Atty. Myrna Mercader's performance report as immediate past president of BF Resort Village Homeowners Assn Inc. (BFRVHAI)

BF RESORT VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

BF Resort Clubhouse, Benet Street, BF Resort Village

Talon Dos, Las Pinas City

June 30, 2011

For: 
All BFRV Homeowners                                                         

From: 
ATTY. MYRNA C. MERCADER

Immediate Past President (2010-2011)

Subject:          
Report of Achievements of the Board of Directors under the Immediate Past Presidency of Atty. Myrna C. Mercader  for the Period July 1, 2010 to June 15, 2011

Hereunder are some of the major tasks and projects that the Board of Directors of the BF Resort Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFRVHAI) achieved under my Presidency as of this writing.  This list is not complete due to lack of space.

The achievements listed hereinbelow may be summarized, thus: 

Growth of the cash holdings of BFRVHAI from over Php800 thousand  as of July 1, 2010 to P10.5 million as of May 31, 2011; improved services to the homeowners/lessees; strengthened internal control system (especially those that involve cash handling and safekeeping); improved accounting and record-keeping system;  upkeep and maintenance of the clubhouse and its premises as well as the village premises; improved security services; others.

A.  On Financial Resources:

1. Build-up of cash from barely Php800 Thousand in July 2010 to Php10.5 million as of May 31,

    2011, with all payables updated except Meralco bills on account of the pending Meralco

    posts rationalization;

2.  Set up of separate accounts for the different bond liabilities;

3.  Spread cash holdings to different depository banks to be within the Php500k PDIC insurance

     coverage.

B.  On Strengthened Internal Control System:

1. Hired the Finance Officer of the Association (vacant for long time)

2. Hired the Bookkeeper of the Association (vacant for long time)

3. Strengthened  internal control measures on and including:

·         Cash holdings and accountabilities

·         Collections from the swimming pools

·         Collections from the gates (controls)

·         Regular and unannounced cash counts of

·         cash holdings of cash custodians

·         Keeping of all cash on hand inside the cash vault

·         Property custodianship

·         Regular financial reporting

·         Regular and up-to-date keeping of the books of accounts

·         Updated registration of the books of accounts and official receipts with BIR

·         Custodianship and safekeeping of accountable forms and documents put under the custodianship of the Finance Officer to safeguard the same

·         Financial reports and documents put and kept under the custodianship of the Finance Officer for their safekeeping

·         Purchase of a filing cabinet with built-in-vault to safeguard daily cash holdings

·         Careful and objective review of all contracts for the BFRVHAI.

C.  On Association Rules and Regulations as well as Operating Policies

1. Approved rules and regulations as well as operating policies designed to protect the

    Association and to safeguard its assets.

D.  On Personnel Concerns:

1. Sponsored certain  personnel benefits to improve the general welfare of the employees;

2. Introduced the merit and award system

3. Introduced  the Performance Rating System

4. Conducted monthly personnel meetings

5. Fostered camaraderie among the employees

6. Instilled discipline among the employees

7. Updated personnel records and contributions to the various government agencies

     concerned:  SSS, Phil Health, BIR, etc.

E.  On Clubhouse  Maintenance

1. Renovated and repainted the clubhouse

2. Cleaned the clubhouse social hall and offices

3. Repaired, cleaned, and maintained the swimming pools and their premises

4. Scrubbed, repainted and cleaned the shower and dressing rooms as well as comfort rooms

5. Cleaned of the clubhouse premises (front, side, and back)

6. Rehabilitated, lighted up, and landscaped the jogging lane, including the benches

7. Trimmed and maintained the trees within the clubhouse premises

8. Kept the clubhouse and its premises well lighted

9. Landscaped the clubhouse and jogging lane premises

10. Removed and cleaned up the rotten buildings within the clubhouse premises

F.   On Guard Houses/Gates/Entrances

1. Repainted the guardhouses  and Control Office

2. Repaired and repainted gates

3. Lighted and cleaned the  guardhouses

4. Installed, repaired and maintained the guardhouse booms.

G.  On Village Maintenance

1. Revived the lighting along JB Tan corner Capitoline, that remained dark for years

2. Grass cut and mopped up vacant lots

3. Declogged and maintained drainage system

4. Trimmed and maintained trees

5. Constructed, repaired, and repainted humps

6. Maintained the non-friendship (secondary) streets

7. Coordinated with the City Hall on the repair of friendship roads

H.  On the Waste Management System (WMS)

1. Developed and operationalized the WMS, where junk collectors in uniform were accredited  

     and who sold their kalakals to the Association.  On the same day, the same kalakals are sold

     to the accredited junk shop operators.  WMS reduced the problem of scavenging that posed

     as risks to the security of the homeowners, while earning respectable profits out of the WMS

     operations.  With a start up capital of over P80,000.00, the fund is now about P600,000.00.

