a reasonable estimation by the Court of the minimum period necessary for the [petitioning lawyer's] reflection of his or her past transgressions for which he or she was meted the ultimate penalty of disbarment. For clarity, the period is reckoned from the time the Court's resolution is promulgated since it is only by then that the lawyer becomes duly informed of his[/her] administrative liability and hence, would be able to begin atoning for his or her malpractice."53

Once this minimum requirement is complied with, however, it must be emphasized that the petition must show convincing proof of the petitioner's remorse and rehabilitation. For it is entirely possible that despite the minimum period of reflection set by the Court, which hence, renders him or her eligible to file a clemency petition, petitioner, throughout all these years, has not yet fully accepted the decision against him or her, or has failed to change his or her ways so as to warrant the mercy of the Court.

To expound, "[r]emorse and reformation must reflect how the claimant has redeemed [his or her] moral aptitude by clearly understanding the gravity and consequences of [his or her] conduct." Concomitantly, "there must be an acknowledgment of the wrongful actions and subsequent showing of sincere repentance and correction. This Court must see to it that the long period of dismissal moved the erring officers to reform themselves, exhibit remorse and repentance, and develop a capacity to live up again to the standards demanded from court officers."54 (Citations and emphasis omitted)

Considering the above requirements, We find that Atty. Rojas has not met the guidelines for this Court to consider clemency. He must first be held accountable, acknowledge his transgressions, and suffer the penalty therefor.

WHEREFORE, for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Remegio P. Rojas is DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision, and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys."

EN BANC

[ A.C. No. 13226. October 04, 2022 ]

JOCELYN G. BARTOLOME, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. REMIGIO P. ROJAS, RESPONDENT.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2022/oct2022/ac_13226_2022.html

To reiterate, the protection accorded to mortgagees in good faith cannot be extended to mortgagees of properties that are not yet registered or registered but not under the mortgagor’s name.

 "Validity of the mortgage

One of the requisites of a valid mortgage contract is ownership of the property being mortgaged.[77] Article 2085 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a mortgage contract:

Art. 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage:

(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfilment of a principal obligation;

(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;

(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose.

Third persons who are not parties to the principal obligation may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property.

Applying this provision and having established that Marietta acquired no valid title or ownership from Enrique over the undivided portions of the property, this court finds that no valid mortgage was executed over the same property in favor of DBP. Without a valid mortgage, there was also no valid foreclosure sale and no transfer of ownership of petitioners’ undivided portions to DBP.

In other words, DBP acquired no right over the undivided portions since its predecessor-in-interest was not the owner and held no authority to convey the property.

As in sales, an exception to this rule is if the mortgagee is a “mortgagee in good faith.”[78] This exception was explained in Torbela v. Rosario:

Under this doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of "innocent purchasers for value." The prevailing jurisprudence is that a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the mortgagor to the property given as security and in the absence of any sign that might arouse suspicion, has no obligation to undertake further investigation. Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless, entitled to protection.[79]

DBP claims that it is covered by this exception. DBP is mistaken. The exception applies when, at the time of the mortgage, the mortgagor has already obtained a certificate of title under his or her name.[80] It does not apply when, as in this case, the mortgagor had yet to register the property under her name.[81]

The facts show that DBP disregarded circumstances that should have aroused suspicion. For instance, at the time of the mortgage with DBP, Marietta only had a tax declaration under her name to show that she was the owner of the property. A tax declaration, by itself, neither proves ownership of property nor grants title. Yet, DBP agreed to accept the property as security even though Marietta’s claim was supported only by the tax declaration, and a certificate of title was yet to be issued under her name.

Granting that Marietta was in possession of the property, DBP should have inquired further as to Marietta’s rights over the property since no certificate of title was issued to her. DBP took the risks attendant to the absence of a certificate of title. It should bear the burden of checking the ownership as well as the validity of the deed of sale. This is despite the eventual issuance of a certificate of title in favor of Marietta.

The rule on “innocent purchasers or [mortgagees] for value” is applied more strictly when the purchaser or the mortgagee is a bank. Banks are expected to exercise higher degree of diligence in their dealings, including those involving lands. Banks may not rely simply on the face of the certificate of title.

