FIRST DIVISION
RAFAEL T. MOLINA
and REYNALDO SONEJA, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
the HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
D
E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA,
JR., J.:
"X x
x.
Affidavits
of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused is
unreliable and deserves scant consideration.[1]
“x x x
Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and that what
he now says is true, is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous
testimony is false. No such reasoning
has ever crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be impeached
by a previous contradictory statement x x x not that a previous statement is
presumed to be false merely because a witness now says that the same is not
true. The jurisprudence of this Court
has always been otherwise, i.e., that contradictory testimony given
subsequently does not necessarily discredit the previous testimony if the
contradictions are satisfactorily explained.
(U.S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; U.S. vs. Briones, 28
Phil. 362; U.S. vs. Dasiip, 26 Phil. 503; U.S. vs. Lazaro, 34
Phil. 871)."[2]
Indeed,
it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken
before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions
precisely sought to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of
the witnesses who had given the testimony later on changed his mind.[3] Such a rule will make
solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses.[4] Unless there be special
circumstances which, coupled with the retraction of the witness, really raise
doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by him at the trial and accepted
by the trial judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of
conviction, or its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different
conclusion, an acquittal of the accused based on such a retraction would not be
justified.[5]
This
Court has always looked with disfavor upon retraction of testimonies previously
given in court.[6] The asserted motives
for the repudiation are commonly held suspect, and the veracity of the
statements made in the affidavit of repudiation are frequently and deservedly
subject to serious doubt.[7]
Such
being the experience of this court, we should proceed with extreme caution and
judicial prudence in according any probative value to affidavits of recantation
in the light of the sad reality that the same can be easily secured from poor
and ignorant witnesses for some financial consideration[8] or through
intimidation.[9] Especially when the
affidavit of retraction is executed by a prosecution witness after the judgment
of conviction has already been rendered, "it is too late in the day for
his recantation without portraying himself as a liar."[10] At most, the retraction
is an afterthought which should not be given probative value.[11]
Mere
retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony if credible.[12] The rule is settled
that in cases where previous testimony is retracted and a subsequent different,
if not contrary, testimony is made by the same witness, the test to decide
which testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of
the general rules of evidence.[13] A testimony solemnly
given in court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this
can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be
carefully compared and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which each was made,
carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the change,
discriminatingly analyzed.[14] The unreliable
character of the affidavit of recantation executed by a complaining witness is
also shown by the incredulity of the fact that after going through the
burdensome process of reporting to and/or having the accused arrested by the
law enforcers, executing a criminal complaint-affidavit against the accused,
attending trial and testifying against the accused, the said complaining
witness would later on declare that all the foregoing is actually a farce and
the truth is now what he says it to be in his affidavit of recantation.[15] And in situations, like
the instant case, where testimony is recanted by an affidavit subsequently
executed by the recanting witness, we are properly guided by the well-settled
rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented on the
witness stand[16] and that affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered inferior to the testimony given
in open court.[17]
Applying
the aforegoing principles, we are hardly perturbed in our affirmance of
petitioners' conviction. Furthermore,
the following antecedent facts and circumstances render the recantation out of
context: (1) complaining witness Homer
Tabuzo went through all the trouble of instructing his wife, (while he was in
Manila in November, 1977, when told that the treasury warrants were encashed at
the PNB), to file the proper complaint and to get xerox copies of the treasury
warrants from the PNB; (2) he proceeded to the authorities the day after he
arrived from Manila, around five (5) days after the treasury warrants were
encashed, to file a formal complaint regarding the falsification of his
signature; and (3) he participated in the various stages of the investigation
and the trial whenever he was summoned by the Fiscal or the Judge. That he executed the affidavit of recantation
in July, 1985 or eight (8) years after the cases were filed, borders on
incredulity. More importantly, the
affidavit of recantation did not cover all points raised and facts established
during the trial. Neither did it refute
testimonial and documentary evidence of other witnesses, especially, for instance,
the other pharmacy owners who were made to appear to have filed bids and
submitted price quotations, when the truth was that they did not. In short, the said affidavit did not at all
explain the other evidence considered by the court a quo in rendering
the judgment of conviction, which evidence unequivocally shows petitioners to
be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged against them.
X x
x."
[1]
People vs. Torino, 11 SCRA 287, p. 293; People vs. Loste, 210 SCRA 614, p. 621.
[2]
People vs. Ubina, 97 Phil. 515, pp. 525-526.
[3]
People vs. Manigbas; 109 Phil. 469, p. 477.
[4]
People vs. Ubina, supra; People vs. Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469; Reano vs. CA, 165
SCRA 525; de Guzman vs. IAC, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Cruz, 208 SCRA 326;
People vs. Mindac, 216 SCRA 558; People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647; People vs.
Juinio, 237 SCRA 826; Lopez vs. CA, 239 SCRA 562.
[5]
People vs. Manigbas, supra, p. 478.
[6]
People vs. Mindac, supra; Lopez vs. CA, supra; People vs. Juinio, supra; People
vs. Logronio, 214 SCRA 519; People vs. del Pilar, 188 SCRA 37; People vs.
Aldeguer, 184 SCRA 1; People vs. Navasca, 76 SCRA 70.
[7]
People vs. Logronio, supra; People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53.
[8]
People vs. Liwag, 225 SCRA 46; People vs. Mangulabnan, 200 SCRA 611; People vs.
Bernardo, 220 SCRA 31; People vs. Mindac, supra; de Guzman vs. IAC, supra;
People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642; People vs. Juinio, supra; People vs. Galicia,
123 SCRA 550; Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622.
[9]
Lopez vs. CA, supra, 565.
[10]
People vs. Loste, 210 SCRA 614, p. 621.
[11]
Flores vs. People, supra, p. 630; People vs. Junio, supra, p. 834.
[12]
People vs. Dulay, 217 SCRA 103, p. 118; People vs. de la Cerna, 21 SCRA 569.
[13]
People vs. Mindac, 216 SCRA 558; Lopez vs. CA, 239 SCRA 562; Reano vs. CA, 165
SCRA 525; People vs. Cruz, 208 SCRA 326.
[14]
People vs. Cruz, supra; Lopez vs. CA, supra.
[15]
Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622; People vs. Juinio, 237 SCRA 826.
[16]
People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; People vs. Mindac, 216 SCRA 558.
[17]
People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47; People vs. Riego, 189 SCRA 445; People vs.
Mindac, supra.