I.  On the Improvement of Security Services

1. Monitored daily the gating services of the security guards

2. Monitored daily the roving services of the security guards

3. Reviewed the daily security reports

4. Recommended remedial/corrected measures on security problems that

    were identified

J.  On Installation of the BFRVHAI Official Bulletin Board

1. The official BFRVHAI bulletin board was put up, where all notices, periodic reports, and other

     announcement as wells as new and developments are posted.

K.  On Maintenance and Purchase of Transportation Equipment

1.Maintained  the dump truck, old L300, Suzuki, and other transportation equipment of the   

    Association.

2.Purchased  a new L300 van.

3.Construction of Garage to house and protect the  BFRVHAI vehicles

L. On the Display of Pictures of Past Presidents and Current Officers and Directors of the  

    Association

1. The pictures of past presidents and those of the present officers and directors of the  

    Association are now on display at the social hall of the Clubhouse to orient the homeowners  

    of their identities.

M.  On Mediation of Complaints of Affected Homeowners

1. Resolved, mediated, and/or acted upon complaints of affected homeowners.

N.  On the Humanitarian and Social Aspects

1. Approved the Damayan Program for homeowners

2. Approved the Damayan Program for employees

3. Approved the Damayan Program for past and present directors

4. Conducted outreach programs for the less privileged

5. Visited and condoned with the bereaved families of employees and 

     homeowners who passed away

6. Attended to the problems of members brought to the attention of the

     Association, thru the President

7. Restored the flag raising ceremonies every Monday

O. On Meralco Posts Inside BF Resort Village:

1. Caused the joint inventory with Meralco of Meralco Posts within the  

     BF Resort Village;

2. Caused the Sectoralization of Meralco posts within the BF Resort Village

           

P.  On Participation and Cooperation in re: Church Activities

1. The Association, its Directors, Officers, and employees participated and cooperated                 

    with the various activities of the Mary Mother of the Church on a year-round basis.

Q.  On Sectoral Outreach Programs

1. The Directors, Officers, and employees of the Association assisted the different     

     sectors in their respective needs ranging from security, maintenance, sports, and    

      other needs.

2.  Held sectoral meetings (all sectors and  individual sectors) to reach out to and    

      report the latest developments to them.

R.  On Water Supply

1.  Continued the legal battle with BF Homes and Philippine Waterworks Construction   

     Corporation before the (on a pro bono basis):

            66.1.  National Water Resources Board (NWRB);

            66.2. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB);

            66.3. Court of Appeals (CA);

            66.4.  Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Branch 255.

2.  Negotiated with the following agencies for the entry into the BF Resort Village

     of Maynilad:

              
2.1.  Maynilad;          
2.2.  BF Homes;      
2.3.  Office of the Mayor, Las Pinas City

           

S.  On Coordination with the Barangay Talon Dos

1. Coordinated very well with the Barangay Talon dos on the various activities relative to the

    maintenance of the premises of the village, maintenance of peace and order; and on the  

    settlement of homeowners disputes.

T.  On Coordination with the City of Las Pinas

1. Coordinated with the Office of the Mayor and the other offices of Las Pinas City for the

     delivery of basic services to the homeowners.

U.  On Various Programs Undertaken

1.  Christmas Bazaar to raise the 13^th month fund for employees

2.  Summer Bazaar

Las Pinas City, June 30, 2011.

