We have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

 "Petitioners also claim that they are protected by law considering that they were buyers in good faith.

Again, this assertion is without basis considering that Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140), from where petitioners'TCT No. 2574 was derived, is void. The only way by which Mora could have acquired ownership over the subject parcels of land and validly transfer that ownership to the petitioners was for Mora to apply for their registration in his own name.

What makes petitioners' cause doubly undeserving of merit is the finding of the two courts below that the land subject matter of this case is part timberland,7 a finding not even once disputed by petitioners. It is, thus, safe to conclude that the land subject of TCT No. 2574 could not have been registered in the name of petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest for the simple reason that under the Constitution, timberlands, which are part of the public domain, cannot be alienated.8 A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found.9 Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands. And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.10 chanrobles virtual law library

All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the assailed decision of the CA, affirming that of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs."

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 149122 : July 27, 2007]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZA, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

https://chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/jul2007/gr_149122_2007.php

 

No court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) over the land which has never been originally registered.

"We DENY.

Petitioners maintain that under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), Mora's reconstituted TCT No. RT-40 (140) is already indefeasible the same having attained finality one (1) year after the CA granted its reconstitution in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Citing the second paragraph of Section 31 of P.D. No. 15294 which reads:

The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same being included in the general description "to all whom it may concern",

petitioners contend that the two courts below were without authority to annul TCT No. 2574 issued in the name of Gregorio Venturanza.

Petitioners are wrong. Clearly, the provisions relied upon refer to original decrees of registration and not to orders of reconstitution. As it is, petitioners cannot even seek refuge in the Land Registration Act because the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been brought within the operation of said law. As correctly pointed out by the CA to which we are in full accord:

xxx the Land Registration Act is not applicable considering that the land covered by TCT No. 2574 had never been within the operation of the Land Registration Act because of the irregularities attending the issuance of the reconstituted title. As found by the trial court:

TCT No. RT-40 (140) supposedly reconstituted from TCT no. 140 in the name of Florencio Mora consists of 2,394 hectares supposedly situated in Buhi, Camarines Sur. It appears from the survey plan that the land was surveyed only in 11 days, which according to Engr. Antonio Rodriguez was quite impossible considering the rugged terrain and the mountainous features of the area. Moreover, it covers timberland.

Significantly, from the exhibits presented by the plaintiff it can be seen that the resurvey plan (Exh. A) shows that the survey of Lot Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was based on TCT No. 140 and it covered an area of 23,944,635 square meters and appeared to have been surveyed on January 20, to January 31, 1953 or a period of 11 days. Exh. "B" shows that the area supposedly covered by TCT 2574 is within the timberland, Project 12, Block B, L.C. 646 and Project 19, Block ALC 761, Exh. "C", the official map of Legaspi City shows that the land covered by TCT 140, which was issued on the basis of the resurvey (Exh. "A") is a land situated in Tigaon, Camarines Sur, while the land covered by TCT No. 40 (140) is a vast tract of land in Buhi, Camarines Sur; that it further appears that the lots covered by TCT No. 40 (140) were supposedly registered in GRLO Sp. Proceedings No. 112 with an area of 23,944,635 square meters but records of the LRC revealed that GRLO records No. 112 refers to a land registration case in Iloilo, and not in Camarines Sur. Exh "D" also shows that Mr. Florencio Mora had never applied for original registration of title covering a land in the municipality of Buhi, Camarines Sur, and that plan RS-383-D (without the suffix capital letter D) involving Lots 1 and 2 situated in the Municipality of Calawag, Quezon, was the subject of Land Registration Case No. 322, GRLO Record No. 13804 with Maximina Zepeda as applicant.

The stench of anomaly became at once pervading when we consider the evidence submitted by the plaintiff. The land practically covers the Municipality of Buhi and are being claimed and possessed by claimants, who appeared as intervenors in this case. The Venturanzas never materially and physically occupied the property because there are actual occupants and possessors. The Venturanzas only asserted ownership over the property in papers but not in physical possession.5

As a necessary consequence, no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) over the land which has never been originally registered. As aptly pointed out by the trial court:

The evidence shows that TCT No. 2574, the title in question, derived its existence from RT-40 (140) in the name of Florencio Mora which was a reconstituted title based on TCT No. 140 allegedly obtained by Florencio Mora during the Japanese occupation. The records of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur, however, do not show how the land covered by TCT No. 140 supposedly in the name of Florencio Mora was registered. Neither is there a decree number, when said decree was entered, the OCT number or LRC Record Number.6

Corollarily, petitioners' argument that the Republic's action for the cancellation of TCT No. 2574 and the reversion of the land covered thereby to the State is barred by the decision of the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R has no leg to stand on.

