Forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth of public officials. - G.R. No. 189434

G.R. No. 189434

"x x x.

R.A. 1379 provides that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and to his other lawful income, said property shall be presumedprima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.[35] The elements that must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are the following: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.

          Thus, in determining whether the presumption of ill-gotten wealth should be applied, the relevant period is incumbency, or the period in which the public officer served in that position. The amount of the public officer’s salary and lawful income is compared against any property or amount acquired for that same period.  In the Swiss Deposits Decision, the Court ruled that petitioner Republic was able to establish theprima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses “were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials.”[36]

          For a petition to flourish under the forfeiture law, it must contain the following:

(a)          The name and address of the respondent.

(b)         The public officer or employment he holds and such other public offices or employment which he has previously held.

(c)          The approximate amount of property he has acquired during his incumbency in his past and present offices and employments.

(d)         A description of said property, or such thereof as has been identified by the Solicitor General.

(e)          The total amount of his government salary and other proper earnings and incomes from legitimately acquired property, and

(f)          Such other information as may enable the court to determine whether or not the respondent has unlawfully acquired property during his incumbency.[37](Emphasis supplied)

          Petitioners claim that the Republic failed to comply with subparagraphs c, d, and e above, because the latter allegedly never took into account the years when Ferdinand Marcos served as a war veteran with back pay, a practicing lawyer, a trader and investor, a congressman and senator. We find this claim to be a haphazard rehash of what has already been conclusively determined by the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision. The alleged “receivables from prior years” were without basis, because Marcos never had a known law office nor any known clients, and neither did he file any withholding tax certificate that would prove the existence of a supposedly profitable law practice before he became President. As discussed in the Swiss Deposits Decision:

The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture:

xxx                                          xxx                                          xxx

4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986.

5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM (Ferdinand Marcos) during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements.

xxx                                          xxx                                          xxx

11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President from 1966 to 1976 was ₱60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, ₱100,000 a year; while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was ₱75,000 a year.[38]

          The Sandiganbayan found that neither the late Ferdinand Marcos nor petitioner Imelda Marcos filed any Statement of Assets and Liabilities, as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Coupled with the fact that the Answer consisted of general denials and a standard plea of “lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations” – what the Court characterized as “foxy replies” and mere pretense – fairness dictates that what must be considered as lawful income should only be the accumulated salaries of the spouses and what are shown in the public documents they submitted, such as their Income Tax Return (ITR) and their Balance Sheets. The amounts representing the combined salaries of the spouses were admitted by petitioner Imelda Marcos in paragraph 10 of her Answer, and reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo:

Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President

1966-1976	at ₱60,000/year	₱660,000
1977-1984	at ₱100,000/year	800,000
1985	at ₱110,000/year	110,000
		₱1,570,00

Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister

June 1976-1985

at ₱75,000/year

₱718,000

In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of ₱30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to ₱2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43.[39]

          The date contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheets filed by the Marcoses are summarized in Schedules A to D submitted as evidence by the Republic. Schedule A showed that from 1965 to 1984, the Marcoses reported Php 16,408,442.00 or USD 2,414,484.91 in total income, comprised of:

Income Source		Amount		Percentage
Official Salaries	-	₱2,627,581.00	-	16.01%
Legal Practice	-	11,109,836.00	-	67.71%
Farm Income	-	149,700.00	-	.91%
Others	-	2,521,325.00	-	15.37%
Total		₱16,408,442.00	-	100.00%

          The amount reported by the Marcos couple as their combined salaries more or less coincided with the Official Report submitted by the Minister of Budget. Yet what appeared anomalous was the Php 11,109,836 representing “Legal Practice,” which accounted for 67% or more than three-fourths of their reported income. Out of this anomalous amount, Php 10,649,836, or 96% thereof, represented “receivables from prior years” during the period 1967 to 1984. The Court cited the Solicitor General’s findings:

In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the₱10.65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his net worth was a mere ₱120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy.[40]

          In addition, the former President also reported a total of                   Php 2,521,325 which he referred to as “Miscellaneous Items” and “Various Corporations” under “Other Income” for 1972-1976. Spouses Marcos did not declare any income from any deposits that may be subject to a 5% withholding tax, nor did they file any capital gains tax returns from 1960 to 1965. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that there are no records pertaining to the tax transactions of the spouses in Baguio City, Manila, Quezon City, and Tacloban.