ATTY. MYRNA C. MERCADER

Immediate Past President

Copy Furnished:

                                   

Hon. Vergel “Nene” Aguilar               Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)

Mayor, Las Pinas City                         NCRFO

                                                            Quezon City

                                                            (by registered mail with return card)

Hon. Luis Bustamante                         Hon. Danny Hernandez

Vice Mayor                                         Councilor

Las Pinas City                                      Las Pinas City 

Hon. Ruben Sanchez

Chairman, Brgy Talon Dos

Las Pinas City

May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Labor Law and Procedure « LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Labor Law and Procedure « LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Labor Law and Procedure

June 21, 2011 Leslie C. Dy

Here are selected May 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on labor law and procedure:

Section 10, Republic Act No. 8042; unconstitutional. Petitioner Yap was employed as an electrician for respondent’s vessel under a 12-month contract. He was found to be illegally terminated with nine months remaining on his contract term. The Court of Appeals (CA) awarded petitioner salaries for three months as provided under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the CA and declared that petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the full unexpired portion of his contract. The Court has previously declared in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. (2009) that the clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. The subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. Moreover, the subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; hence, the same violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also his right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Claudio S. Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011

Doctrine of Operative Fact; applied as a matter of equity and fair play. Petitioner Yap was employed on respondent’s vessel under a 12-month contract. Upon finding that he was illegally terminated, the Court of Appeals (CA) awarded petitioner salaries for three months as provided under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042). While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Section 10 of RA 8042 was declared unconstitutional. In deciding to award petitioner his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his contract, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the operative fact doctrine. As an exception to the general rule, the doctrine applies only as a matter of equity and fair play. It recognizes that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. This case should not be included in the aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law. Claudio S. Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011.

Migrant workers; computation of salary award. Petitioner Yap was employed as an electrician for respondent’s vessel under a 12-month contract. He was found to be illegally terminated with nine months remaining on his contract term, and was declared to be entitled to his salaries for the balance of his contract. Respondents claim that the tanker allowance should be excluded from the definition of the term “salary.” The Supreme Court, after examining the relevant clauses of the contract, rejected respondent’s claim. The word salaries in Section 10 (5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses. A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner. If respondents intended it differently, the contract per se should have indicated that said allowance does not form part of the basic salary or, simply, the contract should have separated it from the basic salary clause. Claudio S. Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011.

Termination for Just Cause; separation pay by way of financial assistance. Petitioner Juliet Apacible was employed as Assistant Area Sales Manager for respondent’s Cebu operations. She was informed that she would be transferred to the Pasig office on account of the ongoing reorganization. Petitioner’s repeated refusal to comply with the transfer order was treated by respondent as insubordination and grounds for her dismissal. The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals all found that petitioner was justly dismissed from employment. The NLRC awarded separation pay as financial assistance, however, noting that petitioner’s obstinacy was upon the advice of her counsel and, therefore, there was a modicum of good faith on her part. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) deleted the award of separation pay. The Supreme Court upheld the CA and declared that the award of financial assistance shall not be given to validly terminated employees, whose offenses are iniquitous or reflective of some depravity in their moral character. When the employee commits an act of dishonesty, depravity, or iniquity, the grant of financial assistance is misplaced compassion. In this case, petitioner’s adamant refusal to transfer, coupled with her failure to heed the order for her to return the company vehicle assigned to her and, more importantly, allowing her counsel to write letters couched in harsh language to her superiors unquestionably show that she was guilty of insubordination, hence, not entitled to the award of separation pay. Juliet G. Apacible vs. Multimed Industries, et al., G.R. No. 178903, May 30, 2011.

Appeal; posting of Appeal Bond; Government’s exemption from the same. Respondents are supervisory and rank and file employees of the DXWG-Iligan City radio station which is owned by petitioner Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and reimbursement of unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) benefits against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner BBC to pay the money claims. On appeal to the NLRC, petitioner BBC averred that since it is wholly owned by the Republic of the Philippines, it need not post an appeal bond. The NLRC dismissed the appeal of BBC for non-perfection. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC. The Supreme Court, in sustaining the CA, held that as a general rule, the government and all the attached agencies with no legal personality distinct from the former are exempt from posting appeal bonds. The rationale is to protect the presumptive judgment creditor against the insolvency of the presumptive judgment debtor. When the State litigates, it is not required to put up an appeal bond because it is presumed to be always solvent. This exemption, however, does not, as a general rule, apply to government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) for the reason that the latter has a personality distinct from its shareholders. In this case, BBC, though owned by the government, is a corporation with a personality distinct from the Republic or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and therefore do not partake in the latter’s exemption from the posting of appeal bonds. Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation vs. Cayetano PACANa III, et al, G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011.

