We Can Close the Access-to-Justice Gap, But You’re Not Going to Like It

See - We Can Close the Access-to-Justice Gap, But You’re Not Going to Like It





"x x x.

The high cost of legal representation

Our legal system has a pretty obvious problem: its cost. The cost of legal representation, in particular. Average hourly rates in 2012 were about $370 for associates. It would take someone working at minimum wage (currently $7.25) more than a week to pay for a single hour of the average associate’s time. At the medianU.S. household income of $50,502, that’s still a bit less than two days of work, before taxes.

[A]ny way you look at it, though, there is a gap. A huge gap. A lot of people cannot afford a lawyer.

Fortunately, lawyers.com says that in rural areas and small towns, fees of $100 to $200 per hour are “probably the norm.” So anywhere from two to four days for someone working at minimum wage, without taking taxes into consideration. Or a day, for someone at the median. That’s without taking into account the cost of living, obviously.

And then, Americans average around $15,000 in credit card debt, $147,000 in mortgage debt, and $31,500 in student loans. In other words, for many Americans hiring a lawyer probably means going into more debt, which means adding interest, and often late fees and overdraft charges, to the lawyer’s hourly rate.

If you are really poor, you might be able to get a lawyer to represent you for free. In general, this means people at or below 125% of the poverty line. (125% of the poverty line is currently $14,363 for an individual, and $29,438 for a family of four. That’s about what you’d make working full-time for minimum wage, and most people would consider themselves poor at twice that.) Free legal services can’t help everyone, either. The Brennan Center for Justice) says about 80% of the need is unmet. Legal Services Corporation says (pdf) it turns away about 50% of those who apply for help.

x x x."

Lane v. Franks: New Supreme Court Public Employee Free Speech Decision | Nahmod Law

See - Lane v. Franks: New Supreme Court Public Employee Free Speech Decision | Nahmod Law





"x x x.

Lane v. Franks: New Public Employee Free Speech Decision

The Supreme Court, on June 19, 2014, handed down an important public employee free speech decision inLane v. Franks (PDF), No. 13-483. The Court unanimously held, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, that a public employee who testifies truthfully at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, is protected by the First Amendmentfrom employer discipline, at least where the testimony is not pursuant to his/her duties as an employee. However, the Court also ruled that the employee’s superior, who fired him, was not liable in damages because of qualified immunity.

Justice Thomas concurred, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, emphasizing that the Court’s ruling applied only to testimony that was not pursuant to a public employee’s official duties.

Previous Posts on Lane v. Franks

I previously blogged about this case when certiorari was granted, see post of January 20, 2014; when (full disclosure here) I co-authored a Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioner, see post of March 13, 2014; and when I did a short video on the case, see post of April 25, 2014. Those posts set out the background and facts.

The Opinion: The First Amendment Merits

Justice Sotomayor initially set out the basics of public employee free speech jurisprudence stemming fromPickering v. Bd. of Education and Garcetti v. Ceballos. She observed that where a public employee is disciplined for his or her speech and asserts First Amendment protection, the first question was whether the speech engaged in–here, Lane’s testimony at two federal criminal trials– was pursuant to the employee’s job duties. In this case, it was clear– even undisputed–that Lane’s testimony,  pursuant to subpoena, at trial, wasnot part of his ordinary job duties. Moreover, it was every citizen’s duty under subpoena to testify truthfully at trial. The Court emphatically rejected the misguided position of the Eleventh Circuit in this case that Lane’s speech was not that of a citizen but that of an employee because he testified about information arising out of his employment.

The second question–whether the speech dealt with a matter of public concern–was also easy to answer: Lane’s testimony dealt with the malfeasance of a state legislator in connection with the misuse of public funds. According to the Court, this was a classic case of whistle-blowing about public corruption. This was surely a matter of public concern. Consequently, the First Amendment was implicated here.

Finally, as to the Pickering balancing test, the Court observed that the various defendants never seriously argued that the balance should tip in favor of allowing Lane to be disciplined. There was no countervailing governmental interest whatever that would justify his firing.

