For the respondents to rightfully claim that they have acquired an imperfect title worthy of judicial confirmation under the aforecited provision, it is incumbent upon them to prove that: (a) the land is alienable and (b) their possession and occupation must be in the manner and for the period prescribed by law. The respondents must prove by means of clear and convincing evidence that since June 12, 1945 or earlier, they and their predecessors-in-interest performed acts of dominion as anyone would naturally do over his property.

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/195137.htm

"x x x.

 

          The respondents categorically stated that they seek to register the subject property in their name under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, which provides:

          SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

            (1)        Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

          For the respondents to rightfully claim that they have acquired an imperfect title worthy of judicial confirmation under the aforecited provision, it is incumbent upon them to prove that: (a) the land is alienable and (b) their possession and occupation must be in the manner and for the period prescribed by law.[21]  The respondents must prove by means of clear and convincing evidence that since June 12, 1945 or earlier, they and their predecessors-in-interest performed acts of dominion as anyone would naturally do over his property.[22]

          Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.  It is clear under Section 48(b) thereof, which applies exclusively to agricultural lands of the public domain,[23]  that possession is not enough.  In order to emphasize the necessity for actual possession and exclude fictional or constructive possession, Section 48(b) speaks of possession and occupation.  As explained by this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba:[24]

The law speaks of possession and occupation.  Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.  Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession.  When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession.  Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction.[25] (Citations omitted)

          It does not matter whether the applicant for registration has been in possession and occupation only after June 12, 1945 for the requirements for confirmation of title is deemed complied with as his predecessors-in-interest’s possession and occupation that date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier are tacked to his.  Thus, it is of great importance that there exists “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence that the applicant’s predecessors-in-interest had been in possession and occupation of the property sought to be registered since June 12, 1945.

          This Court’s review of the records of this case reveals, rather unfortunately, that Feliciano’s purported possession and occupation of the subject property had not been convincingly established to have commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

          The only evidence that the respondents were able to present to prove that Feliciano occupied and possessed the subject property from 1940 until he sold the same to Doroteo in 1952 is the tax declaration for the year 1947, which bears the note to the effect that realty tax payments were paid under the same declaration since 1940.  This annotation cannot be relied upon in the absence of an explanation why the tax declarations for the years previous to 1947 cannot be presented.  Without the need for an elaborate extrapolation, this annotation, by itself, is far from being the credible and competent evidence that the law requires in proving when possession and occupation actually started.  A tax declaration, much less a tax declaration the existence of which is proved by means of an annotation, is not a conclusive evidence of ownership, which is, at best, only a basis for inferring possession.[26]  However, inference cannot support a claim of imperfect title as it is far from the “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence required under prevailing jurisprudence.

          Nonetheless, even assuming that Feliciano had been in possession and occupation of the subject property since 1940, this Court finds that the respondents had not sufficiently demonstrated that his supposed possession and occupation were of the nature and character contemplated by law.  None of the witnesses presented by the respondents testified as to what specific acts of ownership were exercised by Feliciano on the subject property and their general statements on the matter are mere conclusions of law and do not qualify as competent evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation.

Alconaba[27] was resolved against the applicants as their claim of possession and occupation that began in 1940 is based on unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions.  Specifically:

            In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and occupation by their predecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as testified to by Carmencita) or since 1949 (as testified to by Mauricio and declared in respondents' application for registration) are hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.  Proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate their claim.  They cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession. Even granting that the possession by the respondents' parents commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28] (Citations omitted)

          This Court finds no reason to decide this case differently.  Similar to the parties in Alconaba, the respondents failed to account for any act of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over the property done by Feliciano for the length of time that he was supposedly in possession.  The respondents may have alleged that there are various plants and fruit-bearing trees on the property but they did not present any proof that these supposed manifestations of ownership are attributable to Feliciano.  Neither the existence of these plants and trees – their numbers unspecified – decisively show that the subject property was actively and regularly cultivated and maintained – not merely casually or occasionally tended to.

