Wednesday, June 13, 2012

Ignorance of the law; judicial delay. - A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1781

"x x x.


At the outset, the Court notes that Judge Literato’s Decision dated April 28, 2009in Civil Case No. 632 was appealed to the RTC.  Thus, any issue concerning the propriety of said decision now rests with the RTC.  The present administrative case is limited to Judge Literato’s alleged disregard of the rules and delay in rendering judgment in Civil Case No. 632.

Significant herein is Section 7 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides:

Sec. 7.  Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held.  The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof.  This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference. (Emphasis supplied.)


There is no question that Civil Case No. 632, a case for ejectment, is covered by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.  It is equally undisputed that in summary procedure, a preliminary conference should be held not later than 30 days after the last answer has been filed.  Considering that no preliminary conference at all was held in Civil Case No. 632, Judge Literato evidently failed to comply with a basic rule of procedure for which he should accordingly be held accountable.       

Judge Literato’s inaction in Civil Case No. 632 for 322 days constitutes utter disregard for the summary nature of an ejectment case.

Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. In general, courts are required to decide cases submitted for decision within three months from the date of such submission.[14]  With respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment.[15]  

Competence is a mark of a good judge.  When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts.  It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.  Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.[16]

There is no showing herein that Judge Literato required the parties to file their position papers.  Dr. Ramie Hipe filed her Answer in Civil Case No. 632 on January 21, 2008.  Dr. Ramie Hipe also filed her motion to resolve her affirmative defenses onMarch 31, 2009, which was heard and submitted for resolution by Judge Literato onJune 10, 2008.  Judge Literato’s next action thereafter was to render a Decision in Civil Case No. 632 on April 28, 2009.  Even if the Court counts only from June 10, 2008 (the latest incident in Civil Case No. 632), it took Judge Literato 322 days to finally dispose of the case.

Judge Literato irrefragably failed to promptly decide Civil Case No. 632 in accordance with the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.  Judge Literato’s inaction in Civil Case No. 632 is contrary to the rationale behind the Rule on Summary Procedure, which was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.[17] 

The Court cannot stress enough the importance of prompt and expeditious resolution of cases.  The Court reiterates its pronouncement in Sanchez v. Vestil[18]:

This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied.  Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary.  Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.  Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them.[19]


Judge Literato explains his delay in resolving Civil Case No. 632 by citing his duties in other courts throughout Surigao del Norte.  Such an excuse is unacceptable.  The additional court assignments or designations imposed upon Judge Literato does not make him less liable for the delay.[20]  As the Court ruled in EspaƱola v. Panay,[21] if the caseload of the judge prevents the disposition of cases within the reglementary periods, he should ask this Court for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of the cases involved.  This is to avoid or dispel any suspicion that something sinister or corrupt is going on.  Judge Literato never made such a request.  Instead, he kept his silence and left Civil Case No. 632, an ejectment case falling under the Revised Rule for Summary Procedure, pending for nearly a year.

In sum, Judge Literato is administratively guilty of gross ignorance of the Rule on Summary Procedure and undue delay in rendering a decision. 

Under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge.  Section 11(A) of the same Rule provides that the penalty to be imposed if a respondent Judge is found guilty of a serious charge is either a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months, or dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.  

Section 9 of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, classifies undue delay in rendering a decision and violation of Supreme Court circulars as a less serious charge for which the penalty is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine of P10,000.00 to P20,000.00.

Section 17 of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Civil Service Law states that if the respondent Judge is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or counts and the rest may be considered aggravating circumstances. 

The most serious of the charges against Judge Literato is his gross ignorance of the Rule on Summary Procedure, and his undue delay in deciding Civil Case No. 632 is considered an aggravating circumstance.  Another aggravating circumstance is the fact that Judge Literato was previously charged and found guilty of gross inefficiency and gross negligence in A.M. No. 03-10-250-MCTC, for which he had been finedP20,000.00. [22]

However, the Court takes into consideration that aside from his regular station in MTC-Taganaan, Surigao del Norte, Judge Literato sits as acting judge in the MTC-Mainit, and the MCTCs of Dapa, Socorro; Claver, Gicaquit; Del Carmen-Numancia, San Isidro, San Benito; General Luna, Pilar; Malimono, San Francisco; Placer, Bacnag; Sta. Monica, Burgos; and Tubod, Alegria.  Additionally, Judge Literato has been in the service of the judiciary for 26 years.