Aside from the fact that no court could have ever acquired jurisdiction to order the reconstitution of Mora's title over the property which has never been originally registered, the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R did not operate as res judicata which would bar the Republic's action because there was no identity of cause of action between CA-G.R. No. 20681-R and the instant case.

The issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R was whether or not Mora's evidence in Special Proceedings No. 674 and the procedures adopted by him for the reconstitution of certificate of title alleged to have been lost or destroyed were in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 26. The questions of ownership and whether or not the property or portion thereof was registrable, being a timberland, were never put at issue in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R. Neither the non-existence of the original title from which Mora's TCT No. RT-40 (140) and petitioners' TCT No. 2574 were derived, nor the non-registrability of the timberland included in the area in question which constitute Republic's cause of action against the  herein petitioners, were ever raised, much less, decided by the CA in CA-G.R. No. 20681-R."

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 149122 : July 27, 2007]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO AND MARY VENTURANZA, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

https://chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2007/jul2007/gr_149122_2007.php

Duties of lawyers as officers of the courts: "Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. They advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law."

 "As can be gleaned from the above excerpts, however, and as duly pointed out by Atty. Tadena, Afable made no declaration as to the alleged intimidation and participation of Atty. Tadena in the forceful opening of the condominium unit. In fact, nowhere in the aforequoted police reports, made on two (2) separate days, was Atty. Tadena's name even stated. In both accounts, Afable merely identified Dr. Leo Ortega as the perpetrator of the break-in, with the help of his man." He even mentioned the names of Teddy, Sally Ortega, and Maribel, as those who accompanied Dr. Leo Ortega inside the subject premises. But again, he made no statement as to the participation, if any, of Atty. Tadena therein. As such, the Court finds it rather difficult to reasonably admit as true Afable's allegations in his affidavit on Atty. Tadena's alleged indiscretions of threats and breaking into private property. If, indeed, Atty. Tadena scolded Afable and forcefully opened Zenaida's unit, he should have, at least, mentioned her name in the police reports he made on two separate days - on the day of the alleged incident on December 7, 2011 and on the day Zenaida arrived from Davao City on December 21, 2011 - and not merely on the Affidavit19 he executed on January 25, 2012, almost two (2) months after the event.

Thus, while we have, in the past, suspended lawyers who wrongfully asserted their clients' rights outside the bounds of the law,20 we cannot do so if the allegations against them are not satisfactorily proven by the complainants. Time and again, the Court has ruled that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence21 or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.22 In the present case, it cannot be denied that complainant Zenaida failed to discharge that burden. As previously discussed, her bodyguard and witness curiously failed to declare Atty. Tadena's alleged misconduct in his police reports. Neither did he explain the reason for his omission. Apart from this, what cast more doubt on Zenaida's claims are the photographs she presented, supposedly showing Atty. Tadena in the act of breaking into her condominium unit.23 But these photographs are, at best, mere abstract illustrations that are extremely blurred. There is, therefore, an undeniable uncertainty surrounding the issues of whether Atty. Tadena, indeed, threatened Zenaida's bodyguard and whether she actually participated in the forceful opening of the subject condominium unit.

The Court is, however, one with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Tadena must, nonetheless, be admonished with warning that a repetition of the same acts will be dealt with more severely. What have been established by the records are the facts that Leonardo has been living separately from Zenaida since January 2011 and that he has, in fact, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in November 2011. These show that the parties have already submitted to the jurisdiction of the court where the petition was pending. Verily, said court had jurisdiction to consider and rule upon the property relations of the spouses which necessarily include the subject condominium unit. All questions, therefore, pertaining to the administration, possession, and ownership thereof had to be addressed before said court by way of filing a pleading and/or arguing before the judge and certainly not before the building administrator, police officer, or personal bodyguard in a condominium lobby. Accordingly, while it cannot be ruled with certainty that Atty. Tadena truly engaged in threats, intimidation, and the forcible entry into the subject property, the Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner when he held that at the very least, Atty. Tadena could have advised her client to file and make the proper representation before the court, instead of surreptitiously entering the premises.24

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. They advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.25

