Sunday, September 26, 2021
Probation - when allowed, despite appeal
"xxx.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."15 Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals16 that the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction."17
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum.lavvphil This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions.18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.19
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial court’s judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.
Xxx."
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182748
December 13, 2011
ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/dec2011/gr_182748_2011.html
Frustrated vs. Attempted Homicide
"xxx.
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.9 And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.10
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People,11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim’s wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very serious,"12 he could not categorically say that Rufino’s wounds in this case were "fatal." Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case the patient preferred to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth.13
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus – the problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.
x x x x
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home and then come back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.14
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecution’s claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Xxx."
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182748
December 13, 2011
ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/dec2011/gr_182748_2011.html
Unlawful aggression in self-defense
"xxx.
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.4
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.5
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.6
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.7
In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—testified that Arnel was the aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnel’s testimony, the prosecution’s version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence deserving credence.8
Xxx."
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182748
December 13, 2011
ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/dec2011/gr_182748_2011.html
Docket and filing fees vis-a-vis Jurisdiction
"xxx.
THE RULE IS THAT PAYMENT IN FULL OF THE DOCKET FEES WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD IS MANDATORY. (Pedrosa v. Hill, 327 Phil. 153, 158 (1996)
In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 252 Phil. 280 (1989), wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. (Id. at 291.)
Thus, in the more recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros, G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007, (529 SCRA 334, 353), the Court explained that where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin, (463 Phil. 785 (2003), the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances. (Id. at 794.)
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and equitably, Santos v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 762, 770 (1996) for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was only the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice. (Bautista v. Unangst, G.R. No. 173002, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 256, 271.)
The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 130150, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 30.)and Spouses Jimmy and Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga. (G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796.)
In the case of Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan), (371 Phil. 393 (1999), it was stated that the “intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the recency of the changes introduced by the new rules.” In Mactan, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket fees on time.
We held in another case:
x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular case from its operation. (Cua, Jr. v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 181455-56, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 645, 687.)
The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the actual fees paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of court which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 141 which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if petitioners’ claim would be dismissed on a strict application of the Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary circumstances, would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA. Considering, however, that the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the case to the CA would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher interest of substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the Court will resolve the case on the merits. (THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR., VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., G.R. NO. 116121, JULY 18, 2011, MENDOZA, J.).
Xxx."
Source - REMEDIAL LAW DOCTRINES law blog.
Source - REMEDIAL LAW DOCTRINES law blog.
https://remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com/2012/07/rule-is-that-payment-in-full-of-docket.html?m=1
(Author/law blogger Atty. Christian "Kit" Villasis is a professor and BAR Reviewer on Remedial Law of several law Schools and Review Centers, i.e., UP, MLQU, New Era University, UM, National Bar Review Center, Magnificus Juris, Powerhaus Bar Review, CPRS Bar Review, UPLC, UM Bar Review, MLQU Bar Review, NEw Era Bar Review, etc. Prof. Villasis is also a lecturer in the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Seminar for lawyers. Aside from being a litigation (civil and criminal) lawyer, Prof. Villasis has a diversified general law practice. He handles all aspects of corporate, commercial business and banking transactions, protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, collection, admiralty and maritime practice, labor-management relations, election, administrative and local government cases, family cases, real estate transactions, land titles, deeds and conveyances, foreclosure of mortgages, taxation, regulatory compliance, etc.)
Writ of execution against the Counterbond
"xxx.
It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.
Xxx."
G.R. No. L-21450
April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/apr1968/gr_l-21450_1968.html
Summary hearing
"xxx.
Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties" (Ibid., pp. 793-794); and as to the extent and latitude of the hearing, the same will naturally lie upon the discretion of the court, depending upon the attending circumstances and the nature of the incident up for consideration.
In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion "for the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing" (Appellant's brief, p. 4). There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will show that when the motion was called, what the surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer. Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the four-day period within which to file an answer, "the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution"; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
It is also urged that although according to Section 17 of Rule 59, supra, there is no need for a separate action, there must, however, be a separate judgment against the surety in order to hold it liable on the bond (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). Not so, in our opinion. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per Section 12 of Rule 59, "to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he may recover in the action," and stands "in place of the property so released". Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the execution is "returned unsatisfied" (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.
Xxx."
G.R. No. L-21450
April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/apr1968/gr_l-21450_1968.html
Estoppel by laches and jurisdiction - A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
"xxx.
It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case — which shall forthwith be set forth — We are of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation.
As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
It must be remembered that although the action, originally, was exclusively against the Sibonghanoy spouses the Surety became a quasi-party therein since July 31, 1948 when it filed a counter-bond for the dissolution of the writ of attachment issued by the court of origin (Record on Appeal, pp. 15-19). Since then, it acquired certain rights and assumed specific obligations in connection with the pending case, in accordance with sections 12 and 17, Rule 57, Rules of Court (Bautista vs. Joaquin, 46 Phil. 885; Kimpang & Co. vs. Javier, 65 Phil. 170).
Upon the filing of the first motion for execution against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked for an additional affirmative relief — that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds relied upon in support of its opposition — lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.
Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss mentioned heretofore.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Xxx."
G.R. No. L-21450
April 15, 1968
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO, defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/apr1968/gr_l-21450_1968.html
Tuesday, August 31, 2021
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
"xxx.
At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
(7) of law;
(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;
(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
(15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;
(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;
(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(20) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function In support of said contention, respondents maintain that —
Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to safeguard public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President may call them "to prevent or supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution, Article VII, Section 9).
On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force and effect."
Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent General Ver's order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements of the task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver and the named members of the task force should be held liable for damages.
But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members of the armed forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to recover from respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the policy considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public functions from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal. App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).
xxx xxx xxx
The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties is now a settled jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US 483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895, 98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602 F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).
Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his call for the suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from Suit.3
We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4
No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of this authority.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.
We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their action."
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:
However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.
This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated?
Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.
Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically mentioned and Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person confessing becomes a state witness.
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8
Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?
It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales, counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty. Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.
But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.
In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal infirmity cannot be sanctioned.
Xxx. "
Source :
G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988
ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City, respondents.
New jurisdictional amounts
"xxx.
Jurisdiction of Philippine trial courts in civil cases, then and now
August 13, 2021
Manila Standard
" I foresee that the Supreme Court may further adjust the jurisdictional amounts for small claims actions."