Given the foregoing, the penalty of fine in the amount of P30,000.00[23] is deemed commensurate with Judge Literato’s infractions.

x x x."

Court staff dismissed for misconduct - A.M. No. P-09-2720

A.M. No. P-09-2720

"x x x.


 Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public’s respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness.

            In the instant case, records reveal that the conduct of respondent fell short of this standard. The acts described in the complaint, the testimony of complainant and the witness, and the Executive Judge's report clearly established that respondent is guilty of (a) discourtesy and disrespect to superiors; (b) solicitation of gifts; and (c) influence peddling in the litigants' applications for bail bond.  Respondent’s acts constitute misconduct, which the Court will not tolerate.

        Clearly, respondent's shouting at complainant within the court premises, reporting complainant to the police after she was reprimanded for her solicitation, and refusing to talk with complainant judge are not only acts of discourtesy and disrespect but likewise an unethical conduct sanctioned by Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
     
       High-strung and belligerent behavior has no place in government service where the personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and insolence. Such conduct is exacted from them so that they will earn and keep the public’s respect for and confidence in the judicial service. This standard is applied with respect to a court employee’s dealings not only with the public but also with his or her co-workers in the service. Conduct violative of this standard quickly and surely erodes respect for the courts.[13]

          We are appalled that respondent apparently sees nothing wrong with asking or soliciting money from politicians. We have constantly reminded court employees that such act is highly improper conduct as all forms of solicitations and receipt of contributions, directly or indirectly, are prohibited. That is why, the Court provides the rule against any form of solicitations of gift or other pecuniary or material benefits or receipts of contributions for himself/herself from any person, whether or not a litigant or lawyer, to avoid any suspicion that the major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official duties.[14]

Soliciting is prohibited under The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.  Section 2, Canon I thereof provides that "[c]ourt personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions," while Section 2 (e), Canon III states that "Court personnel shall not x x x solicit or accept any gift, loan, gratuity, discount, favor, hospitality or service under circumstances from which it could reasonably be inferred that a major purpose of the donor is to influence the court personnel in performing official duties."[15]

         Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Thus, considering respondent's transgressions, i.e., disrespectful conduct, solicitation, and influence peddling of bail bonds, there is no question that respondent is guilty of grave misconduct.

As noted by the Court Administrator, this Court could no longer impose the penalty of dismissal from the service, because respondent has already resigned.  We likewise agree that her resignation does not render the complaint against her moot. Resignation is not, and should not, be a convenient way or strategy to evade administrative liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanction.[16]

         Under Section 52 (A) (2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, grave misconduct is classified as a grave offense meriting the penalty of dismissal from service. Thus, in the instant case, despite respondent's resignation, the Court deemed it proper to impose the corresponding disciplinary measures and sanctions, to wit: forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if there are still any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.

         WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent EDITHA R. MANGAHAS,GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, her retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, are FORFEITED. She is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIEDfor reemployment in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
        
SO ORDERED.

x x x."

Erring clerk of court. - A.M. No. P-11-3002

A.M. No. P-11-3002

"x x x.



Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[10] Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only must their conduct at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond suspicion.[11] 
Thus, the Court does not hesitate to condemn and sanction such improper conduct, act or omission of those involved in the administration of justice that violates the norm of public accountability and diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the public in the Judiciary.[12]  

It is clear in the findings of the audit team, as bolstered by Nini’s admission, that irregularities in the administration of court funds were indeed committed.  In her explanation,[13] Nini chiefly blamed her heavy workload for the lapses discovered by the audit team. She attributed her shortcomings to the heavy weight of her responsibilities as an accountable officer and an officer of the court performing the tasks of an administrative officer, liaison officer and supply and property custodian. Due to this, she would often deposit funds beyond the time allowed, resulting in unremitted interest and forfeited cashbonds.  Everytime she would cause the withdrawal of interest of fiduciary funds, her practice was to place the amount inside an envelope to be locked inside her vault together with other envelopes containing collections from different funds, decisions of cases due for promulgation, unused official receipts, and marked money used as evidence in criminal cases.

