The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/nov2014/gr_208749_2014.html


“x x x.

Without the res gestae exception, the evidence of the prosecution would consist mainly of hearsay statements by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas all reiterating what AAA allegedly told them. The same question, whether res gestaeas an exception to the hearsay rule must be appreciated from the factual circumstances of the case, is now before this Court in this automatic review.


To pardon her father, AAA chose to ignore the trial court’s subpoenas to testify in her rape complaint, thus leaving missing a vital component in the prosecution’s case, her eyewitness account. But in itself, her pardon would not have worked the dismissal of the rape case since it was given after the complaint was filed in court.


AAA never appeared at the trial proper despite several subpoenas for her to testify, and subsequent subpoenas could not be served after her family moved to a new but unknown address on April 13, 2010. Recall that at the pre-trial, BBB told the court that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case against the accused-appellant since her daughter had already pardoned him. It has, however, been held that even if it is construed as a pardon, AAA’s desistance is not by itself a ground to dismiss the complaint for rape against the accused-appellant once the complaint has been instituted in court. (People v. Montes, 461 Phil. 563, 584 (2003); Victoriano v. People, 538 Phil. 974, 984 [2006])


In People v. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 620, the accused tried to invoke the affidavit of desistance executed by the minor victim’smother stating that they would no longer pursue the rape cases against him. But the high court pointed out that since R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law, took effect in 1997, rape is no longer considered a crime against chastity. Having been reclassified as a crime against persons, it is no longer considered a private crime, or one which cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Thus, pardon by the offended party of the offender will not extinguish his criminal liability.


"As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later on be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable." (Victoriano v. People, 538 Phil. 974, 984 [2006])


The gravity of the crime of rape and its imposable penalty, vis-á-vis the ease with which a charge of rape can be made, compels the Supreme Court to conduct a thorough review of rape every conviction.


A charge of rape by its very nature often must be resolved by giving primordial consideration to the credibility of the victim’s testimony. (People v. Noveras, 550 Phil. 871, 881 [2007]). Because conviction may rest solely thereon, the victim’s testimony must be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things (People v. Nazareno, 574 Phil. 175, 191-192 [2008]), it must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, the victim’s credibility must be put on trial as well. (People v. Jalosjos, 421 Phil. 43, 68 [2001])


But if for some reason the complainant fails or refuses to testify, as in this case, then the court must consider the adequacy of the circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution. In People v. Canlas, People v. Canlas, 423 Phil. 665 (2001), the Court said:


Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the combined effect of the pieces of circumstantial evidence must inexorably lead to the conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.


x x x x


x x x Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience, observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. Conviction may be warranted on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person. (Citations omitted)


The Court is called upon to review the verdict of conviction below, keeping in mind the following principles as guidance: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, albeit innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme care; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must succeed or fail on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to derive strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. (People v. Ogarte, G.R. No. 182690, May 30, 2011, 689 SCRA 395, 405)


In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations must have been "voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and weremade under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation."


Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules." Res gestae, one of eleven (11) exceptions to the hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130, thus:


Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place orimmediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.


In People v. Ner, 139 Phil. 390 (1969), this Court elaborated on Section 36 of Rule 130 as follows:


[T]hat declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the act or occurrence in litigation, although not precisely concurrent in point of time, if they were yet voluntarily and spontaneously madeso nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and weremade under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation, must, upon the clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of the act or transaction itself. (Id. at 404-405, citingLouisville N.A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Buck, 19 NE 453, 458).


The Court enumerated three essential requisites for the admissibility of a given statement as part of res gestae, to wit:


All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of res gestae,is that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circum[s]tances. (Id. at 405)

There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. (People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 352 Phil. 866, 882 [1998]).


In People v. Dianos, 357 Phil. 871 (1998), the Court acknowledged that there are no hard and fast rules in determining the spontaneity of a declaration, but at least five factors have been considered:


By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime, immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement become admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. x x x.


There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a number of factors have been considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. x x x. (Citations omitted and italics in the original)


In People v. Jorolan, 452 Phil. 698 (2003), the Court emphasized that there must be no intervening circumstances between the res gestae occurrence and the time the statement was made ascould have afforded the declarant an opportunity for deliberation or reflection; in other words, the statement was unreflected and instinctive:


An important consideration is whether there intervened between the occurrence and the statement any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant, and thus restore his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberation. His statement then cannot be regarded as unreflected and instinctive, and isnot admissible as part of the res gestae. An example is where he had been talking about matters other than the occurrence in question or directed his attention to other matters. (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)


In People v. Salafranca, G.R. No. 173476, February 22, 2012, 666 SCRA 501, the Court cited two tests in applying the res gestaerule: a) the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact orevent that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself; and b) the said evidence clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.


The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact asto exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestaeis, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony. (Citations omitted, emphasis ours and italics in the original)


By way of illustration, in People v. Villarama, 445 Phil. 323 (2003), the 4-year-old rape victim did not testify, but the accused, an uncle of the victim, was convicted on the basis of what the child told her mother. The Court said:


The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her age, the victim could not havehad the sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her mother that her uncle made her lie down, took off her panties and inserted his penis inside her vagina.