Before the Regional Trial Court or Second Level Court was established as we know it today, there was the Court of First Instance. Before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court or First Level Court was the Justice of the Peace. The court system in the Philippines was organized during the American Regime through Act No. 136 (June 11, 1901).
Interestingly, under Act No. 136, the Court of First Instance (CFI) had jurisdiction on civil actions that involve the following: (a) the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (b) the titles to, possession or interest over real property; (c) the legality of a tax, impost or assessment; or (d) the claim or demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to 100 hundred dollars or more (Section 56, Chapter IV).
It also had jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty cases, probate cases, testate or intestate cases, appointments of guardians, trustees or receivers, annulments of marriage, and all other special cases not otherwise provided. It shall also have the power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts (Section 56, Chapter IV).
After the Philippines was granted independence at the end of WWII, the Philippine legislature passed Republic Act (RA) 296 on 17 June 1948, otherwise known as the “Judiciary Act of 1948.” Under RA 296 the Judges of the CFI were commissioned based on Judicial Districts while the Justices of the Peace were appointed and distributed based on the requirement that each municipality shall have one Justice of the Peace and one auxiliary Justice (Section 68, Chapter V).
The jurisdiction of the CFI in civil cases was generally the same in RA 296 as it was in Act No. 136, except that the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to more than two thousand pesos (Section 44 (c), Chapter IV, RA 296). The change in the threshold amount of the claims or demands from dollars to pesos was evidently due to the independence of the Philippines from the United States.
The Justice of the Peace in Act No. 136, a court of lower rank than the CFI, had concurrent jurisdiction with the latter when the demand or value of the property in controversy amounts to 100 dollars or more but less than 300 dollars. It also has jurisdiction on actions for forcible entry or detainer. (Section 68, Chapter V). In RA 296, the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace remained; it was only the limit values of the subject matter or the amount of the demand which was stipulated to not exceed two thousand pesos exclusive of interest and cost (Section 88, Chapter V).
RA 296 was amended in 1963 to increase the jurisdictional limit from two thousand pesos to ten thousand pesos (RA 3828). The judiciary was eventually reorganized in 1980 under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129. The division of courts was changed from Judicial Districts to Judicial Regions. Consequently, the CFI was replaced by the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) while the Justice of the Peace was replaced by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the metropolitan area, the Municipal Trial Courts in each of the cities or municipalities, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MTC) in each circuit comprising such cities and/or municipalities (Section 14, Chapter II and Section 25, Chapter III, BP Blg 129).
Under BP Blg. 129, the RTC, previously the CFI, continued to have jurisdiction on admiralty and maritime cases, probate cases, testate and intestate cases but the jurisdictional limit was increased to twenty thousand pesos together with other cases in which the demand exclusive of interest and cost exceeds twenty thousand pesos; the MTCs will take the rest. The RTCs like with the CFIs continued to have jurisdiction over annulment of marriage but its jurisdiction was expanded to include contracts of marriage and marital relations (Section 19, Chapter II, BP 129).
BP 129 also transferred cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and the Court of Agrarian Relations to the RTC’s jurisdiction. The RTC was also given jurisdiction over cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions (Section 19, Chapter II, BP 129).
In 1994, BP 129 was amended by RA 7691. The amendment introduced for the first time the sharing of jurisdiction of the RTCs and the MTCs in actions that involve titles to, and possession of real property, and interest therein. If the assessed value of the property exceeds twenty thousand pesos, or in Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos, the RTC will have jurisdiction. In cases wherein the assessed values do not exceed the stated threshold amounts, the action will be filed in their respective MTCs (RA 7691 amending Section 19, Chapter II, BP Blg. 129).
RA 7691 also introduced the sharing of jurisdiction of the RTCs and MTCs in admiralty and maritime cases, probate cases, testate and intestate cases, and all other claims and demands. From a single threshold amount of twenty thousand pesos that distinguished the RTC from the MTC in BP Blg. 129, the amount was increased to one hundred thousand, or two hundred thousand in Metro Manila, to fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The limit amounts were further adjusted in intervals of five years to reach three hundred thousand pesos outside Metro Manila, or four hundred thousand pesos in Metro Manila for the respective RTCs to take cognizance of the cases. Otherwise, the cases will be handled by their respective MTCs. The rest of the jurisdictions conferred by BP 129 to the RTCs and MTCs remained unchanged in RA 7691.
Recently, RA 11576 was passed to further expand the jurisdiction of the RTCs and the MTCs. It must be noted that the amendment no longer distinguishes between cases in Metro Manila or outside of Metro Manila, since the jurisdictional amounts were hugely increased. Hence, civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value exceeds four hundred thousand pesos, jurisdiction falls with the RTCs, and those not exceeding the said amount will be taken cognizance by the MTCs (Section 1, RA 11576).
In admiralty and maritime cases, where the demand or claims exceeds two million pesos; matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds two million pesos; and in all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds two million pesos shall be under the jurisdiction of the RTCs (Section 1, RA 11576). Cases of those nature not exceeding the said amount shall be taken by the MTCs. It must be noted that except for the jurisdictional amounts adjusted by RA 11576, the rest of the jurisdiction of the RTCs and MTCs in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act 7691 remain to be in effect.
Under RA 11576, the authority to adjust the jurisdictional amounts for the First and Second Level Courts was delegated by Congress to the Supreme Court, when necessary, to: (1) reflect the extraordinary supervening inflation or deflation of currency; (2) reflect changes in land valuation; or (3) maintain the proportion of caseload between first and second level courts. This provision is very significant because it gives the Supreme Court the power to adjust the jurisdictional amounts or limits without waiting for an act of Congress (Section 3, RA 11576).
With this recent development, I foresee that the Supreme Court may further adjust the jurisdictional amounts for small claims actions which presently does not exceed four hundred thousand in Metro Manila and three hundred thousand outside of Metro Manila. The said probable adjustment will aid in unclogging the dockets of the MTCs especially for actions purely involving recovery of sums of money arising from contracts of sale, loan, mortgage, services and lease. Congress may even consider creating a small claims court that will handle these types of cases exclusively and expeditiously, without participation of lawyers unless they are the parties.