Undoubtedly, Nini failed to perform her duty to the degree expected of her office. Settled is the role of clerks of court as judicial officers entrusted with the delicate function with regard to collection of legal fees. They are expected to correctly and effectively implement regulations relating to proper administration of court funds. Clerks of court perform a delicate function as designated custodians of the court's funds, revenues, records, properties, and premises. As such, they are generally regarded as treasurer, accountant, guard, and physical plant manager thereof. It is also their duty to ensure that the proper procedures are followed in the collection of cash bonds. Clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns.[14]  Hence, in case of a lapse in the performance of their sworn duties, the Court finds no room for tolerance and is then constrained to impose the necessary penalty to the erring officer.  Surely, Nini must have been acquainted with the tasks of her office. She is expected to have assumed her office with a degree of competence and alacrity worthy of this esteemed position in the Judiciary. Hence, she should have been ready to discharge her sworn duties with the conviction to do away with whining and nitpicking. The Court cannot countenance this attitude, lest pardons for ineptitude become the practice in its ranks. Indeed, the Court zealously aims to safeguard the people’s faith in the Judiciary by improving the route by which justice is served.  Certainly, an officer who constantly bleats about the complexity of his responsibilities resultantly neglects his duties. Such an officer does not aid in the Judiciary’s goal and must then bear the appropriate penalty.

It is hereby emphasized that it is the duty of clerks of court to perform their responsibilities faithfully, so that they can fully comply with the circulars on deposits of collections.  They are reminded to deposit immediately with authorized government depositaries the various funds they have collected because they are not authorized to keep those funds in their custody.[15]  The fact that the collected amounts were kept in the safety vault does not reduce the degree of defiance of the rules.

Records show that SC Circular Nos. 13-92 and 5-93 were not followed by Nini. These issuances provide the guidelines for the proper administration of court funds. The former orders that all fiduciary collections “shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned upon receipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary bank,” while the latter designates the Landbank of the Philippines, as such. Further, the irregularities found by the audit team point to Nini’s ignorance of Circular No. 50-95, which mandates that all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits, and other fiduciary collections should be deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) upon receipt by the Clerk of Court within twenty-four (24) hours.

Safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to an orderly administration of justice, and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars designed to promote full accountability   for government funds.[16]Nini’sunwarranted failure to fulfill these responsibilities deserves administrative sanction. 

Delay in the remittance of collection constitutes neglect of duty.[17] Further, the Court has stated that the failure to remit judiciary collections on time deprives the court of the interest that may be earned if the amounts are deposited in a bank.[18] Under the Civil Service Rules and Omnibus Rules Implementing it, simple neglect of duty is a less grave offense penalized with suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.[19]

It bears stressing that Clerks of Court are the chief administrative officers of their respective courts, and, with regard to the collection of legal fees, they perform a delicate function as judicial officers entrusted with the correct and effective implementation of regulations thereon. Even the undue delay in the remittances of amounts collected by them at the very least constitutes misfeasance. On the other hand, a vital administrative function of a judge is the effective management of his court and this includes control of the conduct of the court’s ministerial officers. It should be brought home to both that the safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to the goal of an orderly administration of justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the Circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds.[20]

With this in mind, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the OCA that Presiding Judge Manreal should be reminded to exercise his administrative duty and strictly monitor the financial transactions of MTCC, Bogo CityCebu, in strict compliance with the issuances of the Court.

x x x."

Ignoring SC orders - A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667

"x x x.