Consequently, the First Amendment protected Lane from discipline for his truthful testimony.

The Opinion: Qualified Immunity

The defendant Franks was sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, which provides a damages remedy against state and local government officials who violate a person’s constitutional rights. See generally Nahmod, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2013). However, qualified immunity is a defense to damages liability where the defendant can show that the relevant constitutional law was not clearly settled at the time of the unconstitutional conduct, thereby not providing fair notice to the defendant that his or her conduct was unconstitutional.

Here, the Court agreed with defendant Franks’ argument that the relevant First Amendment law was not clearly settled in the Eleventh Circuit in January 2009 because, at best, there were Eleventh Circuit opinions going in different directions as to the applicability of the First Amendment to a public employee’s subpoenaed testimony at trial. And Garcetti itself did not address that question.

Comments

1. Lane is a major decision because of its unanimous ruling on the First Amendment issue. It is also significant because it’s the first Supreme Court decision to consider the implications of Garcetti, handed down in 2006. The Court soundly treated Lane’s testimony as citizen speech, even though it arose out of Lane’s employment.

2. The opinion expressly did not address the question whether the First Amendment should protect the truthful testimony of a public employee where that testimony is part of the employee’s job responsibilities. Nevertheless, I would argue that Garcetti should not preclude First Amendment application even here because the obligation of a public employee to testify truthfully arises from his or her status as a citizen, and this should trump the fact that the subpoenaed testimony is part of the employee’s job duties. This is where I would part company with the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito.

On the other hand, if the employee testifies falsely or misleadingly in such a situation, employer discipline should not be barred by the First Amendment.

3. Finally, the defendant in this case, Franks, was protected by qualified immunity because the relevant First Amendment law was not clearly settled at the time he terminated Lane, namely, January 2009. The Court therefore rejected Lane’s contention that, regardless of the Eleventh Circuit’s confusion on the matter,Garcetti itself established clearly settled law.

Nevertheless, Lane declares that as of June 19, 2014, the relevant First Amendment law regarding the truthful testimony of a public employee on a matter of public concern, which is not part of his or her job duties, is indeed protected from governmental discipline by the First Amendment. All public employers are now on notice of this clearly established law in the future.

x x x."

SCOTUS Rules to Protect Whistleblowing, yet Whistleblowers Aren’t Safe | VICE News

See -  SCOTUS Rules to Protect Whistleblowing, yet Whistleblowers Aren’t Safe | VICE News





"x x x.

The Supreme Court today ruled, unanimously, in favor of whistleblowers. The decision certifies that public employees testifying in court about official corruption receive the same First Amendment protections as all American citizens.

The case in question involved the firing of Edward Lane, a former Alabama Community College official, after he testified in the corruption trial of a state lawmaker. Lane should have been protected, the court ruled, because even though his testimony included facts learned at work, it was constitutionally protected as Lane offered it up as a citizen and it served the public interest.

The ruling seems to run counter to the current government line on whistleblowing. Chelsea Manning has begun her 35-year prison sentence and Edward Snowden is a fugitive facing Espionage Act charges... both for blowing the whistle. They released information profoundly in the public interest, revealing military atrocities and the terrifying scope of government spy craft.

The difference, of course, lies in the channels. The Supreme Court’s decision tells us about the government monopoly on truth. It is only when offered as court testimony that public-interest revelations receive state protections — which, of course, means that there is no such thing as public interest “per se,” but rather public interest as and when the authorities deem it so. It is not the purview of the public at all.

x x x.

Follow Natasha Lennard on Twitter:@natashalennard

x x x."

Fraternity violence in schools - 196735.pdf

See - 196735.pdf

Or see -  http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/may2014/196735.pdf





"x x x.



Ii is in the hallowed grounds of a university where students, faculty, and research personnel should feel safest. After all, this is where ideas that could probably solve the sordid realities in this world are peacefully nurtured and debated. Universities produce hope. They incubate all our youthful dreams.



Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu that trade misplaced concepts of perverse brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist because of past impunity. This has resulted in a senseless death whose justice is now the subject matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there are credible witnesses who present themselves courageously before an able and experienced trial court judge.



This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in this society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and suffer the legal consequences of their actions. They must do so for there is an individual who now lies dead, robbed of his dreams and the dreams of his family. Excruciating grief for them will never be enough.

x x x.

l)pon a finding of probable cause, an information is filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: 

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended pmiy; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. 

In People v. Wilson Lab-ea, 113 this court has stated that:

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the trial. 114 

Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information does not violate their constitutional rights. 

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as such.115 It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court. 

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.

The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance.116 What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity. 

The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of  their offenses. 

The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one is the act of all."117 This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not have done so.

In any case, the accused were being charged with the crime of murder, frustrated murder, . and attempted murder. All that is needed for the infornation to be sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the time, place, and persons involved in the offense.

x x x."

The Supreme Court decision on the RH Law | Inquirer Opinion

See - The Supreme Court decision on the RH Law | Inquirer Opinion





"x x x.

Duty to refer. Some provisions of the Reproductive Health Law commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs. In this case, the conscientious objector’s claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from the obligation to refer under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.

“Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modern reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs.

“The same holds true with respect to nonmaternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and healthcare service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of healthcare service providers should be respected.

“All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. ”

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of the child, the Court recognizes the applicability of the principle of double effect. A doctor is obliged to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other.

x x x."



Read more: http://opinion.inquirer.net/75435/the-supreme-court-decision-on-the-rh-law-2#ixzz347uI4zd2
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DOTC: Colorum buses to be slapped with P1-M fine | Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines

See - DOTC: Colorum buses to be slapped with P1-M fine | Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines





"x x x.

DOTC-LTFRB-LTO issue Revised Penalties for Road Transport Violations

In line with their aggressive push to rid the streets of “colorum” or unauthorized public utility vehicle (PUV) operations, the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB), and the Land Transportation Office (LTO) are issuing Joint Administrative Order (JAO) No. 2014-01 or the revised schedule of fines and penalties for violation of laws, rules, and regulations governing land transportation tomorrow, June 4, 2014.  It will take effect on June 19, or 15 days after tomorrow’s publication in two newspapers of general circulation.

“Safety is always our priority. Recent accidents have highlighted the need for harsher penalties to deter illegal PUV practices and to better protect the public. The most significant change we are imposing is the P 1-million fine on colorum bus operators for the first offense, to show that we really mean business in putting an end to their inimical activities which put people’s lives at risk,” said Secretary of Transportation Jun Abaya.

The fine for other first-time colorum offenders are: (1) Trucks – P 200,000; (2) Jeepney – P 50,000; (3) Vans – P 200,000; (4) Sedans – P 120,000; (5) Motorcycles – P 6,000.

Apart from these fines, the colorum vehicles will also be impounded for a minimum period of three months. The entire certificate of public convenience (CPC) to which the colorum vehicle belongs will be revoked, as well as their vehicle registrations. They will also be blacklisted from being used as PUVs in the future.

In case of a second offense, the entire fleet or all CPCs of the erring operator will be revoked, the vehicles will be blacklisted from being used as PUVs in the future, and their vehicle registrations will also be revoked. The violating operator—and in case of corporations, the stockholders and directors—lwill be disqualified from operating any kind of public land transportation.

The JAO covers other PUV-related violations as well, such as the refusal to render services to the public or to convey passengers to their destination; overcharging; employing reckless, insolent, discourteous, or arrogant drivers; operating PUVs with defective parts and accessories; using tampered taximeters; trip cutting; and others.

Abaya also clarified that “the order covers not only franchise violations, but all breaches of road transport rules and regulations, such as the failure to attach license plates and driving without a valid license,” Abaya added.