Topics: Tranquil G.S. Salvador III , Jurisdiction of Philippine trial courts in civil cases , Court of First Instance
Xxx."
Before the Regional Trial Court or Second Level Court was established as we know it today, there was the Court of First Instance. Before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court or First Level Court was the Justice of the Peace. The court system in the Philippines was organized during the American Regime through Act No. 136 (June 11, 1901).
Interestingly, under Act No. 136, the Court of First Instance (CFI) had jurisdiction on civil actions that involve the following: (a) the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; (b) the titles to, possession or interest over real property; (c) the legality of a tax, impost or assessment; or (d) the claim or demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to 100 hundred dollars or more (Section 56, Chapter IV).
It also had jurisdiction over maritime and admiralty cases, probate cases, testate or intestate cases, appointments of guardians, trustees or receivers, annulments of marriage, and all other special cases not otherwise provided. It shall also have the power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts (Section 56, Chapter IV).
After the Philippines was granted independence at the end of WWII, the Philippine legislature passed Republic Act (RA) 296 on 17 June 1948, otherwise known as the “Judiciary Act of 1948.” Under RA 296 the Judges of the CFI were commissioned based on Judicial Districts while the Justices of the Peace were appointed and distributed based on the requirement that each municipality shall have one Justice of the Peace and one auxiliary Justice (Section 68, Chapter V).
The jurisdiction of the CFI in civil cases was generally the same in RA 296 as it was in Act No. 136, except that the demand or the value of the property in controversy amounts to more than two thousand pesos (Section 44 (c), Chapter IV, RA 296). The change in the threshold amount of the claims or demands from dollars to pesos was evidently due to the independence of the Philippines from the United States.
The Justice of the Peace in Act No. 136, a court of lower rank than the CFI, had concurrent jurisdiction with the latter when the demand or value of the property in controversy amounts to 100 dollars or more but less than 300 dollars. It also has jurisdiction on actions for forcible entry or detainer. (Section 68, Chapter V). In RA 296, the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace remained; it was only the limit values of the subject matter or the amount of the demand which was stipulated to not exceed two thousand pesos exclusive of interest and cost (Section 88, Chapter V).
RA 296 was amended in 1963 to increase the jurisdictional limit from two thousand pesos to ten thousand pesos (RA 3828). The judiciary was eventually reorganized in 1980 under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129. The division of courts was changed from Judicial Districts to Judicial Regions. Consequently, the CFI was replaced by the Regional Trial Courts (RTC) while the Justice of the Peace was replaced by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the metropolitan area, the Municipal Trial Courts in each of the cities or municipalities, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MTC) in each circuit comprising such cities and/or municipalities (Section 14, Chapter II and Section 25, Chapter III, BP Blg 129).
Under BP Blg. 129, the RTC, previously the CFI, continued to have jurisdiction on admiralty and maritime cases, probate cases, testate and intestate cases but the jurisdictional limit was increased to twenty thousand pesos together with other cases in which the demand exclusive of interest and cost exceeds twenty thousand pesos; the MTCs will take the rest. The RTCs like with the CFIs continued to have jurisdiction over annulment of marriage but its jurisdiction was expanded to include contracts of marriage and marital relations (Section 19, Chapter II, BP 129).
BP 129 also transferred cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and the Court of Agrarian Relations to the RTC’s jurisdiction. The RTC was also given jurisdiction over cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial and quasi-judicial functions (Section 19, Chapter II, BP 129).
In 1994, BP 129 was amended by RA 7691. The amendment introduced for the first time the sharing of jurisdiction of the RTCs and the MTCs in actions that involve titles to, and possession of real property, and interest therein. If the assessed value of the property exceeds twenty thousand pesos, or in Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos, the RTC will have jurisdiction. In cases wherein the assessed values do not exceed the stated threshold amounts, the action will be filed in their respective MTCs (RA 7691 amending Section 19, Chapter II, BP Blg. 129).
RA 7691 also introduced the sharing of jurisdiction of the RTCs and MTCs in admiralty and maritime cases, probate cases, testate and intestate cases, and all other claims and demands. From a single threshold amount of twenty thousand pesos that distinguished the RTC from the MTC in BP Blg. 129, the amount was increased to one hundred thousand, or two hundred thousand in Metro Manila, to fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
The limit amounts were further adjusted in intervals of five years to reach three hundred thousand pesos outside Metro Manila, or four hundred thousand pesos in Metro Manila for the respective RTCs to take cognizance of the cases. Otherwise, the cases will be handled by their respective MTCs. The rest of the jurisdictions conferred by BP 129 to the RTCs and MTCs remained unchanged in RA 7691.
Recently, RA 11576 was passed to further expand the jurisdiction of the RTCs and the MTCs. It must be noted that the amendment no longer distinguishes between cases in Metro Manila or outside of Metro Manila, since the jurisdictional amounts were hugely increased. Hence, civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value exceeds four hundred thousand pesos, jurisdiction falls with the RTCs, and those not exceeding the said amount will be taken cognizance by the MTCs (Section 1, RA 11576).
In admiralty and maritime cases, where the demand or claims exceeds two million pesos; matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds two million pesos; and in all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds two million pesos shall be under the jurisdiction of the RTCs (Section 1, RA 11576). Cases of those nature not exceeding the said amount shall be taken by the MTCs. It must be noted that except for the jurisdictional amounts adjusted by RA 11576, the rest of the jurisdiction of the RTCs and MTCs in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act 7691 remain to be in effect.
Under RA 11576, the authority to adjust the jurisdictional amounts for the First and Second Level Courts was delegated by Congress to the Supreme Court, when necessary, to: (1) reflect the extraordinary supervening inflation or deflation of currency; (2) reflect changes in land valuation; or (3) maintain the proportion of caseload between first and second level courts. This provision is very significant because it gives the Supreme Court the power to adjust the jurisdictional amounts or limits without waiting for an act of Congress (Section 3, RA 11576).
With this recent development, I foresee that the Supreme Court may further adjust the jurisdictional amounts for small claims actions which presently does not exceed four hundred thousand in Metro Manila and three hundred thousand outside of Metro Manila. The said probable adjustment will aid in unclogging the dockets of the MTCs especially for actions purely involving recovery of sums of money arising from contracts of sale, loan, mortgage, services and lease. Congress may even consider creating a small claims court that will handle these types of cases exclusively and expeditiously, without participation of lawyers unless they are the parties.