Resolutions of this Court should not be treated lightly. As a judge, respondent must be the first to exhibit respect for authority.[20]  Gaspar v. Adaoag[21] teaches: 
          Judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher tribunals much more so this Court from which all other courts should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request and should not be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.
The disrespect of respondent becomes more pronounced as the Court has noted that to date, he has not even complied with its latest Resolution of February 2, 2011 nor adequately complied with the Decision dated September 27, 2007.
In Guerrero v. Judge Deray,[22] the Court held that a judge “who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of [the Supreme] Courtis guilty of gross misconduct and insubordination.”   This ruling was reiterated in Dela Cruz v. Vallarta[23] and Visbal v. Tormis.[24]  Also in Guerrero, this Court held that “indifference or defiance to the Court’s orders or resolutions may be punished with dismissal, suspension or fine as warranted by the circumstances.”[25]
          In the present case, we find that Judge Go failed to heed the above pronouncements. He did not file the required comment to our show cause resolutions despite several opportunities granted him by this Court. His willful disobedience and disregard to our show-cause resolutions constitutes grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office.[26] It is noteworthy that Judge Go was afforded several opportunities to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending before his court and to comply with the directives of this Court, but he has failed, and continuously refuses to heed the same. This continued refusal to abide by lawful directives issued by this Court is glaring proof that he has become disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he purports to belong.[27]
In view of the foregoing, we find that the dismissal of the respondent judge from service is indeed warranted.  This Court has long maintained the policy of upholding competence and integrity in the administration of justice.  Incompetence and inefficiency have no place in the judiciary.  Respondent’s indifference to the charges against him only proves his lack of commitment to the duties of his office, making him unfit to continue in public service.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge James V. Go, presiding judge of theMunicipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Butuan City is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY.
          SO ORDERED.

x x x."

Failure to pay just debts - A.M No. P-11-3003

A.M No. P-11-3003

"x x x.


Before the Court is an administrative complaint for failure to pay just debts, dishonesty and extortion filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro (Lazaro), a retired schools district supervisor of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya against respondents Edna and Bonifacio Magallanes (spouses Magallanes). Edna Magallanes is a Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 28; while Bonifacio Magallanes is a Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, both of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.


The facts are as follows:
Complainant Lazaro lent to respondent spouses Magallanes a total of 135,000 on four separate occasions in the first half of 2005. Respondents offered two land titles and a revolver as collaterals for the loan. One of the land titles turned out to have been encumbered in the amount of 400,000.
Because respondents did not make any payment in spite of promises to do so, complainant was forced to bring the matter to the Barangay Lupon on 04 August 2007. The parties reached an amicable settlement, whereby respondents promised to pay their obligation by 30 August 2007. However, Lazaro received only token amounts of 5,000 and 3,000 from the spouses Magallanes.
In their Comment dated 30 October 2008, respondents admit incurring the aforesaid loans, but deny the charges in the Complaint. They also claim that they have already paid 77,000 of their total obligation. Moreover, they contend that, had they defaulted on their payments, Lazaro should have forfeited in her favor the collaterals they had offered to secure the loans.
On 03 December 2010, the Court received Lazaro’s 29 November 2010 Affidavit of Desistance which stated that complainant did not want to pursue the administrative complaint anymore, and that she agreed to settle the matter amicably with respondents.
On 07 December 2010, we also received a handwritten amicable settlement dated 05 December 2010 signed by the parties. In the document, respondents promised to pay a total of 120,000 inclusive of the remaining loan balance of 70,000 and interest of50,000 upon the dismissal of the case.
On 08 August 2011, the Court received a letter dated 29 July 2011 signed by complainant Lazaro, reporting that spouses Magallanes had paid her the whole amount of 120,000 on 23 June 2011. She also reported that respondents had expressed their sorrow and asked for pardon for the discomfort and trouble they had caused her. She then reiterated her request that the Complaint she filed be dismissed.
This Court has consistently ruled that the withdrawal of a Complaint does not warrant its dismissal, because the issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action against the erring court employee, but whether the latter has breached the court’s norms and standards.[1] This Court has an interest in the conduct and behavior of all employees of the judiciary.
Accordingly, we find spouses Magallanes not guilty of willful failure to pay just debts, considering that they have paid their entire obligation including the interest on the loan.
However, we note with strong displeasure the conduct of respondent spouses Magallanes, who obtained several loans without paying for them at the agreed time.   It took more than six years for them to pay their entire obligation.
To recall, complainant Lazaro was forced to bring the matter to the Barangay Lupon. Respondents promised therein to pay their obligation by 30 August 2007. However, she received only the token amounts of 5,000 and 3,000 from them.
We also note that one of the land titles that respondents gave as collateral turned out to have been encumbered in the amount of 400,000, a fact they did not deny.
Moreover, while we are pleased to learn from complainant Lazaro that, as promised, she has been paid the entire obligation of 120,000 on 23 June 2011, we note that respondent’s promise to her was conditioned upon her execution of an Affidavit of Desistance which she accordingly executed.
All these facts constitute conduct that reflects badly on the judiciary, diminishing the honor and integrity of the offices they hold. This is especially true when we consider that, respondents were admittedly given the loans because they were considered prominent persons in the community; and that they were considered as such, presumably because they worked in the judiciary.
In VillaseƱor v. De Leon,[2] we emphasized that “to preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical standards”. In that case, we said that respondent was “expected to be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her official conduct but also in her personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming her court’s albatross of infamy.”
We expect nothing less than the same conduct from respondents in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the administrative Complaint is hereby DISMISSED. Respondents are warned that, whether official or personal, any future conduct that falls short of the high ethical standards expected of them as court employees shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