A P 5,000 fine will be imposed on those who fail to attach, and those who improperly attach or tamper with motor vehicle license plates and the third-plate stickers. This includes the attachment of any unauthorized accessory or device which impedes the visibility or reflectivity of the valid license plate or third-plate sticker. Unauthorized license plates and third-plate stickers will be confiscated in favor of the government.

Penalties for other violations, such as driving without a valid driver’s license; reckless driving; failure to wear a seatbelt; driving an unregistered motor vehicle; and other breaches of traffic rules and regulations, are also provided for in the JAO.

x x x."

Arizona prisoners win class-action status in health suit

See - Arizona prisoners win class-action status in health suit





"x x x.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on Thursday upheld the class-action status of a lawsuit alleging that Arizona's prison system overuses solitary confinement and provides inadequate health care.

The ruling essentially clears the way for the suit to go to trial in October. It also means that the more than 34,000 inmates in Arizona's 10 state-run prisons will be part of the suit, first filed in 2012, seeking wide-ranging changes in how the state's Department of Corrections confines inmates and treats — or fails to treat — their health- and mental-health-care problems.

The suit doesn't include just under 7,000 inmates in six private prisons under contract with the state. However, because inmates who develop chronic medical conditions or mental illness are typically transferred from the private prisons to state facilities, any of those inmates could potentially become part of the class as well.

RELATED: Arizona prison system sees high number of deaths

RELATED: Prison inmates in Arizona crying foul over medical care

MORE: Prison health care costly, ineffective

U.S. District Court Judge Neil Wake, in Phoenix, granted class-action status in March 2013; Arizona officials had appealed that ruling to the circuit court.

"The state of Arizona has long ignored the basic need of people confined in its prisons, including the constitutional mandate to provide adequate health care. Prisoners have suffered unnecessarily and even died while waiting for basic care," said David Fathi, director of the National Prison Project at the American Civil Liberties Union. Fathi argued the case to the appeals court on behalf of the ACLU and the Prison Law Office, a California group that filed the suit.

In a written statement, Department of Corrections officials said they disagree with the decision, but will not comment on details of the ruling.

"The allegations are not accurate, and the Department of Corrections looks forward to vigorously challenging them and presenting our case at trial," read the statement, provided by department spokesman Doug Nick.

Arizona officials had argued that prisoners don't have enough in common to be considered a class. In its decision, the appeals court said that given that "every inmate in ADC custody is likely to require medical, mental health and dental care, each of the named plaintiffs is similarly positioned to all other ADC inmates with respect to a substantial risk of serious harm resulting from exposure to the defendant's policies and practices governing health care."

Don Specter, director of the Prison Law Office, said the plaintiffs in the suit include "the seriously mentally ill and other prisoners whose mental health has markedly deteriorated in solitary confinement — weeks, months, sometimes years of extreme isolation and sensory deprivation. Sometimes the damage is permanent.

"Arizona must stop this cruel and unusual punishment," he said.

As The Arizona Republic has reported, from 2011 to 2013, Arizona's prison system had a suicide rate 60 percent higher than the national average. More than half the suicides were among prisoners held in solitary confinement, even though they accounted for 9 percent of the prison population. Inmates in solitary are kept in windowless units with lights on 24 hours a day.

x x x."

SC ruling on marital rape unprecedented

See - SC ruling on marital rape unprecedented





"x x x.

The Supreme Court has affirmed the conviction of a husband for raping his wife twice in 1998 and the two life imprisonments imposed on him by the trial court after finding him guilty of marital rape.

“Husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape,” the SC ruled citing the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

In a precedent-setting decision penned by Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, the high court stressed that the presumption of innocence of the husband was “sufficiently overcome by the wife’s clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will.”

It also said that the “evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from the wife’s narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of their two children and the physical evidence of wife’s torn panties and short pants.”

“Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the accused-appellant (husband) is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998,” the SC held.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno and Justices Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Martin S. Villarama Jr. concurred with the ruling.

The couple was married in 1975.  They have four children.

“Husband aggrieved by his wife’s unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make she yields,” the SC said.