Topics: Tranquil G.S. Salvador III , Jurisdiction of Philippine trial courts in civil cases , Court of First Instance
Xxx."
Source :
https://manilastandard.net/mobile/article/362236
Expropriation - the landowners should be paid the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking of the property.
"xxx.
The general rule is "private property may be taken by the government for public purposes after payment of just compensation." This is in consonance with Section 9, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
Just compensation is clearly defined and explained in the case of Evergreen Manufacturing Corporation vs. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 218628, Sept. 6, 2017, Ponente: former Associate Justice Antonio Carpio), to wit:
"Just compensation has been defined as the fair and full equivalent of the loss. More specifically, just compensation has been defined in this wise:
Notably, just compensation in expropriation cases is defined "as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to modify the meaning of the word 'compensation' to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."
The value of the property to be taken shall be paid at the time of taking. This finds support in one case decided by the court entitled, Republic of the Philippines vs. Castillo, et al. (G.R. No. 190453, Feb. 26, 2020), where the Supreme Court, speaking through Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando stated that:
"We ruled that the landowners should be paid the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking of the property, to wit:
"The trial court fixed the value of the property at its 1984 value, while the CA, at its 1993 worth. Neither of the two determinations is correct. For purposes of just compensation, the respondents should be paid the value of the property as of the time of the filing of the complaint which is deemed to be the time of taking of the property."
Xxx."
Source:
https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/08/17/legal-advice/just-compensation/1811227
Doctrine of immutability of judgment
"xxx.
The doctrine of immutability of judgment bars the court from modifying decisions that have already attained finality even if the purpose of the modification is to correct errors of fact or law (Gadrinab vs. Salamanca, et al., GR 194560, June 11, 2014, Ponente: Associate Justice Marvic M. V. F. Leonen).
However, there are instances where the court may relax its rules and this is in consonance with Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, as amended, which states that "these rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
The Supreme Court enumerated instances for the relaxation of the principle of immutability of judgment and this finds support in the case of Latogan vs. People of the Philippines (GR 238298, Jan. 22, 2020) where the Supreme Court, speaking through Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul Inting, stated:
"Withal, as in the liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, the Court has enumerated the factors that justify the relaxation of the rule on immutability of final judgments to serve the ends of justice including: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
"In one case, the CA dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's decision. According to the CA, the RTC decision could no longer be assailed pursuant to the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments. Upon petition for review, though; the Court relaxed the application of the doctrine and held that the doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness and substantial justice."
Xxx."
Source:
https://www.manilatimes.net/2021/08/16/legal-advice/immutability-of-judgment/1811087
To allow the President to unilaterally terminate a treaty that has admittedly been transformed into domestic law is to put the President on a pedestal above the law.
"xxx.
Above the law
acarpio@inquirer.com.ph.
Xxx."
Source :
https://opinion.inquirer.net/143240/above-the-law#ixzz754ZfwLnm
Follow us: @inquirerdotnet on Twitter | inquirerdotnet on Facebook
August 19, 2021
Under our democratic and republican system of government as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacts, amends, or repeals a law, the President executes the law, and the Judiciary declares a law void if it contravenes the Constitution. This is the fundamental check and balance among the three co-equal and independent branches of government to ensure that no one person or branch of government is above the law.
There are additional checks and balances or shared responsibilities built into the Constitution. Within Congress itself, a bill becomes a law only if approved by both chambers of Congress. A law enacted by Congress may be vetoed by the President and this veto may be overturned by two-thirds vote of each chamber of Congress. An item in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill may be vetoed by the President. The President can enter into treaties on his own subject to concurrence by two-thirds vote of the Senate.
The preservation of our democratic and republican system of government depends on the faithful observance of these finely crafted constitutional checks and balances and shared responsibilities. In the recent case of Pangilinan v. Cayetano, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the unilateral termination by President Duterte of the treaty wherein the Philippines acceded to the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Senate had given its concurrence to this ICC treaty in 2011, but President Duterte terminated this treaty in 2018 without Senate concurrence.
Under our democratic and republican system of government as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacts, amends, or repeals a law, the President executes the law, and the Judiciary declares a law void if it contravenes the Constitution. This is the fundamental check and balance among the three co-equal and independent branches of government to ensure that no one person or branch of government is above the law.
There are additional checks and balances or shared responsibilities built into the Constitution. Within Congress itself, a bill becomes a law only if approved by both chambers of Congress. A law enacted by Congress may be vetoed by the President and this veto may be overturned by two-thirds vote of each chamber of Congress. An item in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill may be vetoed by the President. The President can enter into treaties on his own subject to concurrence by two-thirds vote of the Senate.
The preservation of our democratic and republican system of government depends on the faithful observance of these finely crafted constitutional checks and balances and shared responsibilities. In the recent case of Pangilinan v. Cayetano, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the unilateral termination by President Duterte of the treaty wherein the Philippines acceded to the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Senate had given its concurrence to this ICC treaty in 2011, but President Duterte terminated this treaty in 2018 without Senate concurrence.
The issue in Pangilinan v. Cayetano was whether the President could unilaterally terminate a treaty that had previously been given Senate concurrence. The Supreme Court held that the issue was moot, stating: “The Philippines has done all that were needed to facilitate the withdrawal. Any subsequent discussion would pertain to matters that are fait accompli.” Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the unilateral termination by the President of the ICC treaty for the simple reason that the termination had already taken effect under international law.
However, it is well-recognized that an act by a head of state may be valid and binding on a state under international law even as the same act may be unconstitutional under the state’s domestic law. Thus, if President Duterte unilaterally declares, even verbally, that he is abandoning the July 12, 2016 Arbitral Award in the South China Sea Arbitration and China accepts such unilateral declaration, the abandonment is valid and binding on the Philippines under international law even if such abandonment is certainly unconstitutional under Philippine law.
However, it is well-recognized that an act by a head of state may be valid and binding on a state under international law even as the same act may be unconstitutional under the state’s domestic law. Thus, if President Duterte unilaterally declares, even verbally, that he is abandoning the July 12, 2016 Arbitral Award in the South China Sea Arbitration and China accepts such unilateral declaration, the abandonment is valid and binding on the Philippines under international law even if such abandonment is certainly unconstitutional under Philippine law.