          The CA and the MTCC clearly erred in relying on pieces of evidence that are clearly wanting.  It is plainly patent and there is no gainsaying that the respondents failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Considering the proven tendency of the courts to be imprudent and their lack of sagacity when it comes to land registration cases, the advice at circumspection previously issued by this Court deserves reiteration:

Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is ordained.  There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate.  To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence.  Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor.  It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state.  Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as dominus.[29] (Citations omitted)

To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Constitution, the State promotes an equitable distribution of alienable agricultural lands of the public domain to deserving citizens, especially the underprivileged.  A land registration court must, therefore, exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding an application for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title over such lands so that the public domain may not be raided by unscrupulous land speculators.[30] (Citation omitted)

x x x."

Crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate; elements

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/194255.htm

"x x x.

The appeal is unmeritorious.

To be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, the following elements must occur:[9]

1.     The accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.

2.     The accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting.

3.     Illegal recruitment was committed by three persons conspiring and confederating with one another.   

As to the first element, accused-appellant admitted that she did not have a valid license to recruit persons for overseas employment, consistent with her defense that she did not engage in the recruitment of persons for employment.

Anent the second element, both victims, AAA and BBB, narrated in great detail how they were induced by accused-appellant to accept an employment opportunity, and how they were successfully transported from Zamboanga City to Malaysia where they eventually worked as prostituted women.

On the third element, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove that there were more than two persons involved in the alleged crime of illegal recruitment, since the trial court held only two of the accused liable for the crime. The prosecution, she alleges, failed to establish that the other accused Macky, Jun, and Tas also had no license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment.

In the recent case People v. Lalli,[10] we affirmed the trial court’s findings in which 2 of the 3 accused were convicted of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, even though the third accused was at-large. In so ruling, we took note of the fact that the victim would not have been able to go to Malaysia were it not for the concerted efforts of the three accused. We held thus:

Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to establish his guilt. Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged.

It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated — each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision, declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000 imposed on each of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarly able to establish that accused-appellant Bernadette and Franz were not the only ones who had conspired to bring the victims to Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the very least, through the credible testimonies of the witnesses, that (1) Jun and Macky were the escorts of the women to Malaysia; (2) a certain Tash was their financier; (3) a certain Bunso negotiated with Macky for the price the former would pay for the expenses incurred in transporting the victims to Malaysia; and (4) Mommy Cindy owned the prostitution house where the victims worked. The concerted efforts of all these persons resulted in the oppression of the victims.

Clearly, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, together with at least two other persons, came to an agreement to commit the felony and decided to commit it.  It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement laying down the details of how an unlawful scheme or objective is to be carried out. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.[11]

x x x."

The Family Code provision prescribes a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/187512.htm

"x x x.

In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to establish his “well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead,” as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.[13] The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:

1.   That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2.   That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3.   That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and

4.   That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a “well-founded belief” that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas,[14]which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.

In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.

Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not been able to prove a “well-founded belief” that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a “well-founded belief” under Article 41 of the Family Code:

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.”

Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,  competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.  

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC ruling on  the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.”[15]

x x x."

Under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/187512.htm

"x x x.

1.                 On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal

In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[5] the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.

We affirm the CA ruling.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)

Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code.

Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled “Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law.” Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:

Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

xxx                               xxx                               xxx

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:

ART. 253.        The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CA’s affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:

In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are “immediately final and executory.”

xxx                                           xxx                                           xxx

But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.

Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a petition for review under Rule 45.

In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,[7] issued a few months later.

In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under
the Rules of Court,[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that  this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.

We do not agree with the Republic’s argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling inRepublic v. Bermudez-Lorino.  As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial court’s Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended “to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar.”

At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:[9]

This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.

Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:

ART. 238.        Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:

ART. 253.        The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)

In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

ART 247.         The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.   

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.

x x x."