“He (the husband) can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage,” it added.

Nonetheless, the SC warned “menacing personalities” who may use its decision on marital rape “as a tool to harass innocent husbands.”

“In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code and/or other laws,” the tribunal stressed.

x x x."

Though convicted of graft, this judge continued to rule | Opinion, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com

See - Though convicted of graft, this judge continued to rule | Opinion, News, The Philippine Star | philstar.com





"x x x.

This provincial mayor became a judge although on trial for graft. He even got posted to the plum Makati court. Subsequently sentenced, he went on paid leave for seven months. And while on leave he decided a huge money case.

Only in the Philippines? You bet. And the Supreme Court had better probe this 16-year-long farce – lest there be more.

The tale of The Honorable Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz began in 1998, when he became mayor of Dapitan City. In that capacity he caused his police chief to hand over P1 million in intelligence funds, for his personal use. For that he was indicted for graft and malversation before the Sandiganbayan in Mar. 2002.

While out on multiple bail and under trial, Hizzoner Ruiz was appointed judge of the Iloilo City regional trial court (RTC) in Feb. 2004. How he passed “rigid vetting” by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) begs for answers. Only persons of integrity and probity may become judge. Candidates must submit clearances from the Ombudsman and Sandigan. The Supreme Court’s Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), as the JBC secretariat, must verify their submissions.

The OCA also oversees transfers of judgeships. Three years after joining the Judiciary, Judge Ruiz was “promoted” to the Makati City RTC, where teem the country’s biggest financial lawsuits. As presider of the Makati RTC Branch 61, he heard cases from 2007 to May 2, 2013.

On Apr. 29, 2013, the Sandigan found Judge Ruiz guilty as charged. Sentence: imprisonment of six to eight years for graft, 12 to 18 years for malversation. In addition: perpetual bar from public office, return of P950,000 stolen from Dapitan City, and fine of P950,000. The Philippine STAR and three news websites published the conviction on May 2, 3, and 23, 2013.

Opinion ( Article MRec ), pagematch: 1, sectionmatch: 1

Before that on Apr. 3, Judge Ruiz had filed for eight days’ work leave, May 3-15, approved by the Makati executive judge. And before the leave expired, Judge Ruiz filed on May 14 and thrice more for extension till Nov. 29, 2013, again approved. Is a Sandigan sentence not effective immediately, to mean that Judge Ruiz no longer may hold court, much more go on paid leave?

There’s more. On May 2, 2013, two workdays after his conviction, Judge Ruiz rendered decisions on four money and land titling cases in his Branch 61. Then, on May 21, he filed with the OCA for two months’ extension of deadlines to decide five cases. Amazingly he listed among them the four he already had decided on May 2; the fifth involved an even bigger amount. His reason for the request was “the sheer volume of work” as presiding judge of Branch 61 and pairing judge of Branch 60 – yet he was then on leave starting May 3. What was he up to?

More amazingly, the OCA granted the request. Should not the OCA swiftly have suspended Judge Ruiz instead? Does it not keep track of Sandigan verdicts on Judiciary officers, or even of the news?

The plot thickens. The fifth case for which he filed on May 21 for more time to decide, Judge Ruiz actually decided on May 15, 2013. Meaning, he not only was asking for deadline extension for a case already decided – he actually ruled on it, then belatedly filed for delay when he was not reporting for work since May 3. Certifications show that he was not at work on May 15 and 21, nor on Oct. 1, the extended deadline. In fact, a new presiding judge of Branch 60, as pairing judge of Branch 61, already was hearing cases in the latter since a month before.

In that fifth case Judge Ruiz favored one side. Yet he skirted the other litigant’s more basic complaint about the wrong person filing it in the first place. Curiously, the pairing judge from Branch 60 affirmed Judge Ruiz’s ruling in absentia.