For the same reason, President Duterte’s unilateral termination of the ICC treaty is valid and binding on the Philippines under international law but unconstitutional under Philippine law. First, the Court in Pangilinan approved of the mirror principle—that the manner of entering into the treaty should be the same manner in terminating a treaty. Since a treaty can take effect only with the concurrence of the Senate, then a treaty can only be terminated with the concurrence of the Senate.
Second, the Court in Pangilinan admitted that a treaty is “transformed into domestic law by Senate concurrence.” Indisputably, the President has no power to terminate any domestic law using his Executive power alone. It follows that President Duterte has no power to unilaterally terminate the ICC treaty that had previously been given Senate concurrence.
Third, the Court in Pangilinan recognized that treaty-making is a shared responsibility between the President and the Senate as part of the checks and balances carefully crafted into the Constitution. As a check-and-balance mechanism, this shared responsibility in treaty-making would be meaningless if the President could just unilaterally terminate a treaty without Senate concurrence.
Lastly, the overarching constitutional architecture of the Constitution is so designed as to ensure that no one person or branch of government is above the law. The President heads the Executive branch because his power is to execute, that is, to implement the law. He takes an oath of office, prescribed in the Constitution, to “faithfully and conscientiously xxx execute (the) laws.” Terminating a law is the opposite of executing the law. The President has no power to terminate a law. To allow the President to unilaterally terminate a treaty that has admittedly been transformed into domestic law is to put the President on a pedestal above the law.
Second, the Court in Pangilinan admitted that a treaty is “transformed into domestic law by Senate concurrence.” Indisputably, the President has no power to terminate any domestic law using his Executive power alone. It follows that President Duterte has no power to unilaterally terminate the ICC treaty that had previously been given Senate concurrence.
Third, the Court in Pangilinan recognized that treaty-making is a shared responsibility between the President and the Senate as part of the checks and balances carefully crafted into the Constitution. As a check-and-balance mechanism, this shared responsibility in treaty-making would be meaningless if the President could just unilaterally terminate a treaty without Senate concurrence.
Lastly, the overarching constitutional architecture of the Constitution is so designed as to ensure that no one person or branch of government is above the law. The President heads the Executive branch because his power is to execute, that is, to implement the law. He takes an oath of office, prescribed in the Constitution, to “faithfully and conscientiously xxx execute (the) laws.” Terminating a law is the opposite of executing the law. The President has no power to terminate a law. To allow the President to unilaterally terminate a treaty that has admittedly been transformed into domestic law is to put the President on a pedestal above the law.
acarpio@inquirer.com.ph.
Xxx."
Source :
https://opinion.inquirer.net/143240/above-the-law#ixzz754ZfwLnm
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Extraterritorial service of judicial documents
"xxx.
Extraterritorial service of judicial documents
August 20, 2021
Manila Standard
by Tranquil G.S. Salvador III
"What if the defendants do not live or are not found in the country?"
There are civil and commercial proceedings instituted against defendants who do not reside or are not found in the Philippines. Conversely, there are also similar proceedings commenced in a foreign country against those who reside or are found in the Philippines.
In these cases, it cannot be avoided that judicial documents such as orders, resolutions, judgments, official documents issued by courts, pleadings, and other court submissions by the parties, be served extraterritorially (Section 5 (f), Part I, Administrative Order [AO] No. 251-2020).
In the past, I had received requests from foreign lawyers seeking assistance to serve summons, court documents, or pleadings to defendants in the Philippines. I also had cases where judicial documents were prepared and issued in the Philippines but were served to individuals and juridical entities found in or holding business in a foreign country.
Before its amendment in 2019, our Rules of Civil Procedure mandated that extraterritorial service of summons to individuals shall, with leave of court, be: (a) by personal service; (b) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and by sending a copy of the summons and order by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (c) in any manner the court may deem sufficient (Section 15, Rule 14).
However, the 2019 amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure made effective on 1 May 2020 included extraterritorial service of summons as “provided for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party” (Section 17, Rule 14). Significantly, on 4 March 2020 and before the effectivity of the amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Philippines deposited its Instruments of Accession to the Hague Service Convention to be effective on 1 October 2020.
Although there is a separate provision on the extraterritorial service of summons to a foreign juridical entity not registered in the Philippines, there is no provision in the 2019 amendment for the use of international conventions. The modes of extraterritorial service of summons are: (a) by personal service; (b) by publication in the country where the defendant may be found and service of the summons and order by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; (c) by facsimile or electronic means; or (d) by other means the court may direct (Section 14, Rule 14, 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure [2019 ARCP]).
The service of pleadings or judicial documents was limited to personal service, registered mail, or ordinary mail in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, but now includes service by accredited courier, electronic mail, facsimile transmission, other electronic means, or as provided for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party (Section 5, Rule 13, 2019 ARCP).
Interestingly, there is a separate provision on service by the courts of final judgments, final orders or final resolutions by personal service or registered mail. In the 2019 amendments, service by accredited courier of final judgments or final orders upon ex parte motion of a party who is willing to shoulder the expenses was introduced (Section 13, Rule 13, ARCP).
The insertion of the phrase “as provided for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party” in both Rules 13 and 14 of the 2019 ARCP was evidently in anticipation of the accession of the Philippines to the Hague Service Convention. It is worth noting that the Philippines acceded to the Hague Apostille Convention, a different convention, on legalization of foreign public documents on 12 September 2018, which took effect on 14 May 2019.
With this development, the Supreme Court issued the Guidelines to implement the Hague Service Convention. This was to simplify and expedite the service of documents abroad, and to guarantee that the service will be brought to the notice of the recipient in sufficient time (AO No. 251-2020).
Under the said guidelines, for outbound judicial documents, a party may apply, in a civil or commercial proceeding, to determine whether extraterritorial service through the Hague Service Convention is necessary in accordance with Rules 13 and 14 of the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion must be accompanied, in duplicate, by a copy of the Model Form, the original documents to be served, the translations when necessary, and the commitment to pay the fees in full (Section 1, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
If the court finds that extraterritorial service under the Hague Service Convention is warranted, it shall issue an Order to that effect. The Order shall include a directive to the requesting party to procure and submit a prepaid courier pouch which shall be used for the transmission of documents from the court to the Central Authority of the Requested State (Section 2, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
The Central Authority refers to the authority in charge of receiving requests for service from Requesting States and executing them or causing them to be executed. In the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) is the designated Central Authority. (Section 5, Part I, AO No. 251-2020).