Since piercing the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon, those who seek to pierce the veil must clearly establish that the separate and distinct personalities of the corporations are set up to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or perpetrate a deception.

See -
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/168208.htm

"x x x.

At the fore, the question of whether one corporation is merely an alter ego of another is purely one of fact generally beyond the jurisdiction of this Court.[35] In any case, given only these bare reiterations, this Court sustains the ruling of the LA as affirmed by the NLRC that Miramar and Mar Fishing are separate and distinct entities, based on the marked differences in their stock ownership.[36] Also, the fact that Mar Fishing’s officers remained as such in Miramar does not by itself warrant a conclusion that the two companies are one and the same. As this Court held in Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, the mere showing that the corporations had a common director sitting in all the boards without more does not authorize disregarding their separate juridical personalities.[37]

Neither can the veil of corporate fiction between the two companies be pierced by the rest of petitioners’ submissions, namely, the alleged take-over by Miramar of Mar Fishing’s operations and the evident similarity of their businesses. At this point, it bears emphasizing that since piercing the veil of corporate fiction is frowned upon, those who seek to pierce the veil must clearly establish that the separate and distinct personalities of the corporations are set up to justify a wrong, protect a fraud, or perpetrate a deception.[38] This, unfortunately, petitioners have failed to do. In Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union vs. Calica, we ruled thus:[39]

In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of Acrylic, alleging that the creation of the corporation is a devi[c]e to evade the application of the CBA between petitioner Union and private respondent company.  While we do not discount the possibility of the similarities of the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic, neither are we inclined to apply the doctrine invoked by petitioner in granting the relief sought.  The fact that the businesses of private respondent and Acrylic are related, that some of the employees of the private respondent are the same persons manning and providing for auxiliary services to the units of Acrylic, and that the physical plants, offices and facilities are situated in the same compound, it is our considered opinion that these facts are not sufficient to justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic. (Emphasis supplied.)

Having been found by the trial courts to be a separate entity, Mar Fishing – and not Miramar – is required to compensate petitioners. Indeed, the back wages and retirement pay earned from the former employer cannot be filed against the new owners or operators of an enterprise.[40]

x x x."

Forum shopping and litis pendecia explained

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/186730.htm

"x x x.

Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.  Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.  Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets.[12]  What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.[13]  Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt.[14]

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.[15]

Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.  The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action.  This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons.

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.[16]

The foregoing guided this Court in determining whether Yap is liable for forum shopping for filing a complaint for annulment or discharge of checks following Chua’s filing of a complaint for a sum of money with the two cases allegedly involving the same factual antecedents, issues and arguments.  In so doing, this Court agrees with the CA that all the elements of litis pendentia exist and that Yap had indulged in the detestable act of forum shopping, warranting the outright and summary dismissal of Civil Case No. 04-030.

The first requisite of litis pendentia is present as there is identity of parties.  The second and third requisites are likewise present.  Apart from the fact that the same factual antecedents prompted the filing of the two cases, that Yap’s defense in Civil Case No. 6236 constitutes his cause of action in Civil Case No. 04-030 necessarily implies reliance on the same evidence for the resolution of both cases.

Hornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought.  The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions.  If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.  Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies.  Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate thecomplaint in the other.[17]  Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint.[18]

This Court takes note of the fact that Yap filed his complaint for the annulment of the checks he issued to Chua after he was adjudged by the RTC of General Santos City liable.  This strikes the Court as indicative of his  deliberate and willful attempt to render nugatory and defeat the adverse decision of the RTC of General Santos City and relieve himself of his obligation to pay by having the checks he issued annulled, albeit the remedy of appeal was available and which he, in fact, resorted to.  Chua’s complaint is anchored on the amounts Yap received from her and the RTC of General Santos City decided in her favor on the strength of the checks that Yap issued and endorsed to her.  By seeking to cancel or discharge such checks, Yap attempted to use the RTC of Makati City to destroy the evidentiary foundation of the decision of the RTC of General Santos City.  In doing so, Yap trifled with court processes and exposed the courts to the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions.  Worse, Yap sought to accomplish the prohibited - a court reversing a decision rendered by a court of co-equal rank.  Thus, it matters not that the factual findings and conclusions of law of the RTC of General Santos City, the RTC of Makati City, the CA and even of this Court may concur.  It is the fact that our judicial system is rendered vulnerable to such uncertainties and vexations that any and all efforts to forum shop should be treated with aversion.