Appeal; posting of appeal bond within the 10-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and reimbursement of unpaid Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) benefits against petitioner. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of respondents and ordered petitioner BBC to pay the money claims. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC, and without posting the appeal bond, filed a Motion for the Re-computation of the Monetary Award in order that the appeal bond may be reduced. The NLRC denied the motion and dismissed the appeal of BBC for non-perfection. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court both sustained the dismissal by the NLRC. The Motion for the Re-computation of the Monetary Award filed by BBC was tantamount to a motion for extension to perfect the appeal, which is prohibited by the rules. The payment of the appeal bond within the period provided by law is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and not a mere technicality of law or procedure. Hence, the failure on the part of BBC to perfect the appeal had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. Banahaw Broadcasting Corporation vs. Cayetano PACANa III, et al, G.R. No. 171673, May 30, 2011.

Voluntary Resignation; financial assistance may be awarded on equity considerations. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent. Finding instead that petitioner had voluntarily resigned, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint against respondent, but ordered the latter to pay P18,000.00 by way of financial assistance. On appeal, the NLRC found petitioner to be illegally dismissed. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the findings of the LA but deleted the award of financial assistance, ruling that the same may not be awarded in cases of voluntary resignation. The Supreme Court, in upholding the award of financial assistance, stated that while the rule is that financial assistance is allowed only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character, there are instances when financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice and as an equitable concession. In this case, petitioner, who has served respondent for more than eight years without committing any infraction, may be granted such financial assistance on equity considerations. Rodolfo Luna vs. Allado Construction Company, Inc. and/or Ramon Allado, G.R. No. 175251, May 30, 2011.

National Labor Relations Commission; authority to review is limited to issues specifically brought before it on appeal. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent. Finding that petitioner had voluntarily resigned, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint against respondent, but ordered the latter to pay P18,000.00 by way of financial assistance. Respondents interposed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), purely for the purpose of questioning the validity of the grant of financial assistance made by the Labor Arbiter. Instead, the NLRC ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed and was entitled to separation pay. The Court of Appeals (CA) held that it was grave abuse of discretion for the NLRC to rule on the issue of illegal dismissal when the only issue raised to it on appeal was the propriety of the award of financial assistance. The Supreme Court sustained the view of the CA, reasoning that Section 4(d), Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC expressly provides that, on appeal, the NLRC shall limit itself only to the specific issues that were elevated for review. In the case at bar, the NLRC evidently went against its own rules of procedure when it passed upon the issue of illegal dismissal although this question was not raised by respondents in their appeal. Rodolfo Luna vs. Allado Construction Company, Inc. and/or Ramon Allado, G.R. No. 175251, May 30, 2011.

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May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics « LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics « LEXOTERICA: A PHILIPPINE BLAWG

May 2011 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Legal and Judicial Ethics

June 22, 2011 Ramon G. Songco

Here are selected May 2011 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on legal and judicial ethics:

Court personnel; misconduct. A complaint for Grave Misconduct was filed by Judge Tan against Quitorio, then an RTC Legal Researcher, for allegedly drafting a resolution of a motion to dismiss in a case which was not assigned to him and for thereafter informing one of the parties in that case that he had already submitted the draft to Judge Tan and that the said party should follow it up with the judge. Misconduct has been defined as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. The Court finds itself hardly convinced that Quitorio prepared the draft resolution of the motion knowing that the case was not assigned to him in the absence of clear evidence of that fact. However, Quitorio’s admission that he informed a party about the submission of his draft resolution to Judge Tan, and advised said party to follow it up with Judge Tan in her sala, is violative of the confidentiality required of court personnel and constitutes simple misconduct. A court personnel is prohibited from disclosing confidential information to any unauthorized person. Tan v. Quitorio, A.M. No. P-11-2919. May 30, 2011.