The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old child. Such a brutal experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth was still crying when her parents arrived reinforces the conclusion that she was still in a traumatic state when she made the statements pointing to appellant.


x x x x


x x x [I]n Contreras, the victim’s statement that she had been sexually molested by the accused was not received under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, because her statement did not refer to the incident witnessed by Nelene but to a general pattern of molestation of her and her companions by the accused. In contrast, Elizabeth’s declaration to her mother regarding the then just concluded assault were so full of details specific to the incident that there could be no doubt she was referring to the same incident witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.


In People v. Velasquez, 405 Phil. 74 (2001), the 2-year-old rape victim told her mother the following: a) "Si Tatang kakayan na ku pu." ("Tatang has been doing something to me."); and b) "I-tatang kasi, kinayi ne pu ing pekpek ku kaya masakit ya." ("Because Tatang has been doing something to my private part, that is why it hurts.") The girl then showed her mother her private part, which was swollen and oozing with pus, and then she gestured by slightly opening or raising her right foot, and using her right finger, to show what the accused had done to it. The Court ruled:


We hold, therefore, that Aira’s statements and acts constitute res gestae, as it was made immediately subsequent to a startling occurrence, uttered shortly thereafter by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to contrive the same. Regail’s account of Aira’s words and, more importantly, Aira’s gestures, constitutes independently relevant statements distinct from hearsay and admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact that they had been thus uttered.


Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. (Citation omitted)


In People v. Lupac, G.R. No. 182230, September 19, 2012, 681 SCRA 390, the Court accepted as part of res gestae the 10-year-old victim’s denunciation ofher uncle to a neighbor whom she met soon after she managed to get away from her uncle after the rape, uttering the words "hindot" and "inano ako ni Kuya Ega."


In People v. Moreno, G.R. No. 92049, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 292, shortly after the three accused left the house where the complaining victims workedas maids, the maids told their employers, who had just arrived, that they had been raped. The employers testified in court on these statements. The Court held that the maids’ statements were part of res gestae since they were spontaneously made as soon as the victims had opportunity to make them without threat to their lives. The Court said:


This exception is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy because made instinctively, "while the declarant’s mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his utterances at the time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action." Said natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness stand. (Citations omitted)


But in People v. Contreras, 393 Phil. 277 (2000), the accused was acquitted in one of several statutory rape charges because, among other things, the prosecution failed to present the victim, a 6-year-old girl, and the court found that her alleged res gestae statement referred not to the incident or circumstance testified to by the witness but rather to a general pattern of molestation which she and her companions had endured for some time already.


AAA’s statements to the barangay tanodand the police do not qualify as part ofres gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time between the rape and the declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity for reflection.


In People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 352 Phil. 866 (1998), the Court stressed that in appreciating res gestaethe element of spontaneity is critical. Although it was acknowledged that there is no hard and fast rule to establish it, the Court cited a number of factors to consider, already mentioned in Dianos.The review of the facts below constrains this Court to take a view opposite that of the RTC and the CA.


It is of particular significance to note that in her sworn statement to the police, AAA admitted that she first revealed her ordeal of sexual abuse to her cousin DDD in the afternoon of February 5, 2009, although her mother BBB had returned from her overnight guard duty that morning. Shocked by what AAA told him, DDD relayed to BBB "na may problema [si AAA]." BBB thus confronted her, and AAA in her own words narrated that, "kaya kinausap na po ako ni Mama kung ano ang problema ko kaya sinabi ko na po ang ginawa sa akin ni Papa ko po kaya nalaman na lahat ni Mama ang panggagahasa sa akin ni Papa."


After an anguished silence of five years, finally AAA found the courage to reveal to her mother her heart-rending saga of sexual abuse by her own father. Emboldened by her cousin DDD’s moral support, AAA told her mother that she had been hiding her dark secret since Grade III. But as soon as BBB learned, events quickly took their logical course. With BBB now leading the way, BBB and AAA sought the help of the barangay tanodthat same day between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to have the accused-appellant arrested. At around 6:00 p.m., they were able to arrest him as he was coming home. Later that night, AAA accompanied by BBB gave her statement to PO3 Cobardo of the PNP women’s desk.


AAA’s revelation to DDD and BBB set off an inexorable chain of events that led to the arrest of the accused-appellant. There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive about the declarations which AAA made to the barangay tanodand later that night to the police. Her statements werein fact a re-telling of what she had already confessed to her mother earlier that afternoon; this time however, her story to the tanods and the police was in clear, conscious pursuit of a newly formed resolve, exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally exposed and put behind bars. AAA made her declarations to the authorities precisely because she was seeking their help to punish the accused-appellant. There was then nothing spontaneous about her so-called res gestaenarrations, even as it is remarkable to note that while AAA was giving her said statements to the police, her father was already being held in detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly to determine if there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.


Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related happenings, starting with the occurrence of a startling event which triggered it and including any spontaneous declaration made by a witness, participant or spectator relative to the said occurrence. The cases thisCourt has cited invariably reiterate that the statement must be an unreflected reaction of the declarant, undesigned and free of deliberation. In other words, the declarant is spontaneously moved merely to express his instinctive reaction concerning the startling occurrence, and not to pursue a purpose or design already formed in his mind. In People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 74740, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 70, the Court be labored to explain that startling events "speak for themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the unprompted language of the participants":


Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement." A spontaneous exclamation is defined as "a statement or exclamation made immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it isobserved by him. The admissibility of such exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,’ the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him." In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant ratherthan the declarant speaking for himself. Or, stated differently, "x x x the events speak for themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the unprompted language of the participants. The spontaneous character of the language is assumed to preclude the probability ofits premeditation or fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with a good dealof reason, as a guarantee of its truth. (Citations omitted)


The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory statements of AAA to the barangay tanodand the police are part of the res gestae occurrence of the rape. This is error. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose own outrage as the betrayed wife and grieving mother so emboldened AAA that she finally resolved to emerge from her fear of her father. Here then lies the crux of the matter: AAA had clearly ceased to act unthinkingly under the immediate influence of her shocking rape by her father, and was now led by another powerful compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her father.


Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the original declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected to cross-examination by the defense, except in a few instances as where the statement is considered part of the res gestae.


This Court has a situation where the incriminatory statements allegedly made by AAA were conveyed to the trial court not by AAA herself but by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In particular, PO3 Cobardo made a summation of what she claims was AAA’s narration of her ordeal, along with her own observations of her demeanor during the investigation. But unless the prosecution succeeded in invoking res gestae, their testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since AAA’s statements were not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional right of the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.


Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value, and unless it is part of res gestae, the appealed decision runs contrary to the well-settled rule against admitting hearsay evidence, aptly described as "evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." (Francisco, Evidence 244, 3rd Ed. [1996]) The hearsay rule puts in issue the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence, since the statement testified to was not given under oath or solemn affirmation, and more compellingly, the declarant was not subjected to cross examination by the opposing party to testhis perception, memory, veracity and articulateness, on whose reliability the entire worth of the out-of-court statement depends. (Country Bankers Ins. Corp. v. Lianga Bay, 425 Phil. 511, 520 [2002]) It is an immemorial rule that a witness can testify only as to his own personal perception or knowledge of the actual facts or events. His testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of what he learned or heard from others. (RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 36) But equally important, Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x." By allowing the accused to test the perception, memory, and veracity of the witness, the trial court is able to weigh the trustworthiness and reliability of his testimony. There is no gainsaying that the right to confront a witness applies with particular urgency in criminal proceedings, for at stake is a man’s personal liberty, universally cherished among all human rights.


In Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012, 669 SCRA 135, the Court rendered a helpful disquisition on hearsay evidence, why it must be rejected and treated as inadmissible, and how it can be avoided:


To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness isa substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extra judicial source of her information.


In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.


It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.


Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is, therefore, between (a)the fact that the statement was made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b)the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.


Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands tobe denied because the declarant is not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.


To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party’s right to cross-examine her adversary’s witness, the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The first solution is to require that allthe witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtformalizes this solution, viz.:


"Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.– The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode ofanswer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally."


The second solution is to require that allwitnesses be subject to the cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court ensures this solution thusly:


"Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.—Upon the termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue."


Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses face to face x x x," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.


We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out of-court statement depends. (Citations omitted, emphasis ours and italics in the original)


When inculpatory facts are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.


It is well-settled, to the pointof being elementary, that when inculpatory facts are susceptible to two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction. (People v. Timtiman,G.R. No. 101663, November 4, 1992, 215 SCRA 364, 373, citingPeople v. Remorosa, G.R. No. 81768, August 7, 1991, 200 SCRA 350, 360) A forced application of the res gestae exception below results if the Court says that AAA’s incriminatory statements were spontaneous and thus part of a startling occurrence. It produces an outright denial of the right of the accused-appellant to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty, not to mention that he was also denied his right to confront the complainant. As the Court held in People v. Ganguso, 320 Phil. 324 (1995):


An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.1âwphi1 Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense charged. (Citations omitted)


This Court’s views are not a condonation of the bestiality of the accused-appellant but only indicate that there is reasonable doubt as to his guilt entitling him to acquittal. As the Court stated in People v. Ladrillo, 377 Phil. 904 (1999):


Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: sympathy for the victim and admiration for her in publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous misfortune, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities and deal with it withextreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused and demanding punishment for the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law. (Citation omitted)


It needs no elaboration that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. ( People v. Subido, 323 Phil. 240, 251 [1996]). "[T]he burden ofproof rests on the [S]tate. The accused, ifhe so chooses, need notpresent evidence. He merely has to raise a reasonable doubt and whittle away from the case of the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence demands no less," (People v. Tadepa, 314 Phil. 231, 236 [1995]) even as it also demands no less than a moral certainty of his guilt. (1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14[2])


WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action he has taken within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

X x x.”