In response to the Show Cause Resolution,26 dated March 25, 2019, against Attys. Tadena, Reginaldo and Cariaga requiring them to explain why they should not be held administratively liable for an apparent collusion, Atty. Tadena reiterated that the charge of collusion, that is prohibited by law, must relate to the grounds of annulment that the parties agree to use in the petition for nullity of marriage. But the subject e-mail communication between her and the counsels involved cannot constitute collusion because it was merely about a split of legal expenses duly allowed under the law. Atty. Tadena went on to add that the annulment case they filed, which has now attained finality, was duly approved by the Public Prosecutor to have no collusion and had, subsequently, gone through the rigorous trial in the RTC of Pasay City. Hence, she insists that she cannot be held administratively liable for collusion.27 The same arguments were interposed by Atty. Reginaldo in his response,28 while Atty. Cariaga has yet to comply with the Show Cause Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 27, 2017. Thus, Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena is hereby ADMONISHED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or equivalent acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

Further, the Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to INITIATE administrative proceedings against Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena, Atty. Eric Reginaldo and Atty. Neil F. Cariaga for their apparent collusion in the filing of the petition for annulment of marriage of spouses Leonardo Ortega, Jr. and Zenaida Martin-Ortega.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this Decision to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED."

A.C. No. 12018 - ZENAIDA MARTIN-ORTEGA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ANGELYN A. TADENA, RESPONDENT.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

A.C. No. 12018, January 29, 2020

ZENAIDA MARTIN-ORTEGA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. ANGELYN A. TADENA, RESPONDENT.

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2020januarydecisions.php?id=19

Interests and attorney's fees

 "Aside from the principal amount of P248,449.63, petitioner also seeks recovery of interests thereon. As to computation of legal interest, the seminal ruling in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals49 controls, to wit:

x x x x

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.50

In the present case, respondent's obligation does not constitute a loan or forbearance of money. Hence, the principal amount owed to petitioner shall earn interest of 6% per annum to be computed from the time extrajudicial demand for payment was made on February 10, 199551 until finality of this decision. Thereafter, the amount due shall earn interest of 12% per annum computed from such finality until the same is fully paid.

The award of attorney's fees depends on the circumstances of each case and lies within the discretion of the court.52 They may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect its interest by reason of an unjustified act by the other party.53

In the instant case, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees. First, Article 2208 (2) of the Civil Code provides that attorney's fees may be recovered in cases where the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. Second, there is a stipulation in the subject invoices allowing petitioner to recover attorney's fees in case it is compelled to file an action to enforce collection. Third, Article 2208 (5) of the same Code provides that attorney's fees may also be recovered where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim. In the instant case, it is established that respondent's refusal to satisfy petitioner's claim is unreasonable and is, in fact, without basis which compelled petitioner to resort to the instant case to recover what is due it.

The subject invoices stipulate that in case of judicial proceedings to enforce collection, respondent shall pay petitioner an amount equivalent to not less than 20% of the amount due for and as attorney's fees, in addition to costs of suit. However, the Court finds that the rate of 20% is excessive. Accordingly, the award for attorney's fees is reduced to a more reasonable rate of 10% of the total amount due.54

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 24, 2003 and the Resolution of June 4, 2003 of the Court of Appeals as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 3, 1998 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner: (1) the amount of Two Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Four Hundred Forty-Nine Pesos and Sixty-Three Centavos (P248,449.63) plus legal interest of 6% per annum from February 10, 1995 until this Decision becomes final and executory; (2) the legal interest of 12% per annum on the total amount due from such finality until fully paid; (3) 10% of the total amount due as and by way of attorney's fees, and (4) the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."

ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_158621_2008.html

Payment: Burden of Evidence

 "The next question is: whether the evidence presented by respondent supported its claim of payment.

First, the Court does not agree with the finding of the CA that petitioner no longer questioned the ruling of the RTC regarding the probative value of the duplicate copies of the invoices presented in evidence by petitioner, more specifically the six invoices marked as Exhibits "A-2," "A-5," "A-30," "A-31," "A-32" and "A-33," the original copies of which were not produced by respondent as part of its evidence. A perusal of petitioner's appeal brief shows that petitioner specifically raised the issue of whether the RTC erred in failing to accord evidentiary weight to the invoices presented in evidence by petitioner.

Moreover, the RTC correctly admitted Exhibits "A" to "A-33" in its Order dated August 1, 1997.32 Contrary to the claim of respondent that these pieces of evidence presented by petitioner to prove respondent's indebtedness are mere duplicate copies, the same are considered as original copies because they are carbon copies of the invoices which are in the possession of respondent and they may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the other copies.33 Hence, they serve as sufficient proof of the indebtedness of respondent.

