Effect of resignation in administrative cases - G.R. No. 164679

G.R. No. 164679

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To recall, we have held in the past that a public official’s resignation does not render moot an administrative case that was filed prior to the official’s resignation. In Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.,[40] we held that:

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan [A.M. No. P-03-1726, 22 July 2004, 434 SCRA 654, 658], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable[Baquerfo v. Sanchez, A.M. No. P-05-1974, 6 April 2005, 455 SCRA 13, 19-20]. [emphasis and underscoring supplied]

Likewise, in Baquerfo v. Sanchez,[41] we held:

Cessation from office of respondent by resignation [Reyes v. Cristi, A.M. No. P-04-1801, 2 April 2004, 427 SCRA 8] or retirement [Re: Complaint Filed by Atty. Francis Allan A. Rubio on the Alleged Falsification of Public Documents and Malversation of Public Funds, A.M. No. 2004-17-SC, 27 September 2004; Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, 13 September 2004] neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service [Tuliao v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1065, 348 Phil. 404, 416 (1998), citing Perez v. Abiera, A.C. No. 223-J, 11 June 1975, 64 SCRA 302; Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, A.C. No. 207-J, 22 April 1977, 76 SCRA 301] nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic [Sy Bang v. Mendez, 350 Phil. 524, 533 (1998)]. The jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case [Flores v. Sumaljag, 353 Phil. 10, 21 (1998)]. Respondent’s resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable [OCA v. Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511, 20 August 2004]. [emphases and underscoring supplied)

However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present case. In the above-cited cases, the Court found that the public officials – subject of the administrative cases – resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a case already filed[42] or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one.[43] Here, neither situation obtains.

The Ombudsman’s general assertion that Andutan pre-empted the filing of a case against him by resigning, since he “knew for certain that the investigative and disciplinary arms of the State would eventually reach him”[44] is unfounded. First, Andutan’s resignation was neither his choice nor of his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on September 1, 1999, exactly one (1) year and two (2) months after his resignation. The Court struggles to find reason in the Ombudsman’s sweeping assertions in light of these facts.

What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against him. Additionally, even if we were to accept the Ombudsman’s position that Andutan foresaw the filing of the case against him, his forced resignation negates the claim that he tried to prevent the filing of the administrative case.

Having established the inapplicability of prevailing jurisprudence, we turn our attention to the provisions of Section VI of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38. We disagree with the Ombudsman’s interpretation that “[a]s long as the breach of conduct was committed while the public official or employee was still in the service x x x a public servant’s resignation is not a bar to his administrative investigation, prosecution and adjudication.”[45] If we agree with this interpretation, any official – even if he has been separated from the service for a long time – may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad infinitum. We believe that this interpretation is inconsistent with the principal motivation of the law – which is to improve public service and to preserve the public’s faith and confidence in the government, and not the punishment of the public official concerned.[46] Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available to redress the same.

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