          The Balance Sheet attached to the couple’s ITR for 1965 indicates an ending net worth of Php 120,000, which covered the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency. As previously mentioned, the combined salaries of the spouses for the period 1966 to 1986, or in the two decades that they stayed in power, totaled only USD 304,372.43. In stark contrast, as shown by Schedule D, computations establish the total net worth of the spouses for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of           USD 957,487.75, assuming that the income from legal practice is real and valid.[41] The combined salaries make up only 31.79% of the spouses’ total net worth from 1965 to 1984. This means petitioners are unable to account for or explain more than two-thirds of the total net worth of the Marcos spouses from 1965 to 1984.

Thus, for the final time, we soundly reiterate that the Republic was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. The Republic presented further evidence that they had bigger deposits beyond their lawful incomes, foremost of which were the Swiss accounts deposited in the names of five foundations spirited away by the couple to different countries. Petitioners herein thus failed to overturn this presumption when they merely presented vague denials and pleaded “lack of sufficient knowledge” in their Answer.

In any case, petitioners may no longer question the findings of the Sandiganbayan affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision, as these issues have long become the “law of the case” in the original Petition for Forfeiture. As held inPhilippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic:[42]

Law of the case … is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, … so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.     

            Otherwise put, the principle means that questions of law that have been previously raised and disposed of in the proceedings shall be controlling in succeeding instances where the same legal question is raised, provided that the facts on which the legal issue was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.

In the case at bar, the same legal issues are being raised by petitioners. In fact, petitioner Marcos Jr. admits outright that what he seeks is a reversal of the issuesidentical to those already decided by the Court in the Swiss Deposits Decision.[43] He may not resuscitate, via another petition for review, the same issues long laid to rest and established as the law of the case.

x x x."

Barangay chairmen may possess and carry firearms. - G.R. No. 190569

G.R. No. 190569

"x x x.

The original IRR[42] of P.D. 1866 was issued by then Lieutenant General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Fidel V. Ramos on 28 October 1983. The IRR provides that, except when specifically authorized by the Chief of Constabulary, lawful holders of firearms are prohibited from carrying them outside their residences, to wit: 

SECTION 3.   Authority of Private Individuals to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence. —

a.   As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of registration or M/R) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence. 

b.   However, the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearm outside of residence.

c.   Except as otherwise provided in Secs. 4 and 5 hereof, the carrying of firearm outside of residence or official station in pursuance of an official mission or duty shall have the prior approval of the Chief of Constabulary.

By virtue of R.A. 6975,[43] the PNP absorbed the Philippine Constabulary. Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter’s licensing authority.[44]

 On 31 January 2003, PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane issued Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence (Guidelines). In these Guidelines, the PNP Chief revoked all PTCFOR previously issued, thereby prohibiting holders of licensed firearms from carrying these outside their residences, to wit:

4.         Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:

a.     All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR may re-apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter prescribed.

b.     All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from carrying their firearms outside their residence except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty detail orders issued by competent authority pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall pertain only to organic and regular employees.

Section 4 of the IRR lists the following persons as those authorized to carry their duty-issued firearms outside their residences, even without a PTCFOR, whenever they are on duty:

SECTION 4.   Authority of Personnel of Certain Civilian Government Entities and Guards of Private Security Agencies, Company Guard Forces and Government Guard Forces to Carry Firearms. — The personnel of the following civilian agencies commanding guards of private security agencies, company guard forces and government guard forces are authorized to carry their duty issued firearms whenever they are on duty detail subject to the specific guidelines provided in Sec. 6 hereof:

a.   Guards of the National Bureau of Prisons, Provincial and City Jails;

b.   Members of the Bureau of Customs Police, Philippine Ports Authority Security Force, and Export Processing Zones Authority Police Force; and x

c.   Guards of private security agencies, company guard forces, and government guard forces.