x x x."

Monday, June 11, 2012

JBC partly to blame for problems in judiciary | ABS-CBN News

JBC partly to blame for problems in judiciary | ABS-CBN News

"x x x.


(First of three parts)

The Judicial and Bar Council is now the focus of national attention as it begins the process of recommending a replacement for ousted Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona. The process, if done right, is expected to help restore public confidence in the High Tribunal.

Yet many in the legal profession, the judiciary and civil society say the JBC needs reforming, because it is partly responsible for the problems in the judiciary. These problems are exemplified by the rise and fall of Corona, a “midnight appointee” who was eventually impeached and convicted for violating the Constitution and betraying public trust.

The 1987 Constitution vests in the JBC the responsibility of nominating qualified candidates to the judiciary, including the Chief Justice, to the appointing power, the President. It was supposed to remove politics from the appointment processes of the past. From 1972 to 1986, judicial appointments rested solely in the hands of then President Ferdinand Marcos. In the pre-martial law era, appointments to the judiciary made by the President passed through the Commission on Appointments, a body composed of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives.

But several lawyers, judges and members of civil society interviewed over a four-month research questioned the independence of the JBC, whose members are often alter egos of the President appointed to supposedly make sure his choices end up in the council’s list.

Nominees, meanwhile, have resorted to lobbying with not only Malacanang but with the JBC to get into the coveted shortlist, relying on backers that include politicians, presidential friends and relatives, and even religious leaders, including bishops.

JBC composition

The JBC is composed of eight members, four of them ex officio, which means they sit by reason of their office. These are the Chief Justice as ex officio chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and one representative each from both houses of Congress, traditionally the chairperson of the Justice and Human Rights Committee in the Senate and the Justice Committee in the House.
The other four are regular members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. They represent the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the law schools, retired justices of the Supreme Court and the private sector.
Over the years, the interpretation of the constitutional provision on Congress’ representation in the JBC has changed. The Constitution created a seven-member council and gave Congress one seat. For more than a decade, representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives alternately represented Congress in the council and shared one vote. But the setup changed in 2001 when they were given one vote each.

The concession given to Congress, critics point out, has made the JBC more politicized as the legislative branch ended up having a bigger say than the executive and judicial branches, each of which continues to have only one vote.
Sources say the two members of Congress and the justice secretary have been known to vote according to the President’s preferences on numerous occasions, with the Corona experience just one of many examples.

In September 2001 when Corona was nominated associate justice, Sen. Francis Pangilinan and then Taguig Rep. Alan Peter 

Cayetano represented Congress in the JBC. During the deliberations in 2001, these two, along with the other JBC members, apparently ignored the warnings of Jose Ma. Basa III who had gone to the JBC and accused Corona of “condoning the unfair and unlawful actions of his wife” in the Basa-Guidote family land dispute. Corona ranked first in the JBC shortlist in 2002, and was appointed April 9, 2002.