Epilogue: The Sandigan in Aug. 2013 trashed Judge Ruiz’s motion to reconsider his conviction. He quickly appealed to the Supreme Court in Sept. On the week of Oct. 1, the deferred deadline he had asked for to rule on the fifth case, he was also petitioning the SC for more time to complete his appeal papers. The deeds of Judge Ruiz, backed by documents two inches thick, also have been reported to the SC."

Read - 

- See more at: http://www.philstar.com/opinion/2014/05/12/1322063/though-convicted-graft-judge-continued-rule#sthash.LCvU304u.dpuf

Code of professional responsibiity

See - http://www.ibp.ph/d07.html

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CHAPTER I. THE LAW AND SOCIETY CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVE-NESS OF THE PROFESSION. Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed. Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s rights. Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business. Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant. CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS. Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased. Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently. Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING  THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS. Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. CHAPTER II. LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar. Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel. CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW. Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing. Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except: a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profitable sharing arrangement. CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired. Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings. Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only. CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its preferences. He should also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies. Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause. Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgement or misuse Court processes. Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the trial, while the witness is still under examination. Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another. Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him. Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except: a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like, or b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel. CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges. Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings. CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY. Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s race, sex, creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person. Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de oficio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid. Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless: a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or competently; b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a present client and the prospective client; Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients. CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. Rule 15.01 - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client. Rule 15.02 - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client. Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Rule 15.04 - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Rule 15.05 - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case. Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body. Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgements and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court. Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter. Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection there with shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information. CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW. Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding. Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court. Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure on handling the case. CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES. Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees: a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; c) The importance of the subject matter; d) The skill demanded; e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client form the service; h) The contingency or certainty of compensation; i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and j) The professional standing of the lawyer. Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in cases of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to a division of fees in proportion to work performed and responsibility assumed. Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client, accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from anyone other than the client. Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice of fraud. CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except: a) When authorized by the client after acquianting him of the consequences of the disclosure; b) When required by law; c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action. Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use he same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto. Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from his files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose. Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client. Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the client. Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client’s affairs even with members of his family. Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest. CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRTUMSTANCES. Rule 22.01 -A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases: a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules; c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client; d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively; e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement; f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and g) Other similar cases. Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter. The Code of Professionall Responsibility was initially drafted by the Committee on Professional Responsibility, Discipline and Disbarment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, composed of Dean Irene Cortes as Chairman and Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, Attys. Gonzalo W. Gonzalez, Marcelo B. Fernan, Camilo Quiason, Jose F. Espinosa and Carmelo V. Sison as members, with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes as consultants, and Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano and Atty.Concepcion Lim-Jardeleza as resource persons.

GUIDELINES FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS

See - http://www.ibp.ph/d06.html

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE

GUIDELINES FOR IMPOSING
LAWYER SANCTIONS

A.PURPOSE AND NATURE OF SANCTIONS

1.1 Purpose of Lawyer Discipline Proceedings
The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge properly their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.

1.2 Public Nature of Lawyer Discipline Proceedings
Upon the filing and service of formal charges, lawyer discipline proceedings should be public, and disposition of lawyer discipline should be public in cases of disbarment, suspension, and reprimand. Only in cases of minor misconduct, when there is little or no injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession, and when there is little likelihood of repetition by the lawyer, should private discipline be imposed.

1.3 Purpose of These Standards
These standards are designed for use in imposing a sanction or sanctions following a determination by clear and convincing evidence that a member of the legal profession has violated a provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Descriptions in these standards of substantive disciplinary offenses are not intended to create grounds for determining culpability independent of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Standards constitute a model, setting forth a comprehensive system for determining sanctions, permitting flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: (1) consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the appropriate level of sanction in an individual case; (2) consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; (3) consistency in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar offenses within and among jurisdictions.

B. SANCTIONS

2.1 Scope

A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that the lawyer has engaged in professional misconduct.

2.2 Disbarment
Disbarment terminates the individual’s status as a lawyer. Where disbarment is not permanent, procedures should be established for a lawyer who has been disbarred to apply for readmission, provided that:

(1) no application should be considered for five years from the effective date of disbarment; and
(2) the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence:
(a) successful completion of the bar examination;
(b) compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders or rules; and
(c) rehabilitation and fitness to practice law.