Respondent's main evidence consists of 28 original copies of invoices showing the transactions that it had with petitioner. Stamped on the face of each original invoice are the words "PAID" and "AUDITED," duly initialed.

Are these original invoices sufficient to prove payment or, at the least, do the same raise a disputable presumption that respondent had indeed discharged its obligations to petitioner? The Court rules in the negative.

An invoice or bill is a commercial document issued by a seller to the buyer indicating the products, quantities and agreed prices for product or services the seller has provided the buyer.34 An invoice indicates the buyer must pay the seller according to the payment terms.35 From the point of view of a seller, an invoice is a sales invoice.36 From the point of view of a buyer, an invoice is a purchase invoice.37 The document indicates the buyer and seller, but the term "invoice" indicates money is owed or owing.38 The context of the term "invoice" is usually used to clarify its meaning, such as "We sent them an invoice" (they owe us money) or "We received an invoice from them" (we owe them money).39

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila Mining Corporation,40 "sales or commercial invoice" is defined as a written account of goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices charged therefor or a list by whatever name it is known which is used in the ordinary course of business evidencing sale and transfer or agreement to sell or transfer goods and services. On the other hand, the same case defines "receipt" as a written acknowledgment of the fact of payment in money or other settlement between seller and buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or person rendering services, and client or customer.41

Black's Law Dictionary42 defines an invoice as an itemized list of goods or services furnished by a seller to a buyer, usually specifying the price and terms of a sale; a bill of costs.

From the foregoing definitions, an invoice, in and by itself, and as opposed to a receipt, may not be considered evidence of payment. In addition, it does not mean that possession by a debtor of an invoice raises the presumption that it has already paid its obligation. An invoice is simply a list sent to a purchaser, factor, consignee, etc., containing the items, together with the prices and charges, of merchandise sent or to be sent to him; a mere detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost or price of the things invoiced.43

A close examination of the invoices reveals that the words "PAID" and "AUDITED" were stamped on each of them. However, Adora, who is an employee of respondent in charge of all paid accounts, testified that the word "PAID" were stamped on the documents by the accounting department of respondent and not by the petitioner, and that the word "AUDITED" was stamped by respondent's auditor.44 This is not rebutted by respondent. Thus, the Court finds that the trial court committed a serious error in appreciating the evidence when it discredited petitioner’s claim that its purpose in sending the subject invoices to respondent was only to collect the latter's debt, not to evidence payment by the latter.

Furthermore, respondent's defense of payment is made more untenable by its failure to present any supporting evidence, such as official receipts or the testimony of its employee who actually paid or the one who had direct knowledge of the payment allegedly made in petitioner's favor, to prove that it had indeed paid its obligations to the latter. Respondent is a corporation engaged in the business of importation and local sale of duty-free sporting goods and similar products. It is presumed that it takes ordinary care of its concerns. In fact, as part of its evidence, respondent presented Official Receipt No. 5271545 for the amount of P4,472.00 which it paid as advance freight payment in favor of petitioner. Respondent also presented other copies of official receipts for payments it made to another company, PAC-Atlantic Lines (Philippines) Inc. for the amounts of P10,152.12 and P21,144.92, respectively.46 On this basis, it is difficult to see why respondent did not present any receipt or at least show that it had demanded an official receipt as proof of its payment with respect to the 34 transactions for which payment is being claimed by petitioner. Some of the amounts involved in said transactions were larger than the payments respondent made for which it was issued official receipts. Respondent's witness, Adora, failed to sufficiently explain why it did not have receipts in its possession to prove payment. The witness simply reasoned out that even in the absence of any receipt, she assumed that an account was paid once the accounting department of respondent forwarded to her the original invoice which was stamped "PAID".47 Such testimony, as well as the invoices which were stamped paid, are all self-serving and do not, by themselves, prove respondent's claim of payment.

Settled is the rule that in the course of trial in a civil case, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to the defendant to controvert the plaintiff’s prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of the plaintiff.48 In the instant case, respondent's indebtedness to petitioner has been established. However, respondent failed to meet its burden of proving payment. Hence, judgment must be rendered in petitioner's favor."

ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_158621_2008.html

Proof of Payment

 "At the outset, it should be noted that respondent's defense of payment was only raised during the testimony of its first witness, Adora Co (Adora) on August 7, 1997. In its Answer, respondent merely alleged that, except for a transaction it had with petitioner sometime in May 1994, it never engaged the services of the latter for the importation of various products between April and July 1994; and that for the goods it imported in May 1994, it had given petitioner the amount of P44,710.00 to answer for the customs duties and taxes due thereon. Respondent further asserted that the goods were seized by Customs authorities because of petitioner's alleged falsification of receipts covering the payment of customs duties and taxes on the said goods; that by reason of such seizure, the goods, which were kept in open air, lost their commercial value amounting to P200,000.00. Respondent claims that it was not able to recover the value of its seized property nor did petitioner return the amount of P44,710.00 given to it by respondent.

Moreover, it is significant to note that the only issues raised by respondent in its Pre-Trial Brief are the following:

(a) Has plaintiff (herein petitioner) been engaged by defendant (herein respondent) at any time prior to the filing of the present Complaint in the "importation of various products"?

(b) Is [petitioner] guilty of gross negligence on account of the seizure of [respondent's] products due to fake or spurious receipt of payment of customs duties and taxes?

(c) Is [petitioner] liable to refund [respondent] the amount of P44,710.00, received by the former from the latter for the payment of customs duties and taxes assessed on said imported goods?

(d) Is [petitioner] liable to reimburse the amount of P44,710.00 to [respondent] after the latter has paid the said amount to the Bureau of Customs for the release of the imported goods which [petitioner] undertook to release and deliver to [respondent's] customer in Makati City? and

(e) Is [petitioner] liable to defendant for damages and attorney's fees incurred by the latter due to [petitioner's] gross negligence?23

Nowhere in its Answer or in its Pre-Trial Brief did respondent raise the defense that it had already paid petitioner its obligations. As earlier mentioned, respondent denied having entered into the subject transactions for which petitioner seeks payment. To repeat, it was only during the testimony of respondent’s witness, Adora, that respondent claimed payment by presenting in evidence 28 original copies of the subject invoices which Adora claimed to have found two days before she was due to testify in court.

Preliminarily, it is necessary to discuss the effect of failure of petitioner to plead payment of its obligations.

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

In the present case, despite failure of the respondent to raise the defense of payment in its answer, the trial court cannot be faulted for admitting the testimonial and documentary evidence of respondent to prove payment, over the objection of petitioner. The trial court's action is in consonance with Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. - When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.

Interpreting Section 4, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court prior to its amendment in 1997, the provisions of which were essentially the same as the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 10, the Court in Co Tiamco v. Diaz24held that:

x x x when evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him continuance to enable him to meet the new situation created by the evidence.25

The above pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Ong v. Court of Appeals.26

In the instant case, there is no showing that the admission of respondent's evidence would unduly prejudice petitioner in maintaining his claims. Besides, petitioner was given ample opportunity to refute the evidence presented by respondent.

Furthermore, even if respondent's answer was not amended to conform to the evidence it presented, it does not preclude the trial court from adjudicating the issue of payment. Citing of Bank of America, NT & SA v. American Realty Corporation27 and Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. v. Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc.,28 this Court held in Mercader v. Development Bank of the Philippines (Cebu Branch)[29]that:

The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial does not preclude adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings. x x x Although, the pleading may not have been amended to conform to the evidence submitted during trial, judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of the issues alleged but also on the issues discussed and the assertions of fact proved in the course of the trial. The court may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although it had not been actually amended. x x x Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it even though the relevant pleading had not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse party. Put a little differently, so long as the basic requirements of fair play had been met, as where the litigants were given full opportunity to support their respective contentions and to object to or refute each other's evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it.30 (Emphasis supplied)

This principle is in consonance with the one enunciated by the Court in Sy v. Court of Appeals,31 that where there is a variance in the defendant's pleadings and the evidence adduced at the trial, the court may treat the pleading as amended to conform to the evidence."

ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_158621_2008.html

Question of Law vs. Question of Fact

 "The Court shall deal first with the question of whether the issues raised by petitioner are factual.

An issue is factual when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts, or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.15 On the other hand, an issue is one of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.16

In the present case, the main issues raised by petitioner are: (1) whether respondent, who is the debtor, has the burden of proving payment; and (2) whether the subject invoices prove such payment or at least raise a disputable presumption that payment has been made. Clearly, the first issue is not factual as it does not require calibration of evidence. However, the second issue is factual because it requires an examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.