The Judge in the case of lower courts, or the Justice or the Clerk of Court in the case of collegiate courts, as forwarding authorities, shall accomplish and sign the Request using the Model Form, check the completeness of documents, and ensure compliance with the requirements of the Hague Service Convention and that of the Requested State (Section 2, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
Once all the requirements are submitted by the party requesting the extraterritorial service through the Hague Service Convention, the court shall coordinate with the Central Authority of the Requested State and transmit, among others: (a) the order granting the extraterritorial service; (b) the filled-out Request and Summary of the Document to be served; (c) the documents sought to be served; and (d) certified translations of the Model Form when necessary (Section 4, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
The court shall also furnish the OCA with a copy of the request and shall update the OCA on the status of its request. The Central Authority of the Requested State shall then process the request and attempt service in accordance with its domestic laws (Sections 4 and 5, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
On the other hand, inbound judicial documents shall be referred to the OCA. The request, including the documents to be served, must also conform to the Model Form. The intended recipient should be indicated with sufficient specificity, and as much as practicable shall include the house number, building, street name, barangay, municipality/city, province, and zip code. Post office boxes shall not be allowed (Sections 1 and 2, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
All requests must be accompanied by a payment of One Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$100.00) for each recipient to be served, for the costs of service. For multiple recipients residing in the same address, only one fee shall be paid. The Forwarding Authority of the Requesting State (the foreign country) from where the documents originated shall transmit the request, together with all the documents, and proof of payment, to the OCA through electronic transmission, registered mail, or courier services (Sections 3 and 4, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
If, upon evaluation of the OCA, the request fails to comply with any of the requirements, or there are objections for the execution of the request, the OCA shall inform the Forwarding Authority. If the objections are resolved, the processing of the request shall proceed. Otherwise, all documents shall be returned to the Forwarding Authority, along with a notice of objection or denial (Section 5, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
When the request is sufficient in form, the OCA shall forward the request to the court having jurisdiction over the area where the intended recipient resides. The Executive Judge in mutiple-sala courts, or the Presiding Judge in single-sala courts, shall immediately assign a sheriff, process server, or any other competent personnel to serve the document in accordance with the Rules of Court (Sections 6 and 7, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
The officer assigned to serve the document shall execute a return on the service in accordance with the Rules of Court within five (5) days from service. The return shall state that the document and attachment/s have been served, and shall include the method, the place and the date of service, and the person to whom the document was delivered (Section 8, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
Within thirty (30) calendar days from receipt of the request, the judge shall transmit the duly accomplished Certificate and the Return of Service to the Forwarding Authority of the Requesting State. It shall be the duty of the judge to furnish the OCA with a copy of all the documents transmitted to the Requesting State, for monitoring purposes (Section 10, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
The implementation of the Hague Service Convention by the Supreme Court is a step towards making the service of judicial documents to transnational litigants more efficient. This pro-active and dynamic step, as reflected in the Rules, gives the judicial system a much-needed boost in ensuring that cases involving parties who reside or hold business in different parts of the world can expect swift disposition of their cases.
Topics: Tranquil G.S. Salvador III , extraterritorial servce of judicial documents
"What if the defendants do not live or are not found in the country?"There are civil and commercial proceedings instituted against defendants who do not reside or are not found in the Philippines. Conversely, there are also similar proceedings commenced in a foreign country against those who reside or are found in the Philippines.
In these cases, it cannot be avoided that judicial documents such as orders, resolutions, judgments, official documents issued by courts, pleadings, and other court submissions by the parties, be served extraterritorially (Section 5 (f), Part I, Administrative Order [AO] No. 251-2020).
In the past, I had received requests from foreign lawyers seeking assistance to serve summons, court documents, or pleadings to defendants in the Philippines. I also had cases where judicial documents were prepared and issued in the Philippines but were served to individuals and juridical entities found in or holding business in a foreign country.
Before its amendment in 2019, our Rules of Civil Procedure mandated that extraterritorial service of summons to individuals shall, with leave of court, be: (a) by personal service; (b) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and by sending a copy of the summons and order by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (c) in any manner the court may deem sufficient (Section 15, Rule 14).
However, the 2019 amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure made effective on 1 May 2020 included extraterritorial service of summons as “provided for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party” (Section 17, Rule 14). Significantly, on 4 March 2020 and before the effectivity of the amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Philippines deposited its Instruments of Accession to the Hague Service Convention to be effective on 1 October 2020.
Although there is a separate provision on the extraterritorial service of summons to a foreign juridical entity not registered in the Philippines, there is no provision in the 2019 amendment for the use of international conventions. The modes of extraterritorial service of summons are: (a) by personal service; (b) by publication in the country where the defendant may be found and service of the summons and order by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; (c) by facsimile or electronic means; or (d) by other means the court may direct (Section 14, Rule 14, 2019 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure [2019 ARCP]).
The service of pleadings or judicial documents was limited to personal service, registered mail, or ordinary mail in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, but now includes service by accredited courier, electronic mail, facsimile transmission, other electronic means, or as provided for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party (Section 5, Rule 13, 2019 ARCP).
Interestingly, there is a separate provision on service by the courts of final judgments, final orders or final resolutions by personal service or registered mail. In the 2019 amendments, service by accredited courier of final judgments or final orders upon ex parte motion of a party who is willing to shoulder the expenses was introduced (Section 13, Rule 13, ARCP).
The insertion of the phrase “as provided for in international conventions to which the Philippines is a party” in both Rules 13 and 14 of the 2019 ARCP was evidently in anticipation of the accession of the Philippines to the Hague Service Convention. It is worth noting that the Philippines acceded to the Hague Apostille Convention, a different convention, on legalization of foreign public documents on 12 September 2018, which took effect on 14 May 2019.
With this development, the Supreme Court issued the Guidelines to implement the Hague Service Convention. This was to simplify and expedite the service of documents abroad, and to guarantee that the service will be brought to the notice of the recipient in sufficient time (AO No. 251-2020).
