Consideration in a contract is presumed; how to overcome the presumption

SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P. SAGUID vs. SECURITY FINANCE, INC., G.R. No. 159467, December 9, 2005

“x x x.

Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration^[28] exists and is lawful unless the debtor proves the contrary.^[29] Moreover, under Section 3(r) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that there is a sufficient consideration for a contract. The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration.^[30] To overcome the presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence.^[31]

In proving that there is no consideration for the aforementioned documents, petitioners proffered in evidence the following documents that showed that they bought the subject vehicle in cash and not in installment basis: (a) Vehicle Sales Invoice No. 7104;^[32] (b) Vehicle Delivery Note;^[33] (c) Official Receipts No. 208646^[34] and No. 208648;^[35] (d) Certificate of Registration No. 32862328;^[36] and (e) Official Receipt No. 40459605.^[37] In addition, Ms. Zenaida Maralit of Toyota Balintawak, Inc. confirmed that the subject car was indeed paid in cash and not through financing for the reasons that the originals of the Certificate of Registration and the Official Receipt of the subject vehicle have not been marked as encumbered by the Land Transportation Office and are in the possession of the buyer. She added that respondent is not accredited in Toyota Balintawak, Inc. She testified:

Q: Madam Witness, do you know if this vehicle was purchased in cash or through financing?

A: It was purchased in cash.

Q: What proof do you have to show that it was purchased in cash?

A: There was an invoice cash return.

Q: By the way, being the head of the Credit and Collection, what are your duties and functions?

A: We are in-charge of collection, we are in-charge of the documentation with LTO, insurance and financing documents.

Q: As far as the purchase of vehicle through financing, what is your specific duty?

A: We are the one who asked the client to sign the documents.

Q: Will you tell the Honorable Court what is the procedure in case the vehicle is purchased from your office through financing?

A: After the client signed the documents, we get all the requirements based on the credit advice issued by the financing company. So together with the documents and all the requirements, valid ID, post dated checks, we are the one transmitting them to the financing company and after processing, the financing company gave us the proceed two to four days after the release of the vehicle.

Q: As far as the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt are concerned, what did you do with them if the vehicle was purchased through financing?

A: If it was through financing, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration goes to the financing company. We are the one transmitting them. Only the xerox copies of the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration go to the client through financing transaction.

Q: As far as the security of the financing company, when it comes to purchase of vehicle through financing, what do you do with the Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration?

A: The LTO marked there encumbered. It means it was mortgaged to that particular financing company.

Q: Where it was marked?

A: At the Certificate of Registration, it was marked encumbered.

Q: On the face?

A: On the face.

Q: Do you have any policy as far as your company is concerned with regards to the purchase of vehicle through financing?

A: We have only the accredited financing companies.

Q: Is the plaintiff herein, Security Finance, accredited in your company?

A: No, not even in one transaction.

Q: What would be the significance if the original copy of the Certificate of Registration and the corresponding Official Receipt is in the possession of the buyer?

A: That means it was on cash transaction.^[38]

On the other hand, respondent, through Rosauro G. Maghirang, Jr., Vice-President for Marketing, said that it paid the dealer in checks and that they have proof of payment. He testified:

Q: Mr. witness, you said you paid the dealer. In what form did you pay the dealer?

A: In checks, sir.

Q: Do you have any proof of your payment?

A: Yes, sir. ^[39]

It is thus clear that the subject car was bought in cash and not through financing via respondent. We find the evidence presented by respondent to be unreliable and erratic. The testimony of Rosauro Maghirang, Jr. that respondent paid Toyota Balintawak, Inc. is simply unsubstantiated by competent evidence. If respondent truly paid the dealer how come it never presented the checks it used to pay Toyota Balintawak, Inc.? Even assuming arguendo that respondent released the loan proceeds to petitioners, the same would be inconsistent with its allegation that it was the one that paid the dealer. Furthermore, another telltale sign that strengthens the claim of petitioners that they did not transact with respondent for a loan was the fact that the alleged loan/credit application^[40] was not signed by any or both of them.

X x x.”

Elements of valid contract

SPOUSES NORA SAGUID and ROLANDO P. SAGUID vs. SECURITY FINANCE, INC., G.R. No. 159467, December 9, 2005

“x x x.

To ascertain whether or not petitioners are bound by the promissory note and chattel mortgage, it must be established that all the elements of a contract of loan are present. Like any other contract, a contract of loan is governed by the rules as to the requisites and validity of contracts in general. It is basic and elementary in this jurisdiction that what determines the validity of a contract, in general, is the presence of the elements constituting the same, namely: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is established.[26] In this case, petitioners insist the third element is lacking since they never transacted with respondent for the proceeds of the loan which were used in purchasing the subject motor vehicle.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners transacted with respondent and are bound by the promissory note and chattel mortgage they signed. It anchored its ruling on the admission of petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed said documents. Citing Section 4, Rule 129[27] of the Rules of Court, it reasoned out that petitioner Rolando Saguids bare denial cannot qualify the admission he made during pre-trial and during trial that they transacted with respondent and executed the aforesaid documents. It brushed aside the explanation made by petitioner Rolando Saguid that he signed the same in blank and only as preparation for a loan application presented to him by Sonny Quijano.

From the record, it is clear that what petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted was only his signatures in the aforementioned documents and not the contents thereof. In petitioners Answer, Rolando Saguid admitted signing the promissory note in preparation for an application for loan upon the request of Sonny Quijano who promised to facilitate the same for the purchase of another motor vehicle to be converted into a taxicab, but not with respondent. During trial, Rolando Saguid explained the circumstances under which he signed the documents with emphasis that he signed them in blank.