Court personnel; grave misconduct. A security guard employed by the Supreme Court was charged administratively for the theft of used galvinized iron sheets in the SC Compound in Baguio City. There is reasonable ground to believe that Tugas is indeed responsible for the taking of the GI sheets. It is hard to believe that Tugas, being the back post guard at the time, did not hear the rattling and clanging sound of GI sheets being moved and dropped below the perimeter fence. Tugas’ attire at the night of the incident matched that of the culprit as described by the boarder. Misconduct has been defined as “a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.” The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, all of which must be established by substantial evidence, and must necessarily be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Furthermore, misconduct warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to misadministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office. Security guards, by the very nature of their work, are mandated to secure the court premises and protect its property from pilferage. Tugas is bound to safeguard the court premises and its properties. Tugas very clearly violated his duty by taking the GI sheets with the intention to use it for personal house repairs. He unlawfully used his position to procure benefit for himself, blatantly contrary to his duty. With the element of corruption accompanying his unlawful behaviour, Tugas is guilty of grave misconduct. Re: Theft of the Used Galvinized Iron Sheets in the SC Compound, Baguio, A.M. No. 2008-15-SC. May 31, 2011.

Question of law vs.question of fact; alienable/disposable land of public domain (proof of).

G. R. No. 177790

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - CARLOS R. VEGA, MARCOS R. VEGA, ROGELIO R. VEGA, LUBIN R. VEGA, HEIRS OF GLORIA R. VEGA, NAMELY: FRACISCO L. YAP, MA. WINONA Y. RODRIGUEZ, MA. WENDELYN V. YAP and FRANCISCO V. YAP, JR., Respondents, ROMEA G. BUHAY-OCAMPO, FRANCISCO G. BUHAY, ARCELI G. BUHAY-RODRIGUEZ, ORLANDO G. BUHAY, SOLEDAD G. BUHAY-VASQUEZ, LOIDA G. BUHAY-SENADOSA, FLORENDO G. BUHAY, OSCAR G. BUHAY, ERLYN BUHAY-GINORGA, EVELYN BUHAY-GRANETA, and EMILIE BUHAY-DALLAS, Respondents-Intervenors.

G. R. No. 177790 Present: MORALES, J., BRION, BERSAMIN, VILLARAMA, SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: January 17, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, J.:

x x x.

The Court is not persuaded by respondents’ arguments concerning the purported defects of the Petition.

First, petitioner Republic’s failure to attach a copy of respondents Vegas’ Appellee’s Brief to the instant Petition is not a fatal mistake, which merits the immediate dismissal of a Rule 45 Petition. The requirement that a petition for review on certiorari should be accompanied by “such material portions of the record as would support the petition” is left to the discretion of the party filing the petition.[8] Except for the duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment sought to be appealed from,[9] there are no other records from the court a quo that must perforce be attached before the Court can take cognizance of a Rule 45 petition.

Respondents cannot fault petitioner Republic for excluding pleadings, documents or records in the lower court, which to their mind would assist this Court in deciding whether the Decision appealed from is sound. Petitioner Republic is left to its own estimation of the case in deciding which records would support its Petition and should thus be attached thereto. In any event, respondents are not prevented from attaching to their pleadings pertinent portions of the records that they deem necessary for the Court’s evaluation of the case, as was done by respondents Vegas in this case when they attached their Appellee’s Brief to their Comment. In the end, it is the Court, in finally resolving the merits of the suit that will ultimately decide whether the material portions of the records attached are sufficient to support the Petition.

Second, the Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes issue against the conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of land, based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the decisions made by a lower court based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.

In New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.) Inc. v. Fermina S. Abad and Rafael Susan,[10] the Court reiterated the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact in this wise:

We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the evidence presented, specifically the testimony of Mr. Gonzales. It, however, questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court’s conclusion that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas in the proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in their findings on the nature and character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts.

Going now to the substantial merits, petitioner Republic places before the Court the question of whether, based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and disposable. Was it erroneous for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the trial court’s grant of registration applied for by respondents Vegas over the subject land? We find no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the Court of Appeals.

Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides for the instances when a person may file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land:

Section 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x.

Thus, pursuant to the afore-quoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove the following: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.[11] Section 14 (1) of the law requires that the property sought to be registered is already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed.[12]

Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas’ open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and disposable.