In his centennial lecture at the University of the Philippines College of Law last year, retired Chief Justice Reynato Puno singled out the three ex officio members as “carriers of the virus” of “partisan politics,” who, he said, could turn into the “swing votes” in determining who makes it to the shortlist to be submitted to Malacanang.

Regular members

Some lawyers also question whether the regular members exercise independence and whether they truly represent their 
sectors, when it is the President who appoints them.

“There is no genuine representation from the different sectors. It’s the fault also of the stakeholders. They did not organize. They 
failed to insist that the JBC representative come from their ranks,” one source said.

Rolando Inting, executive director for administration of the IBP, cites the IBP as example.

In the initial years, whoever was IBP president was automatically its representative to the JBC. Later, the President appointed the representative endorsed by the IBP board.

In 1997, however, then President Fidel Ramos reversed the process when he appointed his personal choice, Amado Dimayuga, who did not have the prior recommendation of the IBP board. “(Dimayuga) was first appointed by Ramos without the prior conformity (of the IBP board). He got the conformity later,” Inting said

Only recently, under President Benigno Aquino III, was the IBP again able to nominate its own choice: Milagros Fernan-Cayosa.
But Aquino’s appointment of the current representative of academe to the JBC, lawyer Jose Mejia, has rankled people in and out of the court. Reportedly a classmate of Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, who helps vet nominees for the judiciary in behalf of Aquino, Mejia is not a law school professor, but a faculty member of the De La Salle University College of Business and Economics, teaching commercial law to business and economics undergraduates.

The Constitution provides a four-year term for regular members but imposes no limit to their reappointment. Retired SC Associate Justice and now JBC executive committee chairman

Regino Hermosisima, for example, has been appointed four times as the representative of retired justices. He has been on the council for 14 years.

Regular members may also be reappointed in varying capacities. Dimayuga was first appointed as IBP representative and later as a representative of the academe. A dean emeritus of the University of Santo Tomas where he teaches civil law, Dimayuga logged 13 years in the JBC.

Sources said the desire to stay on in the JBC may affect the independence of regular members. “If JBC members want to be reappointed, they have to do the President’s bidding,” said a member of the judiciary.

Interestingly, an occasion when regular members demonstrated their so-called lack of independence also had to do with 
Corona. In 1998, as his term was drawing to a close, Ramos wanted the JBC to fill up the position vacated by SC Associate Justice Ricardo Francisco who had retired that February. Palace insiders said Ramos wanted to appoint Corona, his chief legal adviser, to the high tribunal despite the election ban on appointments.

A few days before the elections in early May, in an exchange of letters with then Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, Ramos insisted that the council convene and submit nominees for the vacancy.

When Narvasa refused to do so, the four regular JBC members, all Ramos appointees, attempted to convene the council and asked then Justice Secretary and ex-officio member Silvestre Bello III to preside over the meeting in the absence of the Chief Justice. But Bello, in a bid to avert a crisis, decided to phone Narvasa who prevailed upon the other JBC members not to nominate anyone.

The high tribunal subsequently issued an en banc resolution supporting Narvasa’s position to observe the restriction on the President’s power to appoint during that election period, even if the Constitution provides that vacancies in the High Court must be filled within 90 days after they occur. The SC further stated that the ban includes appointments to the judiciary and not just executive appointees.

Ironically, the Supreme Court reversed itself in 2010, paving the way for Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to appoint Corona as Chief Justice during the election ban. By then, the High Court was already packed with her appointees, many of whom had breezed through the JBC, and had earned the scathing moniker the “Arroyo Court.”

Criteria for nomination

The JBC is empowered to accept and filter nominees for the posts of Chief Justice and the 14 associate justices of the Supreme Court, 69 justices of the Court of Appeals, 15 justices of the Sandiganbayan, nine justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and more than 2,200 judges in the regional trial courts and lower courts. It also nominates the Ombudsman and his or her deputies.