We find that the Court of Appeals committed an error when it closed its eyes to the clarification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on the ground that same belied his admission. The rule that an admission cannot be contradicted unless it can be shown that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made will not apply under the circumstances obtaining in this case. It does not follow that the admission of the signatures carries with it the admission of the contents of the documents especially when the person who affixed his signatures thereon questions its execution and the veracity of the details embodied therein. Petitioners could have been bound by the terms and conditions of the promissory note and chattel mortgage if petitioner Rolando Saguid admitted not only his signatures but also as to what are contained therein. This is not to be in the case before us. Petitioners can therefore adduce evidence that would nullify or invalidate both the promissory note and the chattel mortgage. In other words, they can show that the elements of the contract of loan are wanting.

The Court of Appeals held that it was not in a proper position to entangle itself in resolving the matter as regards the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid on his admission because whatever the documents he signed in favor of Mr. Quijano is not the concern of the court as the same is not one of the issues presented before it, and that Mr. Quijano is not a party in the case. Petitioners claim that if only the Court of Appeals ruled on the matter, it could have ruled in their favor and sustained the decision of the trial court.

The Court of Appeals should have ruled on the same it being the primal defense of petitioners. It should not have wholly disregarded the qualification made by petitioner Rolando Saguid considering that said defense can easily be supported by other competent evidence. Instead of relying heavily on the admitted signatures, it should have evaluated other evidence that could have either bolstered or disproved the defense of petitioners.

X x x.”

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, FEBrUARY 6, 2007.

“x x x.

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[71]

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text[72] of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.[73]

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

X x x.”

Divorce by alien spouse; effect on Filipino spouse; latter is allowed to remarry.

EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, FEBrUARY 6, 2007.

“x x x.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.^[52] involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.^[53]

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.^[54] (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera^[55] where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.^[56]

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,^[57] the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.^[58] Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.^[59] In Garcia v. Recio,^[60] the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.^[61]

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,^[62] the historical background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code.  A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26.  All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.  The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.^[63] (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.^[64] Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15^[65] and 17^[66] of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.^[67] In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,^[68] the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law, so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, where these words import a policy that goes beyond them.

x x x x

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due.That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.^[69]

X x x.”

Common-law spouse is co-owner; may file petition for letters of administration, be appointed as estate administrator

EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, FEBRUARY 6, 2007.

“x x x.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by aninterested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.[75]

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144[76] of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.[77]

X x x.”

Article 148 of the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry

EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, FEBrUARY 6, 2007.

“x x x.

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79] we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.[80] The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

x x x x

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. x x x[81]

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

X x x.”

Venue for intestate/estate administration and settlement; probate; Rule 73; residence vs. domicile.

EDGAR SAN LUIS VS. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, FEBrUARY 6, 2007.

“x x x.

Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.[41] (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with domicile. The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between residence for purposes of election laws and residence for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.[43] Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[44] dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements[45] from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association[46]and Ayala Country Club, Inc.,[47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards[49] stating that his home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court[50] which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.[51] Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

X x x.”

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty.

JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015 

“x x x. 

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this court previously explained: 

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.45 (Citation omitted) 

X x x. 

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states: 

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: 

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete instrument or document; 

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and 

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied) 

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: 

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—. . . 

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document— 

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and 

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. 

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,47 we stated that "[i]t is obvious that the party acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary public[.]"48 Furthermore, this court pronounced that: 

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.49 (Citations omitted) 

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document. 

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee. 

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery became real. 

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50 Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51 Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,52 and Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the presence of the parties. In Linco, Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing those documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of another despite lack of authorization.54 In these cases, this court imposed the penalty of disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,55 the respondent lawyer notarized 22 public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.56 This court suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary public.57

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "[a] lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes. 

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts[.]" 

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, "wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this infraction. 

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this court’s directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation.61 The lawyer complied with the order to file a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.62 Likewise, she complied with the order to comment through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her delay.63 This court found that the lawyer’s "conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.’"64

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into account all his acts of misconduct. 

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to comply with an order from this court. Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

X x x .” 

JIMMY ANUDON and JUANITA ANUDON vs. ATTY. ARTURO B. CEFRA, A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015 

“x x x. 

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of duty. 

X x x. 

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As this court previously explained: 

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative offices generally.45 (Citation omitted) 

X x x. 

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 states: 

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—"Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: 

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally complete instrument or document; 

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and 

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied) 

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further: 

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—. . . 

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document— 

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and 

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. 

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. In Gamido v. New Bilibid Prisons Officials,47 we stated that "[i]t is obvious that the party acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary public[.]"48 Furthermore, this court pronounced that: 

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds.49 (Citations omitted) 

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary public acknowledging the document. 

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true, Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the representations of the vendee. 

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of forgery became real. 

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50 Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51 Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,52 and Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of notarizing documents without the presence of the parties. In Linco, Lanuzo, and Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing those documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the respondent, like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of another despite lack of authorization.54 In these cases, this court imposed the penalty of disqualification as notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year. 

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,55 the respondent lawyer notarized 22 public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those documents.56 This court suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law for one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary public.57

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires "[a] lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty. Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply with this order until he was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty. Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes. 

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts[.]" 

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, "wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court" constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in 2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in2008. Clearly, his disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this infraction. 

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with this court’s directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s Manifestation.61 The lawyer complied with the order to file a Rejoinder only after being detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days.62 Likewise, she complied with the order to comment through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months without explaining her delay.63 This court found that the lawyer’s "conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.’"64

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to take into account all his acts of misconduct. 

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well as failure to comply with an order from this court. Accordingly, this court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from being commissioned as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 

X x x .”