Section 5 of the guidelines, on the other hand, enumerates persons who have the authority to carry firearms outside their residences, viz:

5.         The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence.

a.     All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved, provided, that the persons and security of those so authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature of their position, occupation and profession are under imminent danger.

b.     All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their respective agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only for the duration of the official mission which in no case shall be more than ten (10) days.

c.     All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration.

d.    Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes of practice and competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit must not be loaded with ammunition and secured in an appropriate box or case detached from the person.

e.     Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps.

It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims, a barangay captain is not one of those authorized to carry firearms outside their residences unless armed with the appropriate PTCFOR under the Guidelines.[45]

However, we find merit in respondents’ contention that the authority of Aguillon to carry his firearm outside his residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of P.D. 1866 but, rather, was rooted in the authority given to him by Local Government Code (LGC).

In People v. Monton,[46] the house of Mariano Monton—the Barrio Captain of Bacao, General Trias, Cavite—was raided, and an automatic carbine with one long magazine containing several rounds of ammunition was found hidden under a pillow covered with a mat. He was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearm, but this Court acquitted him on the basis of Section 88(3) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337(B.P. 337), the LGC of 1983, which reads:

In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction subject to existing rules and regulations on the possession and carrying of firearms.

Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, repealed B.P. 337. It retained the foregoing provision as reflected in its Section 389 (b), viz:

CHAPTER 3 - THE PUNONG BARANGAY

SEC. 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, and Functions.

x x x                            x x x                            x x x

 (b) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to appropriate rules and regulations.

Provincial Prosecutor Dusaban’s standpoint on this matter is correct. All the guidelines and rules cited in the instant Petition “refers to civilian agents, private security guards, company guard forces and government guard forces.” These rules and guidelines should not be applied to Aguillon, as he is neither an agent nor a guard. Asbarangay captain, he is the head of a local government unit; as such, his powers and responsibilities are properly outlined in the LGC. This law specifically gives him, by virtue of his position, the authority to carry the necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction. Petitioner does not deny that when he found Aguillon “openly carrying a rifle,” the latter was within his territorial jurisdiction as the captain of the barangay.

In the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, this Court will give credence to the finding and determination of probable cause by prosecutors in a preliminary investigation.[47]

This Court has consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the exercise of the Ombudsman's investigatory powers.[48]  It is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant this Court’s reversal of theOmbudsman’s findings.[49] This, petitioner has failed to do.

The Court hereby rules that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was no probable cause to hold respondent Aguillon for trial.

The Dissent contends that probable cause was already established by facts of this case, which show that Aguillon was found carrying a licensed firearm outside his residence without a PTCFOR. Thus, Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal Complaint. However, even though Aguillon did not possess a PTCFOR, he had the “legal authority” to carry his firearm outside his residence, as required by P.D. 1866 as amended by R.A. 8294. This authority was granted to him by Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, which specifically carved out an exception to P.D. 1866. 

Following the suggestion of the Dissent, prosecutors have the authority to disregard existing exemptions, as long as the requirements of the general rule apply. This should not be the case. Although the Dissent correctly declared that the prosecutor cannot peremptorily apply a statutory exception without weighing it against the facts and evidence before him, we find that the facts of the case prove that there is no probable cause to charge Aguillon with the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

In interpreting Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, the Dissent found that the factual circumstances of the present case show that the conditions set forth in the law have not been met. Thus, the exemption should not apply.

Contrary to the allegation of the dissent, there is no question as to the fact that Aguillon was within his territorial jurisdiction when he was found in possession of his rifle.