The Constitution requires appointees to be of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. Candidates to the Supreme Court must also, at the minimum, be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least 40 years of age, and must have been for 15 years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the country.

The whole process starts with the call for applications for vacancies posted in the JBC and the Supreme Court websites.
An applicant’s competence is weighed based on his or her education, experience, performance and other accomplishments like authorship of law books, treatises, articles and other legal writings, whether published or not; and leadership in professional, civic or other organizations. Completion of the prejudicature program of the Philippine Judicial Academy is required, but may be waived in places where there are not enough applicants.

The JBC enlists the National Bureau of Investigation to do background checks on applicants.

But JBC Executive Officer Annaliza Ty-Capacite said the NBI does not always submit its findings on time. There have been instances when the applicant was already appointed but the NBI had yet to get back to the council with the outcome of its investigation.

Written opposition and even testimonies of oppositors at a hearing conducted for the purpose are entertained. Anonymous complaints, however, are not, unless there is probable cause that the accusations against the applicant are true.

In 2009, the council started to implement the Survey System on applicants to the appellate courts to supplement the NBI background check. Survey forms, formulated by the research institution Social Weather Stations, are given to the applicant’s colleagues to fill out. The results of the survey are given persuasive weight.

The council also makes sure that the applicant possesses none of the disqualifications for
the position: no pending criminal or administrative cases in local or foreign courts, and no conviction in any criminal case or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.

Bending the rules

The JBC, however, has in the past bended the rules to accommodate the President. In 2009, it voted to relax the rules on age limits for Supreme Court nominees. That rule stated: “The Council shall not consider for nomination non-career and career applicants who may no longer be able to serve the court for at least five years or for at least one and one-half years, respectively, before reaching the compulsory age of retirement,” which was 70.

The moved benefited Rodolfo Robles, a private practitioner and a friend of then President Arroyo who was being considered a candidate for associate justice. Robles was 65 years and four months old at the time, and would have served less than the required five years.

Robles made it to the shortlist submitted to the President, to the chagrin of civil society groups then monitoring Supreme Court appointments, but he was not appointed.

Meanwhile, ex officio member and Iloilo Rep. Niel Tupas once proposed to relax the JBC rules on qualifications for nomination and allow those who have been fined by up to P20,000 to be considered for appointment or promotion to the judiciary. He was roundly criticized by former Chief Justices Hilario Davide, Artemio Panganiban and Reynato Puno, and by the Supreme Courts Appointments Watch (SCAW), a judicial watchdog.

And the JBC has still to live down its mistake of nominating Chinese-born Gregory Ong to the vacancy in the Supreme Court in 2007. Ong actually got appointed by Arroyo who was, however, forced to withdraw his appointment the day after she announced it when civil society groups Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan raised the citizenship issue before the Supreme Court and eventually won the case. (Ong heads the Sandiganbayan’s Fourth Division which is trying the graft cases against Arroyo, including those stemming from the controversial $329 million national broadband network contract with China’s ZTE Corp.)

Shortlist

Based on the deliberation and evaluation, the JBC comes up with a shorter list of applicants to be interviewed. The dates of the interviews of candidates in the shorter list must be published in two newspapers of general circulation, and in both the Supreme Court and the JBC websites.

The council en banc, or any panel of members authorized by the council, then conducts a personal interview of candidates to observe their personality, demeanor, deportment and physical condition, and to assess applicants’ ability to express themselves, especially in the language of the law in court trials and proceedings and in their decisions or rulings.

A 2002 resolution mandated that interviews be made public, but cameras and tape recorders are not allowed inside the room. Television and radio coverage are also prohibited. Only the members of the JBC can ask questions of the candidate. In 2011, however, Vincent Lazatin of SCAW was allowed to broadcast in real time his observations of the public interviews of candidates for the position of Ombudsman using the social media network Twitter.

After the interviews are completed, the JBC meets in executive session for the final deliberation on the shortlist of candidates. Under its own rules promulgated in 2000, the council must give “due weight and regard” to the recommendees of the Supreme Court when the slot at stake is in the highest court of the land.