Thus, in Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation,[82] this court ruled that:

Respondent . . . is not an ordinary mortgagee; it is a mortgagee-bank. As such, unlike private individuals, it is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.[83] (Citations omitted)

DBP failed to exercise the degree of diligence required of banks when it accepted the unregistered property as security for Marietta’s loan despite circumstances that should have aroused its suspicion.

Citing Blanco v. Esquierdo, DBP argued that since it did not participate in the dealings between Enrique and Marietta, it should be considered as an innocent mortgagee for value.

Blanco involves an alleged widow of the deceased who adjudicated to herself the deceased’s property and thereafter mortgaged the property to DBP.[84] The brothers and sisters of the deceased filed an action for the annulment of the affidavit executed by the alleged widow and the cancellation of the certificate of title under her name.[85] The trial court ordered the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to the alleged widow, including the registration of the mortgage deed.[86]

In Blanco, this court declared that DBP was a mortgagee in good faith, thus:

The trial court, in the decision complained of, made no finding that the defendant mortgagee bank was a party to the fraudulent transfer of the land to Fructuosa Esquierdo. Indeed, there is nothing alleged in the complaint which may implicate said defendant mortgagee in the fraud, or justify a finding that it acted in bad faith. On the other hand, the certificate of title was in the name of the mortgagor Fructuosa Esquierdo when the land was mortgaged by her to the defendant bank. Such being the case, the said defendant bank, as mortgagee, had the right to rely on what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said certificate. (De Lara, et al. vs. Ayroso, 95 Phil., 185; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4838; Joaquin vs. Madrid, et al., 106 Phil., 1060). Being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained her title thereto thru fraud.[87]

DBP’s reliance on Blanco is misplaced. In Blanco, the certificate of title had already been issued under the name of the mortgagor when the property was mortgaged to DBP. This is not the situation in this case.

To reiterate, the protection accorded to mortgagees in good faith cannot be extended to mortgagees of properties that are not yet registered or registered but not under the mortgagor’s name.

Therefore, the Regional Trial Court did not err in ordering the nullification of the documents of sale and mortgage. Contracts involving the sale or mortgage of unregistered property by a person who was not the owner or by an unauthorized person are void."

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 193551. November 19, 2014 ]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY ROGELIA LOPEZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [NOW SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC.], RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/59904

“The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.”[76] It does not apply when the land is not yet registered with the Registry of Deeds.

"We have consistently upheld the principle that “no one can give what one does not have.”[61] A seller can only sell what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not own but has authority to transfer, and a buyer can only acquire what the seller can legally transfer. [62]

This principle is incorporated in our Civil Code. It provides that in a contract of sale, the seller binds himself to transfer the ownership of the thing sold, thus:

Art. 1458. By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.

The seller cannot perform this obligation if he or she does not have a right to convey ownership of the thing. Hence, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1459. The thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.

Title or rights to a deceased person’s property are immediately passed to his or her heirs upon death.[63] The heirs’ rights become vested without need for them to be declared “heirs.”[64] Before the property is partitioned, the heirs are co-owners of the property.[65]

In this case, the rights to Gregoria Lopez’s property were automatically passed to her sons — Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos — when she died in 1922.[66] Since only Teodoro was survived by children, the rights to the property ultimately passed to them when Gregoria Lopez’s sons died.[67] The children entitled to the property were Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique.

Gregorio, Simplicio, Severino, and Enrique became co-owners of the property, with each of them entitled to an undivided portion of only a quarter of the property. Upon their deaths, their children became the co-owners of the property, who were entitled to their respective shares, such that the heirs of Gregorio became entitled to Gregorio’s one-fourth share, and Simplicio’s and Severino’s respective heirs became entitled to their corresponding one-fourth shares in the property.[68]

The heirs cannot alienate the shares that do not belong to them. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Since Enrique’s right to the property was limited to his one-fourth share, he had no right to sell the undivided portions that belonged to his siblings or their respective heirs. Any sale by one heir of the rest of the property will not affect the rights of the other heirs who did not consent to the sale. Such sale is void with respect to the shares of the other heirs.

