"xxx.
In a nutshell, the ultimate issue is: Did the court commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting respondent's motion for a bill of particulars as executor of former President Marcos' estates considering that the deceased defendant was then a defaulting defendant when the motion was filed?
We rule in the negative, and dismiss the instant petition for utter lack of merit.
Under the Rules of Court, a defending party may be declared in default, upon motion and notice, for failure to file an answer within the allowable period. As a result, the defaulting party cannot take part in the trial albeit he is entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.33
The remedies against a default order are: (1) a motion to set aside the order of default at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment on the ground that the defendant's failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect and that the defendant has a meritorious defense; (2) a motion for new trial within 15 days from receipt of judgment by default, if judgment had already been rendered before the defendant discovered the default, but before said judgment has become final and executory; (3) an appeal within 15 days from receipt of judgment by default; (4) a petition for relief from judgment within 60 days from notice of judgment and within 6 months from entry thereof; and (5) a petition for certiorari in exceptional circumstances.34
In this case, former President Marcos was declared in default for failure to file an answer. He died in Hawaii as an exile while this case was pending, since he and his family fled to Hawaii in February 1986 during a people-power revolt in Metro Manila. His representatives failed to file a motion to lift the order of default. Nevertheless, respondent, as executor of his father's estate, filed a motion for leave to file a responsive pleading, three motions for extensions to file an answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of which were granted by the anti-graft court.
Given the existence of the default order then, what is the legal effect of the granting of the motions to file a responsive pleading and bill of particulars? In our view, the effect is that the default order against the former president is deemed lifted.
Considering that a motion for extension of time to plead is not a litigated motion but an ex parte one, the granting of which is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the court; that in some cases we have allowed defendants to file their answers even after the time fixed for their presentation; that we have set aside orders of default where defendants' failure to answer on time was excusable; that the pendency of the motion for a bill of particulars interrupts the period to file a responsive pleading; and considering that no real injury would result to the interests of petitioner with the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars, the three motions for extensions of time to file an answer, and the motion with leave to file a responsive pleading, the anti-graft court has validly clothed respondent with the authority to represent his deceased father. The only objection to the action of said court would be on a technicality. But on such flimsy foundation, it would be erroneous to sacrifice the substantial rights of a litigant. Rules of procedure should be liberally construed to promote their objective in assisting the parties obtain a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their case.35
While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the court to lift the default order because there was no motion nor order to that effect, the anti-graft court's act of granting respondent the opportunity to file a responsive pleading meant the lifting of the default order on terms the court deemed proper in the interest of justice. It was the operative act lifting the default order and thereby reinstating the position of the original defendant whom respondent is representing, founded on the court's discretionary power to set aside orders of default.
It is noteworthy that a motion to lift a default order requires no hearing; it need be under oath only and accompanied by an affidavit of merits showing a meritorious defense.36 And it can be filed "at any time after notice thereof and before judgment." Thus, the act of the court in entertaining the motions to file a responsive pleading during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings effectively meant that respondent has acquired a locus standi in this case. That he filed a motion for a bill of particulars instead of an answer does not pose an issue because he, as party defendant representing the estate, is allowed to do so under the Rules of Court to be able to file an intelligent answer. It follows that petitioner's filing of a bill of particulars in this case is merely a condition precedent to the filing of an answer.
Indeed, failure to file a motion to lift a default order is not procedurally fatal as a defaulted party can even avail of other remedies mentioned above.
As default judgments are frowned upon, we have been advising the courts below to be liberal in setting aside default orders to give both parties every chance to present their case fairly without resort to technicality.37 Judicial experience shows, however, that resort to motions for bills of particulars is sometimes intended for delay or, even if not so intended, actually result in delay since the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading is suspended and the subsequent proceedings are likewise set back in the meantime. As understood under Section 1 of Rule 12, mentioned above, a motion for a bill of particulars must be filed within the reglementary period for the filing of a responsive pleading to the pleading sought to be clarified. This contemplates pleadings which are required by the Rules to be answered under pain of procedural sanctions, such as default or implied admission of the facts not responded to.38
But as defaulted defendants are not actually thrown out of court because the Rules see to it that judgments against them must be in accordance with the law and competent evidence, this Court prefers that the lifting of default orders be effected before trial courts could receive plaintiffs' evidence and render judgments. This is so since judgments by default may result in considerable injustice to defendants, necessitating careful and liberal examination of the grounds in motions seeking to set them aside. The inconvenience and complications associated with rectifying resultant errors, if defendant justifies his omission to seasonably answer, far outweigh the gain in time and dispatch of immediately trying the case.39 The fact that former President Marcos was in exile when he was declared in default, and that he later died still in exile, makes the belated filing of his answer in this case understandably excusable.
The anti-graft court required the Marcos siblings through its January 11, 1999 Order40 to substitute for their father without informing them that the latter was already declared in default. They were unaware, therefore, that they had to immediately tackle the matter of default. Respondent, who stands as the executor of their father's estate, could assume that everything was in order as far as his standing in court was concerned. That his motion for leave to file a responsive pleading was granted by the court gave him credible reason not to doubt the validity of his legal participation in this case. Coupled with his intent to file an answer, once his motion for a bill of particulars is sufficiently answered by petitioner, the circumstances abovementioned warrant the affirmation of the anti-graft court's actions now being assailed.
Xxx."
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. (as executor of the estate of FERDINAND E. MARCOS), respondents.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_148154_2007.html
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 148154, December 17, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. (as executor of the estate of FERDINAND E. MARCOS), respondents.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/dec2007/gr_148154_2007.html
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