The authority of punong barangays to possess the necessary firearm within their territorial jurisdiction is necessary to enforce their duty to maintain peace and order within the barangays. Owing to the similar functions, that is, to keep peace and order, this Court deems that, like police officers, punong barangays have a duty as a peace officer that must be discharged 24 hours a day. As a peace officer, a barangay captain may be called by his constituents, at any time, to assist in maintaining the peace and security of his barangay.[50] As long as Aguillon is within his barangay, he cannot be separated from his duty as a punong barangay—to maintain peace and order.

As to the last phrase in Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991, stating that the exception it carved out is subject to “appropriate rules and regulations,” suffice it to say that although P.D. 1866 was not repealed, it was modified by the LGC by specifically adding to the exceptions found in the former. Even the IRR of P.D. 1866 was modified by Section 389 (b) of the LGC as the latter provision already existed when Congress enacted the LGC. Thus, Section 389 (b) of the LGC of 1991 added to the list found in Section 3 of the IRR of P.D. 1866, which enumerated the persons given the authority to carry firearms outside of residence without an issued permit. The phrase “subject to appropriate rules and regulations” found in the LGC refers to those found in the IRR of the LGC itself or a later IRR of P.D. 1866 and not those that it has already amended.

Indeed, petitioner’s mere allegation does not establish the fact that Aguillon was drunk at the time of his arrest. This Court, however, is alarmed at the idea that government officials, who are not only particularly charged with the responsibility to maintain peace and order within their barangays but are also given the authority to carry any form of firearm necessary to perform their duty, could be the very same person who would put their barangays in danger by carelessly carrying high-powered firearms especially when they are not in full control of their senses.

While this Court does not condone the acts of Aguillon, it cannot order the prosecutor to file a case against him since there is no law that penalizes a local chief executive for imbibing liquor while carrying his firearm. Neither is there any law that restricts the kind of firearms that punong barangays may carry in the performance of their peace and order functions. Unfortunately, it also appears that the term “peace and order function” has not been adequately defined by law or appropriate regulations.

x x x."

Electric coopratives; powers of NEA. - G.R. No. 173840

G.R. No. 173840

":x x x.

         The Court finds the petition meritorious. As the assigned errors are interrelated, the Court will discuss them jointly.

         Section 10, Chapter II of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 5 of P.D. No. 1645, provides:

Section 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. − In the exercise of its power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda and other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and other borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.

          

If the electric cooperative concerned or other similar entity fails after due notice to comply with NEA orders, rules and regulations and/or decisions, or with any of the terms of the Loan Agreement, the NEA Board of Administrators may avail of any or all of the following remedies:

                                   x x x x.

           (e) Take preventive and/or disciplinary measures including suspension and/or removal and replacement of any or all of the members of the Board of Directors, officers or employees of the Cooperative, other borrower institutions or supervised or controlled entities as the NEA Board of Administrators may deem fit and necessary and to take any other remedial measures as the law or the Loan Agreement may provide.

           x x x x  (Emphasis supplied.)

         In addition, Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of P.D. No. 269, as amended by Section 7 of P.D. No. 1645, states:

Section 7. Subsection (a), Section 24, Chapter III of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 24. Board of Directors. − (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions.

The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of vacancies, the procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall be defined in the by-laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and regulations.

           x x x.  (Emphasis supplied.)

         A comparison of the original provisions of Sections 10 and 24 of P.D. No. 269 and the amendatory provisions under Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645 would readily show that the intention of the framers of the amendatory law is to broaden the powers of the NEA.