2.3 Suspension
Suspension is the removal of a lawyer from the practice of law for a specified minimum period of time. Generally, suspension should be for a period of time equal to or greater than six months, but in no event should the time period prior to application for reinstatement be more than three years. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to apply for reinstatement, but a lawyer who has been suspended should not be permitted to return to practice until he has completed a reinstatement process demonstrating rehabilitation, compliance with all applicable discipline or disability orders and rules, and fitness to practice law.

2.4 Interim Suspension
Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending imposition of final discipline. Interim suspension includes:
(a) suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime” or,
(b) suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause immediate and serious injury to a client or the public.

2.5 Reprimand
Reprimand, also known as censure or public censure, is a form of public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.

2.6 Admonition
Admonition, also known as private reprimand, is a form of non-public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer’s right to practice.

2.7 Probation
Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be imposed alone or in conjunction with a reprimand or an admonition; probation can also be imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement.

2.8 Other Sanctions and Remedies
Other sanctions and remedies which may be imposed include:
(a) restitution,
(b) assessment of costs,
(c) limitation upon practice,
(d) appointment of a receiver,
(e) requirement that the lawyer take the bar examination or professional responsibility examination,
(f) requirement that the lawyer attend continuing education courses, and
(g) other requirements that the state’s highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with the purposes of lawyer sanctions.

2.9 Reciprocal Discipline
Reciprocal discipline is the imposition of a disciplinary sanction for conduct for which a lawyer has been disciplined in another jurisdiction.

2.10 Readmission and Reinstatement
In jurisdictions where disbarment is not permanent, procedures should be established to allow a disbarred lawyer to apply for readmission. Procedures should be established to allow a suspended lawyer to apply for reinstatement.

C. FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
IMPOSING SANCTIONS

3.0 Generally
In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, a court should consider the following factors:

(a) the duty violated;
(b) the lawyer’s mental state; and
(c) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

4.0 Violations of Duties Owed to Clients

4.1 Failure to Preserve the Client’s Property
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:

4.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.

4.2 Failure to Preserve the Client’s Confidences
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving the failure to preserve client property:

4.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, knowingly reveals information relating to representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly reveals information relating to the representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed, and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently reveals information relating to representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed and this disclosure causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently reveals information relating to representation of a client not otherwise lawfully permitted to be disclosed and this disclosure causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.

4.3 Failure to Avoid Conflicts of Interest
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving conflicts of interest:

4.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, without the informed consent of client(s):

(a) engages in representation of a client knowing that the lawyer’s interests are adverse to the client’s with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to the client; or
(b) simultaneously represents clients that the lawyer knows have adverse interests with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
(c) represents a client in a matter substantially related to a matter in which the interests of a present or former client are materially adverse, and knowingly uses information relating to the representation of a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.

4.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer’s own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect another client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.34 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether the representation of a client may be materially affected by the lawyer’s own interests, or whether the representation will adversely affect another client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.

4.4 Lack of Diligence
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving a failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client:

4.41 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer abandons the practice and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
(b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or
(c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client.

4.42 Suspension is generally appropriate when:
(a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or
(b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.43 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.44 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent and does not act with reasonable diligence in representing a client, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.

4.5 Lack of Competence
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factor set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving failure to provide competent representation to a client:

4.51 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer’s course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer’s conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.52 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an area of practice in which the lawyer knows he or she is not competent, and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.53 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:

(a) demonstrates failure to understand relevant legal doctrines or procedures and causes injury or potential injury to a client; or
(b) is negligent in determining whether he or she is competent to handle a legal matter and causes injury or potential injury to a client.

4.54 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether he or she is competent to handle a legal matter, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client.

4.6 Lack of Candor Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases where the lawyer engages in fraud, deceit, misrepresentation directed toward a client:

4.61 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a client.

4.62 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.