As this Court held in Madara v. Perello:[19]

Other permutations depending on the rulings of the two courts and the timing of these rulings are possible.  In every case, our justice system suffers as this kind of sharp practice opens the system to the possibility of manipulation; to uncertainties when conflict of rulings arise; and at least to vexation for complications other than conflict of rulings.  Thus, it matters not that ultimately the Court of Appeals may completely agree with the RTC; what the rule on forum shopping addresses are the possibility and the actuality of its harmful effects on our judicial system.[20]

 x x x."

A statute granting tax exemption is strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the exemption.

See -  http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/181136.htm

"x x x.

Being a derogation of the sovereign authority, a statute granting tax exemption is strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the exemption. When based on such statute, a claim for tax refund partakes of the nature of an exemption. Hence, the same rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer-claimant applies to the claim.[14]

In the present case, petitioner’s claim for a refund or tax credit of input VAT is anchored on Section 112(A) of the NIRC, viz:

Section 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. -

(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. - any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods of properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales.

Thus, a taxpayer engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale may apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate, or refund of creditable input tax due or paid, attributable to the sale.

In a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not only entitlement to the grant of the claim under substantive law. It must also show satisfaction of all the documentary and evidentiary requirements for an administrative claim for a refund or tax credit.[15] Hence, the mere fact that petitioner’s application for zero-rating has been approved by the CIR does not, by itself, justify the grant of a refund or tax credit. The taxpayer claiming the refund must further comply with the invoicing and accounting requirements mandated by the NIRC, as well as by revenue regulations implementing them.[16]

Under the NIRC, a creditable input tax should be evidenced by a VAT invoice or official receipt,[17] which may only be considered as such when it complies with the requirements of RR 7-95, particularly Section 4.108-1. This section requires, among others, that “(i)f the sale is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax, the term ‘zero-rated sale’ shall be written or printed prominently on the invoice or receipt.”

We are not persuaded by petitioner’s argument that RR 7-95 constitutes undue expansion of the scope of the legislation it seeks to implement on the ground that the statutory requirement for imprinting the phrase “zero-rated” on VAT official receipts appears only in Republic Act No. 9337. This law took effect on 1 July 2005, or long after petitioner had filed its claim for a refund. 

RR 7-95, which took effect on 1 January 1996, proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to the Secretary of Finance by the NIRC for the efficient enforcement of the same Tax Code and its amendments. In Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[18] we ruled that this provision is “reasonable and is in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from the covered sales of goods and services.” Moreover, we have held in Kepco Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue[19] that the subsequent incorporation of Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 in Section 113 (B) (2) (c) of R.A. 9337 actually confirmed the validity of the imprinting requirement on VAT invoices or official receipts – a case falling under the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by reenactment.

In fact, this Court has consistently held as fatal the failure to print the word “zero-rated” on the VAT invoices or official receipts in claims for a refund or credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales, even if the claims were made prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9337.[20] Clearly then, the present Petition must be denied.

In addition, it is notable that the CTA Second Division and the CTA En Banc, including Presiding Justice Acosta in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, both found that petitioner failed to sufficiently substantiate the existence of its effectively zero-rated sales to NPC for the 3^rd and 4^th quarters of taxable year 1999, as well as all four quarters of taxable year 2000. It must also be noted that the CTA is a highly specialized court dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of revenue-related problems, in which it has necessarily developed an expertise.[21] Hence, its factual findings, when supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal.[22] We find no sufficient reason to exempt the present case from this general rule.

x x x."