Under the said guidelines, for outbound judicial documents, a party may apply, in a civil or commercial proceeding, to determine whether extraterritorial service through the Hague Service Convention is necessary in accordance with Rules 13 and 14 of the 2019 Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion must be accompanied, in duplicate, by a copy of the Model Form, the original documents to be served, the translations when necessary, and the commitment to pay the fees in full (Section 1, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
If the court finds that extraterritorial service under the Hague Service Convention is warranted, it shall issue an Order to that effect. The Order shall include a directive to the requesting party to procure and submit a prepaid courier pouch which shall be used for the transmission of documents from the court to the Central Authority of the Requested State (Section 2, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
The Central Authority refers to the authority in charge of receiving requests for service from Requesting States and executing them or causing them to be executed. In the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) is the designated Central Authority. (Section 5, Part I, AO No. 251-2020).
The Judge in the case of lower courts, or the Justice or the Clerk of Court in the case of collegiate courts, as forwarding authorities, shall accomplish and sign the Request using the Model Form, check the completeness of documents, and ensure compliance with the requirements of the Hague Service Convention and that of the Requested State (Section 2, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
Once all the requirements are submitted by the party requesting the extraterritorial service through the Hague Service Convention, the court shall coordinate with the Central Authority of the Requested State and transmit, among others: (a) the order granting the extraterritorial service; (b) the filled-out Request and Summary of the Document to be served; (c) the documents sought to be served; and (d) certified translations of the Model Form when necessary (Section 4, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
The court shall also furnish the OCA with a copy of the request and shall update the OCA on the status of its request. The Central Authority of the Requested State shall then process the request and attempt service in accordance with its domestic laws (Sections 4 and 5, Part II, AO No. 251-2020).
On the other hand, inbound judicial documents shall be referred to the OCA. The request, including the documents to be served, must also conform to the Model Form. The intended recipient should be indicated with sufficient specificity, and as much as practicable shall include the house number, building, street name, barangay, municipality/city, province, and zip code. Post office boxes shall not be allowed (Sections 1 and 2, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
All requests must be accompanied by a payment of One Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$100.00) for each recipient to be served, for the costs of service. For multiple recipients residing in the same address, only one fee shall be paid. The Forwarding Authority of the Requesting State (the foreign country) from where the documents originated shall transmit the request, together with all the documents, and proof of payment, to the OCA through electronic transmission, registered mail, or courier services (Sections 3 and 4, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
If, upon evaluation of the OCA, the request fails to comply with any of the requirements, or there are objections for the execution of the request, the OCA shall inform the Forwarding Authority. If the objections are resolved, the processing of the request shall proceed. Otherwise, all documents shall be returned to the Forwarding Authority, along with a notice of objection or denial (Section 5, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
When the request is sufficient in form, the OCA shall forward the request to the court having jurisdiction over the area where the intended recipient resides. The Executive Judge in mutiple-sala courts, or the Presiding Judge in single-sala courts, shall immediately assign a sheriff, process server, or any other competent personnel to serve the document in accordance with the Rules of Court (Sections 6 and 7, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
The officer assigned to serve the document shall execute a return on the service in accordance with the Rules of Court within five (5) days from service. The return shall state that the document and attachment/s have been served, and shall include the method, the place and the date of service, and the person to whom the document was delivered (Section 8, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
Within thirty (30) calendar days from receipt of the request, the judge shall transmit the duly accomplished Certificate and the Return of Service to the Forwarding Authority of the Requesting State. It shall be the duty of the judge to furnish the OCA with a copy of all the documents transmitted to the Requesting State, for monitoring purposes (Section 10, Part III, AO No. 251-2020).
The implementation of the Hague Service Convention by the Supreme Court is a step towards making the service of judicial documents to transnational litigants more efficient. This pro-active and dynamic step, as reflected in the Rules, gives the judicial system a much-needed boost in ensuring that cases involving parties who reside or hold business in different parts of the world can expect swift disposition of their cases.
Topics: Tranquil G.S. Salvador III , extraterritorial servce of judicial documents
Xxx."
Source :
https://manilastandard.net/mobile/article/362795
Corporations vested with public interest
Fiduciary duty of diligence of the highest level for corporations vested with public interest
MAP Insights
In 1990, without formal statutory basis, the Supreme Court in Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, under the ponencia of Justice Isagani Cruz, began to lay down the corporate governance principle that “corporations vested with public interest” owe a fiduciary duty not just to the shareholders, but the public that they serve or interact with, particularly in the banking industry, thus:
The banking system is an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized nation. Whether as mere passive entities for the safe-keeping and saving of money or as active instruments of business and commerce, banks have become an ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to regard them with respect and even gratitude, most of all, confidence … The point is that as a business affected with public interests and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
Prior to Simex International, the doctrine pervading the relationship of a bank with its depositors, was that of simply being contractual in character — that of a loan or mutuum — under which the rights and obligations of the parties emanate from the principle of breach of contract between debtor and creditor. Simex International therefore evolved the relationship between the bank and its depositors into one that is fiduciary in character — a doctrine that has since then pervaded the decisions of the Supreme Court involving the dealings of the banks with their depositors.
Although there was resistance in some of the decisions to extend that “fiduciary nature of the relationship,” beyond those of the depositors, the formal recognition of banks being vested with public interests eventually covered all of their dealings with the public, thus:
• Over supervision of their officers and employees as the only way to ensure that banks will comply with their fiduciary duties;
• In extending loans and other credit accommodations;
The banking system is an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized nation. Whether as mere passive entities for the safe-keeping and saving of money or as active instruments of business and commerce, banks have become an ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to regard them with respect and even gratitude, most of all, confidence … The point is that as a business affected with public interests and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
Prior to Simex International, the doctrine pervading the relationship of a bank with its depositors, was that of simply being contractual in character — that of a loan or mutuum — under which the rights and obligations of the parties emanate from the principle of breach of contract between debtor and creditor. Simex International therefore evolved the relationship between the bank and its depositors into one that is fiduciary in character — a doctrine that has since then pervaded the decisions of the Supreme Court involving the dealings of the banks with their depositors.
Although there was resistance in some of the decisions to extend that “fiduciary nature of the relationship,” beyond those of the depositors, the formal recognition of banks being vested with public interests eventually covered all of their dealings with the public, thus:
• Over supervision of their officers and employees as the only way to ensure that banks will comply with their fiduciary duties;
• In extending loans and other credit accommodations;
• In accepting real estate mortgages, dealing with registered land and other properties given as security; and,
• In general, in handling all their transactions, or dealings with the public.