Regardless of their agreement, Enrique could only convey to Marietta his undivided one-fourth share of the property, and Marietta could only acquire that share. This is because Marietta obtained her rights from Enrique who, in the first place, had no title or interest over the rest of the property that he could convey.

This is despite Enrique’s execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication wherein he declared himself to be the only surviving heir of Gregoria Lopez. The affidavit of self-adjudication is invalid for the simple reason that it was false. At the time of its execution, Enrique’s siblings were still alive and entitled to the three-fourth undivided share of the property. The affidavit of self-adjudication did not have the effect of vesting upon Enrique ownership or rights to the property.

The issuance of the original certificate of title in favor of Marietta does not cure Enrique’s lack of title or authority to convey his co-owners’ portions of the property. Issuance of a certificate of title is not a grant of title over petitioners’ undivided portions of the property.[69] The physical certificate of title does not vest in a person ownership or right over a property.[70] It is merely an evidence of such ownership or right.[71]

Marietta could acquire valid title over the whole property if she were an innocent purchaser for value. An innocent purchaser for value purchases a property without any notice of defect or irregularity as to the right or interest of the seller.[72] He or she is without notice that another person holds claim to the property being purchased.[73]

As a rule, an ordinary buyer may rely on the certificate of title issued in the name of the seller.[74] He or she need not look “beyond what appears on the face [of the certificate of title].”[75] However, the ordinary buyer will not be considered an innocent purchaser for value if there is anything on the certificate of title that arouses suspicion, and the buyer failed to inquire or take steps to ensure that there is no cloud on the title, right, or ownership of the property being sold.

Marietta cannot claim the protection accorded by law to innocent purchasers for value because the circumstances do not make this available to her.

In this case, there was no certificate of title to rely on when she purchased the property from Enrique. At the time of the sale, the property was still unregistered. What was available was only a tax declaration issued under the name of “Heirs of Lopez.”

“The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.”[76] It does not apply when the land is not yet registered with the Registry of Deeds.

At the very least, the unregistered status of the property should have prompted Marietta to inquire further as to Enrique’s right over the property. She did not. Hence, she was not an innocent purchaser for value. She acquired no title over petitioners’ portions of the property."

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 193551. November 19, 2014 ]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LOPEZ, REPRESENTED BY ROGELIA LOPEZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [NOW SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC.], RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/59904

We have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

 "Petitioners also claim that they are protected by law considering that they were buyers in good faith.

Again, this assertion is without basis considering that Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140), from where petitioners'TCT No. 2574 was derived, is void. The only way by which Mora could have acquired ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that ownership to the petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own name.

What makes petitioners' cause doubly undeserving of merit is the finding of the two courts below that the land subject matter of this case is part timberland,7 a finding not even once disputed by petitioners. It is, thus, safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not have been registered in the name of petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for the simple reason that under the Constitution, timberlands, which are part of the public domain, cannot be alienated.8 A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found.9 Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.10 chanrobles virtual law library

All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the assailed decision of the CA, affirming that of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs."

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 149122 : July 27, 2007]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZA, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

https://chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/jul2007/gr_149122_2007.php

 

No court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) over the land which has never been originally registered.

"We DENY.

Petitioners maintain that under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140) is already indefeasible the same having attained finality one (1) year after the CA granted its reconstitution in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Citing the second paragraph of Section 31 of P.D. No. 15294 which reads:

The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description "to all whom it may concern",

petitioners contend that the two courts below were without authority to annul TCT No. 2574 issued in the name of Gregorio Venturanza.

Petitioners are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer to original decrees of registration and not to orders of reconstitution. As it is, petitioners cannot even seek refuge in the Land Registration Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been brought within the operation of said law. As correctly pointed out by the CA to which we are in full accord:

xxx the Land Registration Act is not applicable considering that the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been within the operation of the Land Registration Act because of the irregularities attending the issuance of the reconstituted title. As found by the trial court:

TCT No. RT-40 (140) supposedly reconstituted from TCT no. 140 in the name of Florencio Mora consists of 2,394 hectares supposedly situated in Buhi, Camarines Sur. It appears from the survey plan that the land was surveyed only in 11 days, which according to Engr. Antonio Rodriguez was quite impossible considering the rugged terrain and the mountainous features of the area. Moreover, it covers timberland.