The settled rule is that issues of fact are not proper subjects of a petition for review before this Court.17 Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.18 The Court finds that petitioner was able to demonstrate that the instant case falls under the fourth exception as will be discussed forthwith.

As to the first issue raised, the settled rule is that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.19 Even where the creditor alleges non-payment, the general rule is that the onus rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment.20 The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.21 Where the debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence – as distinct from the general burden of proof – shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.22

Since respondent claims that it had already paid petitioner for the services rendered by the latter, it follows that the former carries the burden of proving such payment."

ROYAL CARGO CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs. DFS SPORTS UNLIMITED, INC., respondent. G.R. No. 158621, December 10, 2008.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/gr_158621_2008.html

Official Receipt is the best evidence to prove Payment.

 "We have reviewed the records of the case and we are more convinced with the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Rosita P. Lee (Lee), respondent’s Treasurer, explained that it is the company practice to prepare four copies of SALES INVOICES. Respondent’s delivery personnel would bring two copies of the Sales Invoices at the time of the delivery – the original and a duplicate copy. Both copies were supposed to be signed by petitioner’s representative. Respondent’s delivery personnel would leave the duplicate copy with petitioner and retain the original copy of the Sales Invoice. Whenever respondent made a collection, it would prepare a STATEMENT  OF ACCOUNT and it would send the Statement of Account, together with the original copies of the SALES INVOICES, to petitioner.8

Considering this practice, it is impossible for respondent to present the original or duplicate copies of the Sales Invoices which bore the signatures of petitioner’s representative because they are both in petitioner’s possession. The Sales Invoices accepted by the trial court, which bore the signatures of petitioner’s representatives, were retained by respondent and not delivered to petitioner because they were not yet due at the time the Statement of Account was prepared.

The Court also notes that the SALES INVOICES state: "PAYMENT NOT VALID WITHOUT OUR OFFICIAL RECEIPT."9 The SALES INVOICES are NOT EVIDENCE OF PAYMENT . They are only evidence of the RECEIPT OF THE GOODS. The BEST EVIDENCE TO PROVE PAYMENT of the goods is the OFFICIAL RECEIPT. Petitioner failed to present any official receipt to prove that it had already paid the goods to respondent.

We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation that petitioner DID NOT OBJECT to the entries in the STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNT. Petitioner did not do anything despite the clear reminder in the Statements of Account which states: "IMPORTANT: If this statement does not agree with your record, please notify us at once."10 Petitioner remained SILENT for FOUR YEARS from the time it received the Statements of Account until the filing of the case against it. Petitioner did not even bother to respond to the DEMAND LETTER sent by respondent. Petitioner’s SILENCE is uncharacteristic of persons who have just been asked to pay an obligation to which they are not liable.11 In one case,12 the petitioner RECEIVED a STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT from the respondent WITHOUT PROTEST, and the petitioner DID NOT CONTROVERT the respondent’s demand letter. The Court applied ESTOPPEL IN PAIS where one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own SILENCE when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.13 We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s SILENCE for FOUR YEARS is TANTAMOUNT TO ADMISSION of the entries in the Statements of Account sent by respondent."

EL ORO ENGRAVER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EVERETT CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 125267, February 18, 2008. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_125267_2008.html

Statement of Accounts and Estoppel

 "We agree with the Court of Appeals’ observation that petitioner did not object to the entries in the STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNT. Petitioner did not do anything despite the clear reminder in the Statements of Account which states: "IMPORTANT: If this statement does not agree with your record, please notify us at once."10 Petitioner remained silent for four years from the time it received the Statements of Account until the filing of the case against it. Petitioner did not even bother to respond to the demand letter sent by respondent. Petitioner’s silence is uncharacteristic of persons who have just been asked to pay an obligation to which they are not liable.11 In one case,12 the petitioner received a statement of account from the respondent without protest, and the petitioner did not controvert the respondent’s demand letter. The Court applied ESTOPPEL IN PAIS where one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.13 We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner’s SILENCE FOR FOUR YEARS is TANTAMOUNT TO ADMISSION of the entries in the Statements of Account sent by respondent.

The Court of Appeals did not even have to rely on estoppel. Petitioner RECEIVED the STATEMENTS OF ACCOUNT as well as the SALES INVOICES as evidenced by the handwritten statement of petitioner’s representative, Alicia Alcaraz,14 who wrote the words "rec’d original" on the Statements of Account.15 Lee testified:

Atty. Meris:

Do you have a proof that the originals of the said invoices are already in the hands of the defendant?