More importantly, the recognized fiduciary obligation of banking institutions to all such stakeholders, was characterized to be of the “highest degree,” and not just the diligence of a good father of a family. Thus, in PCI Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:
“Time and again, we have stressed that banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and confidence of the public in general is of paramount importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest, degree of diligence. A bank’s liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but primary; the defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees is of no moment.
“Banks handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.”
The theory that the nature of the banking industry is one that is vested with public interest and owes fiduciary duties to other stakeholders was formally incorporated into the General Banking Law of 2000, where Section 2 thereof expressly imposes a fiduciary duty on banks when it declared the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance,” which requires a bank to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. In Philippine National Bank v. Pike, the Supreme Court held that even if the transaction with the bank occurred prior to the promulgation of the General Banking Law of 2000, nonetheless its Section 2 categorical declaration of the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires highest standards of integrity and performance” is only a statutory affirmation of the Supreme Court’s decisions in esse at the time of such transactions. In other words, the doctrine that the diligence of the highest degree, and high standards of integrity and performance are required of corporations impressed with public interest has common-law binding effect without the need of any statutory confirmation thereof.
Once that threshold had been breached in the banking industry, the Supreme Court began to apply the doctrine of fiduciary obligation of corporations, and their Boards of Directors and Management, to affected stakeholders (not just shareholders), when the underlying business enterprise is that which affects a large segment of the public.
In 2006, in its decision in Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, the Court began to move away from the otherwise well-established doctrine that a malpractice on the part of an independent or visiting physician does not make the hospital vicariously liable therefor. The Court held:
“In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the ‘ostensible’ agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the ‘doctrine of apparent authority’.”
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that “through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.” Estoppel rests on this rule: “Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.”
The gravamen of the Nogales decision is to the effect that when a hospital holds out a physician as a member of its medical staff, when in fact he is an independent contractor merely using the facilities of the hospital, then insofar as the patient is concerned, the hospital has clothed such a physician with authority to bind the hospital under the doctrine of apparent authority, which the hospital cannot later on repudiate to insulate itself from the malpractice assertions hurled against the physician. Among the circumstances that were found by the Court to have played into the application of the doctrine of apparent authority was that the hospital granted staff privileges to the attending physician; it made the patient’s husband sign a consent form printed on the hospital’s letterhead; and that the complications experienced during the operation were referred to the hospital’s head which gave the impression to the patient and her husband that the attending physician was a member of the hospital’s medical staff and was collaborating with other hospital-employed specialists in treating the patient.
Quoting from American jurisprudence, Nogales began to characterize the “public interest” nature of a corporation operating a hospital, thus: “The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present day hospital, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and [interns], as well as administratively and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of ‘hospital facilities’ expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.”
Subsequently, the Court had the occasion to revisit and expand the Nogales doctrine in its original decision in Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, where the decision went into a historical development of hospitals and the resulting theories concerning their liability for the negligence of physicians, thus: “Until the mid-19th century, hospitals were generally charitable institutions, providing medical services to the lowest classes of society, without regard for a patient’s ability to pay. Those who could afford medical treatment were usually treated at home by their doctors.
“However, the days of house calls and philanthropic health care are over. The modern health care industry continues to distance itself from its charitable past and has experienced a significant conversion from a not-for-profit health care to for-profit hospital businesses. Consequently, significant changes in health law have accompanied the business-related changes in the hospital industry. One important legal change is an increase in hospital liability for medical malpractice. Many courts now allow claims for hospital vicarious liability under the theories of respondeat superior, apparent authority, ostensible authority, or agency by estoppel.”
Xxx."
Once that threshold had been breached in the banking industry, the Supreme Court began to apply the doctrine of fiduciary obligation of corporations, and their Boards of Directors and Management, to affected stakeholders (not just shareholders), when the underlying business enterprise is that which affects a large segment of the public.
In 2006, in its decision in Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, the Court began to move away from the otherwise well-established doctrine that a malpractice on the part of an independent or visiting physician does not make the hospital vicariously liable therefor. The Court held:
“In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the ‘ostensible’ agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the ‘doctrine of apparent authority’.”
The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that “through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.” Estoppel rests on this rule: “Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.”
The gravamen of the Nogales decision is to the effect that when a hospital holds out a physician as a member of its medical staff, when in fact he is an independent contractor merely using the facilities of the hospital, then insofar as the patient is concerned, the hospital has clothed such a physician with authority to bind the hospital under the doctrine of apparent authority, which the hospital cannot later on repudiate to insulate itself from the malpractice assertions hurled against the physician. Among the circumstances that were found by the Court to have played into the application of the doctrine of apparent authority was that the hospital granted staff privileges to the attending physician; it made the patient’s husband sign a consent form printed on the hospital’s letterhead; and that the complications experienced during the operation were referred to the hospital’s head which gave the impression to the patient and her husband that the attending physician was a member of the hospital’s medical staff and was collaborating with other hospital-employed specialists in treating the patient.
Quoting from American jurisprudence, Nogales began to characterize the “public interest” nature of a corporation operating a hospital, thus: “The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present day hospital, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and [interns], as well as administratively and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of ‘hospital facilities’ expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.”
Subsequently, the Court had the occasion to revisit and expand the Nogales doctrine in its original decision in Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, where the decision went into a historical development of hospitals and the resulting theories concerning their liability for the negligence of physicians, thus: “Until the mid-19th century, hospitals were generally charitable institutions, providing medical services to the lowest classes of society, without regard for a patient’s ability to pay. Those who could afford medical treatment were usually treated at home by their doctors.
“However, the days of house calls and philanthropic health care are over. The modern health care industry continues to distance itself from its charitable past and has experienced a significant conversion from a not-for-profit health care to for-profit hospital businesses. Consequently, significant changes in health law have accompanied the business-related changes in the hospital industry. One important legal change is an increase in hospital liability for medical malpractice. Many courts now allow claims for hospital vicarious liability under the theories of respondeat superior, apparent authority, ostensible authority, or agency by estoppel.”
Xxx."
Source :
https://www.bworldonline.com/fiduciary-duty-of-diligence-of-the-highest-level-for-corporations-vested-with-public-interest/
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