Significantly, from the exhibits presented by the plaintiff it can be seen that the resurvey plan (Exh. A) shows that the survey of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was based on TCT No. 140 and it covered an area of 23,944,635 square meters and appeared to have been surveyed on January 20, to January 31, 1953 or a period of 11 days. Exh. "B" shows that the area supposedly covered by TCT 2574 is within the timberland, Project 12, Block B, L.C. 646 and Project 19, Block ALC 761, Exh. "C", the official map of Legaspi City shows that the land covered by TCT 140, which was issued on the basis of the resurvey (Exh. "A") is a land situated in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, while the land covered by TCT No. 40 (140) is a vast tract of land in Buhi, Camarines Sur; that it further appears that the lots covered by TCT No. 40 (140) were supposedly registered in GRLO Sp. Proceedings No. 112 with an area of 23,944,635 square meters but records of the LRC revealed that GRLO records No. 112 refers to a land registration case in Iloilo, and not in Camarines Sur. Exh "D" also shows that Mr. Florencio Mora had never applied for original registration of title covering a land in the municipality of Buhi, Camarines Sur, and that plan RS-383-D (without the suffix capital letter D) involving Lots 1 and 2 situated in the Municipality of Calawag, Quezon, was the subject of Land Registration Case No. 322, GRLO Record No. 13804 with Maximina Zepeda as applicant.

The stench of anomaly became at once pervading when we consider the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. The land practically covers the Municipality of Buhi and are being claimed and possessed by claimants, who appeared as intervenors in this case. The Venturanzas never materially and physically occupied the property because there are actual occupants and possessors. The Venturanzas only asserted ownership over the property in papers but not in physical possession.5

As a necessary consequence, no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) over the land which has never been originally registered. As aptly pointed out by the trial court:

The evidence shows that TCT No. 2574, the title in question, derived its existence from RT-40 (140) in the name of Florencio Mora which was a reconstituted title based on TCT No. 140 allegedly obtained by Florencio Mora during the Japanese occupation. The records of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, however, do not show how the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name of Florencio Mora was registered. Neither is there a decree number, when said decree was entered, the OCT number or LRC Record Number.6

Corollarily, petitioners' argument that the Republic's action for the cancellation of TCT No. 2574 and the reversion of the land covered thereby to the State is barred by the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R has no leg to stand on.

Aside from the fact that no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's title over the property which has never been originally registered, the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R did not operate as res judicata which would bar the Republic's action because there was no identity of cause of action between CA-G.R. No. 20681-R and the instant case.

The issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R was whether or not Mora's evidence in Special Proceedings No. 674 and the procedures adopted by him for the reconstitution of certificate of title alleged to have been lost or destroyed were in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 26. The questions of ownership and whether or not the property or portion thereof was registrable, being a timberland, were never put at issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Neither the non-existence of the original title from which Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) and petitioners' TCT No. 2574 were derived, nor the non-registrability of the timberland included in the area in question which constitute Republic's cause of action against the  herein petitioners, were ever raised, much less, decided by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R."

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 149122 : July 27, 2007]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZA, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

https://chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/jul2007/gr_149122_2007.php

Duties of lawyers as officers of the courts: "Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. They advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law."