Witness:

Yes, we have given them the statements of accounts which together with the originals as shown by the signature of their employee Alicia Alcaras.

x x x x

Atty. Meris:

(to witness)

How do you know that this is the signature of Miss Alcaras?

Witness:

Because I am very familiar with her signature as I have been receiving communications with her frequently during the time that we are having business transaction with the defendant.16

Petitioner failed to rebut that it received the Statements of Accounts and the Sales Invoices attached to them. In sum, respondent PROVED during the trial that it DELIVERED d the goods, and that it had NOT RECEIVED PAYMENT for the goods so delivered.

In its Answer With Counterclaim,17 petitioner alleged that all its purchases from respondent had already been fully paid and satisfied. Petitioner alleged:

and by way of SPECIAL and AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, defendant avers:

4. That there is no cause of action;

5. That the claim is unenforceable under the statute of fraud;

6. That the claim or demand had been paid, waived and/or otherwise extinguished;

7. That in the alternative, granting arguendo that the defendant received some of the said construction materials, the same are defective and not suitable for the purpose of which they have been purchased and/or some of these materials were not received by the defendant corporation. Consequently, it should not be obliged to pay for the same[.]

x x x x18

During the trial, petitioner did not show which of the materials covered by the Sales Invoices had been paid, waived or extinguished, which materials were defective, and which materials were not received. Petitioner only insisted that it had no obligation to respondent. Thus, petitioner FAILED TO PROVE  that it did not receive the goods, or that it already paid respondent for the goods delivered.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 29 February 1996 Decision and 13 June 1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44782. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED."

EL ORO ENGRAVER CORPRATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EVERETT CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 125267, February 18, 2008. 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/feb2008/gr_125267_2008.html

Robbery with Homicide

 "Time and time again, this Court has ruled that when conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the act of all.26 As shown above, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that conspiracy had attended the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide. Despite the protestations of appellant that he did not conspire to rob and kill, but only to rob, the victim, we hold that appellant is liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The elements of this special complex crime are the following: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.27

The records and the pleadings show that all the above-mentioned elements are present in the case at bar. Appellant and his cohorts broke into the house of Aragon’s uncle;28 took the victim’s wallet and cash, wrist watch and several pieces of jewelry amounting to P67,000;29 and, in the course of the robbery, stabbed and killed the victim.

As aforesaid, whenever a homicide is committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part in the asportation will be held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if they did not all actually take part in the homicide, unless it appears that those who did not do so endeavored to prevent the killing.30

Appellant, upon hearing the groaning emanating from the bedroom, did not do anything to check on what was happening. Thinking that his cohorts were stabbing the victim,31 appellant simply allowed them to finish their dastardly deed. He hid for two years – first in the house of his grandmother32 and, later on, in that of his mother.33 On January 6, 1994, a barangay official apprehended and brought him to the Mandaluyong jail.34

It is therefore clear that appellant did not do anything to prevent his co-conspirators from stabbing and ultimately killing the victim. When he left the scene of the crime; he could have gone to the police to report the crime, but he hid and tried to escape the arm of the law. Because he did not do anything to prevent the homicide, he is therefore equally guilty of robbery with homicide.

We affirm the awards of actual damages which were duly proven.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 121272,  June 6, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs. REYDERICK LAGO, appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_121272_2001.html

Conspiracy

 "The second paragraph of Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code defines conspiracy, as follows:

"A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."

The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties’ conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out. The conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.12"

G.R. No. 121272,  June 6, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs. REYDERICK LAGO, appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_121272_2001.html

Conspiracy in Robbery with Homicide

 "When conspiracy is proven in a case of robbery with homicide, all those who participated in the robbery will be held guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if not all of them actually took part in the homicide perpetrated by just one of them on the occasion or as a consequence of the asportation."

G.R. No. 121272,  June 6, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs. REYDERICK LAGO, appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/jun2001/gr_121272_2001.html

If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

 "Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,23 and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.

Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.29

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:

[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.

The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential house of strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner ₱25,000 as attorney’s fees and ₱10,000 as litigation expenses, as well as the costs of suit.

We affirm the Regional Trial Court.

The rationale behind the Court’s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,32 is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."

G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009

CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,

vs.

ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_159310_2009.html

Adulterous cohabitation

 "Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couple’s cohabitation also does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply."

G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009

CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,

vs.

ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/feb2009/gr_159310_2009.html

Secondary evidence

Rule 130, Section 5, etc. 

2019 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

2. Secondary Evidence

Section 5. When original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his or her part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (5a)

Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. - If the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he or she must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he or she fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. (6a)

Section 7. Summaries. - When the contents of documents, records, photographs, or numerous accounts are voluminous and cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established is only the general result of the whole, the contents of such evidence may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation.

The originals shall be available for examination or copying, or both, by the adverse party at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court. (n)

Section 8. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. — When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (7)

Section 9. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. — A party who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence. (8)

Original document rule

Rule 130

A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC

RULE 130

2019 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

1. Original Document Rule

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, recording, photograph or other record, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained by local judicial processes or procedures;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office; and

(e) When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue. (3a)

Section 4. Original of document. —

(a) An "original" of a document is the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original."

(b) A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.

(c) A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or (2) in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. (4a)

What need not be proved

 RULE 129

WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the National Government of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the pre-trial and the trial, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, shall hear the parties on the propriety of taking judicial notice of any matter.

Before judgment or on appeal, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may take judicial notice of any matter and shall hear the parties thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (3a)

Section 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, oral or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that the imputed admission was not, in fact, made.

A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC

2019 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.

"Second Issue: Prescription

The instant action for reconveyance, restitution, and accounting impleads the Estate/Heirs of Gregorio Licaros for previous acts committed by the decedent during his lifetime, more particularly for conspiring with the main defendants to prejudice the Republic. An action to recover ill-gotten wealth is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription, as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code.[17] Section 15 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states:

“Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel.”

The intendment of the foregoing constitutional provision -- exempting actions to recover ill-gotten wealth from the operation of the general rules of prescription -- presumably lies in the special attendant circumstances and the primordial state interests involved in cases of such nature.

From the preceding discussion, it is clear that any action involving the recovery of unlawfully acquired properties against Licaros or his transferees, may not be deemed to have prescribed. The language of the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal. Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions denying, for lack of merit, petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss."

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 157438. October 18, 2004 ]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LICAROS; NAMELY, CONCEPCION B. LICAROS AND ABELARDO B. LICAROS, PETITIONERS, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.govph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/46207

Cause of action

"A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect and not to violate that right; and (3) an act or omission constituting a breach of obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff or violating the right of the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[12]

The allegations in the Second Amended Complaint clearly and unequivocally outlines its cause of action against Defendant Licaros as follows:

“The wrongs committed by Defendants, acting singly or collectively and in unlawful concert with one another, include the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power, as more fully described below, all at the expense and to the grave and irreparable damage of the plaintiff and the Filipino people.

x x x x x x x x x

“Former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, now deceased, had facilitated the fraudulent acquisition of the assets x x x General Bank and Trust Company (GBTC) worth over P688-Million at that time, to favor the Marcoses and the Lucio Tan group who acquired said GBTC’s assets for a measly sum of P500,000.00. Hence, his Estate represented by his heirs must be impleaded as a party defendant for the purpose of obtaining complete relief.”[13]

The Second Amended Complaint was unambiguous when it charged that Licaros, during his lifetime, had conspired with the main defendants -- particularly former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Lucio Tan and Philippine National Bank President Panfilo O. Domingo -- in facilitating the allegedly questionable transfer of the GBTC assets to Tan.

This charge of “conspiracy” casts a wide net, sufficiently extensive to include all acts and all incidents incidental, related to or arising from the charge of systematic plunder and pillage against the main defendants in Sandiganbayan Case No. 0005. The assailed role of Licaros as Central Bank governor in the questioned GBTC deal is not excluded therefrom. If proven, the allegation of conspiracy may make him liable with his co-defendants.

The alleged conspiracy to defraud the Republic put the case against the Estate/Heirs of Licaros squarely under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Said the Court:

“Under Section 2 of the President’s Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding the ‘Funds, Moneys, Assets and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, their close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents or Nominees’ whether civil or criminal are lodged with the ‘exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan’ and

necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to the review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.”[14] (Emphasis supplied). "

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 157438. October 18, 2004 ]

HEIRS OF GREGORIO LICAROS; NAMELY, CONCEPCION B. LICAROS AND ABELARDO B. LICAROS, PETITIONERS, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/46207

Citizenship requirement for elective officials

"In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations."

Source  - 

GR No. 120295 June 28, 1996

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/jun1996/gr_120295_1996.html