The Labor Code recognizes that an employer, for just cause, may validly terminate the services of an employee for serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer or representative in connection with the employee’s work. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed by the employer in the former, or simply loss of confidence, also justifies an employee’s dismissal from employment.

See - http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/june2012/176184.htm

"x x x.

Before this Court, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether or not the CA gravely erred in upholding his dismissal as valid based on just cause.

The Labor Code recognizes that an employer, for just cause, may validly terminate the services of an employee for serious misconduct or willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the employer or representative in connection with the employee’s work.[18] Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed by the employer in the former, or simply loss of confidence, also justifies an employee’s dismissal from employment.[19]

The LA, the NLRC and the CA all acknowledged that, notwithstanding petitioner’s acquittal in the criminal case for qualified theft,[20] respondent PLDT had adequately established the basis for the company’s loss of confidence as a just cause to terminate petitioner. This Court finds that approach to be correct, since proof beyond reasonable doubt of an employee’s misconduct is not required in dismissing an employee.[21] Rather, as opposed to the “proof beyond reasonable doubt” standard of evidence required in criminal cases, labor suits require only substantial evidence to prove the validity of the dismissal.[22]

Willful breach of trust or loss of confidence requires that the employee (1) occupied a position of trust or (2) was routinely charged with the care of the employer’s property.[23] As correctly appreciated by the CA, petitioner was charged with the care and custody of PLDT’s property.

To warrant dismissal based on loss of confidence, there must be some basis for the loss of trust or the employer must have reasonable grounds to believe that the employee is responsible for misconduct that renders the latter unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his or her position.[24] Here, petitioner disputes the sufficiency of PLDT’s basis for loss of trust and confidence. He alleges that he did not steal the plant materials, considering that he had lawful possession.[25]  

However, assuming that he lawfully possessed the materials, PLDT still had ample reason or basisto already distrust petitioner. For more than a month, he did not even inform PLDT of the whereabouts of the plant materials. Instead, he stocked these materials at his residence even if they were needed in the daily operations of the company. In keeping with the honesty and integrity demanded by his position, he should have turned over these materials to the plant’s warehouse.

The fact that petitioner did not present any documents or requisition slips at the time that the PNP took the plant materials logically excites suspicion. In addition, PLDT received a security report stating that petitioner had engaged in the illicit disposal of its plant materials, which were recovered during the search conducted at his residence

Thus, PLDT reasonably suspected petitioner of stealing the company’s property. At that juncture, the employer may already dismiss the employee since it had reasonable grounds to believe or to entertain the moral conviction that the latter was responsible for the misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.[26]

In a final effort to impugn his dismissal, petitioner claims that he could only be faulted for breaching PLDT’s rules and regulations which prohibited the employees from bringing home company materials.[27]

In this regard, petitioner exacerbates his position. By admitting that he breached company rules, he buttressed his employer’s claim that he committed serious misconduct.

Employees cannot take company rules for granted, especially in this case where petitioner’s breach involved various plant materials that may cause major disruption in the company’s operations. Indeed, an employer may discharge an employee for refusal to obey a reasonable company rule.[28] As a rule, although this Court leans over backwards to help workers and employees continue with their employment, acts of dishonesty in the handling of company property are a different matter.[29]

Given these circumstances, it would have been unfair for PLDT to keep petitioner in its employ. Petitioner displayed actions that made him untrustworthy. Thus, as a measure of self-protection,[30]PLDT validly terminated his services for serious misconduct and loss of confidence.

Having established the validity of petitioner’s dismissal, we sustain the rulings of the tribunals a quo. To emphasize, “our empathy with the cause of labor should not blind us to the rights of management. This Court should stamp out, rather than tolerate, the commission of irregular acts wherever these are noted. Malpractices should not be allowed to continue but should be rebuked.”[31]

x x x."