 "As can be gleaned from the above excerpts, however, and as duly pointed out by Atty. Tadena, Afable made no declaration as to the alleged intimidation and participation of Atty. Tadena in the forceful opening of the condominium unit. In fact, nowhere in the aforequoted police reports, made on two (2) separate days, was Atty. Tadena's name even stated. In both accounts, Afable merely identified Dr. Leo Ortega as the perpetrator of the break-in, with the help of his man." He even mentioned the names of Teddy, Sally Ortega, and Maribel, as those who accompanied Dr. Leo Ortega inside the subject premises. But again, he made no statement as to the participation, if any, of Atty. Tadena therein. As such, the Court finds it rather difficult to reasonably admit as true Afable's allegations in his affidavit on Atty. Tadena's alleged indiscretions of threats and breaking into private property. If, indeed, Atty. Tadena scolded Afable and forcefully opened Zenaida's unit, he should have, at least, mentioned her name in the police reports he made on two separate days - on the day of the alleged incident on December 7, 2011 and on the day Zenaida arrived from Davao City on December 21, 2011 - and not merely on the Affidavit19 he executed on January 25, 2012, almost two (2) months after the event.

Thus, while we have, in the past, suspended lawyers who wrongfully asserted their clients' rights outside the bounds of the law,20 we cannot do so if the allegations against them are not satisfactorily proven by the complainants. Time and again, the Court has ruled that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence21 or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.22 In the present case, it cannot be denied that complainant Zenaida failed to discharge that burden. As previously discussed, her bodyguard and witness curiously failed to declare Atty. Tadena's alleged misconduct in his police reports. Neither did he explain the reason for his omission. Apart from this, what cast more doubt on Zenaida's claims are the photographs she presented, supposedly showing Atty. Tadena in the act of breaking into her condominium unit.23 But these photographs are, at best, mere abstract illustrations that are extremely blurred. There is, therefore, an undeniable uncertainty surrounding the issues of whether Atty. Tadena, indeed, threatened Zenaida's bodyguard and whether she actually participated in the forceful opening of the subject condominium unit.

The Court is, however, one with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Tadena must, nonetheless, be admonished with warning that a repetition of the same acts will be dealt with more severely. What have been established by the records are the facts that Leonardo has been living separately from Zenaida since January 2011 and that he has, in fact, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in November 2011. These show that the parties have already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court where the petition was pending. Verily, said court had jurisdiction to consider and rule upon the property relations of the spouses which necessarily include the subject condominium unit. All questions, therefore, pertaining to the administration, possession, and ownership thereof had to be addressed before said court by way of filing a pleading and/or arguing before the judge and certainly not before the building administrator, police officer, or personal bodyguard in a condominium lobby. Accordingly, while it cannot be ruled with certainty that Atty. Tadena truly engaged in threats, intimidation, and the forcible entry into the subject property, the Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner when he held that at the very least, Atty. Tadena could have advised her client to file and make the proper representation before the court, instead of surreptitiously entering the premises.24

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. They advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.25

In response to the Show Cause Resolution,26 dated March 25, 2019, against Attys. Tadena, Reginaldo and Cariaga requiring them to explain why they should not be held administratively liable for an apparent collusion, Atty. Tadena reiterated that the charge of collusion, that is prohibited by law, must relate to the grounds of annulment that the parties agree to use in the petition for nullity of marriage. But the subject e-mail communication between her and the counsels involved cannot constitute collusion because it was merely about a split of legal expenses duly allowed under the law. Atty. Tadena went on to add that the annulment case they filed, which has now attained finality, was duly approved by the Public Prosecutor to have no collusion and had, subsequently, gone through the rigorous trial in the RTC of Pasay City. Hence, she insists that she cannot be held administratively liable for collusion.27 The same arguments were interposed by Atty. Reginaldo in his response,28 while Atty. Cariaga has yet to comply with the Show Cause Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 27, 2017. Thus, Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena is hereby ADMONISHED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or equivalent acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

Further, the Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to INITIATE administrative proceedings against Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena, Atty. Eric Reginaldo and Atty. Neil F. Cariaga for their apparent collusion in the filing of the petition for annulment of marriage of spouses Leonardo Ortega, Jr. and Zenaida Martin-Ortega.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this Decision to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED."

A.C. No. 12018 - ZENAIDA MARTIN-ORTEGA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ANGELYN A. TADENA, RESPONDENT.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

A.C. No. 12018, January 29, 2020

ZENAIDA MARTIN-ORTEGA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ANGELYN A. TADENA, RESPONDENT.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2020januarydecisions.php?id=19