         A clear proof of such expanded powers is that, unlike P.D. No. 269, P.D. No. 1645 expressly provides for the authority of the NEA to exercise supervision and control over electric cooperatives. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.[5] If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.[6] Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.[7]  Section 38 (1), Chapter 7, Book 4 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987provides, thus:

                        Supervision and control shall  include the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

        

         The Court, therefore, finds it erroneous on the part of the CA to rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply in the present case. It is true that the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent.[8] However, the basic issue in the present case is not whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent; rather, the issue is who between the RTC and the NEA has primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by SAMELCO II. A careful reading of the above-quoted provisions of P.D. No. 1645 clearly show that, pursuant to its power of supervision and control, the NEA is granted  the authority to conduct investigations and other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations  with respect to all matters affecting electric cooperatives. Certainly, the matter as to the validity of the resolution issued by the Board of Directors of SAMELCO II, which practically removed respondent from his position as a member of the Board of Directors and further disqualified him to run as such in the ensuing election, is a matter which affects the said electric cooperative and, thus, comes within the ambit of the powers of the NEA as expressed in Sections 5 and 7 of P.D. No. 1645.

         In this regard, the Court agrees with petitioners' argument that to sustain the petition for prohibition filed by respondent with the RTC would constitute an unnecessary intrusion into the NEA's power of supervision and control over electric cooperatives.

         Based on the foregoing discussions, the necessary conclusion that can be arrived at is that, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, the NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution.

            It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.[9]  In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.[10]

         Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.  The Court, in a long line of cases,[11] has held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him.  Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial review can be sought.[12]The premature resort to the court is fatal to one’s cause of action.[13] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.[14]

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.[15] The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.[16] Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.[17]

True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.[18]

         Respondent, however, failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the above-enumerated exceptions. While respondent alleged in his Urgent Petition for Prohibition that the subject resolution was issued with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of his right to due process, mere allegation of arbitrariness will not suffice to vest in the trial court the power that has been specifically granted by law to special government agencies.[19] Moreover, the issues raised in the petition for prohibition, particularly the issue of whether or not there are valid grounds to disallow respondent from attending SAMELCO's Board meetings and to disqualify him from running for re-election as a director of the said Board, are not purely legal questions. Instead, they involve a determination of factual matters which fall within the competence of the NEA to ascertain.

         Finally, the Court agrees with petitioners' contention that the availability of an administrative remedy via a complaint filed before the NEA precludes respondent from filing a petition for prohibition before the court. It is settled that one of the requisites for a writ of prohibition to issue is that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20] In order that prohibition will lie, the petitioner must first exhaust all administrative remedies.[21]  Thus, respondent's failure to file a complaint before the NEA prevents him from filing a petition for prohibition before the RTC.

x x x."

A.C. No. 7481

A.C. No. 7481

"x x x.

The Issue

          The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his lawyer's oath when he mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.

The Court's Ruling

          After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors that respondent acted with deceit when, through the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his client's property for his personal benefit. 

          Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without his knowledge or consent, and partook of the proceeds of the sale for his own benefit.  His contention that he merely accommodated the request of his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's signature reflected thereon was forged.  As aptly opined by Commissioner De Mesa, the fraudulent transactions involving the subject property were effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in respondent's safekeeping and custody during complainant's absence.  

          Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors correctly recommended his disbarment for violations of the pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client which may come into his possession.

Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from client.

Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.

Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

          In Sabayle v. Tandayag,[11] the Court disbarred one of the respondent lawyers and ordered his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the grounds of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct.  The respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false and simulated transaction not only by notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also – and even worse – sharing in the profits of the specious transaction by acquiring half of the property subject of the Deed of Sale.

          In Flores v. Chua,[12] the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for having deliberately made false representations that the vendor appeared personally before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale.  He was found guilty of grave misconduct.

          In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness and plain inability to discharge the bounden duties of a member of the legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to practice law and to live up to the exacting standards demanded of the members of the bar.  It bears to stress that “[t]he practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and morality.  Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.”[13]

          Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant will not serve to mitigate his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[14]

          With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of disbarment proper in this case, as recommended by Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors.  Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:

     “SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx or for any violation of the oathwhich he is required to take before admission to practice xxx” (emphasis supplied)

          The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.[15]  Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.

          WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is  DISBARRED and his name orderedSTRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

         

Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.

SO ORDERED.

x x x."