For the Supreme Court and lower appellate courts, a list of at least three nominees for every vacancy has to be transmitted to the President. Candidates are ranked according to the number of votes they garner in the shortlist sent to the Office of the President. In 2008, the JBC approved the open voting system, in which the tally sheets of the JBC members’ votes during their closed-door deliberations are to be released to the public. (Names of candidates to lower courts are not ranked.)

But, citing anecdotal evidence where the JBC had failed to muster a majority vote of all members and demonstrated inconsistencies in voting patterns, among others, the SCAW said the council's selection process is hardly a filtering system for the best and the brightest.

According to SCAW, there had been cases where the JBC went through two rounds of voting because the first round failed to come up with at least three names that garnered the required majority vote of council members. A JBC member once admitted that the shortlist submitted to the President was expanded, including candidates not previously qualified, at the request of the appointing power.

In at least two instances in 2009, SCAW said the JBC twice “forced itself to come up with six names even if there were not six qualified candidates among the pool of applicants” for two vacant SC positions, just to satisfy the single search and shortlist process.

(To be continued)

(This series is adapted from VERA Files’ study on the post-Marcos judicial appointments process. VERA Files is put out by veteran journalists taking a deeper look at current issues. Vera is Latin for “true.”)

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Irregularities in high court exposed - News - Manila Standard Today - Daily news, current events, latest news in the Philippines Sites site

Irregularities in high court exposed - News - Manila Standard Today - Daily news, current events, latest news in the Philippines Sites site

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Ganzon had filed a motion to reconsider before the SC’s third division but his plea and his companies’ second motion for reconsideration were denied. Thus, he asked for the tribunal to elevate his case to the full court.
Ganzon, who had been ordered to pay the P60 million in compensation to Australian Andrew James McBurnie, said the foreigner could not have filed personally, as required by the rules, the alleged illegal dismissal case in 2002 because he had left the country in 1999 and had not returned since then.
That was the reason McBurnie failed to attend any of the 14 hearings conducted by labor arbiter Salimathar Nambi on the complaint that was filed in absentia, Ganzon told the high court.
Despite McBurnie’s filing of the case in absentia and his non-attendance in hearings, the labor arbiter ordered an award of P60 million in compensation to the Australian was allegedly illegally dismissed less than two months after his reported employment.
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Looking for a chief justice | Inquirer Opinion

Looking for a chief justice | Inquirer Opinion

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The JBC, however, is also weighed down by being suspected of lacking independence. This suspicion arises from the composition of the body. The JBC is composed of the “Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.” The last four are called regular members. They are appointed by the incumbent president with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the seven members of the JBC, therefore, the president has a hand in the choice of five. It is therefore not difficult to imagine how the president can have a great influence on the formation of the exclusive list prepared by the JBC, from which the president must choose who to appoint to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court itself can also have a strong influence on who will be chosen as justice.  This factor had a great bearing in the saga of former Chief Justice Renato Corona.
It will be recalled that the position of chief justice was vacated within two months from the presidential election, when Chief Justice Reynato Puno reached retirement age. In Article VII of the Constitution, which contains the extent and limits of presidential power, there is a provision which prohibits the president from making permanent appointments to vacancies during those two months except to executive positions when urgently needed.
In 1998 the Supreme Court had ruled that the president may not make appointments to the judiciary during the prohibited period. But in 2010 the Court ruled that the prohibition did not apply to appointments to the Supreme Court because Article VIII required that Supreme Court vacancies had to be filled within 90 days—as if the Court would not be able to survive without a chief justice! And to think that the next president would still have had 45 days to satisfy the 90-day requirement! Looking back, former Chief Justice Corona probably rues that Supreme Court decision.
The Supreme Court at any particular time is sometimes referred to by the name of the current chief justice. In 2010 we had the Puno Court, but it was suspected of being in fact an Arroyo Court, thanks to the appointing system which had allowed Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to fill the Court with her own people. During the period when the controversy about the president’s appointing authority was being debated in media, the gut feel of many was that the majority members of the Court would vote the way they ultimately did. Thus the decision did not come as a surprise. But it developed into a 2012 tragedy from which we should learn valuable lessons.

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