Unless a land is reclassified and declared alienable and disposable, occupation of the same in the concept of an owner - no matter how long -cannot ripen into ownership and result in a title; public lands not shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable lands remain part of the inalienable domain and cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.[13]

Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed; they call for proof.[14] To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as any of the following: a presidential proclamation or an executive order; other administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator; or a legislative act or statute.[15] The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable.[16]

Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable and disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.[17]

However, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,[18] the Supreme Court overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and ruled that a CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, as it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that the land indeed is alienable and disposable.[19]

To comply with the first requisite for an application for original registration of title under the Property Registration Decree, respondents Vegas should have submitted a CENRO certification and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary that the land is alienable and disposable, together with their application. However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, respondents Vegas failed to submit a CENRO certification -- much less an original classification by the DENR Secretary -- to prove that the land is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[20] If the stringent rule imposed in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., is to be followed, the absence of these twin certifications justifies a denial of an application for registration. Significantly, however, the Court’s pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., was issued after the decisions of the trial court[21] and the appellate court[22] in this case.

Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano,[23] the Court affirmed the findings of the trial and the appellate courts that the parcel of land subject of registration was alienable and disposable. The Court held that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification, which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement:

While Cayetano failed to submit any certification which would formally attest to the alienable and disposable character of the land applied for, the Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director Celso V. Loriega, Jr., as annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence by Paulita, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement. It clearly indicates that Lot 249 had been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925.

The DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the contrary. It bears noting that no opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration Authority or the DENR to contest respondents' applications on the ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor of respondents. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and a certified true copy of the DENR’s original classification of the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR on the ground of substantial compliance.

Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the evidence on record.

First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the CENRO who testified that the subject land is alienable and disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection of the subject land.

In the Report,[24] Mr. Gonzales attested under oath that (1) the “area is entirely within the alienable and disposable zone” as classified under Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on 31 December 1925;[25] (2) the land has never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes; (3) the land is not within a previously patented/decreed/titled property;[26] (4) there are no public land application/s filed by the applicant for the same land;[27] and (5) the land is residential/commercial.[28] That Mr. Gonzales appeared and testified before an open court only added to the reliability of the Report, which classified the subject land as alienable and disposable public land. The Court affirms the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Mr. Gonzales’ testimony and written report under oath constituted substantial evidence to support their claim as to the nature of the subject land.

Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as evidence by respondents-intervenors Buhays,[29] expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable. Similar to Republic v. Serrano, Mr. Samson G. de Leon, the officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional Executive Director for Operations of the DENR, approved the said subdivision plan, which was annotated with the following proviso: “[T]his survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 15, L.C. Map No. 582, certified on Dec. 31, 1925.” Notably, Mr. De Leon’s annotation pertaining to the identification of the land as alienable and disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales.

Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas’ application for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable. In the Supplementary Report submitted during the trial court proceedings,[30] the LRA did not interpose any objection to the application on the basis of the nature of the land. It simply noted that the subject subdivision plan (Psu-51460) had also been applied for in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505, but that there was no decree of registration issued therefor. Thus, the LRA recommended that “should the instant case be given due course, the application in Case No. 1469, GLRO Record No. 32505 with respect to plan Psu-51460 be dismissed.” In addition, not only did the government fail to cross-examine Mr. Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing evidence to support its opposition. In contrast to the other cases brought before this Court,[31] no opposition was raised by any interested government body, aside from the pro forma opposition filed by the OSG.

The onus in proving that the land is alienable and disposable still remains with the applicant in an original registration proceeding; and the government, in opposing the purported nature of the land, need not adduce evidence to prove otherwise.[32] In this case though, there was no effective opposition, except the pro forma opposition of the OSG, to contradict the applicant’s claim as to the character of the public land as alienable and disposable. The absence of any effective opposition from the government, when coupled with respondents’ other pieces of evidence on record persuades this Court to rule in favor of respondents.

In the instant Petition, petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gonzales to testify as to when the land was declared as alienable and disposable. Indeed, his testimony in open court is bereft of any detail as to when the land was classified as alienable and disposable public land, as well as the date when he conducted the investigation. However, these matters could have been dealt with extensively during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic waived because of its repeated absences and failure to present counter evidence.[33] In any event, the Report, as well as the Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subject land was certified as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was even classified as residential and commercial in nature.

Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents Vegas, coupled with the absence of any countervailing evidence by petitioner Republic, substantially establishes that the land applied for is alienable and disposable and is the subject of original registration proceedings under the Property Registration Decree. There was no reversible error on the part of either the trial court or the appellate court in granting the registration.

