The period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.

G.R. No. 234608, JULY 3, 2018

ARVIN R. BALAG, Petitioner
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ORDER AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AND REVISION OF CODES AND MGEN. JOSE V. BALAJADIA, JR. (RET.) IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS, Respondents

"xxx.

The period of detention under
the Senate's inherent power of
contempt is not indefinite.

The Court finds that there is a genuine necessity to place a limitation on the period of imprisonment that may be imposed by the Senate pursuant to its inherent power of contempt during inquiries in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that Congress, in conducting inquiries in aid of legislation, must respect the rights of persons appearing in or affected therein. Under Arnault, however, a witness or resource speaker cited in contempt by the Senate may be detained indefinitely due to its characteristic as a continuing body. The said witness may be detained for a day, a month, a year, or even for a lifetime depending on the desire of the perpetual Senate. Certainly, in that case, the rights of persons appearing before or affected by the legislative inquiry are in jeopardy. The constitutional right to liberty that every citizen enjoys certainly cannot be respected when they are detained for an indefinite period of time without due process of law.

As discussed in Lopez, Congress' power of contempt rests solely upon the right of self-preservation and does not extend to the infliction of punishment as such. It is a means to an end and not the end itself. 48 Even arguendo that detention under the legislative's inherent power of contempt is not entirely punitive in character because it may be used by Congress only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to remove an obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty of the said witness. It is when the restrictions during detention are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent to punish. Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears excessive in relation to that purpose. 49 An indefinite and unspecified period of detention will amount to excessive restriction and will certainly violate any person's right to liberty.

Nevertheless, it is recognized that the Senate's inherent power of contempt is of utmost importance. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislations are intended to affect or change. Mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed through the power of contempt during legislative inquiry.50 While there is a presumption of regularity that the Senate will not gravely abuse its power of contempt, there is still a lingering and unavoidable possibility of indefinite imprisonment of witnesses as long as there is no specific period of detention, which is certainly not contemplated and envisioned by the Constitution.

Thus, the Court must strike a balance between the interest of the Senate and the rights of persons cited in contempt during legislative inquiries.1avvphi1 The balancing of interest requires that the Court take a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation. These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the government's promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other.51

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony called relates to that subject. 52 Accordingly, as long as there is a legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize the detained witness.

Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:

First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules state:


Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry, the Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.

The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members. Concurring and dissenting reports may likewise be made by the members who do not sign the majority report within seventy-two (72) hours from the approval of the report. The number of members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions of the Committee Report shall be taken into account in determining whether the Report has been approved by a majority of the members: Provided, That the vote of a member who submits both a concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the majority unless he expressly indicates his vote for the majority position.

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.

Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases supplied)

As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after the conduct of the legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in the Senate Rules because it mandates that the committee begin the consideration of its Report within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the inquiry. The said Committee Report shall then be approved by a majority vote of all its members; otherwise, it is disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject matter of the next order of business, and it shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the Senate whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the succeeding order of business. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one (1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the detained witnesses likewise ends.

In Arnault, there have been fears that placing a limitation on the period of imprisonment pursuant to the Senate's power of contempt would "deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance."53 Also, in view of the limited period of imprisonment, "the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed xxx."54

The Court is of the view that these fears are insufficient to permit an indefinite or an unspecified period of imprisonment under the Senate's inherent power of contempt. If Congress believes that there is a necessity to supplement its power of contempt by extending the period of imprisonment beyond the conduct of its legislative inquiry or beyond its final adjournment of the last session, then it can enact a law or amend the existing law that penalizes the refusal of a witness to testify or produce papers during inquiries in aid of legislation. The charge of contempt by Congress shall be tried before the courts, where the contumacious witness will be heard. More importantly, it shall indicate the exact penalty of the offense, which may include a fine and/or imprisonment, and the period of imprisonment shall be specified therein. This constitutes as the statutory power of contempt, which is different from the inherent power of contempt.

Congress' statutory power of contempt has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as reflected in the cases of In re Chapman and Jurney v. MacCracken. Similarly, in this jurisdiction, the statutory power of contempt of Congress was also acknowledged in Lopez. It was stated therein that in cases that if Congress seeks to penalize a person cited in contempt beyond its adjournment, it must institute a criminal proceeding against him. When his case is before the courts, the culprit shall be afforded all the rights of the accused under the Constitution. He shall have an opportunity to defend himself before he can be convicted and penalized by the State.

Notably, there is an existing statutory provision under Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the refusal of a witness to answer any legal inquiry before Congress, to wit:


Art. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions. - The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from two hundred to one thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who, having been duly summoned to attend as a witness before the National Assembly, (Congress), its special or standing committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional Commissions and its committees, subcommittees, or divisions, or before any commission or committee chairman or member authorized to summon witnesses, refuses, without legal excuse, to obey such summons, or being present before any such legislative or constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation or to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall restrain another from attending as a witness, or who shall induce disobedience to a summon or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Verily, the said law may be another recourse for the Senate to exercise its statutory power of contempt. The period of detention provided therein is definite and is not limited by the period of the legislative inquiry. Of course, the enactment of a new law or the amendment of the existing law to augment its power of contempt and to extend the period of imprisonment shall be in the sole discretion of Congress.

Moreover, the apprehension in Arnault - that the Senate will be prevented from effectively conducting legislative hearings during recess - shall be duly addressed because it is expressly provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.

In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced.1âwphi1 The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness.

In fine, the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness.

In addition, if the Congress decides to extend the period of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a witness beyond the duration of the legislative inquiry, then it may file a criminal case under the existing statute or enact a new law to increase the definite period of imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. However, the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry.

The December 12, 2017 Resolution of the Court ordering the temporary release of Arvin R. Balag from detention is hereby declared FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Xxx."