4.63 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes injury or potential injury to the client.

4.64 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in failing to provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to the client.

5.0 Violations of Duties Owed to the Public

5.1 Failure to Maintain Personal Integrity
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the facts set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or in cases with conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation:

5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or

(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.

5.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.

5.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in any other conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation and that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.

5.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any other conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.

5.2 Failure to Maintain the Public Trust Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving public officials who engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or who state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official:

5.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position knowingly misuses the position with the intent to obtain a significant benefit or advantage for himself or another, or with the intent to cause serious or potentially serious injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.

5.22 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position knowingly fails to follow proper procedures or rules, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.

5.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position negligently fails to follow proper procedures or rules, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.

5.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position engages in an isolated instance of negligence in not following proper procedures or rules, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.

6.0 Violations of Duties Owed to the Legal System

6.1 False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to a court:

6.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

6.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial action when material information is being withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

6.14 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of neglect in determining whether submitted statements or documents are false or in failing to disclose material information upon learning of its falsity, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding.

6.2 Abuse of the Legal Process
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving failure to expedite litigation or bring a meritorious claim, or failure to obey any obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists:

6.21 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.

6.22 Suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

6.23 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to comply with a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or other party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

6.24 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in complying with a court order or rule, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no actual or potential interference with a legal proceeding.

6.3 Improper Communications With Individuals in the Legal System
Absent aggravating or mitigating circumstances, upon application of the factors set out in Standard 3.0, the following sanctions are generally appropriate in cases involving attempts to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law:

6.31 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:

(a) intentionally tampers with a witness and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding; or
(b) makes an ex parte communication with a judge or juror with intent to affect the outcome of the proceeding, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding; or
(c) improperly communicates with someone in the legal system other than a witness, judge, or juror with the intent to influence or affect the outcome of the proceeding, and causes significant or potentially significant interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.

6.32 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in communication with an individual in the legal system when the lawyer knows that such communication is improper, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or causes interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.

6.33 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in determining whether it is proper to engage in communication with an individual in the legal system, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or interference or potential interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.

6.34 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in improperly communicating with an individual in the legal system, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a party, or causes little or no actual or potential inference with the outcome of the legal proceeding.

7.0 Violations of Duties Owed to the Profession

7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

7.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

7.4 Admonition is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether the lawyer’s conduct violates a duty owed to the profession, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.

8.0 Prior Discipline Orders

8.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or
(b) has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.

8.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer has been reprimanded for the same or similar misconduct and engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.

8.3 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
(a) negligently violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or
(b) has received an admonition for the same or similar misconduct and engages in further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.

8.4 An admonition is generally not an appropriate sanction when a lawyer violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order or when a lawyer has engaged in the same or similar misconduct in the past.

9.0 Aggravation and Mitigation

9.1 Generally After misconduct has been established, aggravating and mitigating circumstances may be considered in deciding what sanction to impose

9.2 Aggravation

9.21 Definition. Aggravation or aggravating circumstances are any considerations, or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.

9.22 Factors which may be considered in aggravation. Aggravating factors include:
(a) prior disciplinary offenses;
(b) dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) a pattern of misconduct;
(d) multiple offenses;
(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) indifference to making restitution.

9.3 Mitigation

9.31 Definition. Mitigation or mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed.

9.32 Factors which may be considered in mitigation. Mitigating factors include:
(a) absence of a prior disciplinary record;
(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive;
(c) personal or emotional problems;
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
(e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
(f) inexperience in the practice of law;
(g) character or reputation;
(h) physical or mental disability or impairment;
(i) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(j) interim rehabilitation;
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(l) remorse;
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.

9.4 Factors Which Are Neither Aggravating Nor Mitigating. The following factors should not be considered as either aggravating or mitigating:
(a) forced or compelled restitution;
(b) agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper behavior or result;
(c) withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
(d) resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
(e) complainant’s recommendation as to sanction;
(f) failure of injured client to complain.