Respondents-intervenors Buhays’ title to that portion of the subject land is likewise affirmed, considering that the joint claim of respondents-intervenors Buhays over the land draws its life from the same title of respondents Vegas, who in turn failed to effectively oppose the claimed sale of that portion of the land to the former’s predecessors-in-interest.

It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It does not in any way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals were rendered prior to these rulings.[34] To establish that the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all applications for original registration under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.

As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of substantial compliance showing that there has been a positive act of government to show the nature and character of the land and an absence of effective opposition from the government. This exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future applications.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial court’s Decision dated 18 November 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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[1] Rollo at 28-40.

[2] TSN, 24 July 2000, at 5-6.

[3] Exhibit “CC” (Report dated 13 January 1997), Regional Trial Court records at 125.

[4] Motion for Intervention dated 14 August 1998 and Opposition dated 14 April 1998 (Exhibits “7” and “8”), Regional Trial Court records, at 158-170.

[5] Exhibit “1,” Regional Trial Court records, at 167-168.

[6] Exhibit “5,” Regional Trial Court records, at 418.

[7] Comment dated 03 September 2007, rollo at 44-55.

[8] Rule 45, Sec. 4 (d) of the Rules of Court.

[9] “The petition shall … (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would support the petition; …” (Rule 45, Sec. 1 [d] of the Rules of Court)

[10] G.R. No. 161818, 20 August 2008, 562 SCRA 503.

[11] Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172102, 02 July 2010; Lim v. Republic, G.R. Nos. 158630 & 162047, 04 September 2009, 598 SCRA 247; Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, 23 December 2008, 575 SCRA 51; Llanes v. Republic, G.R. No. 177947, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 258; Republic v. Diloy, G.R. No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413; Ong v. Republic, G.R. No. 175746, 12 March 2008, 548 SCRA 160; Republic v. Lao, G.R. No. 150413, 01 July 2003, 405 SCRA 291.

[12] Republic v. Diloy, G.R. No. 174633, 26 August 2008, 563 SCRA 413; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442.

[13] Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, G.R. No. 159589, 23 December 2008, 575 SCRA 51; Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, G.R. Nos. 167707 & 173775, 08 October, 2008, 568 SCRA 164.

[14] Republic v. Naguiat, G.R. No. 134209, 24 January 2006, 479 SCRA 585, citing Director of Lands v. Funtilar, 142 SCRA 57 (1986).

[15] Republic v. Candymaker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, 22 June 2006, 492 SCRA 272, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 697, 710-711 (2002); Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, 04 December 2008, 573 SCRA 89; Buenaventura v. Pascual, G.R. No. 168819, 27 November 2008, 572 SCRA 143; Republic v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 151910, 15 October 2007, 536 SCRA 108.

[16] Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 91; Zarate v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 131501, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 322.

[17] Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, 04 December 2008, 573 SCRA 89; Spouses Recto v. Republic, G.R. No. 160421, 04 October 2004, 440 SCRA 79.

[18] G.R. No. 154953, 26 June 2008, 555 SCRA 477.

[19] See Republic v. Heirs of Fabio, supra note 11; Republic v. Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172102, 02 July 2010; Republic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010.

[20] CA Decision, at 12; rollo at 39.

[21] RTC Decision dated 18 November 2003.

[22] CA Decision dated 30 April 2007; rollo at 28-40.

[23] G.R. No. 183063, 24 February 2010.

[24] Exhibit “CC,” Regional Trial Court records, at 125.

[25] Exhibit “CC-1,” id.

[26] Exhibit “CC-2,” id.

[27] Exhibit “CC-3,” id.

[28] Exhibit “CC-4,” id.

[29] Exhibit “5,” Regional Trial Court records at 418.

[30] Exhibit “AA,” Regional Trial Court records at 107-108.

[31] In Republic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010, the Laguna Lake Development Authority also opposed Roche's application on the ground that, based on technical descriptions, her land was located below the reglamentary lake elevation of 12.50 meters and, therefore, may be deemed part of the Laguna Lake bed under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 4850. In Republic v. Hanover, supra note 19, the Republic was represented by the OSG and the DENR in opposing the application for registration.

[32] Republic v. Roche, G.R. No. 175846, 06 July 2010.

[33] Decision dated 18 November 2003, Regional Trial Court records at 442-443.

[34] As earlier stated, the RTC and CA Rulings were promulgated before Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.